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Abstract 
In discussing the relationship between science and religion during the Victorian period, 
historians have paid much attention to Christian monotheism, deism, spiritualism, 
materialism, agnosticism, and atheism; however, pantheism has received little 
attention. Yet the Victorians published thousands of discussions of pantheism, which 
shows that pantheism was a significant religious position in the Victorian ferment of 
faith. Through exploring these writings, this dissertation shows that there was 
considerable interest in pantheism among Victorian thinkers concerning the viability of 
pantheism and its relationship with science. The first two chapters present a general 
account of pantheism in Victorian Britain, with eight Victorian advocates of pantheism 
being identified and their lives and philosophies being introduced. These people are 
John Hunt, Alfred Barratt, James Martineau, Thomas Elford Poynting, James Hinton, 
James Allanson Picton, Charles Bray, and Constance Plumptre. As science became the 
dominant intellectual authority in Victorian Britain, many Victorian religious thinkers 
made use of it in support of their religious doctrines. The next three chapters show that 
advocates of pantheism likewise drew heavily on contemporary scientific theories in 
advancing and defending their pantheistic views of God, the world, humans, ethics, 
science and religion, and the future of religion. They were strongly attracted to theories 
that implied a unified and creative universe, such as the correlation of forces, the idea 
of living matter, and the evolutionary theory of life. Scientific practitioners John Tyndall 
and Thomas Huxley and evolutionary philosopher Herbert Spencer were their most 
popular scientific sources. In consequence of pantheistic uses of science, these writers 
and their theories were sometimes criticised for being pantheistic, and pantheism was 
often treated as a science-related threat by Christian critics. This dissertation 
demonstrates that pantheism was more widely accepted in Victorian Britain than has 
been previously recognised and that pantheistic thinkers drew extensively on science. 
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Introduction 
[T]here can be no doubt whatever that the form of thought known as 
Pantheism, given new prominence by the speculations of Descartes and 
Spinoza, has received extraordinary impetus in yet more recent times from 
the concurrent influence of the study of nature in two aspects: that of 
aesthetic delight in scenery, of which Wordsworth—though personally much 
less of a Pantheist than Goethe—is the chief exponent; and that of physical 
science, notably in the domains of chemistry and biology. 
—by Richard F. Littledale in the Contemporary Review, 1877.1 
 
We do not believe that Pantheism will ever become the predominant religious 
error of this country; but it may very probably become sufficiently prominent 
[…]. 
—by an anonymous writer in the Dublin Review, 1874.2 
 
 
In the 1870s, pantheism was widely discussed in British publications. Many Victorian 
thinkers, such as the above cited anonymous writer in the Catholic periodical, the 
Dublin Review, reported that pantheism had become significantly popular in Britain. 
Some thinkers, such as the Church of England clergyman Richard Littledale (1833–1890), 
considered that science constituted an important impetus for the spread of pantheism. 
When reading their words, questions may come to mind in regard to why pantheism, a 
seemly foreign religious position for the Victorians, was observed by them as prominent 
in Britain, and why science was raised by people like Littledale to the same importance 
as poetry in the spread of pantheism in Britain. Currently, there are no satisfactory 
                                                     
1 Richard F. Littledale, ‘The Pantheistic Factor in Christian Thought’, Contemporary Review, 30 
(1877), 642–60 (pp. 642–43). 
2 Anon, ‘Catholicity and Pantheism’, Dublin Review, 23 (1874), 251–56 (p. 254). 
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accounts of pantheism or of pantheism and science in Victorian Britain in the 
historiography that can shed light on these questions. So far, the historiography of 
religion and of science and religion in Victorian Britain has focused on Christian 
monotheism,3 deism, spiritualism, materialism, agnosticism, and atheism. Pantheism in 
Victorian Britain has generally been ignored by historians as well as by philosophers. By 
addressing this neglect of Victorian pantheism and of its relation to science, this 
dissertation contributes an important new element to the understanding of religion in 
Victorian Britain and of the complex public debate surrounding science and religion at 
that time. 
The historical study of pantheism in Victorian Britain is viable since there exists a 
considerable amount of writing discussing pantheism written by Victorian thinkers. A 
search for the keyword ‘pantheism’ within the date range from 1 January 1830 to 31 
December 1899 in the ProQuest British Periodicals Database produced 6,504 results, 
among the 4,357,103 total articles on this database within this date range.4 The articles 
mentioning pantheism compose 0.15% of the articles within this range. Within the same 
date range, there are 8,067 results for ‘spiritualism’, 11,966 results for ‘materialism’, 
and 144,966 results for ‘Christianity’; and they compose respectively 0.19%, 0.27% and 
3.33% of the articles included in the database. The percentage of articles mentioning 
‘pantheism’ is therefore very close to that of the articles mentioning ‘spiritualism’ or 
‘materialism’, although neither of these comes close to the percentage of articles 
mentioning ‘Christianity’. These numbers indicate that if we consider spiritualism and 
materialism significant in Victorian Britain, then pantheism can be considered 
significant as well. The results for pantheism, when arranged decade by decade (see the 
chart below), demonstrate a steep increase from the 1830s to the 1850s, with the peak 
maintaining for three decades from the 1850s to the 1880s. 
                                                     
3  In this dissertation, the terms ‘monotheism’ and ‘theism’ are used in a narrow sense, 
indicating the belief that there is only one supernatural and personal God who creates and 
governs the world. ‘Monotheist’ and ‘theist’ are people who hold such a belief. 
4  ProQuest British Periodicals Database <https://search.proquest.com/britishperiodicals/> 
[accessed 20 August 2018]. Notice that these articles can be positive, neutral, negative, or 
indifferent on the subject. 
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This trend is in accordance with the observations the two aforementioned Victorian 
thinkers made in the 1870s about pantheism being more and more prominent in Britain. 
It should be noted that the digitalised periodicals in this database have been selected 
according to some unspecified criterion, thus these numbers are not the total numbers 
of Victorian periodical articles or of articles that mentioned certain key words. For 
example, it is likely that cheap titles are underrepresented, yet many Victorian radical 
thinkers spread their religious ideas through these cheap prints. 5  Thus, the true 
numbers and percentages may be different from those given above. 
    In addition to periodicals, accessible historical materials include books and pamphlets. 
The Hathi Trust Digital Library counts 20,418 results for the keyword ‘pantheism’ 
between 1830 and 1899 in the United Kingdom; while there are 18,963 items for 
‘spiritualism’ and 36,749 items for ‘materialism’ under the same search criteria.6 The 
Hathi Trust Digital Library counts many duplicates; thus, these results do not reflect the 
true numbers of book titles. Nevertheless, these numbers indicate that the number of 
                                                     
5 See the section 1.1.3 on materialistic pantheism for some examples. 
6 Hathi Trust Digital Library <https://babel.hathitrust.org/> [accessed 20 August 2018]. 
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books mentioning pantheism could be even higher than the number of books 
mentioning spiritualism and could be not far behind the number of books mentioning 
materialism. 
These sources have mostly been ignored by historians. The historiography of 
pantheism in Victorian Britain is currently very limited. Thomas McFarland in Coleridge 
and the Pantheist Tradition (1969) introduces the influence of German pantheistic 
philosophy on the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834).7 Ruth Barton reveals 
physicist John Tyndall’s (1820–1893) pantheistic tendencies in ‘John Tyndall, Pantheist: 
A Rereading of the Belfast Address’ (1987). 8  David Knight discussed the chemist 
Humphry Davy’s (1778–1829) pantheistic sentiments in ‘Higher Pantheism’ (2000), and 
he also points out that pantheism was attractive for some Victorians in the mid-
Victorian era in a few pages in his Science and Spirituality (2004).9 Herbert Schlossberg 
gives a two-page account of pantheism in late Victorian England in his Conflict and Crisis 
in the Religious Life of Late Victorian England (2009), pointing out that pantheism was 
seen by several Victorian thinkers as popular in Britain.10 These accounts represent 
almost the entirety of the historiography of pantheism in Victorian Britain. Coleridge 
and Davy were early nineteenth century figures while Tyndall almost never used the 
term ‘pantheism’ in his published writings. It is hard to consider that they were 
responsible for tens of thousands of writings mentioning pantheism in Victorian Britain 
and for the prevalence of pantheism in the 1870s. Therefore, a careful study of these 
widely ignored historical materials is needed, in order to make a more accurate picture 
of pantheism in Victorian Britain. 
A preliminary question of such a study is whether the situation that most historians 
do not mention Victorian pantheism reflects a true lack of pantheists or pantheistic 
                                                     
7 Thomas McFarland, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969). 
8 Ruth Barton, ‘John Tyndall, Pantheist: A Rereading of the Belfast Address’, Osiris, 3 (1987), 
111–34. 
9David Knight, ‘Higher Pantheism’, Zygon, 35 (2000), pp. 603–12; David Knight, Science and 
Spirituality: The Volatile Connection (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 86-88. 
10  Herbert Schlossberg, Conflict and Crisis in the Religious Life of Late Victorian England 
(Somerset: Transaction Publishers, 2009), pp. 269–70. 
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thinkers in Victorian Britain. A quick survey of the historical sources discredits such a 
claim. I identify eight Victorian advocates of pantheism, whose writings offered 
extensive and learned accounts on the subject. They are James Martineau (1805–1900), 
Charles Bray (1811–1884), Thomas Elford Poynting (1813–1878), James Hinton (1822–
1875), John Hunt (1827–1907), James Allanson Picton (1832–1910), Alfred Barratt 
(1844–1881), and Constance Plumptre (1848–1929). Although their pantheistic 
philosophies and theologies were quite different and sometimes controversial, they 
nevertheless shared the view that pantheism was the best religious position since it was 
the religious position that was the most in accordance with modern science. They often 
drew upon scientific theories in their pantheistic writings, and they frequently 
mentioned scientific figures, such as John Tyndall, Thomas Huxley (1825–1895), Ernst 
Haeckel (1834–1919), and Herbert Spencer (1820–1903). All of them, except Martineau, 
are currently very marginal in historiographies of religion and of religion and science. It 
is also notable that pantheism was reported as a popular belief among working-class 
people, and that the leaders of working-class radicals Robert Owen (1771–1858), 
George Holyoake (1817–1906), and Charles Bradlaugh (1833–1891) had pantheistic 
views. 
I have not come across a great number of pantheistic figures in my research. Even so, 
the number is still significant enough to justify this study. We can learn from these 
pantheistic thinkers unique religious, philosophical, and science-related ideas that are 
different from what we have learned from Christian monotheists, deists, spiritualists, 
materialists, agnostics, and atheists. It is worth mentioning that their writings did not 
compose the entirety of the materials about pantheism in Victorian Britain. There were 
also many contributions from critics of pantheism. They often claimed that pantheism 
was fanciful, that pantheism was an oriental error that would not affect the sober 
British mind, and that pantheism was immoral as it dismissed the boundary between 
good and evil. Advocates of pantheism disagreed with these criticisms. From debates 
surrounding pantheism, we can learn more about people’s opinions towards pantheism 
and towards pantheism and science. Overall, in this dissertation, I explore the historical 
materials concerning pantheism in Victorian Britain, and I aim to give a general account 
of pantheism in Victorian Britain, an account of the lives and philosophies of the eight 
14 
 
Victorian advocates of pantheism, and a detailed account about how scientific theories 
were used by these advocates of pantheism in support of their pantheistic ideas. 
 
Historiography 
Since this dissertation concerns pantheism and the relationship between pantheism 
and science in Victorian Britain, it mainly lies within the historiography of the 
relationship between science and religion, the historiography of science, and the 
historiography of religion. In this section, I give a short account of the relevant 
historiographical fields. First, I give a brief overview of the historiography of science and 
religion, showing how the current contextual approach emerged, and why nowadays 
historians consider the conflict thesis problematic. I then suggest using the phrase ‘the 
Victorian ferment of faith’ to replace ‘the Victorian crisis of faith’ as the phrase that 
characterises the state of faith in Victorian Britain. Secondly, I give an account of the 
current state of the historiography of pantheism in Victorian Britain and demonstrate 
that much remains to be done. Lastly, I list some philosophical and theological studies 
of pantheism that may provide some insights for this historical study of pantheism. 
    Historical accounts of the relationship between science and religion trace back to the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Anti-religious scientific practitioners at the time 
propagated the conflict thesis, according to which science and religion were in a 
timeless conflict. In this picture, science represented truth and freedom, while religion 
represented superstition and oppression, and science would inevitably win over religion. 
Historians usually cite John William Draper’s (1811–1882) History of the Conflict 
Between Religion and Science (1874) and Andrew Dickson White’s (1832–1918) A 
History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896) as chief examples 
of the conflict thesis.11 
                                                     
11  For example, John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 2; Gary B. Ferngren ed., The History of 
Science and Religion in the Western Tradition: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 2000), p. 
xiii. 
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    The conflict model of science and religion represents a Whiggish way of writing 
history. The historiography of science was in general Whiggish until the mid-twentieth 
century with the history of science being used to justify modern science. Whiggish 
history described science as a continuous enterprise gradually progressing towards 
truth, and the history of science was an account of theories and events that were 
considered successful, while other theories and events were ignored as valueless. In the 
1950s and 1960s, historians and philosophers of science began to criticise and 
eventually abandoned the cumulative and progressive image of science as well as the 
Whiggish way of writing history of science.12 With the rejection of Whiggish narratives, 
history of science began to be written from the relatively independent point of view of 
the historian rather than from the point of view of the advocate of science. Historians 
began to write more contextual histories of science by examining the social, cultural, 
economic, and political aspects of science rather than concentrating solely on the 
intellectual aspect of science. Instead of organising events in a simple progressive 
picture, historians now explore the complexity of human activities, and expand their 
subjects of enquiry from elite scientists to people outside the scientific community. 
In the 1970s, historians began to write the history of the relationship between science 
and religion in this contextual manner.13 With the social, cultural, and political histories 
of science and religion being written, the conflict model of science and religion became 
implausible. Historians of science and religion deconstructed the conflict thesis. They 
proposed that science and religion as two fields were not in themselves in conflict, and 
that what was in conflict were people of different ideologies, beliefs, and economic, 
political, and social positions. Notably, Frank Miller Turner explores the formation of 
                                                     
12 Thomas Dixon, ‘Introduction’, in Science and Religion: New Historical Perspectives, ed. by 
Thomas Dixon, Geoffrey Cantor, and Stephen Pumfrey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), pp. 1–19 (p. 1). 
13 The time is also given in Dixon, ‘Introduction’, p. 1. 
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the conflict thesis in the nineteenth century.14 He draws out the picture that the conflict 
thesis was made by naturalistic scientific practitioners in support of their aim to 
professionalise and secularise science in order to secure their intellectual and 
educational authority, their incomes, and their social stances. John Hedley Brooke has 
been known as the one who gave the final blow to the conflict thesis with his book 
Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives (1991).15 The contextual approach 
has been affirmed notably through Brooke and Geoffrey Cantor’s lectures 
Reconstructing Nature: The Engagement of Science and Religion (1998), and through 
Science and Religion: New Historical Perspectives (2010), a collection of the proceedings 
of the 2007 science and religion conference at the University of Lancaster, which 
marked Brooke’s retirement.16  More recently, James Ungureanu has examined the 
origin of the conflict thesis in his doctoral dissertation ‘The Origins of the “Conflict 
Thesis”: Draper, White, and the Protestant Tradition’ (2017).17 Historians of science and 
religion no longer concern themselves with the conflict thesis, and works such as The 
Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion (2010) edited by Peter Harrison aim to 
convey this to the public.18 However, the conflict thesis is still widely supported among 
the general public. 
This dissertation is written under this contextual approach. It also specially focuses 
on religious people’s uses of scientific sources in support of their religious ideas.19 From 
                                                     
14 Such as Frank M. Turner, ‘The Victorian Conflict between Science and Religion: A Professional 
Dimension’, Isis, 69 (1978), 356–76; and Frank M. Turner, Contesting Cultural Authority: Essay 
in Victorian Intellectual Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
15 Brooke, Science and Religion. 
16 John Hedley Brooke and Geoffrey Cantor, Reconstructing Nature: The Engagement of Science 
and Religion (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1998); Dixon et al. ed., Science and Religion. 
17 James C. Ungureanu, ‘The Origins of the “Conflict Thesis”: Draper, White, and the Protestant 
Tradition’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, The University of Queensland, 2017). 
18  Peter Harrison ed., The Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
19 Histories of science and religion written with this focus include: David C. Lindberg and Ronald 
L. Numbers ed., God and Nature—Historical Essays on the Encounter between Christianity and 
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this perspective, the complexity and richness of the interactions between science and 
religion in the public arena, beyond the elite scientific circle, can be uncovered, and thus 
we can broaden our historical knowledge of the relationship between science and 
religion. 
The time and location of study of this dissertation is Victorian Britain. In studies of 
religion in Victorian Britain, the phrase ‘Victorian crisis of faith’ is often seen. It is a 
phrase that was used by the Victorians themselves, and for a long time, historians used 
it to characterise the status of faith in general in Victorian Britain. Many historical works 
are centred around this phrase.20 Historians draw the picture that orthodox Christians 
were troubled by naturalistic and rationalistic interpretations of the Bible and nature 
mainly because these interpretations changed God’s and man’s places in nature. 
Christian churches were constantly under attack from working-class radicals since many 
radicals saw churches as a cause of their precarious living conditions. The coverage of 
Christian churches was decreasing as the population grew faster than the expansion of 
churches, and as the number of disbelievers in Christianity greatly increased throughout 
the Victorian era. Many Christians also reported that they suffered crises of faith and 
life since they felt that they could not hold their Christian beliefs and had to become 
                                                     
Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Jonathan Topham, ‘Beyond the 
“Common Context”—The Production and Reading of the Bridgewater Treatises’, Isis, 89 (1998), 
233–62; and Aileen Fyfe, Science and Salvation—Evangelical Popular Science Publishing in 
Victorian Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
20 For example: Anthony Symondson ed., The Victorian Crisis of Faith (London: S.P.C.K., 1970). 
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disbelievers.21 In this picture, there is a strong sense of the crisis of losing faith, but since 
the 1980s historians have started to see this picture as problematic.22 
It is certain that many Victorian individuals experienced changes in their faith, but 
whether changes of faith would necessarily lead to crises in their minds or lives is 
questioned by historians. For example, Bernard Lightman demonstrates, in his essay 
‘Robert Elsmere and the Agnostic Crises of Faith’ (1990), that changes of faith did not 
necessarily provoke crises for individuals. He points out that William Clifford (1845–
1879) and Leslie Stephen (1832–1904) suffered pain and anguish from their changes of 
faith, while Herbert Spencer, Thomas Huxley, and John Tyndall did not experience such 
pain when they changed their faith.23 It is also certain that Christian churches were 
under assaults from working-class and middle-class radicals, but whether these assaults 
put Christianity in crisis has also been questioned. For example, In the book Crisis of 
Doubt (2006), Timothy Larsen argues that many Victorian sceptics, freethinkers, and 
secularists were reconverted to Christianity. He points out that the percentage of 
secularist leaders who became Christians was higher than that of Christian ministers 
who became sceptics.24 His work demonstrates that the change of faith was not one-
directional and that Christian churches did not always lose but often gained followers 
from opposite camps. Callum G. Brown also argues against a picture of gradual 
secularisation according to which Christianity had gradually lost its influence in British 
                                                     
21  Many writings on radicals show details of Victorian religion under the threat of secular 
thoughts and movements, such as: Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind 
in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Edward Royle, 
Victorian Infidels: The Origin of the British Secularist Movement, 1791–1866 (Manchester: 
University of Manchester Press, 1974); and Edward Royle, Radicals, Secularists, and Republicans: 
Popular Freethought in Britain, 1866–1915 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980). 
22 This change in the historiography has been pointed out and furthered in the collection of 
essays: Richard J. Helmstadter and Bernard Lightman ed., Victorian Faith in Crisis (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990). 
23 Bernard Lightman, ‘Robert Elsmere and the Agnostic Crises of Faith’, in Helmstadter and 
Lightman ed., Victorian Faith in Crisis, pp. 283–314 (p. 295). 
24 Timothy Larsen, Crisis of Doubt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. vii. 
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society since the beginning of the nineteenth century. He argues that Christianity 
stopped being the British ‘nation’s core religious and moral identity’ only from the 
1960s, and before this decade, Britain was strongly Christian.25 
There are some other concerns among historians. The objectivity of the Victorians’ 
own accounts of crises of faith can be problematic. Jeffrey von Arx points out, in his ‘The 
Victorian Crisis of Faith as Crisis of Vocation’ (1990), that some Victorian writings 
spreading the concept of the crisis of faith were written by heterodox religious people 
with the purpose of supporting their religious positions.26 As these Victorian writings 
were coloured by stances, they should not be treated as objective accounts of the state 
of faith in Victorian Britain. The term ‘faith’ can also be seen as an umbrella term that 
does not simply mean Christianity. If we use wider definitions of it, faith can hardly be 
seen as in crisis. For example, James R. Moore argues, in his essay ‘Theodicy and Society: 
The Crisis of the Intelligentsia’, that faith is a theodicy, which aims to resolve apparent 
evil with divine existence.27 He considers that naturalism was a new theodicy for the 
Victorians rather than an unbelief. By taking this view, Moore argues that faith in 
general was changing but was never in crisis in Victorian Britain. 
It is agreed among historians that the faiths of many Victorians were unstable and 
changing. The vast numbers of religious organisations and publications at that time 
reflect people’s efforts to find suitable beliefs. Their searches were not always painful 
but were often pleasurable, since these searches presented thrilling challenges and 
sometimes allowed those advocating their beliefs to make fortunes. As the phrase ‘the 
Victorian crisis of faith’ is considered problematic by historians, ‘the Victorian ferment 
of faith’ is used instead in this dissertation as a characterisation of religion in Victorian 
Britain. Faith in Victorian Britain can be seen as being in a state of ferment with many 
                                                     
25 Callum G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation 1800–2000, 
Second Edition (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 1. 
26 Jeffrey von Arx, ‘The Victorian Crisis of Faith as a Crisis of Vocation’, in Helmstadter and 
Lightman ed., Victorian Faith in Crisis, pp. 262–82. 
27 James R. Moore, ‘Theodicy and Society: The Crisis of the Intelligentsia’, Ibid., pp. 71–125. 
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religious people agitated or excited by religious challenges and ‘tending to bring about 
a purer, more wholesome, or more stable condition’ of faith.28 
The historical study of pantheism in the Victorian ferment of faith is relatively lacking, 
compared with the studies of Christian denominations, deism, spiritualism, materialism, 
atheism, and agnosticism. The more specific study of the pantheistic uses of science in 
Victorian Britain is rarer still. The following works contain discussions of pantheism in 
early Victorian Britain. Thomas McFarland’s Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition (1969) 
is a very useful guide to the history of pantheism in early nineteenth century Britain and 
before. McFarland draws out the links between Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), German 
Idealists, and Coleridge, and gives his views about the origins of the terms ‘pantheism’. 
Richard Berkeley’s more recent book, Coleridge and the Crisis of Reason (2007), 
examines Coleridge’s response to the pantheistic controversy in Germany, and provides 
an insight about the influence of German pantheism on Coleridge.29 Julia A. Lamm’s 
article ‘Romanticism and Pantheism’ in The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century 
Theology (2007) discusses the pantheistic element in German idealists’ philosophies 
from the 1780s to the early nineteenth century.30 She briefly discusses the spread of 
this pantheistic element towards Britain and America, influencing the British poets 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth (1770–1850) and American poets and 
essayists Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) and Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862), in 
two short paragraphs. In literary studies, we can also find works on Wordsworth’s and 
Coleridge’s pantheistic poems and on the Scottish essayist Thomas Carlyle’s (1795–
1881) pantheistic writings, such as M. H. Abrams’s Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition 
and Revolution in Romantic Literature (1973) and Martin Priestman’s Romantic Atheism: 
                                                     
28 One of the definitions of the word ‘fermentation’ in OED <https://www.oed.com/> [accessed 
20 August 2018]. 
29 Richard Berkeley, Coleridge and the Crisis of Reason (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
30 Julia A. Lamm, ‘Romanticism and Pantheism’, in The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-
Century Theology, ed. by David Fergusson (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 165–86. 
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Poetry and Freethought, 1780–1830 (1999). 31  However, they use the category of 
Romanticism rather than pantheism, and they seldom discuss pantheism theologically 
and philosophically. In the studies of Romanticism and science that involve discussions 
of pantheistic thinkers, such as Trevor H. Levere’s Poetry Realised in Nature: Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge and Early Nineteenth-Century Science (1981) and Alan Richardson’s 
British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind (2001), pantheism is also seldom 
discussed.32 
Discussions of pantheism in mid- and late-Victorian Britain are even rarer. Ruth 
Barton’s article ‘John Tyndall, Pantheist: A Rereading of the Belfast Address’ (1987) 
discusses the evidence of Tyndall’s pantheistic tendencies in the 1874 Belfast Address 
and in his personal writings. She argues that Tyndall might have been a pantheist and 
that his annual mountaineering trips to the Alps might have been a pantheistic practice. 
Stephen Kim has argued against Barton in his John Tyndall's Transcendental Materialism 
and the Conflict between Religion and Science in Victorian England (1996). Kim claims 
that Tyndall was a transcendentalist rather than a pantheist. 33  It seems that Kim 
considers that pantheists should deny transcendence, but Tyndall believed in 
transcendence, thus he concludes that Tyndall was not a pantheist. The disagreement 
between Barton and Kim mainly concerns the definition of pantheism. It is worth noting 
that those who were called pantheists in Victorian Britain did not always deny 
transcendence, and I will discuss the definition of pantheism in the next section. Lamm 
has also pointed out that almost no thinkers who have been called pantheists totally 
                                                     
31  M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature 
(New York: Norton, 1973); Martin Priestman, Romantic Atheism: Poetry and Freethought, 
1780–1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Some of Carlyle’s writings were 
considered by some of his contemporaries to be pantheistic. This will be further demonstrated 
and discussed in the section 1.1.2 on poetical pantheism. 
32 Trevor H. Levere, Poetry Realised in Nature: Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Early Nineteenth-
Century Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Alan Richardson, British 
Romanticism and the Science of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
33 Stephen Kim, John Tyndall’s Transcendental Materialism and the Conflict between Religion 
and Science in Victorian England (Lewiston: Mellen University Press, 1996), pp. 11 and 45–46. 
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excluded transcendence with the probable exception of Spinoza.34 If we do not narrow 
down the definition of pantheism to its strictest form (in which there is no sense of 
transcendence), then, as Barton has analysed, Tyndall was a possible pantheist. 
Nevertheless, Tyndall is not selected as an advocate of pantheism for analysis here since, 
in his published writings, he almost never used pantheistic terminologies and he rarely 
discussed the relationship between God and nature. There are currently not enough 
materials regarding Tyndall for this dissertation’s purpose, though the John Tyndall 
Correspondence Project currently in progress may reveal more about his views on 
pantheism.35 
    David Knight, in ‘Higher Pantheism’ and Science and Spirituality, claims that 
pantheism was ‘a feather-bed’ for the chemist Humphry Davy and others who fell from 
Christianity in the nineteenth century,36 and that Davy’s pantheistic sentiments might 
have influenced his pupil Michael Faraday (1791–1867) and, through Faraday, John 
Tyndall. He also points out that pantheism was attractive for the Victorians because it 
was a pro-science and non-denominational religious position with ‘loose and 
accommodating’ doctrines, and that many Victorians practiced pantheism because they 
disliked denominational religions while seeing science as a new vehicle of salvation. 
Herbert Schlossberg in his Conflict and Crisis in the Religious Life of Late Victorian 
England (2009) classifies pantheism as one of the alternatives to Christianity. 37  He 
points out that Victorian thinkers such as James Martineau and Frederic Harrison 
(1831–1923) observed that pantheism had been spreading widely in England since the 
mid-nineteenth century, and he suggests that the popularity of pantheism might have 
been caused by the influence of idealistic philosophy and the spread of ideas from Asia. 
Schlossberg also points out that to assume that the term ‘pantheism’ in Victorian Britain 
had only one meaning can be misleading, as Harrison observed that Victorians used the 
term ‘pantheism’ loosely with many meanings. 
                                                     
34 Lamm, ‘Romanticism’, p. 166. 
35  See the website of the project <https://tyndallproject.science.yorku.ca/> [accessed 20 
August 2018]. 
36 Knight, Science and Spirituality, p. 86. 
37 Schlossberg, Conflict and Crisis, pp. 269–70. 
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From these writings, historians only have a vague picture, in which pantheism was 
present in the Victorian ferment of faith, gaining popularity among anti-Christian and 
pro-science people from the mid-nineteenth century, and worrying orthodox Christians. 
Detail is lacking. There are almost no accounts on pantheistic figures, except Tyndall 
whose status as a pantheist was dubious. Moreover, if pantheism was the religious 
position for many pro-science Victorians, then why have historians of science and 
religion not yet studied pantheism as an important case of the interaction between 
science and religion? These problems will be addressed in this dissertation. 
Pantheism is a very philosophical religious position, so although this is a historical 
study, I will refer to the works of philosophers and theologians when analysing 
pantheistic theories and practices. Michael P. Levine’s Pantheism: A Non-Theistic 
Concept of Deity (2005) is a modern philosophical account of pantheism.38 He presents 
his work as the first complete attempt to offer a philosophical defence of pantheism 
after Spinoza’s Ethics (1675). Spinoza was a key figure in modern and Western 
pantheism. Michael Della Rocca’s Spinoza (2008) and Sherry Deveaux’s The Role of God 
in Spinoza’s Metaphysics (2007) can be of great help in understanding Spinoza’s 
pantheism and its influence on German idealists.39 The leader of the contemporary 
pantheist organisation, the World Pantheist Movement, Paul Harrison’s book Elements 
of Pantheism: A Spirituality of Nature and the Universe is also useful in understanding 
how pantheism can be practiced.40 
Scholarship on panentheism deserves a mention. The term ‘panentheism’ was 
imported from the German term ‘Panentheismus’, which was coined by the philosopher 
Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832) in the early nineteenth century.41 In the 
collection of papers on panentheism, entitled In Whom We Live and Move and Have 
Our Being (2004), the term ‘panentheism’ is defined as the belief that the universe 
                                                     
38 Michael P. Levine, Pantheism: A Non-Theistic Concept of Deity (London: Routledge, 2005). 
39 Michael Della Rocca, Spinoza (London: Routledge, 2008); Sherry Deveaux, The Role of God in 
Spinoza’s Metaphysics (London: Continuum, 2007). 
40 Paul Harrison, Elements of Pantheism (USA: CreateSpace, 2013). 
41 Anon, ‘Panentheism’, OED <https://www.oed.com/> [accessed 20 August 2018]. 
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exists in God but that God’s being is not exhausted by the universe,42 while pantheism 
is treated as the belief that God and the universe are strictly identified. The term 
‘panentheism’ was almost never used by the Victorians, and it only become popular in 
the 1890s.43 There has been a panentheistic movement in Christian theology in the 
twentieth and the twentieth-first centuries that makes the term popular among 
scholars.44 It would be anachronistic to use this term in this dissertation, which focuses 
primarily on the 1850s to the 1870s, even though several advocates of pantheism in 
Victorian Britain could be classified as panentheists. The difference between pantheism 
and panentheism is principally a matter of definition, and this will be discussed in the 
next section.45 John W. Cooper’s book Panentheism—The Other God of the Philosophers 
from Plato to the Present (2013), contains a brief historical account of panthentheism.46 
Cooper listed eight nineteenth-century English panentheists, though none of them are 
included in this dissertation as Victorian advocates of pantheism. Many of them 
belonged more to the theist camp than to the pantheist camp. Some of them, notably 
Samuel Alexander (1859–1938) and William Inge (1860–1954), held clear pantheistic 
ideas and associated these ideas with science. They can be further studied by historians 
to enrich our knowledge of pantheism and of the relationship between pantheism and 
science in Victorian Britain. 
 
                                                     
42 Arthur Peacocke, ‘Introduction’, in In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being, ed. by 
Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), pp. xviii–xxii (p. 
xviii). 
43 When search for the keyword ‘panentheism’ in Copac <https://copac.jisc.ac.uk/> [accessed 
28 August 2018], the oldest result is an 1892 article. 
44 Michael W. Brierley, ‘Naming a Quiet Revolution: The Panentheistic Turn in Modern Theology’, 
in Clayton and Peacocke ed., In Whom We Live, pp. 1–18 (pp. 1–2). 
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Coleridge, p. 269. 
46 John W. Cooper, Panentheism—The Other God of the Philosophers (Grand Rapids: Baker 
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Pantheism as a Historian’s Category 
The question of what counts as pantheism in Victorian Britain is not easy to answer. 
There was no organised religion or movement in Victorian Britain that labelled itself 
pantheism. I have located no evidence for religious societies, sects, or groups of 
pantheism in Victorian Britain. The Anglican clergyman Charles Maurice Davies (1828–
1910) famously hunted sects between 1874 and 1875 in London. He visited religious 
gatherings each week and wrote a report after every visit. His reports were published 
in four works—Unorthodox London (1874), Heterodox London (1874), Orthodox London 
(1874–5), and Mystic London (1875).47 His observations covered a very wide range of 
religious practices in London, but he did not report any pantheistic gatherings, and this 
constitutes strong evidence that there was no pantheistic organisation, at least in 
London. In addition, there was no pantheistic periodical; thus, even though pantheism 
was gaining popularity during the second half of the nineteenth century, it was not an 
organised movement like the Oxford Movement, Owenism, or Secularism. As 
pantheism was not an organised religion or movement, there existed no universal creed 
or manifesto of pantheism at the time, and people rarely called their position 
pantheism or themselves pantheists. This makes it difficult to identify pantheistic ideas 
and pantheistic thinkers. 
The situation that thinkers in the past and present have many different definitions of 
pantheism, creates additional difficulties in the identification of pantheism. Among 
current historians, Kim and Lamm seem to define pantheism as the pantheism of 
Spinoza, according to which God must be absolutely identified with nature leaving no 
room for transcendence. According to this definition, Kim claims that Tyndall was not a 
pantheist, and Lamm claims that German idealists were not pantheists.48 Knight defines 
                                                     
47 Charles Maurice Davies, Unorthodox London, New Edition (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1876); 
Charles Maurice Davies, Heterodox London (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1874); Charles Maurice 
Davies, Orthodox London, Second Series (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1875); Charles Maurice 
Davies, Mystic London (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1875). 
48 Lamm’s claim can be found in Lamm, ‘Romanticism’, pp. 181–82. 
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pantheism loosely, allowing a degree of transcendence; in other words, he includes 
what we now call ‘panentheism’ in ‘pantheism’. By this definition, Knight treats Davy as 
a pantheist. Schlossberg quotes Frederic Harrison’s words and claims that ‘pantheism’ 
in the 1880s could mean ‘nearly anything’.49 Frederic Harrison’s original words were: 
‘We may include under the somewhat technical term Pantheism all those types of 
thoughts, and conscious and unconscious tendencies of thought, which have this 
common sign—that they find the ultimate and dominant idea in some divine Mystery 
of the Universe, in the sense of Beauty and Power of Nature, in the immensity of the 
sum of Life and Matter’.50 Here we see three definitions of pantheism from the strictest 
to the loosest. 
Victorian thinkers’ definitions of pantheism were as inconsistent as our historians’ 
ones, and their definitions were usually influenced by their religious stances. It was 
common among those who rejected accusations of pantheism made against them, to 
use very narrow definitions of pantheism so that they could exclude their ideas from 
pantheism. For example, Herbert Spencer was accused of pantheism, since in the first 
chapter of his First Principles (1860) he posited an unknowable reality of which all things 
were manifestations, and he also claimed that this unknown reality was what God 
represented in true religions. His claim was identical to the pantheist creed that God is 
all and all is God; however he denied that his idea was pantheistic. According to his 
definition, the ‘hypothesis of self-creation’ was the core feature of pantheism. He 
claimed that self-creation was impossible because it implied the existence of potential 
universes before the real universe, and he considered that the idea that something 
potential (i.e., not existent) existed was paradoxical.51 He thus repudiated pantheism. 
It was also common among Victorian essayists to use rather broad definitions of 
pantheism. For example, a writer in the High Church periodical, the British Critic, and 
                                                     
49 Schlossberg, Conflict and Crisis, p. 270. 
50 Frederic Harrison, ‘Pantheism, and Cosmic Emotion’, The Nineteenth Century, 10 (1881), 284–
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51 Herbert Spencer, First Principles of a New System of Philosophy, Second Edition (New York: D. 
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Quarterly Theological Review, considered that there were many ‘steps’ and ‘road[s]’ of 
pantheism.52 People were pantheistic according to him if they ‘reduce[d] God’s noble 
acts into forthgoings of some one principle, such as that of mercy or benevolence’, if 
they were ‘talking and thinking of the superiority of mind over matter well nigh akin to 
idolizing an abstract humanity’, if they were ‘speaking of the things of nature as if they 
were parts of God’, and if they ‘view[ed] human souls and all other motive powers in 
the universe as parts of the Divine Being, to whom the material world is as a body’.53 
Though he used a broad definition of pantheism, he excluded orthodox Christianity 
from pantheism. 
Some advocates of pantheism gave even broader definitions of pantheism to the 
extent that almost all religions were included. For example, Constance Plumptre in her 
General Sketch of the History of Pantheism (1878–9) included Bishop George Berkeley 
(1685–1753) and agnostics (such as Tyndall and Spencer) among the pantheists. A 
reviewer in the Evangelical non-conformist journal, the British Quarterly Review, 
commented that Plumptre ‘often extends the term very much further, so as apparently 
to include all in who there has been a spirit of religiosity without any definite dogmatic 
theory. Thus widened out, Pantheism becomes simply the natural religious instinct’.54 
Due to the lack of consensus, I need to clarify what the term ‘pantheism’ denotes in 
this dissertation in order to define a clear object of study. In this dissertation, 
‘pantheism’ is used to denote a spectrum of views concerning the relationship between 
God and the world and involving a particular emphasis on the immanence of God to the 
extent that God and the world are inseparable. It is a religious position that sees all in 
God and God in all while the essence of each may be or may not be exhausted by the 
other. In short, my treatment of pantheism is similar to Knight’s which includes what 
we now call ‘panentheism’ in ‘pantheism’. According to this definition, the category of 
                                                     
52 Anon, ‘Observations on the Attempted Application of Pantheistic Principles to the Theory and 
Historic Criticism of the Gospels’, British Critic, and Quarterly Theological Review, 31 (1842), 
303–24 (p. 306). 
53 Ibid., p. 306. 
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pantheism is wide enough to include more than the extreme form of pantheism but is 
not so wide as to include all religions. 
To further explain, first, in this dissertation, pantheism is treated as a philosophical 
and theological position concerning the relationship between God and the world. 
Pantheism in Victorian Britain had its historical particularities. Victorian writings about 
pantheism were full of Christian terminologies like ‘God’ and ‘divine’. The concept of 
God and the relationship between God and the world were central to both criticisms 
and defences of pantheism at the time. Pantheisms outside of Britain and at different 
times were not necessarily concerned with God or God’s relationship with the world. 
For example, the manifesto of the World Pantheist Movement does not mention the 
terms ‘God’ or ‘divine’, and states the intention of keeping the pantheistic belief 
naturalistic. 55  There are no Christian supernatural terms in the classical writing of 
Taoism, Tao Te Ching, and the central concept of Tao is usually understood as the 
fundamental law of the world.56 This historical particularity of pantheism in Victorian 
Britain was due to Victorian Britain being a Christian country and due to several 
pantheistic traditions in Europe having been cultivated within Christian cultures. Peter 
Harrison has pointed out that ‘substantive questions to do with relations between the 
monotheistic Western religions and science cluster around a common set of issues, 
typically to do with God’s power, his activity or his relation to the world’; although he 
also claims that ‘non-theistic or polytheistic religious traditions raise a rather different 
set of questions’, criticisms and supports of pantheism in Victorian Britain were actually 
centred around the set of issues he mentioned.57 
Secondly, pantheism is treated as a spectrum of views rather than as a singular point 
at the extreme of the spectrum. This was how many Victorians treated pantheism. 
Many Victorian thinkers did not see pantheism as an absolute identification of God and 
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the universe nor as the rejection of the transcendence of God.58 The term ‘panentheism’ 
was extremely rare in Victorian writings, and they usually used ‘pantheism’ or ‘higher 
pantheism’ to address the position of ‘panentheism’. While the absolute identification 
of God and the world was a sign of pantheism, the immanence of God in the world was 
also a sign of pantheism. Many were labelled pantheists in Victorian Britain not because 
they believed in the absolute identification of God and the world denying God His 
transcendency, but because their views of the immanence of God was endorsed to 
higher degrees that traditional Christians normally would not tolerate. 
There is a stereotype according to which Christian monotheism differs from 
pantheism in the sense that God is transcendental in Christian monotheism while God 
is immanent in pantheism. As I have discussed, many pantheists believed that God was 
both transcendent and immanent. Moreover, God in most traditional Christian beliefs 
can be interpreted as being both transcendent and immanent, and this is reflected in 
the doctrine of the Trinity in which the Father is the transcendental aspect of God while 
the Son and the Spirit are the immanent aspects of God. As James R. Moore points out, 
Anglican clergymen Aubrey Lackington Moore (1843–1890) and Charles Kingsley (1819–
                                                     
58 For example, see M. G. E., ‘Pantheism, its Historical Phases’, Journal of Sacred Literature and 
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1875) used this interpretation of the Trinity to reconcile Darwinian science and 
Christianity and to argue against deism and pantheism. 59  People normally do not 
consider holding the doctrine of the Trinity to be pantheistic, even though the 
immanence of God is implied in the doctrine. 
What is the difference between Christian monotheism and pantheism then? I 
propose that the difference between them is to be found in the degree of immanence 
of God rather than in the question of whether God is transcendent or immanent. In 
traditional Christian beliefs, there is a strong sense that God and the world are different 
things, that God is the creator and designer of the world, and that God is immanent in 
the world in the sense that He energises and governs the world. God can leave the world 
if He is willing to, and man and God are different individuals. In pantheism, God and the 
world are inseparable, the world is God himself, either partially or fully, with man being 
one with God. This difference in immanence was also mentioned by Victorian thinkers. 
For example, John Hunt, a clergyman of the Church of England, wrote in his An Essay on 
Pantheism (1866) that ‘[t]he difference between ordinary Theism and what is called 
Pantheism, is perhaps most distinctly seen in the question of God’s immanency in the 
universe. Does God abide in His creation, or is He seated on a silent throne in some far 
distant region beyond the boundary wall of the universe?’.60 In practice, for traditional 
Christians, the world is the land of trial and they need to be forgiven by God in order to 
live an eternal happy life in heaven; for pantheists, the world is already Eden and they 
are already one with God. Pantheists can satisfy their religious needs by conceiving the 
world as heaven and themselves as existing in God. This can be blasphemous for 
Christians. 
The boundary of pantheism in Victorian Britain can be made clearer by contrasting 
pantheism with other non-Christian positions. Compared to atheists, pantheists 
affirmed the existence of God, which atheists denied. Compared to materialists, 
pantheists used supernatural terminology, which materialists usually did not use. 
Compared to spiritualists, pantheists usually denied the existence of the after-life, 
                                                     
59 James R. Moore, The Post-Darwinian Controversies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), p. 339. 
60 John Hunt, An Essay on Pantheism (London: Longmans, 1866), p. 355. 
31 
 
which spiritualists affirmed. Compared to agnostics, pantheists had claims over the 
ultimate nature of the world and God, while agnostics tried to remain silent. There is a 
risk here of over-simplification, and it must be noted that the boundaries between 
pantheism and other religious positions were never settled. 
According to this definition, Victorian thinkers who clearly expressed their support 
for pantheism are the object of study of this dissertation. Charles Bray, John Hunt, 
James Allanson Picton, James Hinton, and Constance Plumptre, are of this type. I have 
also included Victorian thinkers who did not directly articulate their support for 
pantheism but supported the identification of God and the world or supported higher 
degrees of the immanence of God in the world, and who were accused of pantheism by 
their reviewers. Alfred Barratt, James Martineau, and Thomas Elford Poynting are of 
this type. I have not included Victorian thinkers who were accused of pantheism but 
who almost never discussed the identification of God and the world or the immanence 
of God, such as Tyndall and Spencer. This dissertation also focuses on philosophical, 
theological, and scientific figures who expressed ideas explicitly, while literary figures, 
such as Wordsworth, Alfred Tennyson (1809–1892), and Carlyle, whose poetical 
expressions were often vague, are generally not studied in this dissertation. 
It is important to note that Victorian pantheistic thinkers are not directly called 
‘pantheists’ in this dissertation, but are rather called ‘advocates of pantheism’, 
‘supporters of pantheism’, or ‘pantheistic thinkers’. This is because although most of 
them advocated pantheistic ideas, they did not call themselves pantheists, and some of 
them even explicitly or implicitly expressed that they did not wish to be assigned this 
label. The term ‘pantheist’ was indefinite and perceived by many people as notorious 
in Victorian Britain. It was normally not beneficial for a Victorian to call himself or herself 
a pantheist. Hunt, Picton, Martineau, and Poynting preferred to be identified as 
Christians. Hunt was a clergyman of the Church of England, Picton was a minister of 
Congregationalism, and Martineau and Poynting were ministers of Unitarian churches. 
They advocated their pantheistic systems as Christian theologies rather than as being 
in opposition with Christianity. Plumptre and Bray did not belong to any churches and 
they sometimes stood against Christianity. Even so, they usually identified as 
freethinkers rather than as pantheists. Hinton was a preacher of his own pantheistic 
religion, though he also did not call himself a pantheist. Thus, considering these thinkers’ 
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preference, and in order to avoid confusions when discussing their refutations of the 
label ‘pantheist’, they are not called pantheists in this dissertation. Advocates, 
supporters, or thinkers of pantheism are more accurate titles. 
 
Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is mainly based on published materials accessed through the ProQuest 
British Periodicals Database, the Hathi Trust Digital Library, the Internet Archive, and 
the libraries of the University of Leeds. As I am exploring an uncharted territory in the 
historiography, and due to the constraint of time of a doctoral project, I have decided 
to focus on publications and to leave out the great number of unarchived and unsorted 
private sources. By examining published materials, I intend to identify major advocates 
of Victorian pantheism, and to present their views of pantheism, their views of science 
and religion, their motivations, and what their reviewers or critics said. 
This dissertation is composed of five chapters. The first chapter gives an overview of 
two main aspects of pantheism in Victorian Britain—the traditions of pantheism that 
existed from the beginning of the Victorian era and Victorians’ views of pantheism 
expressed in publications. I argue in the first section of the chapter that there were 
three pantheistic traditions that were particularly influential in Britain from the 
beginning of the Victorian era. They were Spinozian and German idealistic pantheism, 
poetical pantheism, and materialistic pantheism. I argue and demonstrate in the second 
section of the chapter that there was a significant change in the general attitude 
towards pantheism in British publications in the 1860s from overwhelmingly negative 
to neutral or slightly positive. 
The second chapter is a biographical chapter. I introduce the lives and pantheistic 
ideas of the eight Victorian advocates of pantheism. I demonstrate that advocates of 
pantheism came from a very wide range of religious backgrounds and that they held 
different, and sometimes controversial, pantheistic ideas. I also demonstrate that 
pantheism was not necessarily against Christianity, as some advocates of pantheism 
claimed that pantheism was a Christian theology. 
The next three chapters give accounts of the uses of science in support of pantheism 
by Victorian advocates of pantheism. These chapters are structured according to the 
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three major themes of Victorian science—force, matter, and evolution. Each theme 
composes a chapter. The layouts of these three chapters are generally the same. In the 
first sections, I introduce relevant scientific developments that were used by pantheistic 
thinkers, while in the subsequent sections, I give detailed accounts of how these 
theories were used by pantheistic thinkers. I show that these pantheistic thinkers drew 
heavily on contemporary scientific theories in support of their pantheistic ideas, and 
that several relevant scientific theories and scientific practitioners were accused of 
pantheism. 
Throughout the dissertation, I demonstrate that pantheism in Victorian Britain was a 
significant religious position, which attracted attention from many thinkers. There were 
supporters as well as critics of pantheism from almost all kinds of religious backgrounds. 
I also demonstrate that pantheism in Victorian Britain often appeared in discussions of 
science, and that it was often treated as a science-related religion, not only by 
supporters but also by critics. This dissertation contributes an extended historical 
account of pantheism and of pantheism and science in Victorian Britain to scholarship 
on Victorian religion and on Victorian science and religion. 
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Pantheism in Victorian Britain 
In the early Victorian era, British thinkers were aware of many pantheistic traditions 
around the world. Among them, three traditions attracted the most attention since they 
were seen as influential on British people’s minds. These three traditions were 
Spinozian and German idealistic pantheism, poetical pantheism, and materialistic 
pantheism. Other traditions, mainly ancient Greek pantheism, Neo-Platonism, and 
Indian pantheism, were sometimes mentioned but were not normally associated with 
British thought, as these traditions seemed alien to the Victorians. In the early Victorian 
era, comprehensive works on pantheism were notably lacking in Britain. The three 
influential pantheistic traditions were discussed fragmentally, and I have yet to come 
across an article mentioning them all at once. Later in the century, many British thinkers 
became more aware of these three influential traditions and began listing them 
together in their writings. For example, Evangelical minister Thomas Pearson in his 
Evangelical Alliance Prize Essay on Infidelity (1854) gave an introduction to, what he 
called, the pantheistic aspect of infidelity.61 He began with the German idealists who, 
he pointed out, were greatly influenced by Spinoza; and then he introduced the 
pantheism of French socialists; finally, he gave an short account of the circulation of 
pantheistic poems in Britain. These three traditions held a foundational role in the 
development of pantheism in Victorian Britain and were often mentioned by Victorian 
thinkers, however, these traditions are rarely mentioned by historians. In the first 
section of this chapter I give an account of these pantheistic traditions so that we can 
better understand the later development of Victorian pantheism. 
There was a significant change in the general attitude towards pantheism in British 
publications during the Victorian era from overwhelmingly negative to neutral or 
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Agencies (London: Partridge, Oakey, & Co., 1854). 
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slightly positive. This significant change in views of pantheism has not yet been 
mentioned in the historiography, thus, I give an account of this change in the second 
section of this chapter. I will show that discussions of pantheism from the 1830s to the 
1850s were mostly negative. Pantheism in these early decades was often treated as an 
erroneous doctrine and sometimes even as an evil one. Attitudes towards pantheism 
changed greatly in the 1860s. While criticisms remained, many positive views also 
emerged and continued to emerge in the following decades. In addition to the 
advocates of pantheism, many positive responses came from non-advocates. Many 
British thinkers, critics or not, began to consider that former treatments of pantheism 
in Britain had been very biased, and they began to treat pantheism as a respectable 
approach to religious questions. It is important to note that pantheism did not always 
hold a negative connotation in Victorian Britain and that many Victorian thinkers from 
the 1860s endeavoured to treat pantheism more fairly. 
 
1.1 Pantheistic Traditions 
1.1.1 Spinoza and German Idealistic Pantheism 
In the beginning of the Victorian era, Spinoza’s philosophy and German idealistic 
philosophies constituted the strongest philosophical tradition of pantheism in Europe. 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Humphry Davy were both fascinated by Spinoza’s 
philosophy. When Victorian thinkers mentioned pantheism, they often explicitly or 
implicitly associated it with the monistic philosophies of Spinoza and his followers. As 
Thomas McFarland points out, the earliest available text mentioning the term 
‘pantheist’ was a 1705 pamphlet written by the Irish-born freethinker John Toland 
(1670–1722), and his 1720 book Pantheisticon shows that he used this term as a 
synonym of ‘Spinozist’.62 Toland’s text reflects that when the term pantheism was used 
in the early eighteenth century, it was strongly associated with Spinoza. Spinoza was a 
seventeenth-century Dutch philosopher of a Portuguese-Jewish origin who was born in 
Amsterdam. He was dissatisfied with the theology of the Jewish community in 
                                                     
62 McFarland, Coleridge, pp. 266–67. 
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Amsterdam and was excommunicated in 1656 for heresy. He moved to Rijnsburg on the 
western coast of the Netherlands in 1661 and then moved again in 1663 to Voorburg, 
which is a few miles north of Rijinsburg.63 During these years, he mainly worked on his 
philosophical writings and lived by grinding lenses and from small sums received 
through patronage. Spinoza’s full philosophical system was published posthumously in 
1677 in Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrate (Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical 
Order). 
Spinoza’s philosophy, as summarised by Michael Della Rocca, is characterised by 
rationalism and naturalism.64 Spinoza’s rationalism can be seen as a strict commitment 
to what philosophers call the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). The PSR asserts that 
for everything that exists, there must be sufficient reason to explain why it exists.65 
Ontologically, the PSR asserts that everything must have a cause, and that there is no 
non-causal existence. Spinoza’s naturalism was the view that everything in the world 
was governed by the same principles.66 By strictly following the PSR and his associated 
naturalism, Spinoza denied Descartes and others’ dualism of mind and matter which 
asserted that there were two kinds of substances—spiritual and material—governed by 
different principles. Spinoza claimed that there was only one substance. This one 
substance had infinite attributes though humans could only perceive two attributes—
thought and extension. Each attribute had many modes and these modes were the 
things humans perceived. While modes were causal, there were no causal relations 
between attributes—i.e., mind and body had no causal relationship. For Spinoza, mind 
and body were parallel, and they were two ‘ways of conceiving or explaining the same 
thing’. 67  Rocca also points out that Spinoza’s view of mind was panpsychic, since 
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everything had a mind in Spinoza’s view.68 Spinoza denied freewill on the grounds that 
freewill was a non-causal existence functioning as a cause of the causal world, and this 
violated the PSR and Spinoza’s naturalism. For Spinoza, everything was caused, and 
human desire and volition were not exceptions. 
Pantheism in Spinoza’s philosophy was explicit. Spinoza identified God with the one 
substance by definition at the beginning of his Ethics. He wrote that ‘[b]y God (Deus) I 
understand a being absolutely infinite’, and that ‘[e]xcept God no substance can exist 
or be conceived’.69 His God shared some similarities with the traditional Christian God, 
such as eternity, infinity, omnipresence, omniscience, being the first cause, and being 
free of outside causes; but it was also fundamentally different from the traditional 
Christian God since it was not personal (not human-like), did not have freewill, was not 
extramundane, and did not give final causes to things. Spinoza used the term ‘God’ as 
a synonym of the substance throughout the whole of his Ethics. He also used the 
personal pronouns ‘he’ to address God. For example, when proving propositions about 
the mind-body relationship, Spinoza wrote: ‘All modes of thinking have God for their 
cause, in so far as he is a thinking thing and not in so far as he is explained by another 
attribute’.70 Such a rhetoric was similar to orthodox Christian rhetoric about God, and 
it made Ethics look religious. By using this rhetoric, Spinoza’s philosophy provided a 
direct source for later pantheistic thinkers. He even claimed that Saint Paul agreed with 
him since the apostle said that ‘in him [God] we live, and move, and have our being’.71 
Spinoza’s alterations of the concept of God and the Bible and his determinism were too 
radical to be accepted by most Christian thinkers at the time in Europe. This was why 
Spinoza chose not to publish his Ethics before he died. Due to its denial of the 
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personality, freewill, and transcendence of God, Spinoza’s philosophy was criticised as 
atheism and viewed negatively for about a hundred years.72 
The revival of Spinoza’s philosophy began from the mid-1780s in Germany. The 
German philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819) in his book Ueber die Lehre 
des Spinoza (On the Doctrine of Spinoza) (1785) reported Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s 
(1729–1781) conversion to Spinoza’s philosophy. Lessing was one of the most 
prominent philosophers of the Romantic era. Jacobi reported a conversation with 
Lessing before Lessing’s death, in which Lessing said: ‘There is no other philosophy than 
the philosophy of Spinoza’.73 The words of Lessing gave rise to a burst of sympathy for 
Spinoza’s philosophy among German thinkers. Philosophers, such as Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe (1749–1832), Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), Friedrich Schlegel 
(1772–1829), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), 
Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling (1775–1854), Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), 
and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), were inspired by Spinoza’s Ethics to formulate 
monistic philosophies with different degrees of commitment to the PSR and Spinoza’s 
naturalism. McFarland points out that their idealistic turning was influenced by Kant. 
Kant separated phenomena from noumena (which meant things as they were in 
themselves) while implying that noumena were unknowable. According to McFarland, 
these German thinkers eliminated noumena and claimed mind as the only substance.74 
Many of these German idealists treated the one substance as God, like Spinoza did, 
and a new religion of Spinozism was even proposed by some idealists in the 1790s. As 
quoted by McFarland, physicist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799) said in 1790 
that ‘if the world is still standing in a countless number of years, then the universal 
religion will be a purified Spinozism’.75 Schlegel also proposed a ‘new religion’ founded 
on ‘monistic nature philosophy’ in 1798, and Schelling was in support of it.76 These cases 
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show that many prominent thinkers in late eighteenth-century Germany already began 
to advocate the view that pantheism could offer a better alternative to the traditional 
Christianity. 
Coleridge and Davy were both greatly influenced by the German revival of Spinoza’s 
philosophy. A physician friend of Coleridge, Clement Carlyon (1777–1864), reported a 
dinner attended by Coleridge and Davy and others in his lodgings in London in the 
autumn of 1803.77 Late in the evening, at Coleridge’s request, Davy presented his poem 
entitled ‘Spinozism’.78 As Carlyon commented, the poem was ‘conceived as much at 
least in the spirit of Christianity as of Spinozism’.79  In his poem, Davy presented a 
Spinozian world that was divine and fully causal, but somehow the transcendent 
creation of the world still occurred and human souls were immortal. For example, his 
lines that ‘All, all is change; the renovated forms | Of ancient things arise and live again’ 
seems to assert an unbroken causality in all things. By contrast, ‘A sacred spark, created 
by His breath | The immortal mind of man His image bears’ seems to assert the 
existence of an extramundane God and the immortal soul of man. Coleridge was also 
on the one hand enthusiastic about Spinoza’s philosophy and saw divinity in nature, but 
on the other hand remained dissatisfied by the loss of the personality of God and human 
free will. 80  Thus, despite pantheism being so abundant in his writings, Coleridge 
criticised and rejected pantheism.81 
In Germany, pantheistic doctrines were also applied in Biblical criticism, and this gave 
rise to some concerns among British thinkers. The orientalist William Hodge Mill (1792–
1853), who held the office of Christian Advocate at the University of Cambridge 
between 1840 and 1844, wrote Observations on the Attempted Application of 
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Pantheistic Principles to the Theory and Historic Criticism of the Gospels (1840) to refute 
the German philosopher David Friedrich Strauss’s (1808–1874) application of Hegelian 
pantheism in the highly controversial work The Life of Jesus Critically Examined (1835–
6). 82  Strauss’s The Life of Jesus appeared to many as undermining the historical 
authenticity of the Gospels by interpreting most Gospel stories as myths. By myths, 
Strauss meant fictions regarding which we cannot know whether they were based on 
real events or were purely imaginary. For many Christians, if the Gospels proved to be 
mostly fictional, then the foundation of Christian belief would be threatened. Most 
criticisms of this book therefore concentrated on Strauss’s mythical interpretation of 
the Gospels.83 Mill went beyond appearances and realised that Strauss’s motivation in 
writing this book was ‘far more […] a desire of working out on a historical ground the 
philosophical principles of his master [Hegel], than […] any attachment to mythical 
theories on their own account’. 84  He saw that Strauss’s deconstruction of the 
supernaturalness of Jesus followed the same pattern as the pantheistic deconstruction 
of the supernaturalness of God. He wrote that, in Strauss’s work, ‘the Christ is no longer 
in origin and essential glory infinitely above his brethren of mankind, but a generic 
expression of what is common to his Church,—a mere reflex of ideal Christendom, as 
the pantheistic God is a reflex of the world’.85 He also saw that Strauss’s Christology was 
an extension of Hegelian pantheism. He wrote that ‘the newest philosophy […] teaches 
that when God is spoken of as a Spirit, it is a necessary consequence of that statement 
that, so far as man is spirit, there is no distinction or difference between them. […] God 
and man are one’.86 Strauss claimed that ‘Humanity is the union of the two natures—
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God become man, the infinite dirempting [separating] itself into the finite, and the finite 
spirit remembering its infinitude’, and that ‘by the kindling within him of the idea of 
humanity, the individual man participates in the divine-human life of the species’.87 In 
Strauss’s view, humanity was Jesus, and to know his philosophy was the way of 
salvation. Under his interpretation, the Gospels taught us to follow the universal 
process in which all finite spirits would eventually merge into God’s infinite spirit.88 Mill 
thus warned readers of pantheism in Strauss’s mythical interpretation of the Gospels. 
 
1.1.2 Poetical Pantheism 
While Spinoza and German idealism might have seemed foreign to the Victorians, 
poetical pantheism was a more familiar pantheistic tradition in nineteenth-century 
Britain. The phrase ‘poetical pantheism’ was used by many Victorian thinkers to denote 
this tradition. For example, an 1863 essay in the critical journal, the Saturday Review of 
Politics, Literature, Science and Art, was entitled ‘Poetical Pantheism’.89 As the essayist 
pointed out, poetical pantheism was different from ‘the old habit of personifying the 
processes of nature’ or ‘the common poetical licence of attributing human passions to 
the elements’ (558). He defined this phrase as a ‘real and earnest belief in spiritual 
vitality underlying all we see around us, and an attempt to interpret the evidences of 
this life for no mere purposes of literary illustration, but in the search for truth and 
harmony throughout the universe’ (558). Simply anthropomorphising nature or natural 
objects did not count as poetical pantheism; the essence of poetical pantheism was the 
belief in an immanent deity throughout nature. The essayist named William 
Wordsworth as the founder of poetical pantheism. ‘It was Wordsworth who first 
developed this poetical pantheism, and heard one voice in nature’ (558). Percy Shelley 
(1792–1822) was considered ‘a far more proper and philosophical exponent of this 
pantheism’ (559). The essayist claimed that ‘[i]n Shelley the pure poetical pantheism 
reaches its highest development’ (559). The essayist also considered that the trace of 
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Schelling’s philosophy could be found in Wordsworth’s pantheistic poems while a 
mystic Platonism could be found in Shelley’s poems. By contrast, Alfred Tennyson was 
considered to have shown fewer philosophical traces in his pantheistic poems. 
    Poetical pantheism can be seen as a product of the Romantic movement in Europe in 
the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century. A major goal of 
the romantic movement was to explore the value of emotion and intuition, 
counteracting the emphasis on the value of reason of the past centuries. It was common 
among Romantic poets to express deep sentiments aroused by natural scenes. Some of 
them expressed religious experiences evoked by conceiving a unified intelligence, 
willpower, or spirit running through the whole of nature. As the aforementioned 
essayist from the Saturday Review pointed out, poets who were influential in spreading 
pantheism through poetry in Britain included Wordsworth, Shelley, and Tennyson. The 
famous American pantheistic poet and essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson can be added to 
the list, since Emerson’s pantheistic poems were also read in Britain. The famous 
Scottish essayist Thomas Carlyle, though not a poet, also deserves a mention here since 
he often promoted his natural supernaturalism in his lectures and writings. Turner and 
Barton consider Carlyle’s natural supernaturalism to be a naturalistic and pantheistic 
inspiration for many Victorian scientific practitioners, such as Spencer, Huxley, Tyndall, 
and Francis Galton (1822–1911).90 M. H. Abrams and Martin Priestman point out that 
these literary figures used supernatural terminologies to describe the objects that they 
believed to be purely natural.91 For example, as we will see below, Wordsworth used 
the term ‘sublime’ to describe a religious experience aroused by natural things, while 
this term was commonly used to describe a religious experience aroused by 
supernatural things. His verses on the one hand described nature as divine, and on the 
other hand, implied that the supernatural was natural, consequently deconstructing the 
supernatural. His poems were associated with pantheism because they implied an 
immanent deity in nature. 
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    The following lines that Wordsworth wrote a few miles above Tintern Abbey on 13 
July 1798 was a famous example of poetical pantheism: 
 
a sense sublime  
Of something far more deeply interfused,  
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,  
And the round ocean, and the living air,  
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man; 
 
A motive and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought, 
And rolls through all things.92 
 
As Jonathan Roberts argues, Wordsworth expressed his religious epiphanies in such 
lines, leading readers to see the divine nature of things and to feel the compassionate 
and nourishing aspect of nature, while at the same time not requiring him to commit 
himself to a specific religious position or to use supernatural conceptions.93 Due to the 
vagueness of Wordsworth’s poems, they were used to support various beliefs, including 
pantheism as well as various branches of Christian monotheism.94 Wordsworth had a 
good relationship with the established Church of England. Through subtle use of his 
poetic talent, he never explicitly committed to a specific religious position in his writings. 
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Many of his contemporaries debated on whether his God was nature itself or was a 
supernatural existence.95 
    The following lines from Shelley’s famous poem ‘Ode to the West Wind’ written in a 
wood near Florence in 1819 gives a taste of Shelley’s pantheism.  
 
Wild Spirit, which art moving everywhere; 
Destroyer and preserver; hear, oh, hear!96 
 
Shelley was a radical poet who spoke against social oppression, injustice, and violence; 
and he was greatly influenced by Wordsworth and Coleridge although he never met 
them.97 James Bieri points out that Shelley translated Spinoza’s works, thus Spinoza’s 
philosophy might also have been an influence in his pantheistic view of nature.98 Many 
Victorian readers saw pantheism in Shelley’s poems. For example, the Victorian poet 
Roden Noel (1834–1894) found that Shelley’s pantheism was ‘overt’.99 The essayist of 
the Saturday Review mentioned above commented that ‘Shelley distinguishes the one 
vital force of nature under many names, and calls it almost indifferently Beauty, Life, 
and Light, and Love’, and he claimed that what Shelley exemplified was ‘not merely 
poetry borrowing the forms of pantheism, but pantheism putting on the dress of 
poetry’.100 
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    Tennyson was Queen Victoria’s Poet-Laurate succeeding Wordsworth after the 
latter’s death in 1850.101 He wrote a poem using the phrase ‘The Higher Pantheism’ as 
the title published in 1869.102 In the poem, he expressed his belief that nature was 
created by God but was not entirely separated from God.103 For example, he wrote: 
 
God is law, say the wise; O soul, and let us rejoice, 
For if He thunder by law the thunder is yet His voice. 
 
Law is God, say some; no God at all, says the fool, 
For all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool; 
 
And the ear of man cannot hear, and the eye of man cannot see; 
But if we could see and hear, this Vision-were it not He?104 
 
An anonymous reviewer in the North British Review, a Presbyterian periodical, 
commented that the God presented in these lines was too personal to be considered a 
pantheistic deity. In the reviewer’s view, a pantheistic God should be non-personal, but 
Tennyson was nonetheless satisfied with the title ‘The Higher Pantheism’ since he 
considered that this phrase described the harmonious feeling he felt when conceiving 
both a personal God and a divine nature.105 
Emerson was one of the founders of the transcendental movement in early 
nineteenth-century America which shaped American spirituality. As his writings were 
widely circulated in Britain, he deserves a mention here. Emerson was a minister in the 
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Unitarian Church before he resigned for the reason that the ecclesiastical religion was 
too restrictive for him.106 He found that Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s expressions of 
the spiritual sentiments inspired by nature were more in tune with his own feelings, 
and he also read German idealists.107 In his half-philosophical and half-poetical work 
Nature (1837), Emerson proposed that we should ‘enjoy an original relation to the 
universe’.108 He encouraged readers to find spiritual inspiration, atheistic sentiments, 
and guidance for life directly from nature, rather than from other people’s words, 
including the Bible.109 Emerson found God in nature as well as in man. He wrote that 
 
the dread universal essence […] is that for which all things exist, and that by 
which they are; that spirit creates; that behind nature, throughout nature, spirit 
is present; one and not compound, it does not act upon us from without, that 
is, in space and time, but spiritually, or through ourselves. 
[…] 
The world proceeds from the same spirit as the body of man. It is a remoter 
and inferior incarnation of God, a projection of God in the unconscious.110 
 
He saw humans as the conscious incarnation of God, while nature was God’s 
unconscious incarnation. The Evangelical minister Thomas Pearson in his Evangelical 
Alliance Prize Essay on Infidelity (1854) pointed out: ‘In some of the transatlantic 
productions which are circulating among us, we meet with the system [pantheism] in 
its poetic or most attractive form. The Emerson school, which numbers many disciples 
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in our land, is unquestionably pantheistic’.111 As he pointed out, Emerson’s and his 
followers’ pantheistic writings were circulating in Britain and gaining adherents. 
Thomas Carlyle was often accused of pantheism by his contemporaries. Irish Catholic 
judge and writer John O’Hagan (1822–1890) commented: ‘Carlyle […] “cannot conceive 
God making the world, and then sitting apart, like an architect, seeing it go.” The 
“Eternal Harmonies” are his only God. This pantheism […] is the key to all that seems so 
incongruous in him’.112 There was also an interesting conversation between Carlyle and 
an enquirer: ‘“Sir,” wrote the enquirer, “People say you are a Pantheist: is it true?” “Sir,” 
answered the philosopher, “I am neither a Pantheist nor a Pot-theist.—Yours, T. 
Carlyle”’.113 It is uncertain whether Carlyle was a pantheist, since he often expressed his 
ideas inconsistently, and he clearly denied being a pantheist. 114  A contemporary 
reviewer of Carlyle criticised those who accused Carlyle of pantheism, claiming that the 
label—‘pantheism’—is ‘rather more worthless than usual in the present case, because 
Mr. Carlyle is ostentatiously illogical and defiantly inconsistent’.115 Nevertheless, Carlyle 
admired his pantheistic friends such as Goethe and Emerson,116 and he often suggested 
readers to see supernatural interferences, like miracles, as natural phenomena, and to 
see spirit in nature. For example, in a chapter entitled ‘Natural Supernaturalism’ in his 
novel Sartor Resartus (1833–34), Carlyle wrote that ‘[t]o me perhaps the rising of one 
from the dead were no violation of these Laws [of Nature]’, and that ‘all the Spirits of 
the Universe […] dwell with us visibly, as ministering servants, in our houses and 
workshops’.117 These words could inspire pantheism. 
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Poetical pantheism was generally well received by the Victorians. One important 
factor was the metaphorical nature of poems which allowed a great multitude of 
interpretations. The above-mentioned lines could be interpreted as supporting strict-
sense pantheism, higher pantheism, Christian monotheism, or something else. Many 
Victorian thinkers held the view that poems did not convey serious ideas but simply 
sentiments, thus they usually did not direct serious accusations of pantheism at 
pantheistic poems. Pantheistic poetry could be valued by Christian thinkers as an 
emotional guide to the divinity of God’s creations or to God’s intimate and continuous 
relationship with his creations. In this sense, pantheistic poetry could be used to 
counter deism in which God stepped back from his creation after he created it. But 
when the literal meanings of pantheistic poems were taken seriously as philosophies or 
theologies, then criticisms from various religious backgrounds would follow. For 
example, in 1881, when the positivist writer Frederic Harrison, who believed in Auguste 
Comte’s (1798–1857) Religion of Humanity,118 talked about Wordsworth’s pantheistic 
lines mentioned-above, he asked: 
 
This is poetry. Is it religion? It is exquisitely touching and inspiring to the spirit. 
Is it enough to guide lives, to curb passions, to give light to despair, 
unconquerable force to societies, nations, races? Can it do what the law of 
Moses did, or the law of Christ; because, if it cannot do this, it is not religion?119 
 
His answer was negative. He wrote: 
 
Poetry is one thing. Science, Action, Life, Religion, are far other—all much wider 
and more continuous. […] Poets are not (for all that some people say) the 
guides of life; their business is to beautify life. And after all, this Worship of 
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Nature, this poetry of Pantheism, is but one side even of Poetry, and not its 
grandest.120 
 
Harrison’s words demonstrated a common attitude among Victorian thinkers that 
poetry was not a serious subject compared to science, philosophy, and theology, and 
that the pantheism in it should not be taken literally. 
 
1.1.3 Materialistic Pantheism 
Beside the Spinozian and German idealistic and the poetical traditions of pantheism, 
there was also a materialistic tradition of pantheism among materialists, socialists, and 
working-class people in Europe. Margaret C. Jacob has pointed out that many 
seventeenth and eighteenth century European materialists believed in a pantheistic 
religion, with the English philosopher John Toland, who coined the term ‘pantheist’, as 
the most prominent representative.121 According to her, these thinkers deified and 
worshiped nature. Though Toland was almost never mentioned in the Victorian sources 
I examine, several continental materialists were occasionally mentioned. 
    The aforementioned evangelical minister Thomas Pearson observed that ‘in its 
[pantheism’s] most unphilosophic form, it constitutes the faith of a large portion of the 
French people’, and that ‘[t]he socialism of the Continent is, in a great measure, 
pantheistic’.122 He claimed that the French freethinkers Voltaire (1694–1778), Victor 
Cousin (1792–1867), and Pierre Leroux (1797–1871) and the German communist 
Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) were all pantheistic in their teachings.123 What troubled 
Pearson in this kind of pantheism was the deification of man. He claimed that ‘God 
according to them, was in Jesus Christ, and so he is in the French people’, ‘[m]an thus 
becomes a god to himself’, ‘[t]heology becomes anthropology’, and ‘pantheism reaches 
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the point to which it is ever tending, the very verge of atheism’.124 Cheap print was 
considered by Pearson a major way of spreading infidelity among the working classes.125 
In his view, working-class pantheism was cultivated in some cheap radical prints in 
which the ideas of Emerson and of European freethinkers and socialists were advocated, 
though he did not give names of those prints. 
Several British working-class radical leaders were indeed attracted to pantheism in 
their publications. British leaders of working-class radical movements in the nineteenth 
century were greatly influenced by continental radicals.126 As pantheism was relatively 
well regarded among continental radicals, British radicals also occasionally advocated 
pantheism. Edward Royle has mentioned that ‘Shepherd Smith’, James Elishama Smith 
(1801–1857), preached pantheism to working-class people in the 1830s. 127  Robert 
Owen (1771–1858), the leader of the British socialists in the 1830s and 1840s who 
opposed established religions,128 advocated pantheism in his cheap socialist periodical, 
the New Moral World. The periodical featured pantheistic poems and even promoted 
a pantheistic religion. For example, Shelley’s pantheistic and anti-oppression poem 
‘Prometheus unbound’ was quoted in an article on Shelley on 1 December 1838; and 
an extract from Wordsworth’s ‘Tintern Abbey’ was printed with the title ‘NATURE’ on 
29 December 1838.129 A pantheistic religion was advocated by Owen in an article on 
‘The Religion of the Millennium’ on 28 November 1835. Owen wrote: 
 
we deduce the following conjectures, as probable truths:— 
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1st. That an eternal, uncaused Existence has ever filled the universe, and is, 
therefore, omnipresent. 
2nd. That this eternal, uncaused, omnipresent Existence possesses attributes to 
“direct the atom, and control the aggregate of nature;” in other words, to govern 
the nature as it is governed. 
3rd. That these attributes, being eternal and infinite, are powers which are 
incomprehensible to man. 
[…] 
11th. That, for the convenience of discourse, it is necessary that some concise 
term should be adopted, by which to designate this eternal, uncaused, 
omnipresent Power; and that the term God is, perhaps, as unexceptionable for 
this purpose as any one word that can be employed,—and it has the additional 
recommendation of general use in its favour. 
12th. That, therefore, this eternal, uncaused, infinite, incomprehensible power, 
will be universally called God.’130 
 
To believe that there was an immanent, omnipresent, eternal, uncaused, infinite, and 
incomprehensible God who ran nature was clearly pantheistic, though Owen did not 
use the term ‘pantheism’. He claimed that this belief was a suitable religion for his 
followers. He stressed that there was no prayer, no worship, no ceremony, and no 
church, and that the religious practice was the pursuit of happiness, the action that was 
assigned by God as ‘the ultimate object of […] [man’s] nature’.131 
    Another radical periodical, the Movement—Anti-Persecution Gazette, edited by 
George Holyoake (1817–1906), a next-generation radical leader who coined the term 
‘secularism’ in 1851,132 also spoke positively of pantheism. For example, an essay on 
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pantheism of ‘a young lady’, signed S. D. C, was printed in 1845.133 The pantheism she 
introduced was Emerson’s pantheism, which, she considered, asserted that ‘there is a 
loving spirit in the fair universe, whom we should ever adore without us, and cherish 
within us’ (98). She claimed that pantheists worshiped God through the study of the 
world. She wrote that ‘to [fully] realize the fact that there is god in all creation would 
require omnipresence and omniscience; but to grasp the principle, and strive ever 
towards its realization, this is to be a Pantheist. From this it follows that the true 
Pantheist will be devoted to the study of reality. His worship will […] consist in […] the 
loving study of the grand principles of science, the high musings of philosophy, the wild 
soarings of poetry, or the beautiful lessons of psychology’ (99). After these words, she 
argued, in a poetic fashion, that science, philosophy, morality, and religion would all 
work in harmony in this pantheistic practice. 134  Holyoake gave a rather neutral 
comment after this article. He wrote that ‘[i]ndeed Pantheism is religion without a bible. 
It worships God without having a god—or in other words, worships it under the name 
of nature. […] “Pantheism,” treated to my satisfaction, would separate itself entirely 
from Atheism’ (100). The New Moral World and the Movement might be two of the 
cheap prints that Pearson observed spreading pantheistic views among working-class 
people. 
Holyoake’s views were not radical in the religious arena. He intended to keep his 
secularism neutral and to avoid conflicts with Christianity. He even asserted that 
secularism was also pious since it wiped out superstitions, it increased human 
intelligence and morality, it made the world more beautiful by encouraging people to 
focus on making this life better, and it sent ‘to heaven clean, intelligent, bright-minded 
saints’. 135  However, he was troubled by pantheism sometimes due to the way he 
reconciled secularism and the concept of God. In the monograph, The Trial of Theism 
(1858), Holyoake wrote that since his secularism asserted nothing beyond nature, if he 
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wanted to incorporate the concept of God, then ‘[i]t […] seems to me that Nature and 
God are one—in other words, that the God whom we seek is the Nature which we 
know’. 136  Holyoake quickly rejected pantheism on the ground that he could not 
conceive nature as ‘a being, intelligent and conscious’ (157). He considered that to 
conceive a united intelligence in nature was essential for pantheism, thus he denied 
being a pantheist. He wrote: 
 
while I go with the Pantheist so far as to accept the fact of Nature in the 
plenitude of its diverse, illimitable, and transcendent manifestations, I cannot 
go farther and predicate with the Pantheist the unity of its intelligence and 
conscious. This is the inability, rather than any design of my own, which has 
exposed me to the unacceptable designation of Atheist (157). 
 
Holyoake’s religious stance appears to have drifted between pantheism and 
atheism. His contemporary, James Buchanan (1804–1870), Chair of Systematic 
Theology at the Free Church of Scotland’s New College in Edinburgh, commented 
that ‘Speaking of Nature as self-existent and eternal, Mr. Holyoake ascribes such 
attributes to it as might seem to imply a leaning towards Pantheism, rather than 
the colder form of mere material Atheism’.137 
Another leader of the movement of secularism, Charles Bradlaugh (1833–1891), also 
had some connections with pantheism. Contrary to Holyoake, he clearly announced his 
atheistic position, since one of his motivations to join the movement of secularism was 
his hatred of Christianity.138 Although Bradlaugh advocated atheism, he was an admirer 
of Spinoza and he probably derived his atheism from Spinoza’s philosophy.139 One of 
Bradlaugh’s biographers, John Mackinnon Robertson (1856–1933), pointed out that 
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‘Bradlaugh’s own atheism was simply the logical completion of Spinoza’s pantheism’.140 
Indeed, in a lecture on Spinoza, Bradlaugh revered Spinoza as ‘a great truth-lover’, and 
he regarded the pantheistic claim that ‘God is all there is’ as logically the same thing as 
atheism.141 
Though historians usually see these radical leaders as materialistic, deistic, or 
atheistic, they sometimes supported pantheism. Their positive words on pantheism 
would grant pantheism credit among their working-class followers. Many Victorian 
working-class people did not subscribe to Christian doctrines. The church attendance 
rate among working-class people was extremely low, and there were towns, factories, 
and mines where almost no workers attended church services.142 Pantheism had been 
advocated to working-class people through cheap print and words of radicals at least 
since the 1830s, and pantheism reached a significant degree of prevalence among them 
by 1870. 
Pearson did not consider pantheism to be very popular among British working-class 
people when he made his observation around 1854. He claimed that ‘Pantheism among 
ourselves is somewhat of an exotic. The sturdy English mind is not the most congenial 
soil for it. The philosophy from which it has sprung, is alien to the mental habitudes of 
our people’. 143  Probably this was the case during and before the mid-nineteenth 
century, but pantheism had gained much ground among British working-class 
unbelievers in the second half of the nineteenth century. In an article about working-
class unbelievers published in 1871 in the Christian monthly magazine for Sunday 
reading, the Golden Hours, the writer, a ‘special commissioner’, specified five kinds of 
‘infidelity’ that were ‘most liable to meet’ in working-class people. 144  They were 
atheism, pantheism, materialism, spiritualism, and indifferentism. He claimed that 
atheism was the rarest while indifferentism was the most pervasive. He situated the 
popularity of pantheism as somewhere in between atheism and indifferentism. The 
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writer implied that people had a high chance of encountering pantheists when working 
with working-class people. He gave an example of a pantheist wood-turner he had met: 
 
I remember arguing the question with one, a wood-turner, a steady, good 
workman. It was on a lovely summer day when even the dingy walls of a 
London court gleamed responsive to the brightness which lighted up its gloom. 
He was at work at an attic window, from which “coign of vantage” one could 
see the fleecy clouds radiant with beauty traverse the blue sky, as if in search 
of some place undefiled by London smoke. The man had been talking of the 
glories of nature in the curious style of rhapsody so common among these 
people, and pointing to the clouds exclaimed— 
“see those white-robed emanations of the God we adore as they flit along 
the sky! We see and behold their beauty, and as we gaze they are absorbed 
again into the ether from which they sprang; so with ourselves. We shall go 
back to the God from which we and all we see around us came,—tree, flowers, 
all that makes the world that your fabled Garden of Eden was.” 
“Yes, that is all very pretty in poetry; but do you really mean to tell me you 
believe the trees are emanations from God?” 
“Undoubtedly I do.” 
“Well,” said I, “then I must say you treat the Deity with but scant respect, for 
there you have Him, or an emanation of Him, turning upon the lathe, whilst 
you cut and carve Him at your pleasure.”145 
 
The wood-turner saw nature as God. He considered that the world was already the 
‘Garden of Eden’, and that once a man died, he relinquished the alienation from God, 
returned to God, and became one with God. He seemed to be religiously satisfied with 
this view. He knew where he came from and what happened after he died; the world 
was a beautiful, kind, warm, and divine place for him; and his belief was strengthened 
by his wild work. As the writer noted here, this pantheistic view was ‘common among 
these people’. His words implied that pantheism had gained much ground among 
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working class people at this time. Being a Christian commissioner, the writer criticised 
the wood-turner’s pantheism as a mere fantasy and claimed that the personality of God 
and man’s moral responsibility were destroyed in this fantasy.146 
 
1.2 Changing Views of Pantheism 
So far, we have seen three traditions of pantheism that existed in Victorian Britain from 
the beginning of the Victorian era. These traditions influenced Victorian views of 
pantheism throughout the era. We will see in this section that there was growing 
concern about pantheism among Victorian thinkers from the 1830s to the 1850s, and 
there were many new supports for pantheism that appeared from the 1860s to the 
1890s. 
 
1.2.1 Growing Concerns with Pantheism from the 1830s to the 1850s 
Views about pantheism from the 1830s to the 1850s were overwhelmingly negative in 
British publications. Besides in poetry and in a few radical publications, mainstream 
publications were full of critical voices against pantheism. During these decades, 
Christians generally considered pantheism to be dangerous. As we have seen in the 
previous section, pantheism was seen as one of the major beliefs of French radicals, 
who had violently overthrown their king and church; pantheism was also considered a 
belief that could result in blasphemous interpretations of the Bible inspired by German 
thinkers; moreover, leaders of British anti-religious radical movements sometimes 
advocated pantheism. The number of articles mentioning pantheism during this period 
increased decade by decade, as I have shown in the Introduction of this dissertation. 
This indicates that people were more and more concerned with pantheism. A great 
number of articles on pantheism were written by Christians who defended Christian 
monotheism against pantheism. William H. Mill’s and Thomas Pearson’s writings were 
examples of scholarly, objective, and humble rebuttals of pantheism, but not all critics 
of pantheism were as polite. 
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There were many negative and often vitriolic takes on pantheism. In 1838, a reviewer 
in the medical journal, the Medico-Chirurgical Review, criticised the transformation 
theory of life proposed by German pantheistic thinkers. 147  The reviewer called 
pantheism ‘an acephalous monster’ (450), since he considered that German pantheists 
ignored ‘the supposition of a Great First Cause’, which should be the starting premise 
of any theory of life. He considered that German pantheists’ naturalistic explanation of 
the origin of life without the assumption of God would not stand ‘the tribunal of science’ 
(451). He warned readers that ‘this childish folly [pantheism] […] is opposed to all 
experience, to probability, to reason; and the man who can reject the simple doctrine 
of a God and a creation, for this godless, self-existing, self-destroying, self-contradicting, 
senseless, aimless crotchet, must be the most credulous slave to superstition that ever 
formed the raw materials of a lunatic’ (452). 
A reviewer of Mill’s book in the British Critic, and Quarterly Theological Review, an 
organ of the High Church party, called Strauss’s work a ‘poisonous book’ while calling 
Mill’s work ‘a safeguard’.148 The reviewer claimed that pantheism was an error to be 
blamed on the fanciful, i.e. unrealistic, mind of oriental people, and that British people 
had a more rational and realistic mind that was usually able to resist such fanciful 
thoughts. He wrote: ‘our national character is thought to be less inclined to oriental 
phases of error, than that of the Germans’; and ‘We are apt to assume that what is 
oriental is fanciful, i.e. that it does not approve itself to our own more staid 
temperament, and therefore is more opposed to reason than what we are likely to take 
up’ (307). He quoted Savoyard philosopher Joseph de Maistre’s (1753–1821) words in 
Du Pape (1819) that ‘the English are unimaginative nation after all,—and Pantheism is 
an imaginative system after all’, and that ‘[w]e deny that Pantheism is any thing else 
than a most imaginative system’ (311–12). However, the reviewer also saw many 
pantheistic tendencies in Britain. He blamed romantic poetry for this situation. He 
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wrote that poets are ‘the most imaginative persons of a nation’, and that ‘our poets, 
who should have been the purifiers of our passions, and our guides to truth, have been 
too frequently the palliators and adorners of error’ (312). He claimed that pantheists 
and those who had pantheistic tendencies did not see the reality of the Trinity, which 
had been affirmed in the Bible and by devout Christian sentiments. He wrote that 
pantheistic ideas of God and nature were caused by ‘an habitual blindness and 
indifference’ or by ‘an habitude aversion to find any objective truth’ (320). 
The writer of an article, ‘Pantheism, Communism and Christianity’ (1848), published 
in the Catholic journal, the Rambler, called pantheism and communism ‘two portentous 
monsters of our day’.149 He claimed that pantheism and communism were caused by 
man’s fears of isolation either from God, from nature, or from other men. As himself a 
Catholic, he argued that Catholicism was the most harmonious way to deal with the 
relations between men, between man and nature, and between man and God. He 
considered pantheism to be ‘a refuge against the desolating materialism of the last two 
centuries’ (163). The problem of pantheism for him was that pantheists identified 
nature and man with God, and consequently they failed to see ‘the true God’ (163), who 
was distinct from his creation—nature and man. He judged that pantheism was ‘the 
fatal vision which the waking slumbers of our day have conjured up before our eyes, 
and before which the romantic, the imaginative, and the aspiring bow down and adore’ 
(163). He described pantheism as ‘romantic, imaginative, unpractical’ (164). 
In an article published in the Methodist journal, the Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine, 
entitled ‘Revelation versus Pantheism’ (1849), the writer deplored that pantheists 
ignored that the revelation of God in the Bible was a proven fact, and that their 
excessive tolerance led them to treat all religions as essentially equal. He wrote: ‘That 
there is a revelation of truth, from the God of truth, by the Spirit of truth, is a confessed 
fact, is a proved fact. […] That some persons do not receive the Bible as this divinely-
authorized set of documents should be accepted; that they have no veneration for its 
statements as to the past, present, and future’.150 He claimed that pantheists had a 
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‘latitudinarian mode of treating sacred things, as though religion was still an 
undiscovered region, or as though all religions, so called, of the various pagan nations, 
possessed so much in common of the elements of truth, as to be worthily classed with 
Christianity: in a word, as if Pantheism were the true divinity’ (49). Such a degree of 
tolerance, he argued, if in politics, would be the same as ‘to admit the Jew into 
Parliament’ (49). For him, to ‘keep the Jew out of Parliament’ ‘is not injustice. And to 
refuse a seat in a Christian Legislature to an avowed opponent of Christian doctrines 
and claims, is no more unjust than impolitic’ (50). He gave the examples of polytheistic 
worship in Egyptian and Hindu religions and pointed out that the polytheism and 
idolatry worships in Egypt and India were not equal to Christianity in Britain and thus 
pantheists’ equivalence of all religions was a fallacy. 
In 1858, an essayist of the non-denominational Protestant Journal of Sacred 
Literature and Biblical Record commented that ‘[i]n the present day pantheism is the 
most dangerous and insidious form in which infidelity presents itself’, because 
‘pantheism comes forth decked in gay attire, and, with strange mystic utterances, 
claims the attention and demands the homage of men’.151 He saw Germany and India 
as ‘nation[s] of pantheists’ (310) while France also had quite strong pantheistic 
developments. He saw the sensational philosophies of French philosophers Voltaire, 
Cousin, and Condillac as pantheistic. He called their masterpiece, the French 
Encyclopaedia, the ‘chief permanent organ of the French sensationalists’ and ‘the 
principal means of disseminating pantheistic atheism in that age’ (300). As for the 
German side, the writer considered that ‘Pantheism appears in embryo in his [Kant’s] 
Critique of Pure Reason’ (301). ‘Hegel’s pantheism is undisguised’ (304). ‘D. F. Strauss is 
a Hegelian pantheist, and represents the extreme left of his party’, and ‘Feuerbach’s is 
the most recent development of German pantheism. In his hands it has become bald 
materialistic atheism’ (304). The writer also mentioned Schelling and Fichte as 
pantheists. The writer claimed that pantheism was one of the two pillars of modern 
infidelity. He wrote that ‘[a]ll modern infidel philosophy is either pantheism or 
positivism; it takes its form from the speculations of Hegel, or the science of Comte’ 
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(306). He saw that both Hegel’s absolute idealism and Comte’s positivism ‘make God 
one with humanity’ (306). 
On the British side, the writer also considered that ‘many of the religious speculations 
which have recently risen into notice in England have their roots in pantheism’ (307–8). 
Like Pearson, he considered that ‘[t]he writings of Emerson […] have been mainly 
instrumental in giving popularity to the gorgeous dreams of pantheism in this country’ 
(307). He noted that Thomas Carlyle ‘has been grievously deceived by the seductions of 
pantheism, and knows not that it is a delusion. […] His hero-worship is nothing but 
intellectual pantheism’ (307). 
This writer criticised pantheism for two main reasons. The first was that ‘Pantheism 
is virtually atheism’ (294). He reasoned that ‘[i]f the appellation God is rightly used to 
denote a personal Being—a Being capable of sustaining certain relations to us, as 
Creator, Preserver, Governor, the object of worship and reverence, then the pantheist 
has no God’ (308). He argued that the pantheist ‘worships the creature as if it were the 
Creator’ (294) rather than worships ‘the living and the true God’ (295). He also argued 
that pantheism in practice had to become polytheism and idol worship. He wrote that 
‘Pantheism naturally developes itself into polytheism, and the pantheist becomes an 
idolater, as is remarkably illustrated in the history of Hindoo pantheism’ (296). 
The second reason was that ‘Pantheism, in common with materialistic atheism, is 
destructive of all morality’ (310). He saw determinism as a necessary doctrine of 
pantheism and reasoned that ‘[t]he whole phenomena of the universe being regarded 
by the pantheist as but a chain of necessary developments, man and all his actions being 
but necessary products of the restless activity of the one great Being, there can be no 
such thing as a distinction between moral good and evil, between virtue and vice’ (310). 
He considered that ‘The deity of the pantheist, having neither personality nor will, can 
form no law, can exercise no authority, and bestow no favours, and consequently can 
bring us under no obligation to him’ (311); and men ‘are in all their thoughts, words, 
and actions, mere automata’ (311). He mentioned the French Revolution as an example 
of the destructive moral consequences of pantheism: ‘Pantheism everywhere uproots 
the foundations of social order, recruiting the ranks of socialism, and communism, and 
libertinism. The idealism of the modern pantheist tends to the very same issues as the 
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sensationalism of the French atheists, which prepared the way for and gave intensity to 
all the moral desolations of the French Revolution’ (310). 
These writers from various traditional Christian churches all treated pantheism as a 
fatal error. They, and most of their target readers, saw the existence of an extra-
mundane God separated from the world created by Him as the truth. For them, 
pantheism was simply untrue since they considered that pantheists dismissed the 
image of an extra-mundane God. Though they were very confident about Christian 
monotheism, they still showed concern about the prospect of pantheism spreading in 
Britain in the way it had spread in Germany and France. They treated pantheism as a 
potential threat since they saw that those strong and blasphemous traditions of 
pantheism in Germany and France were penetrating British people’s minds, especially 
those of poets. In order to prevent the development of pantheism in Britain, they 
usually criticised pantheism for the reasons that pantheism was fanciful, poetical and 
unrealistic; that pantheism was a product of the oriental mind and thus was not for 
British people; that pantheism was unpractical if not fell into polytheistic worships like 
the state of religions in India, which they considered to be primitive and uncivilised; and 
that pantheism destroyed morality by dismissing the boundary between good and evil. 
 
1.2.2 New Supports for Pantheism from the 1860s to the 1890s 
During the 1860s, the danger of pantheism became very real in the eyes of many British 
thinkers. Serious historical, philosophical, and theological studies and discussions of 
pantheism boomed during this decade. In the meantime, writings advocating 
pantheism began to appear. James Hinton’s Man and His Dwelling-Place and Life in 
Nature were published in 1859 and 1862; John Hunt’s An Essay on Pantheism was 
published in 1866; some of James Martineau and Thomas Elford Poynting’s pantheistic 
writings were also published during this decade; and Alfred Barratt’s pantheistic work 
Physical Ethics was published in 1869. Views of pantheism were no longer 
overwhelmingly negative as many neutral and positive voices emerged. The following 
paragraphs focus on the views of pantheism developed by other essayists, 
commentators, and critics in order to demonstrate the change in the public’s attitude 
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towards pantheism. The philosophies of pantheistic thinkers will be introduced in the 
second chapter of this dissertation. 
In 1863, a translation of French philosopher M. Emile Saisset (1814–1863)’s acclaimed 
Essai de philosophie religieuse (1862) was published in Britain. The translated work 
inspired a considerable number of British thinkers to discuss pantheism. The main topic 
of Saisset’s work was, in his words, ‘the capital problem of religious philosophy, the 
Personality of God’.152  In his introduction, Saisset expressed his concerns: ‘I found 
Pantheism one of the questions of the day. This was about 1840. German ideas had 
been spreading in France. […] The masters of French philosophy were considered to be, 
generally speaking, extremely favourable to the movement [of German idealism]’ (1). 
He also wrote that ‘[o]n all sides, through the multitudinous echoes of the press, in 
serious books in light pamphlets, in journals and reviews, might be heard the 
consecrated anathema: Rationalism necessarily terminates in Pantheism’ (2). Saisset 
expressed that he loved philosophy, which he considered to be based on rationalism, 
but that he was not in favour of pantheism, thus he was worried that if rationalism 
necessarily led to pantheism, then he could not be a philosopher. His work aimed to 
discredit pantheism and focused on the issue of the personality of God. The work was 
published in two volumes and contained two main parts. The first part was a historical 
sketch of modern pantheism from Spinoza to Hegel, and the second part contained nine 
meditations in support of the traditional Christian view of the personality of God. 
For Saisset, the question of personality was very problematic in pantheism. In his view, 
pantheists either treated God as the only person or did not treat God as a person; in 
either case, God and man did not have personality since the essence of being a person 
was lacking. He wrote that men ‘are evidently not distinct persons, with their several 
lives and their proper destinies; what we call our life, our person, our destiny, are pure 
illusions’ (8), and that God ‘is nothing more than an abstraction’, God ‘is without reality 
and without life; it has neither consciousness, nor love, nor liberty, nor happiness; it is 
undetermined being, pure being’ (9). Saisset aimed to preserve both the personality of 
God and the personality of man, but his solution was weak. He actually held a 
                                                     
152 M. Emile Saisset, Essay on Religious Philosophy, 2 vols (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1863), I, p. 
1. The numbers in brackets after quotations from Saisset are page numbers of this volume. 
64 
 
pantheistic view of God that ‘[a]nything, I say, anything but God. For God is the perfect 
and infinite being, and beyond the perfect being who possesses all the powers of being, 
nothing is possible, nothing can be conceived’, and a pantheistic view of ‘a universe 
without limits, unfolding itself through space and time, and expressing, by an 
inexhaustible multitude of created being, the omnipotence of the immense and eternal 
Creator’.153 How in such a pantheistic view could the personalities of God and man 
remain the same as they were in traditional Christianity? Saisset’s answer was that this 
was ‘the great mystery’.154 
With the publication of Saisset’s work in Britain, many thinkers took this as an 
opportunity to express their views of pantheism. Views of pantheism during this time 
were mixed. The anonymous translator of Saisset’s work had a negative view of 
pantheism. In an essay he attached in his translation of Saisset’s work, he clearly 
announced his alliance with Christian monotheism against pantheism. He expressed 
that he translated this work because he needed a philosophical work on pantheism to 
refute pantheism efficiently and such works were lacking in Britain. As he observed, 
‘[t]wenty years ago, a learned and pious divine of the Church of England [W. H. Mill] 
wrote these warning words: “[…] [pantheism] is now in the course of propagation to 
cultivated minds from the centre of Christian Europe.” The warning has been fulfilled. 
The snow has melted in Germany, and we have had a flood in England’. 155  He 
considered that ‘Pantheism is pre-eminently the metaphysical heresy. Few men are 
metaphysicians: many men have an interest in the refutation of Pantheism. Hence the 
need of something in the shape of a philosophical manual to modern Pantheism. Such 
a manual I had not been able to find until I met with M. Saisset’s Essai de Philosophie 
Religieuse’ (194). Through a summary of Saisset’s views, the translator criticised 
pantheism: 
 
He [Saisset] has shown that Pantheism is founded upon deductions from that 
experience which it condemns; that its vaunted premises are word-jugglings, false 
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to the verge of madness; that it promises the soul an ocean of light to lead it into 
an abyss of darkness, without morality, immortality, or God—for its morality is a 
fancy, its immortality is death, and its God is the negation of God. (225–26) 
 
The translator’s defence of the Christian image of a personal God was based on intuition 
and emotion. He claimed: ‘Never has my own personality more irresistibly led me to 
the Personality of God’ (228). 
    An anonymous reviewer in the Eclectic Review, a joint journal of Churchmen and 
Dissenters, also took a critical stance towards pantheism. The reviewer called Spinoza’s 
identification of God and the world ‘a faith in this cold and wretched dream vortex’.156 
He praised the translator and quoted the translator’s summary of Saisset’s views. The 
reviewer observed that ‘God versus Modern Pantheism […] [is] the one absorbing 
question among the thinkers of the day’ (52). He also observed that science was used 
by pantheists, as he wrote: ‘[w]e have said that Pantheism is the great heresy of our 
times. It is said, that “Science has destroyed for ever the distinction between God and 
the universe;” the Pantheist is perpetually presenting his formidable dilemmas. Either 
God is conceived as creating the universe out of himself, or else God creates the 
universe in himself, and therefore the universe is himself’ (58). Another reviewer in the 
London Quarterly Review, a Methodist journal, also agreed with the translator and 
stood against pantheism.157 
A reviewer of the London Review, a non-denominational journal, gave a rather neutral 
view of pantheism. He welcomed Saisset’s work and the translator’s translation.158 He 
pointed out that Saisset considered that ‘the system of Pantheism requires the 
annihilation either of the Divine or human personality’ (577). He also expressed his 
dissatisfaction with Saisset’s meditation, for the reason that ‘we cannot but think that 
on this and one or two other questions his own mind has been somewhat coloured by 
his studies of Pantheism’ (577). 
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A positive view of pantheism was presented in a book-trade journal, the Critic. A 
reviewer claimed that ‘[w]e [The Critic] have sympathy with the pantheism of the old 
Oriental religions; of the earliest […] Greek philosophy; of the Stoics; of the Alexandrian 
School; of the Mystics […]; of Giordano Bruno; of Spinoza; of modern German 
philosophy’, and that ‘[a]part from our theoretical preference for pantheism we regard 
pantheism as the indispensable instrument for the moral and religious regeneration of 
the human race’.159 The journal’s stance was against Christian theism as the reviewer 
claimed that they had ‘borne the yoke of theism and thrown it aside’ (235), and that 
‘[n]owhere in the Bible can the impious, the monstrous distinction between God and 
nature be found’ (235). Theism, the separation of God and nature, was considered by 
him an ‘unnatural’ product ‘during the formation of the Christian Church’ (235). He 
argued that theism was speculative while pantheism was empirical. He claimed that 
‘[t]he theist builds with assumptions and abstractions; the Pantheist builds with facts, 
not with gross, material facts, but with the Divine facts of life infinite and undying. To 
see life everywhere; to feel life evermore, is pantheism; and to pantheism the highest 
duty, the holiest joy, is the diffusion of life’ (235). The reviewer also criticised those who 
held prejudices against pantheism, and Saisset and the translator were included. He 
claimed that pantheism was being ‘made black and ugly by its foes’ (235), while ‘[s]o far 
from being the most audacious and blasphemous, pantheism is the humblest and most 
reverential of creeds’ (235). 
A few years later, in 1866, John Hunt’s An Essay on Pantheism was published. This 
was mainly an historical account of pantheistic religions and philosophies. Hunt covered 
Indian religions, ancient Greek religions and philosophies, Jewish Cabala beliefs, 
pantheistic Christian saints, Neo-Platonism, the philosophies of Descartes, Leibnitz, and 
Spinoza, the pantheism of Giordano Bruno, German and French mysticism, German 
transcendentalism, and poetry. Hunt intended to address the problem of the lack of 
knowledge and the rightful treatment of pantheism in Britain. He wrote in his 
introduction that ‘Germany and France have their Essays on Pantheism from all sides, 
and by the representatives of all schools. England has nothing but meagre accounts in 
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Encyclopedias or Histories of Philosophy, the reading of which, speaking generally, 
would make no man wiser than he was before’, and that ‘Pantheism is something so 
frightful […] that it is an iron mask and nobody knows who the man is who owns it’.160 
In the end of his account, Hunt gave his speculation about what pantheism was. This 
was where he showed an enthusiastic support for pantheism. Hunt claimed that 
‘Pantheism is, on all hands, acknowledged to be the theology of reason. […] It is the 
philosophy of religion; the philosophy of all religions. It is the goal of Rationalism, of 
Protestantism, and of Catholicism, for it is the goal of thought’ (374–75). Hunt defined 
pantheism as the theology that was based on reason. He claimed that all rational 
theistic speculations, if they assumed that God was infinite, would end in pantheism. 
This was a very positive view of pantheism from a churchman at that time. Hunt knew 
that his view was not in line with his peers. He wrote that ‘[m]any will be offended that 
I have given a fair hearing to theologians and philosophers who have long by universal 
consent being placed without the pale of the Church’ (xxiii). 
Probably because of Hunt’s sincerity, many reviews of his work were positive. Many 
reviewers also spoke positively of pantheism. A reviewer in the Athenaeum, the most 
influential independent literary review journal, expressed a positive view of pantheism. 
The reviewer considered that pantheism was an intellectual enterprise containing many 
‘profound intellects’.161 Another anonymous reviewer in the Reader, a critical journal 
edited by David Masson (1822–1907), gave a very positive view of pantheism. He called 
pantheism ‘one of the methods of contemplating the universe’. 162  He treated 
pantheism as a product of monism in opposition to the dualism of matter and mind, 
and he considered that dualism belonged to ‘unspeculative’ minds and that for ‘a higher 
development of thought’, dualism ‘cannot be permitted to remain’ (691). He claimed 
that ‘the natural tendency of human speculation is to establish universal unity’, and that 
‘Pantheism we conceive to be the ultimate and necessary goal in such intellectual 
endeavours’ (691). The reviewer opposed the view that pantheism was atheism. He 
claimed that ‘the pantheistic faith is the only consistent one that can be received’ (691). 
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He agreed with Hunt that ‘when we speak of infinity, we imply Pantheism’ since if God 
was the infinite, then everything ‘must be a portion of this infinite’, i.e., a portion of 
God (692). The reviewer also pointed out that pantheism was perceived with 
unnecessary bias and fear in Britain. He wrote: 
 
The belief in Pantheism is esteemed a sin. There is something so mysteriously 
awful and unholy in the name to most people, that a man is deemed a theological 
castaway who entertains the heresy, and, like rationalism, and many other 
perverted and misunderstood words, the term is employed as the synonym of all 
that is untrue. […] But the exigencies of thought and the leadings of thought and 
the leadings of the intellect are far beyond the necessities of an adherence to 
doctrines whose admission is grounded upon traditional sanctity, and whose 
retention is compelled by fear. (692) 
 
    There were still voices against pantheism. A reviewer in the Contemporary Review, 
an independent review journal of philosophy and theology, pointed out that the 
absence of the personality of God in pantheism led to an absence of a divine and 
commanding voice in morality. He wrote that ‘where this [conviction of the personality 
of God] has been absent […] it tends to pass into the theory of an evolution of many 
phases of being through which the Being is ever, but imperfectly, realizing Itself, and 
that this involves a practical negation of the Divine Will commanding good and 
forbidding evil, a practical obliteration of the lines of demarcation between good and 
evil themselves.’ 163  He criticised Hunt, claiming that ‘this thought colours […] his 
interpretation of Christian doctrine and of religious acts’, and that he felt ‘regret’ about 
Hunt’s statements (125–26). Hunt did try to reason that God was both personal and 
impersonal, but the reviewer wrote that he did ‘not quite see how’ (125) this was 
reasonable. The reviewer considered that the denial of the personality of God in 
pantheism was a ‘fascination’ and those who believed so ‘has been dazzled by the 
darkness’ (126). 
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In 1866, there were other essays on pantheism written by Christian apologists who 
felt the need to criticise pantheism. Two critical essays written separately by J. W. 
Jackson and W. H. Gillespie were published in the Protestant Journal of sacred literature 
and Biblical record.164 Jackson criticised pantheism in general and Gillespie criticised 
James Hinton’s pantheism in particular. 
Jackson considered that pantheism had become dangerously dominant in the 
intellectual circles of his time, as he wrote: ‘It [Pantheism] is embodied in most 
respectable octavos, written by authors of repute, and published by firms of undoubted 
credit. It pervades our science, it is moulding our philosophy, and, we may add, infecting 
our theology. It is the dominant spirit of the age, and with its subtle influence shapes 
the thoughts, even of those least conscious of its presence’.165 The main aim of this 
essay was to criticise pantheism and to defend Christian monotheism over pantheism. 
Jackson expressed: ‘There is no doubt that among other orderly arrangements of God’s 
providence, the missions of races as well as individuals find a place. […] the religious 
product of the Semitic mind is Monotheism, the underlying element of Judaism, 
Christianity, and the faith of Islam. While conversely, the religious product of the Indo-
European mind is Pantheism’ (316). He claimed: ‘The latter [Pantheism] sees the divine 
in Nature. The former [Monotheism] beholds the divine above Nature. The first adores 
Creation, the last worships the Creator. The one stops at effects, the other mounts to 
their cause. The former is guided by reason, the later by inspiration. Strictly speaking, 
the product of the first is a philosophy, while that of the last is alone really entitled to 
the epithet of FAITH’ (317). He mainly criticised pantheists for not seeing the true extra-
mundane creator and for worshiping creation rather than the creator; and he criticised 
pantheism for being a philosophy rather than a faith. 
Jackson saw pantheism as ‘dangerous’ (320) from three aspects. First, Jackson 
considered that pantheism was ‘a half true’ (320) doctrine. In his view, pantheists were 
right in asserting everything as a part of the universe, but pantheists did not venture 
beyond the phenomenal world. Secondly, Jackson considered that pantheism was a 
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deficient product of ‘the comparatively imperfect development of some of their [Indo-
European race’s] moral sentiments’ (320). Finally, Jackson considered that the most 
dangerous aspect was that pantheism was ‘in harmony with the spirit of the age in its 
scientific contemplation of nature, to which Pantheism is the religious response’ (320). 
But he claimed that ‘we have no fear of Pantheism, by which we mean, no fear of its 
ultimate triumph. It can never finally supersede Monotheism, which is the higher and 
nobler idea of the two’ (321). For Jackson, a religion must appeal to the heart. As he 
considered that pantheism ‘appeals to the head when we require a response to the 
heart’, he claimed that pantheism ‘is and must be an utter failure’ and ‘[i]t will die out, 
leaving neither the ruins of a temple nor the wrecks of a creed, but only a name in 
philosophy’ (321). 
Gillespie picked up Hinton’s pantheism as a specific case of pantheism to criticise.166 
The slogan of Hinton’s pantheism was that man was dead and nature was alive, and in 
order to be alive from death, man must be one with nature. Besides criticising Hinton’s 
somewhat perplexing theory, Gillespie compared Hinton’s resurrection of man with 
Jesus’s resurrection. Gillespie pointed out that pantheism was usually incompatible 
with the resurrection of Jesus, which was a miraculous resurrection of a dead body. 
Pantheism usually did not allow for such a supernatural miracle. He wrote that ‘Spinoza 
admitted that the proof of the fact of the resurrection would be equal to the fullest 
disproof of his whole scheme of Pantheism. […] In like manner […] if Christ be risen, 
Hinton’s faith is vain’ (96). Gillespie then contrasted Christianity and pantheism using 
this point. He claimed that ‘Christianity professes to be based upon the reality of Christ’s 
resurrection from the dead’ and that ‘[t]his Christianity, founded on the asserted 
resurrection, has been the religion of the most civilized nations of the world for more 
than eighteen hundred years. […] At present, Christianity is the sole religion of civilized 
and advancing man’ (96). If the resurrection of Jesus was unreal, then ‘[t]he most 
intelligent men on the face of the earth have, for centuries, given their adhesion to a 
system that rests upon the allegation of a fact, which never happened’ (97). He claimed 
that the resurrection of Jesus was ‘far less incredible’ than that Christianity was 
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‘founded upon a baseless lie’ (97). He was using the authoritative state of Christianity 
to argue for the supremacy of Christian monotheism over pantheism. He claimed that 
in history, while there were many pantheistic schemes, ‘Christianity marched on 
unimpeded, conquering and to conquer, until the freshest and grandest races of man 
have enlisted under her banners, and proclaimed themselves soldiers of the Cross’ 
(102–3). Like Jackson, Gillespie considered that pantheism would vanish while Christian 
monotheism would endure. 
Jackson was a prolific opponent of pantheism. He also wrote several other short 
essays criticising some specific philosophies of pantheism. In his essay ‘Positivism—The 
Pantheism of Auguste Comte’ (1867), he claimed that French positivist philosopher 
Auguste Comte’s religion of humanity was ‘the Papal phase of Arian Pantheism’.167 He 
criticised Comte’s religion, claiming that it was based on reason rather than on 
revelation and that it was a philosophy rather than a religion. He wrote that ‘it [Comte’s 
positivism] is the purely intellectual product of a predominantly literary and scientific 
age. It is the outcome of an especial literary and scientific people, and had therefore 
very properly as its mouthpiece a savant, and not a saint; a teacher of mathematics, 
and not a worker of miracles’ (182). He considered that a religion based on reason and 
science rather than on revelation was not legitimate. 
Though many anti-pantheistic articles were published in the Journal of Sacred 
Literature (which was previously the Journal of Sacred Literature and Biblical Record 
before 1867), there was also a pro-pantheism article in the journal. An anonymous 
essayist argued in favour of Hinton and against Jackson and Gillespie in his article ‘Mr. 
Hinton’s Metaphysical Views’ (1867). The essayist claimed that Hinton ‘has honoured 
the discoveries of scientific men, and revered the teaching of the Bible’ and has ‘united 
religion and science in one perfect arch, each sustaining and answering to the other’.168 
He valued Hinton’s pantheism since he considered that it was based on both reason and 
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revelation. He pointed out that ‘[m]en who are continually employing their reason in 
the investigation of the laws of nature, and who find that they are led to truth by 
accepting nothing which cannot be proved, are led to try their religion in the same way’ 
(81). Hinton was one of these men in his eyes. He argued that Hinton’s pantheism was 
a new pantheism since Hinton did not worship matter, Hinton distinguished between 
the Creator and creation, and Hinton believed in a personal God.169 The essayist praised 
Hinton’s attempt to reconcile Christian doctrines with rationalism. 
    The 1860s was a decade during which the reception of pantheism in Britain changed 
significantly. While there were still many Christian critics criticising pantheism for 
similar reasons as in the former decades, many positive voices of pantheism, which had 
been rare in the former decades, emerged. Many thinkers, whether they held negative 
or positive views about pantheism, considered that pantheism had become a sign of 
the times in Britain and therefore they felt the need to address it. Many of them also 
pointed out that pantheism was treated biasedly and fearfully, and that knowledge 
about pantheism was inadequate in the past decades. They wished to give pantheism a 
fair treatment. Discussions of pantheism became much more philosophical, focusing on 
the issues of infinity, personality, morality, and rationalism. Many thinkers began to 
treat pantheism as a theology based purely on reason, in which the claims of the infinity 
and the impersonality of God were inevitable; while in previous decades, there were 
many critics treating pantheism as an irrational failure. For some thinkers, these 
points—rationalism, the infinity of God, and the impersonality of God—were the 
strengths of pantheism, while for some other thinkers, these points constituted the 
weaknesses of pantheism. The situation was complex. Many thinkers, who spoke 
positively of pantheism, came from liberal theological backgrounds with strong 
philosophical educations, which made them more inclined to be sympathetic towards 
philosophical systems of pantheism, especially Spinoza’s philosophy and German 
idealism. Most critics of pantheism seemed to come from orthodox Christian 
backgrounds who wished to maintain the traditional Christian doctrine of a personal 
and extra-mundane God and the traditional Christian worship of God. 
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Victorian views of pantheism in the remaining decades of the nineteenth century 
generally followed the same pattern as in the 1860s. Critics continued to denounce 
pantheism for similar reasons. Writers who were sympathetic towards philosophy and 
rationalism gave pantheism fair treatments and viewed it as a decent branch of human 
intellectual endeavour. More works on pantheism from advocates of pantheism, Picton, 
Plumptre, Bray, and others, were published. These pantheistic writings and reviewers’ 
responses will be further discussed in the rest of the dissertation. 
The entries for pantheism in different editions of the Encyclopaedia Britannica also 
reflect the change in the reception of pantheism throughout the whole Victorian era. 
The seventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica was published in 1842 and 
contained a short entry on pantheism. Pantheism was said to be ‘a philosophical species 
of idolatry, leading to atheism, in which the universe was considered as the supreme 
God’. 170  The contributor called pantheism an ‘absurd system’ (790). He traced 
pantheism back to ancient Greece and considered Spinoza to be the philosopher who 
had revived pantheism in modern times. But besides ancient Greek religions and 
philosophies and Spinoza, he mentioned no other schools of pantheism. This reflected 
the lack of knowledge of pantheism among British thinkers during that period. 
The eighth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, published in 1860, contained a 
large entry for pantheism contributed by Scottish philosopher John Downes (1827–
1864).171 Downes covered major pantheistic traditions: Hindu religions, ancient Greek 
religions and philosophies, Gnostics, Neo-Platonism, Bruno, Spinoza, Shelling, and 
Hegel. Compared to Hunt’s later account, Downes did not cover poetry and mysticism 
and some other small traditions. Contrary to Hunt, Downes clearly stood against 
pantheism. Like many Christian critics, he claimed pantheism to be ‘a great speculative 
error’ ‘for erring men’ (231). His introduction of pantheism was accompanied by his 
criticisms of pantheism. Near the end of his article, he wrote that this entry ‘is an outline 
of the numerous attempts at constructing a science of Being which have ended in 
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pantheism, which is but another name for failure’, and that pantheism was one of many 
‘fantastic follies of the human brain’ (237). This large and critical entry reflected many 
Christian thinkers’ need for a better knowledge of pantheism to refute pantheism 
during this period. 
The ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica was issued many years later in 1888. 
There was no entry for pantheism in this edition, though pantheism received a neutral 
and objective introduction in the entry for theism.172 Pantheism was treated as a kind 
of theory of God, alongside monotheism, polytheism, and atheism. The contributor 
wrote that ‘pantheism regards all finite things as merely aspects, modifications, or parts 
of one eternal self-existent being’ (234). An entry of pantheism was given in the tenth 
edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1902), but was only used to redirect readers to 
the entry for theism, and the entry for theism was a revised version of that of the ninth 
edition.173 These two editions reflected many British thinkers’ determination to treat 
pantheism objectively as a branch of thought in the last third of the nineteenth century 
without previous prejudices. 
 
1.3 Conclusion 
From the three pantheistic traditions and Victorian views of pantheism, we can find two 
reasons explaining why pantheism was seen by many Victorian thinkers as an 
increasingly popular pro-science religious position in Britain. First, many Victorian 
thinkers treated Spinoza as the beginning of so called modern pantheism. Spinoza’s 
pantheism was founded on rationalism and naturalism. When Spinoza’s philosophy was 
revived and developed in the late eighteenth-century in Germany, the rationalistic and 
naturalistic characteristics were inherited. As rationalism and naturalism were also the 
characteristics of science, many Victorian thinkers saw that modern pantheism and 
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science shared these two creeds. Moreover, science, rationalism, and naturalism were 
used by European radicals as weapons against established churches, and such voices 
were increasingly popular in British publications. Though many thinkers, who belonged 
to traditional Christian churches, highly valued reason and studied nature through 
scientific methods, most of them could not push rationalism and naturalism to the 
extreme. They affirmed the existence of a supernatural God and the existence of 
miracles as truths. For many thinkers, pantheism was the extreme rationalistic and 
naturalistic position in which the supernatural was denied and everything was caused 
naturally (i. e. there were no miracles). Since the beginning of the Victorian era, 
working-class radicals had been using rationalism and naturalism to argue against the 
supernatural establishments of traditional Christianity. Middle-class radicals, such as 
the Westminster Review circle and the X-Club, joined forces to spread such criticisms. 
For many Victorian thinkers, the sign that rationalism and naturalism was becoming 
more and more popular in Britain also meant that pantheism was becoming more and 
more prevalent in Britain. The view that science, rationalism, and naturalism were 
bound up with pantheism inspired many Victorians to study pantheism. 
    Secondly, from the beginning of the Victorian era, there were thinkers who noticed 
that some scientific theories were developed by German and French pantheists with 
the premise that a supernatural God and a supernatural creation did not exist. The 
developmental theory of life, which was developed into the famous and controversial 
evolutionary theory of life in the mid- and late-nineteenth century, was the most salient 
one. Some Victorian thinkers criticised these theories as if they were pantheistic 
doctrines. In this way, they implied that pantheism was an important factor that 
influenced the formation of scientific theories. This potentially gave much credit to the 
image of pantheism as a science-related religious position. Therefore, it was no wonder 
that some Victorian thinkers viewed the increasing popularity of the developmental 
theory of life in Britain as a sign of the increasing popularity of pantheism. 
    Mid- and late-Victorian advocates of pantheism were surely influenced by these 
traditions, views, and scientific images of pantheism. The selected eight advocates of 
pantheism in this dissertation also argued for pantheism as a scientific religion. In return, 
they further cultivated this image of pantheism. Their use of science in support of 
pantheism is the topic of the rest of the dissertation. 
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2     
Diverse Ways to Pantheism in Victorian Britain 
In this chapter, I give accounts of the pantheistic ideas of the eight Victorian advocates 
of pantheism and explain how they came to advocate pantheism. These histories are 
seldom mentioned and studied by historians. The eight advocates of pantheism came 
from a wide range of religious and social backgrounds. Their lives and their views of 
pantheism were very different. It is necessary to first have a grasp of their lives and 
pantheisms before moving on to their uses of science in support of pantheism. I mainly 
focus on their education, intellectual development, publications, pantheistic ideas 
expressed in publications, and contemporaries’ views of their pantheistic ideas. They 
are arranged according to their religious backgrounds from the most orthodox to the 
most secular. 
The first two figures, John Hunt and Alfred Barratt, came from the Church of England 
background. Hunt was an Anglican clergyman and Barratt was an Anglican layman. They 
had very different views of pantheism. Hunt saw pantheism as a belief that God was 
the infinite, and he considered that pantheism was the end of all rational theological 
speculations. Barratt saw pantheism as a belief that God was the universal 
consciousness. They also arrived at pantheism from quite different routes. Hunt 
developed an interest in studying unorthodox theology while he worked as a clergyman, 
and he chose to write on pantheism because he found that pantheism was treated in a 
biased manner in and before the early-1860s in Britain. He endeavoured to correct the 
biased image of pantheism and proposed pantheism as a valuable theological 
speculation. Barratt was a moral philosopher and he tried to develop an evolutionary 
ethics. He proposed pantheism as the next step of the evolution of religion. 
Nevertheless, they did have some similarities. Both of them stressed the validity of the 
applications of rationalism and new scientific discoveries to Christian theology. They 
considered pantheistic images of God to be future images of God when rationalism and 
science became dominant in society. They were liberal when it came to the speculations 
on the essence of God and on the relationship between God and the world; but when 
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it came to religious practice, they were rather traditional and affirmed the way of 
worship of the Church of England. They presented pantheism not as an unorthodox 
theological position, but rather as a more thoughtful orthodox position. According to 
Hunt, pantheism had already been proposed by Christian saints, such as Saint Paul; and 
according to Barratt, Christianity would evolve into pantheism in the future. They were 
seldom criticised by their reviewers as unorthodox or blasphemous. These two figures 
were uncommon types of Church of England clergymen and subscribers, nonetheless, 
their cases show that while there were many Victorian Christian thinkers treated 
pantheism as an anti-Christian position, there were thinkers from the Church of England 
willing to openly treat pantheism as an orthodox position. 
The next two figures are Unitarian ministers James Martineau and Thomas Elford 
Poynting. Poynting was taught by Martineau and was greatly influenced by Martineau’s 
higher pantheism. Both of their pantheistic ideas were influenced by Joseph Priestley 
(1733–1804), who was a prominent philosopher, theologian, scientific practitioner, and 
advocate of Unitarianism. In philosophy and theology, Priestley was famous for his 
philosophy of necessity and materialistic monism.174 It is rare to see scholars associating 
Priestley with pantheism, though there were some signs of pantheism in Priestley’s 
thought. Priestley was against the dualism of matter and spirit, and he preferred to see 
everything as matter. He was not atheistic, and he considered that everything in the 
universe was necessitated by God. Though he preferred to not make claims about God’s 
nature, it can be inferred that his God was to a very large extent immanent in the 
universe. Martineau’s biographer Joseph Estlin Carpenter (1844–1927) once called 
Priestley’s theology ‘quasi-materialistic pantheism’. 175  The young Martineau was in 
favour of Priestley’s view of an immanent God. Although he later repudiated Priestley’s 
necessitarianism since he found necessitarianism incompatible with the idea of freewill, 
he still held the idea of an immanent God and used it to support his view that religion 
was also a discipline that studied the physical universe. According to Martineau, God 
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was not fully identified with the universe, and there was an aspect of God that was 
outside the universe, which guaranteed God’s freedom of will. Poynting was similar to 
Martineau in the way he approached and held pantheism, and he also intended to 
reconcile science and religion in the fields of physical studies. Deism was not an option 
for him, since he considered that if the laws of nature were not directly operated by 
God then the conclusion that there was no God at all would follow. More than 
Martineau, Poynting adopted Boscovish’s and Faraday’s matter-as-force theories to 
unite matter and force, and to turn everything into force. Such a strategy had been 
adopted by Priestley who used Boscovish’s matter-as-force theory to substantiate his 
monistic view of the world.176 Both Martineau and Poynting preached their pantheistic 
ideas, and although there were some criticisms from their fellow Unitarian ministers, 
their pantheistic thoughts were generally tolerated as they did not radically challenge 
the way Unitarians practiced religion. There were not many traces of pantheism in 
Unitarianism, and Martineau and Poynting were again rare cases within their religious 
group. 
Following the two Unitarian ministers are James Hinton and James Allanson Picton. 
They both proposed rather systematic forms of pantheism including theology and 
religious practice, and they were both dissenters but eventually broke with their former 
religious groups and became independent preachers. Picton named his scheme 
Christian Pantheism while reviewers of Hinton’s works called Hinton’s scheme 
Hintonism. Both schemes were utterly pantheistic. They also tried to portray their 
religious views as being in accordance with Christianity, especially with some Biblical 
lines and with the concepts of sin, salvation, and resurrection. Their views were often 
welcomed by radical reviewers but strongly criticised by religious reviewers. The details 
of their pantheisms and the ways they approached pantheism were however very 
different. Hinton was a surgeon, and he developed his pantheistic views while he 
reflected on the relationships between brain and spirit and between life and death. He 
believed that humans suffered because humans had defective perceptions that caused 
them to perceive the universe as dead, but that in fact, the universe was fully alive and 
was God Himself. In order to be saved from suffering, humans had to know that the 
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universe was alive, to abandon the limited self, and to be emerged into the universal 
life. Picton was influenced by biblical criticism when he studied for the ministry. He was 
also greatly influenced by German idealistic pantheism, Spinoza’s pantheistic 
philosophy, and Herbert Spencer’s philosophy of the unknowable. He found pantheism 
to be the religious position that best synthesised his views. He saw pantheism as a belief 
in a united, infinite, eternal, and unknowable God. He considered that this image of God 
was most in accordance with science, and that the worship of this image of God would 
be the future of all religions including Christianity. As far as I can ascertain, Hinton and 
Picton did not have many followers. Their views were quite unique among thinkers in 
Victorian Britain. 
The final two figures, Charles Bray and Constance Plumptre, were non-sectarians, 
necessitarians, and supporters of secular reforms. They both came from religious 
families; Methodism for Bray, and most likely the Church of England for Plumptre; 
though during their twenties, they had become non-sectarians. They both held that no 
phenomena were supernatural or outside the natural chain of cause and effect. Their 
definitions of pantheism differed in some respects. Plumptre, like Picton, defined the 
pantheistic God as an infinite, eternal, and mysterious entity of which everything was 
the manifestation. Bray defined God as force, and he was like Poynting using matter-
as-force theories to reduce everything to force. The ways they approached pantheism 
were also different. Bray was once an enthusiastic evangelical, but he lost faith in 
denominational religions when he realised that there was no universally agreed 
religious truth. He soon found determinism and science to be more robust than 
denominational religions, and he devoted himself to secular social reforms, but he 
always believed in God. When he grew old, he gradually found pantheism to be the 
suitable belief for him, as it could easily and neatly synthesise the concept of God, 
determinism, and science while there was no need to commit to any denominations. 
Plumptre was a scholar of occult philosophy when she was young. She wrote on several 
pantheist philosophers such as the sixteenth-century Italian philosophers Giordano 
Bruno and Lucilio Vanini. She valued them as freethinkers who fought corrupted 
religious authorities, and valued pantheism as the true religion that would not conflict 
with science. Their cases hint at the possibility that necessitarianism and anti-
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supernaturalism could bring a Victorian to advocate pantheism if he or she also believed 
in the existence of God. 
 
2.1 John Hunt (1827–1907), Church of England Clergyman 
and Historian 
2.1.1 Hunt’s Life and Publications 
John Hunt was born in the village of Bridgend in West Lothian, Scotland, on 21 January 
1827.177 He enrolled at the University of St Andrews in 1847. Hunt was a prolific writer 
on theology and the history of theology. His translations of German poems, Select 
Poems: From the German (1852) and The Spiritual Songs of Martin Luther (1853), were 
published soon after he graduated. These works seem to indicate that he learned 
subjects pertaining to German literature and German theology at St Andrews. In 1855, 
he was ordained as an Anglican deacon, and two years later he was ordained priest. 
Between 1855 and 1859, he was a curate of Deptford in Sunderland. After that, from 
1859 to 1877, he worked in churches in and around London. Between 1866 and 1877, 
he was also on the editorial staff of the independent religious journal, the 
Contemporary Review. In 1877, he was appointed vicar of the Otford parish in Kent. 
Hunt’s first book on pantheism, An Essay on Pantheism, was published in 1866, the 
year when he worked as a clergyman of the Church of England and on the staff of the 
Contemporary Review. Hunt aimed to give a relatively unbiased account of pantheistic 
philosophies, ‘a fair hearing to [pantheistic] theologians and philosophers’, which was 
lacking in Britain at that time.178 Hunt gave an account on how he engaged with this 
subject in the introduction of this book. As Hunt indicated in the introduction, he began 
studying the history of theology at the end of 1859, at which point he had been working 
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as a clergyman for four years ‘in a parish far away from books and civilization’ and he 
‘was deeply affected with a sense of […] ignorance of theology’ (xvii). In order to study 
theology, he moved to a curacy in London in 1859, and he ‘formed a plan of reading all 
the books which had been written against Christianity and mastering all the systems 
which are said to be in opposition to it’ (xvii). He read these materials at the British 
Museum. The famous book Essays and Reviews (1860), which contained seven essays 
written by six Church of England clergymen and a layman on the topics of biblical 
criticism, science, and Christianity, inspired Hunt to write a comprehensive account of 
the theologies that opposed Christianity. At first, Hunt intended to write on ‘Pantheism, 
Atheism, Deism’ (xviii) as he observed that there were no comprehensive works on any 
of them. Later in 1863, following a suggestion from a friend, he chose pantheism as his 
first subject. 
Hunt mentioned that he first came across pantheism and the relationship between 
pantheism and Christianity when he read the sermon, ‘Spiritual Influence’, by John 
Caird (1820–1898) who was, after 1862, the professor of divinity at the University of 
Glasgow and one of Her Majesty’s chaplains of Scotland. In the sermon, Caird 
speculated that a human could construct a machine and leave its operation to God’s 
laws, but that God could not leave such a machine to anyone else as there was no 
second God to take care of the machine, thus God could not leave the world.179 Hunt 
remarked that Caird’s view seemed to be the Spinozian idea of divine immanence, 
which had been largely denied among Christians. ‘But,’ he wrote, ‘here I found it in the 
sermons of a popular preacher, whose orthodoxy as a minister of the Calvinistic Church 
of Scotland had never been question’ (xix). He felt an eagerness to learn about Spinoza 
in order to see whether Spinoza and Caird were different. After studying Spinoza, he 
moved on to the works of French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) and 
American transcendentalist Theodore Parker (1810–1860) who also talked much about 
divine immanence. Then he moved to German transcendentalists as he heard that ‘the 
German transcendentalists were all Pantheists’ (xix). After German philosophy, Hunt 
completed his studies with Hindu religions that were also widely considered pantheistic 
at the time. 
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Hunt also mentioned that he intended to make his work a defence of the use of 
reason in theology after reading Henry Longueville Mansel’s (1820–1871) 1858 
Bampton lecture of on ‘The Limits of Religious Thought Examined’. Mansel developed 
Scottish philosopher William Hamilton’s (1788–1856) criticism of the application of 
reason in theology, which was itself a development of Kant’s criticism. 180  As Hunt 
summarised, Mansel and Hamilton held that ‘reason has no right to be heard in 
theology’ (xxi). Mansel was fiercely attacked by contemporary theologians including the 
famous Frederick Denison Maurice (1805–1872).181 Hunt was against Mansel and he 
found that his own work on pantheism could be used to support the application of 
reason in theology. For this reason, Hunt often talked about pantheism in the light of 
the dualism of reason and revelation in his work. 
After seventeen years, in 1884, a revised and extended version of An Essay on 
Pantheism was published with a new title Pantheism and Christianity. In the revised 
introduction, Hunt indicated that he had added several chapters ‘in which the argument 
is brought to a more definite issue’.182  Hunt’s other publications included a three-
volume work, Religious Thought in England From the Reformation to the End of Last 
Century, published between 1870 and 1873. With the same impartial spirit he had 
manifested in An Essay on Pantheism, Hunt claimed that the work was ‘not written to 
promote the interest of any part, and the utmost effort ha[d] been made to preserve 
fairness and impartiality’.183 He was dissatisfied with the fact that existing works on the 
history of religion in England were coloured by religious prejudices. ‘If it is the work of 
a Churchman, it takes the form of a defence of the Church of England; if by a 
Nonconformist, it is a defence of nonconformity’. 184  In 1896, a sequel of Religious 
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Thought in England was published to include religious thought in England in the 
nineteenth century. Hunt stressed again his unbiased stance by beginning his book with 
Goethe’s words: ‘I DO not judge, I only record’. 185  Besides these books, Hunt also 
continuously contributed to the Contemporary Review. A collection of his 
Contemporary Review papers entitled Contemporary Essays in Theology was published 
in 1873.186 
 
2.1.2 Hunt’s Support for Pantheism 
Hunt’s views of pantheism were mainly expressed in his two books: An Essay on 
Pantheism (1866) and the new edition Pantheism and Christianity (1884). In both books, 
Hunt first gave an historical account of pantheism and then formulated some reflections 
on what pantheism was and how it could benefit Christianity. Hunt showed a clear 
favour towards pantheism and an interest to reconcile pantheism and Christian 
theology. As we have seen in the first chapter of this dissertation, Hunt’s definition of 
pantheism was simple and very broad. He identified pantheism with rational theology. 
He wrote in An Essay on Pantheism: 
 
Pantheism is, on all hands, acknowledged to be the theology of reason […] It is the 
philosophy of religion; the philosophy of all religions. It is the goal of Rationalism, 
of Protestantism, and of Catholicism, for it is the goal of thought. There is no 
resting place but, by ceasing to think or reason on God and things divine. 
    But what is Pantheism? Substantially and primarily, Pantheism is the effort of 
man to know God as Being, infinite and absolute. It is ontological Theism—another, 
a necessary and an implied form of rational Theism. The argument from teleology 
proves a God at work; the argument from ontology proves a God infinite.187 
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In Hunt’s view, the belief that God was the infinite was an inevitable conclusion of any 
rational speculations on God’s being. Hunt reasoned that if God was the infinite, then 
the world we lived in was surely in God, since if the world we lived in was not in God, 
then God was limited and was not the infinite. From this point, Hunt concluded that 
pantheism, the position that affirmed God’s immanence and infinitude, was the end of 
any rational speculations on God. 
The reconciliation between Christianity and pantheism was thus, in Hunt’s view, the 
reconciliation of Christianity and reason. To renounce pantheism was, for him, to 
renounce reason.188 Whether Christian theology should always be rational or should 
involve some doctrines without reason was a highly debated question in the mid-1860s. 
Hunt held that Christian theology should be thoroughly rationalistic, that there should 
not be any doctrines held without being examined by reason. He wrote in the 
conclusion of An Essay of Pantheism: 
 
To separate between reason and revelation is to put asunder what God hath 
joined together. To speak of their harmony is but to enunciate a truism, for 
revelation is made to reason—that is, it appeals to man as a moral and rational 
being. It is in itself the highest reason, for it is the Divine reason speaking to the 
reason of man.189 
 
He considered that Christian theology should be like a science in embracing reason. He 
pointed out that early apostles like St Paul used reason to spread Christianity. 
‘Christianity recommended itself by its reasonableness to the philosophers of 
Alexandria. […] Their deep longing for yet higher and clearer truth was satisfied in 
Christianity’ (380). The abandonment of reason was equal to the abandonment of the 
Christian saints—‘S. Paul and S. John, S. Augustine and S. Athanasius’ (379)—for Hunt. 
This point was made more apparent in the introduction of Pantheism and Christianity. 
Hunt wrote: 
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The object of this book is to show not only that they [Christianity and Pantheism] 
can be reconciled, but that Christianity will be a great gainer by the reconciliation. 
Something which is called Pantheism is found invariably to be the ultimate 
utterance of reason on God and his relation to nature. Christianity, properly 
understood, will meet at the same goal.190 
 
Hunt also discussed some other issues concerning pantheism—the classification of 
pantheism, creation, the personality of God, good and evil, determinism, immorality, 
and God’s immanence. Hunt observed that there were two extreme cases of 
pantheism—material pantheism and spiritual pantheism, and there were ‘a multitude 
of intermediary views approaching more or less to either of these’.191 In his definition, 
material pantheists saw God as matter, which was equal to ‘no God’; while spiritual 
pantheists saw God as spiritual and there was no matter (1). He considered that 
material pantheists were atheists, since they had no God and he excluded this group 
from his account of pantheism. However, he did not give any example of material 
pantheism. He may have been referring to the materialistic philosophy of Voltaire or 
Cousin, which he left out of his account. 
On the issue of creation, Hunt considered that there were three main views. He wrote: 
‘The first is properly emanation, or the evolution of all things from the essence of God. 
The second is that of some of the ancient philosophers—that God wrought on an 
eternal material, external to Himself. The third is the modern Christian doctrine of the 
Mosaic creation’ (334). He considered the last two problematic and argued that only 
the first one was reasonable. Here we see he used the term ‘evolution’. He made several 
uses of the science of evolution in support of the emanation way of creation. This will 
be discussed in the fifth chapter of this dissertation. 
Hunt pointed out that a common way to separate theism and pantheism was to claim 
that ‘the Theist believes God to be personal, the Pantheist believes Him to be 
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impersonal’.192 Hunt still wanted a personal God and was thus dissatisfied with the view 
that a pantheistic God was necessarily impersonal. He argued that God was both 
personal and impersonal. He reasoned that God ‘is personal, because our highest 
conception of being is as a person. Only to the personal can we ascribe reason, 
consciousness, freedom of action. And here our idea of God emerges as that of the 
highest personality’ (341). But God ‘must be something more than is implied in the word 
person’; God ‘is more than personal, and in this sense impersonal’ (341). He considered 
that when pantheists claimed God as impersonal, they meant that God was more than 
a perfect human being, but not that God was less than a human being. He also 
considered that to conceive God as a perfect human being was legitimate, since God as 
the infinite included the image of a perfect human being. 
The problem of evil in pantheism was also tackled by Hunt. He pointed out that 
‘Pantheism is sometimes defined as a doctrine which denies the distinction between 
good and evil’.193 He considered that ‘this definition is too indefinite to be of any service’ 
(351). He argued that in Christian ‘religious philosophy’ ‘evil or sin is generally identified 
with imperfection’ (351), and Spinoza defined evil in this way as well, thus if the 
distinction between good and evil was not denied in Christianity, it was not denied in 
pantheism as well. 
As for the issues of freewill and immortality. Hunt held the same view as Spinoza that 
individuals’ freedom of will and immortality were guaranteed by the freedom and 
immortality of God. Since ‘we are but modes of God’ (355), God’s freedom and 
immortality were our freedom and immortality. Hunt considered that the resurrection 
of Christ was not the literal resurrection of Christ’s physical body but was an indication 
that Christ’s ‘spiritual body’ (355) never died. 
‘[T]he question of God’s immanency in the universe’ was considered by Hunt another 
way to ask whether God was personal or impersonal or to ask ‘if God has created only 
once, or if He creates unceasingly’ (355). Hunt’s view was that God ‘must be in His 
universe as well as out of it’, must be ‘immanent in the world, yet transcending the 
world’ (356). Hunt considered that a God that ‘is far distant, dwelling in some special 
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heaven’ (356) was not an infinite God, since such a God was contained by the heaven. 
In his view, God, the infinite, must be immanent in the universe and must create 
unceasingly. 
 
The reception of Hunt’s works on pantheism was generally positive. It was probably 
Hunt’s emphasis on neutrality—his claim that he did not intend to defend any churches 
in his works but to bring out pantheism as it really was—that helped him to avoid 
criticism. The pantheism he defined and advocated was also too broad to be criticised. 
To criticise his pantheism was almost equal to criticising reason itself. 
An account of An Essay on Pantheism in the critical journal, the Reader, read that ‘on 
the whole, the work is a very creditable performance’.194 The reviewer agreed with 
Hunt on most points and spoke positively of pantheism.195 The independent literary 
review journal, the Athenaeum, spoke highly of this book, observing that ‘[n]one can 
peruse his treatises without being struck with the honest purpose of the author to deal 
fairly with the men of whom he speaks, and not to misrepresent their opinions. As an 
introduction to the study of Pantheism we believe the book to be valuable’.196 But the 
reviewer also pointed out that this work was not for veteran philosophers: ‘It will hardly 
satisfy those who have already studied philosophy or theology, because it is 
unsystematic and its materials are loosely arranged’ (326).The radical journal, the 
Westminster Review, welcomed Hunt’s study and his identity as an orthodox 
churchman. It was written that ‘[w]e are sometimes inclined to despair of the prospects 
of theology within the bounds of the regularly constituted and creed-bound churches. 
The appearance of such a book as Mr. John Hunt’s, on Pantheism, is therefore the more 
cheering’.197 A reviewer of the Contemporary Review gave Hunt praise, even though he 
wrote somewhat negatively of pantheism and criticised many of Hunt’s points. The 
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reviewer wrote: ‘it is the work of a man indefatigable in his pursuit of truth, not content 
with second-hand information where it was accessible to him at the fountainhead, 
making his task a labour of love, and proclaiming the results fearlessly. There is, we 
believe, no English treatise bringing together anything like the same amount of 
information, given, wherever it was possible, in the words of his authorities, and 
grouped with an instructive clearness’.198 
The new edition, Pantheism and Christianity, received yet higher praises. The Scottish 
literary review journal, the Scottish Review, commented that ‘[e]xcellent as the essay 
on Pantheism is, its successor is in every way a more elaborate, complete and 
satisfactory work’. 199  The Evangelical Nonconformist journal, the British Quarterly 
Review, praised Hunt’s literary talent, observing that ‘Dr. Hunt is to be congratulated 
on his grasp and his great power of presenting the leading features of complicated 
systems in a few paragraphs. His research has been enormous; and if he had not been 
gifted with a strongly individual and at the same time assimilative and liberal genius, 
the result would have been a Dryasdust book’.200 The reviewer also praised Hunt’s 
neutral stance: ‘Dr. Hunt is finely liberal and tolerant; the book is a condemnation of all 
narrow sectarianism and dogmatism. Many […] will no doubt be led to say, “I like your 
book because it is inclusive, not exclusive”’ (485). He also called An Essay of Pantheism 
a ‘remarkable essay on Pantheism’ (484). 
The Unitarian theologian C. B. Upton (1831–1920), who wrote many essays criticising 
pantheism, praised Hunt’s work, writing that ‘we expect that his essay in its new form 
will be welcomed by many readers’.201  However, he considered that ‘[t]he general 
character of the book is popular and descriptive, rather than analytic and logical’ (372), 
and that ‘it does not succeed in giving a very clear idea either of what are the 
characteristic marks of Pantheism as compared with other forms of religious belief, or 
of the relations in which the different Pantheistic systems stand to each other’ (372-73). 
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Upton especially criticised Hunt’s broad definition of pantheism for mingling traditional 
Christian theism and pantheism. He considered that traditional Christian theism was in 
opposition to pantheism in the sense that humans had individual wills, that their wills 
were not God’s will, so that they had Sin and needed salvation. 
As these reviewers indicated, Hunt’s works were like encyclopaedias of pantheism. 
He successfully created an unbiased image of pantheism, though philosophers might 
find his accounts lacking in detail and his reflections on pantheism too simple. His 
identification of pantheism with rationalism appeared promising, but he seemed to 
ignore that the poetical aspect of pantheism was more emotional and instinctive than 
rationalistic. Radical presses found his positive views towards pantheism useful, while 
more critical periodicals more readily found weaknesses in his philosophical and 
theological accounts. 
 
2.2 Alfred Barratt (1844–1881), Anglican Layman and 
Oxford Fellow 
2.2.1 Barratt’s Life and Publications 
Alfred Barratt was born in Manchester in 1844, the eldest son of a solicitor, James 
Barratt. 202  As Michael Ruse writes, Barratt received a very good education. He 
graduated from Balliol College, Oxford, in 1866 with a double first degree from the 
classical, mathematical, and law school and the modern history school. He worked at 
Oxford University thereafter. In 1867, he became a fellow at Brasenose College, Oxford. 
In 1870, he acquired the Eldon law scholarship. In 1876, he married a school friend’s 
sister, Dorothea, and they had a daughter. In 1880, he was appointed secretary to the 
Oxford University commission. The following year, he died because of overwork at the 
age of 37. As he died early, he only published two books. One was Physical Ethics 
published in 1869, 203  and the other was an unfinished work Physical Metempiric 
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published in 1883 after his death. His religious belief is not specified by Ruse, but Barratt 
mentioned that he subscribed to the doctrines of the Church of England at the end of 
Physical Ethics. 
 
2.2.2 Barratt’s Pantheistic Ideas 
Barratt’s interest in pantheism was exposed in Physical Ethics. In this book, Barratt 
aimed to propose an ethical system built on physical sciences without any assumption 
of supernatural intervention. Barratt saw himself as a student of the famous progressive 
evolutionary philosopher Herbert Spencer, though he sometimes disagreed with 
Spencer. 204  His philosophy was centred on progressive evolutionism, like Spencer. 
Regarding religion, Barratt held that religious images of God reflected man’s dreams of 
perfection. According to Barratt, in Christianity, man dreamed that his consciousness 
could be extended from individuals to the whole of humanity, and the image of the 
Christian God bore the dream of universal humanity; when this dream came true, man 
would dream to extend his consciousness further to become a universal consciousness; 
and thus, the future image of God would be that of a universal consciousness. Barratt 
knew that to see God as a universal consciousness was pantheistic, and he claimed that 
‘in the future expression of man’s idea of the relation of the Deity to the universe we 
may anticipate a strong leaning to Pantheism’.205 Since his view of pantheism was a part 
of his evolutionary philosophy, the details will be discussed in the fifth chapter of this 
dissertation to avoid repetition. 
    Barratt believed that the pantheistic mind-set would be the future of humanity. He 
was pantheistic when he made claims such as ‘[i]t matters […] little whether we speak 
of the Deity as an Omniscient Mind or as a Self-Conscious Universe’.206 But he still 
claimed to be a believer in the doctrines of the Church of England. At the end of the 
book, he wrote: 
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I have spoken many things harshly […] of some of the forms and doctrines of 
our 19th century Christianity, and especially of that branch of it to which I 
belong, I cannot forbear to express my belief that in Christianity rather than 
in any hostile school of religious thought, and in the Church of England as its 
most typical and comprehensive phase, lies the natural source of that 
regeneration of religious life and of that extension of man’s belief and 
sympathy beyond the old dead letter of the law to the level of his highest 
knowledge and ideas.207 
 
In Barratt’s view, the Church of England was like other religions gradually turning 
towards pantheism,208 and before the pantheistic future became real, he was satisfied 
with the current Church of England. 
 
Barratt’s book was generally well received. H. Calderwood, a reviewer in the 
independent religious journal, the Contemporary Review, pointed out that ‘[t]he 
advanced guard are now on as far as a region of Physical Ethics’,209 and that Barratt was 
doing this fashionable practice. The radical critical journal, the Examiner, pointed out 
that most of Barratt’s ethical ideas were not original at the time and Barratt’s work 
looked like a student notebook, but the reviewer still credited the work as ‘a successful 
attempt to systematise for the first time a very heterogeneous and scattered mass of 
fact and theory’.210 Barratt’s view of pantheism was noticed by the reviewer, who could 
not understand how Barratt could make ‘an uncalled-for avowal of his adhesion to the 
Church of England’ while asserting that ‘Pantheism is to be the religion of the future’ 
(53). He questioned Barratt’s expertise in religious issues. 
    Barratt’s work was ambitious and stylish but lacked maturity. Barratt tried to make 
himself clear by using extensive notes and this resulted in a lack of simplicity and 
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sharpness. The part about pantheism had many interesting and original ideas, however, 
it lacked enough development. It is no wonder that he was fiercely criticised by the 
critical journal the Examiner. 
 
2.3 James Martineau (1805–1900), Unitarian Minister 
2.3.1 Martineau’s Life and Publications 
James Martineau was born in a middle-class merchant family in Norwich, England, in 
1805.211 He received a good education. His father Thomas Martineau (1764–1826) was 
keen on educating his eight children. The famous female writer and journalist Harriet 
Martineau (1802–1876) was one of them. As the second youngest child, James’ was also 
helped in his education by his brothers and sisters. James attended the public grammar 
school in the cathedral close between 1815 and 1819. He then spent two years at the 
school of Unitarian minister Lant Carpenter (1780–1840) in Bristol. At Carpenter’s 
school, he learned natural sciences and scientific ways of thinking. Between 1821 and 
1822, he received a training in machine tool maker James Fox’s (1780–1830) firm in 
Derby between 1821 and 1822. After that, he decided to take a career in the ministry 
and studied at Manchester College, York, between 1822 and 1826. In 1828, James 
moved to Dublin and took the post of junior minister of Eustace Street Presbyterian 
Meeting-House. After about four years in Dublin, he moved to Liverpool in 1832 and 
worked as a Unitarian minister until 1857. In the meantime, when Manchester College 
was moved from York to Manchester in 1840, Martineau was appointed professor of 
mental and moral philosophy and logic in the college. The college was moved again to 
London in 1853, and Martineau later moved there in 1857. He became a full-time tutor 
in the college and a Unitarian minister of Little Portland Street Chapel in London. 
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Between 1869 and 1885 Martineau was appointed principal of Manchester College, 
London, and then he retired from public work. 
Martineau was a productive essayist and lecturer. He began to lecture and write for 
periodicals during his college days at Manchester College, York. Martineau often wrote 
about science and religion and their reconciliation. It was one of Martineau’s doctrines 
that religious claims must not go against reason.212 He was one of the most famous 
apologists for the theistic position in Victorian Britain. He confronted Herbert Spencer 
and John Tyndall on topics such as agnosticism, evolution, and scientific materialism in 
the 1860s and the 1870s, and he was praised by his contemporaries as ‘a champion of 
theism’. 213  After his retirement, he composed several treatises to summarise his 
thought, of which Types of Ethical Theory (1885), A Study of Religion (1888), and The 
Seat of Authority in Religion (1890) were the most famous. 
 
2.3.2 Martineau’s Pantheistic Ideas 
After Martineau’s death in 1900, five biographies were published within six years. 
Among them, Joseph Estlin Carpenter’s James Martineau (1905) was well-written, and 
James Drummond and Charles Barnes Upton’s The Life and Letters of James Martineau 
(1901) was the official one and contained a lengthy account of Martineau’s philosophy 
and theology.214 Besides these biographical works, a large number of papers, books, 
encyclopaedia entries have appeared in the past two centuries introducing, analysing 
and discussing Martineau’s ideas. These materials cover almost all noteworthy aspects 
of Martineau’s thought. I select relevant materials from this literature base as well as 
Martineau’s original writings to show how Martineau approached pantheism and what 
his pantheistic ideas were. 
    Joseph Estlin Carpenter pointed out that when Martineau began to study for the 
ministry at Manchester College, York, he was already in favour of pantheism. Martineau 
was at first under the influence of the Unitarian theologian and natural philosopher 
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Joseph Priestley’s ‘quasi-materialistic pantheism’, and he found the pantheistic poetry 
of Wordsworth and Shelley appealing.215 A group of essays written by Martineau in the 
autumn of 1824 showed Martineau’s interests in the pantheistic conception of God, 
and he was accused of pantheism by his readers. 216  These essays included the 
prototypes of Martineau’s views of the relationship between God and the world, and 
of the relationship between science and religion. In the first essay, Martineau claimed 
that general laws proposed by scientific practitioners were only statements of facts, but 
not actual causes of natural phenomena. In Martineau’s view, scientific laws stated 
invariable sequences, but causes were not simply invariable sequences, and there 
should be something voluntary, something intellectual, in causations. He claimed that 
not only the first cause, which was normally attributed to God in Christian theology, 
was intellectual, but also that the causes of every effect must be intellectual. As all 
causes were intellectual, Martineau also attributed them to God, and therefore, in his 
view, God became immanent in nature and was the direct cause of everything. He 
further claimed that since the study of the first cause, i.e. God, was normally considered 
the function of religion, so the study of the causes of every effect should be the function 
of religion but not of science. After the publication of the first essay, Martineau received 
‘charges of pantheism and atheism’.217 He was surprised but did not change his claims 
on the immanence of God in his next two essays. He concluded in the second essay that 
‘all uniformity in nature is the immediate result of the harmonising agency of God’, and 
in the third essay that ‘of him, and through him, and to him are all things’.218 
The years between 1840 and 1849 was the foundation period of Martineau’s 
philosophical theism.219 His sophisticated views of the relationships between science 
and religion and between nature and God were formed during this period. There was a 
controversy between Unitarian apologists and Anglican critics in Liverpool in 1839 in 
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which Martineau participated. After the controversy, he felt a need to break away from 
Priestley’s philosophy of necessity.220  He seriously rethought the foundation of his 
philosophy when he was preparing lectures for his college work. In Priestley’s 
philosophy of necessity, free will was an illusion and every will was determined. 
Martineau had a deep sense that there was something voluntary behind natural 
phenomena, or that there was free will in nature. He developed a theory that identified 
cause and will.221 He believed that we intuitively conceive that every phenomenon must 
have a cause and that this experience of causation is the foundation of our knowledge; 
otherwise, he claimed, knowledge would be impossible.222 Will in Martineau’s view 
meant purpose and implied consciousness and personality.223 He considered that we 
intuitively conceive our will to be the causes of our actions, and that we can by analogy 
conceive causes outside ourselves in nature to also be wills. By conceiving natural 
causes as wills, Martineau considered that there should be a person responsible for 
these wills, and this person was God. Wills of nature were thus the Will of God, and God 
was in this sense immanent in everything. Since will was conscious and personal in his 
understanding, so every cause must also be conscious and personal. Natural laws and 
forces proposed by scientific practitioners were thus not causes because they had no 
purpose or personality. As J. Estlin Carpenter pointed out: ‘Force as defined by 
Martineau, “Will minus purpose,” can neither exist nor act; it is only a creation of the 
mind, convenient for scientific calculation, but in no way representing the total reality. 
Science, therefore, had no business to treat the terms which express the phases of 
power under various combinations of circumstance’. 224  By the end of the 1840s, 
Martineau had formed the idea that science disclosed the methods of nature, but the 
causes of nature must be disclosed by religion. This was the reason Martineau usually 
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gave when he insisted that religion must not retreat from investigations concerning the 
physical universe. 
Martineau’s pantheism was a kind of ‘higher pantheism’, as philosopher Alfred 
William Benn (1843–1916) also called it.225 When Martineau attacked necessitarianism, 
he also attacked the pantheism that sided with necessitarianism. In his view, although 
God was immanent in the world, God and the world must not be identical. He 
considered that if God had free will, then God must have a part outside the world which 
was not confined by the world, therefore, he considered that God must have a 
supernatural element. In his article ‘Nature and God’, he showed these considerations 
in his comments on the pantheism of Thomas Elford Poynting. Martineau claimed that 
the pantheism he was against was the pantheism that identified nature and God, rather 
than the pantheism that affirmed the transcendency of God. He wrote that ‘[w]e use 
this word [pantheism], not as a loose term of current reproach,—reproach often 
directed against precisely what is most pure and true in the religion of thoughtful 
men,—but rigorously, to mark the absence in a scheme of the universe of any thing or 
being properly objective to God: and this feature we cannot but regard as a fatal loss of 
philosophical equilibrium’. 226  He claimed that ‘the Personality of God, and his 
Transcendency beyond Nature, are never compromised’ (169). In his essay ‘Distinctive 
Types of Christianity’, he argued in favour of the pantheistic idea of the immanence of 
God in nature while, at the same time, refusing to give up free will. He exclaimed that 
‘Let Christian Theism keep Morals, and Pantheism may have Nature’.227 
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2.4 Thomas Elford Poynting (1813–1878), Unitarian 
Minister and Teacher on Scientific Subjects 
2.4.1 Poynting’s Life and Publications 
The biographical information of Thomas Elford Poynting is much less accessible than 
that of Martineau. The Unitarian theologian C. B. Upton wrote a paper in memory of 
Poynting published in the Unitarian periodical, the Theological Review, in October 1879. 
This is the only biographical article on Poynting that I have been able to access.228 Due 
to the lack of materials, this section relies heavily on Upton’s account of Poynting’s life 
and views. 
    Upton pointed out that Poynting was a clerk to a solicitor in Bath at the age of twenty 
in the year 1833 and taught Latin, French, and Mathematics outside his office hours.229 
Poynting later moved to Flowery Field to take charge of the school of Thomas Ashton 
(1775–1845), a cotton manufacturer of Flowery Field House, Hyde, Cheshire. 230  In 
addition to the above mentioned subjects, he also taught chemistry. Upton remarked 
that Poynting was ‘one of the most active members of a class of young men, formed for 
the study of botany, geology and zoology’.231 At the age of thirty, Poynting decided to 
change his career and went to Manchester College, Manchester, to study for the 
Unitarian ministry.232 James Martineau was at that time professor of mental and moral 
philosophy and logic in the college. Poynting was taught by Martineau. At the end of 
1845, he finished his course and began to preach as an assistant to clergyman Robert 
Smethurst in the Presbyterian chapel in Monton Green. After Smethurst died in 1846, 
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Poynting became his successor. He worked as the minister of the Monton Green chapel 
until his death in 1878. During his ministership, he still offered private science lessons. 
His book on education, The Temple of Education, was published in 1853. Upton 
commented that this work was ‘a treatise covering the whole ground of physical and 
mental science’ in which Poynting held that theology must be treated ‘as an 
indispensable factor in a healthy and complete education’, but that the work was ‘too 
ambitious’ and ‘somewhat fantastic’.233 
Poynting made several contributions to the Inquirer and the Theological Review. He 
also wrote a book Glimpses of the Heaven that Lies About Us published in London in 
1860. From his writings, we can see that as a man working in both scientific education 
and the ministry, Poynting was deeply troubled by the materialistic and atheistic 
implications of science that were pervasive in the society and that were rumoured to 
be uttered by scientific practitioners such as Tyndall and Huxley. In his essay 
‘Materialism, an Unscientific Habit of Thought’ (1874), he claimed that ‘Materialism is 
that notion concerning matter which leaves no room for a belief in spirit. It stands in 
many minds an impassable barrier, casting over them a dark and chilling shadow, 
paralyzing all higher faith by the suggestion that there is no longer a God to love, a soul 
to honour, or a heaven to expect’.234 He implied that if this materialistic atheism was 
‘the nature and necessary result of true science’ (227), then he had to either stop his 
service of God or stop teaching science, since science led to the denial of God. It seems 
that this controversy between the devotion to science and the devotion to religion 
drove Poynting to seek the reconciliation between science and religion. What he came 
up with was a religious philosophy he termed ‘the Higher Pantheism’.235 Martineau also 
considered Poynting’s philosophy to be ‘pantheistic’.236 His pantheistic philosophy was 
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first publicized in his Glimpses of the Heaven that Lies About Us (1860) and later in a 
fuller version in ‘Materialism, an Unscientific Habit of Thought’ (1874). 
 
2.4.2 Poynting’s Higher Pantheism 
Poynting’s higher pantheism was based on a combination of Martineau’s theory of force 
and will and the matter-as-force theories of physicists Roger Joseph Boscovich (1711–
1787) and Michael Faraday.237 Poynting tried to dismiss the dualism of matter and force 
by using physicists’ matter-as-force theories. He reduced matter to force so that 
everything in nature was force. He also attempted to adapt Martineau’s view of force 
and will to propose that force in its essence was intelligent, so that ‘the all-pervading 
force’ was ‘intelligent or directed by intelligence’.238 This all-pervading intelligence was 
considered by Poynting to be God’s intelligence or God’s will. Upton claimed that in 
Poynting’s pantheism, ‘Nature […] was none other than the living word of God; its 
essence His volitions; its laws His habits of action; its adaptions the work of His wisdom; 
its loveliness and beneficence the ever-renewed expression of His Eternal Beauty and 
His Eternal Love’.239 
Through this pantheistic view of God and nature, Poynting was able to claim that 
science did not necessarily lead to materialistic atheism. Upton pointed out that in a 
short novel of Poynting, Norton Purnell (1865), Poynting opposed the view that ‘the 
laws of nature are so perfect, so all-pervading, that they seem to leave no need for Him 
[God], no room for His presence’.240 Through the fictional character Norton, Poynting 
argued that laws were actions of God but not something separated from God. He wrote: 
‘There is no law of nature, except the law of God’s living action. God is here! by my side 
and dwelling in me’.241 Poynting implied that when conceiving God as immanent in 
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nature and conceiving natural laws as God’s actions, the perfectness and the all-
pervasiveness of natural laws did not exclude God from nature, but instead confirmed 
the perfection and the omnipresence of God. Therefore, the scientific quest for natural 
laws did not have to result in atheism. 
Upton pointed out that Poynting felt that his theory had brought him ‘intellectual 
harmony’ and ‘spiritual joy’, since it enabled him to solve the controversy between 
science and faith.242 He felt an ‘exhilaration of his soul as […] he had thus thrown off for 
ever an incubus that had long weighed down his higher life’.243 He felt that this theory 
‘must be the true theory of the material universe’, and thus he felt a missionary duty to 
spread this truth to others. 244  Minister George Beaumont, a friend of Poynting, 
reported that Poynting ‘had a feeling which seldom found formal expression, but which 
would sometimes get utterance in the closer confidences of friendship, and which he 
has expressed to me many a time in letters and in words, that he had a mission, a 
prophetic function in the exposition and diffusion of his spiritual philosophy’.245 From 
Poynting’s writings and Upton’s article, it can be inferred that Poynting did preach his 
pantheistic philosophy in his sermons, incorporated it into his views on scientific 
education, and used it to argue against materialistic atheism in periodicals. 
As the name ‘higher pantheism’ suggests, Poynting did not fully identify God and the 
world. Upton pointed out that Poynting claimed that space was not within God, so God 
was not fully identical with the world, and that God did have a supernatural aspect 
where his free will was guaranteed. Poynting considered that man’s will was a part of 
God’s will, but that God still gave man free will. He did not explain what the supernatural 
aspect of God was, and how God gave man free will. It seems that he simply 
compromised the coherence of his religious philosophy in order to meet the intuitive 
need for free will. Upton thus judged that ‘[w]e do not know how to define his position 
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more clearly than by saying that he was psychologically Theistic and metaphysically 
Pantheistic’.246 
 
2.5 James Allanson Picton (1832–1910), Congregational 
Minister and Politician 
2.5.1 Picton’s Life and Publications 
James Allanson Picton was born in Liverpool in 1832.247 His father James Allanson Picton 
(1805–1889) was a famous antiquary and architect. 248  Picton was educated at a 
Liverpool high school and the mechanics institute, and he began to work in his father’s 
office at the age of fifteen. At the age of nineteen, Picton decided to train for the 
Congregational ministry. He attended courses simultaneously at Lancashire 
Independent College, which was founded by the Lancashire Congregational Union, and 
at Owens College, Manchester, which was later incorporated into the University of 
Manchester. His tutor in Lancashire Independent College, Samuel Davidson (1807–
1898), was at that time engaged in a controversy centred on his higher criticisms of the 
Bible. Picton sided with his tutor and supported theological liberalism. His radical 
position made his ministerial career difficult and unstable. In 1855, he started a master’s 
degree at London University. In 1857, he obtained his first ministerial position in the 
Church of St John the Evangelist in Cheetham Hill, Manchester. But a few years later, in 
1862, he was accused of heresy because the radical opinions he defended in a discourse, 
and he was forced to move to Gallowtree Gate Congregational Chapel in Leicester. In 
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1869, Picton moved again to a Congregational chapel in St Thomas’s Square, Hackney, 
where he continued to deliver his radical views. 
In 1870, a course of Picton’s lectures was published in the book New Theories and the 
Old Faith. In these lectures, Picton showed his views of religion as well as his interests 
in using science. These lectures covered the nature of religion, the inspirations of God, 
and the infallibility of the Bible. Picton held that religion was a necessary aspect of 
human existence, but that theological opinions should be modified constantly 
according to the progress of human knowledge, especially scientific discoveries. He 
believed that the Bible was not the only inspiration from God and that God inspired 
humans continuously. He said: ‘the work of inspiration has not on any theory been 
confined to the production of a book. It has been […] a continuous though variable force 
in the development and progress of mankind’.249 In his view, the Bible was not infallible. 
The book was generally well received. The literary review journal, the Athenaeum, 
praised it, claiming that ‘[u]nlike most of the divines who speak from the pulpit or the 
press, he shows himself abreast of the age in its best thoughts about the Scriptures, 
familiar with the tendencies and results of science, and alive to the doings of historical 
criticism. The volume may be confidently recommended as one of healthy tone, fitted 
to enlighten, instruct and elevate’. 250  The independent religious journal, the 
Contemporary Review, pointed out that ‘[t]he book belongs to a class which is becoming 
common; a class which distinctly marks the present transition era of theology’.251 The 
Evangelical Nonconformist periodical, the British Quarterly Review, commented that 
‘[n]otwithstanding grave differences of opinion with Mr. Picton, we are eager to admit 
our extremely high appreciation of the power and spirit of this very remarkable 
volume’.252 Even Charles Darwin (1809–1882) read the book. When Darwin discussed 
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how humans’ belief in immorality or the soul was developed in his book The Descent of 
Man, he mentioned Picton’s words about the relationship between developmental 
theory and the soul and immorality.253 In these words, Picton argued that there was no 
dualism between soul and body, that ‘I do not pretend to have a soul; I am a soul’ (193). 
He considered that the current body of human beings came into being through ‘an 
indefinitely long process of creation’ (193), rather than through any sudden creation. 
In New Theories and the Old Faith, Picton also showed that he had a considerable 
amount of knowledge about pantheism. He talked about pantheism in Buddhism,254 
though he did not actively advocate pantheism. His first book advocating pantheism 
was a monograph, The Mystery of Matter and Other Essays, published in 1873.255 In this 
book, he argued that pantheism was the essence of religion. He regarded the Christian 
worship of God as the highest form of worship in his time and proposed a Christian 
pantheism as the future of all religions. Picton’s contributions to periodicals greatly 
increased from that year. He wrote papers for leading critical journals such as the 
Examiner, the Fortnightly Review, and the Academy. He also wrote for religious journals 
such as the Theological Review (a Unitarian organ) and the Contemporary Review. 
Among his periodical papers, many concerned education, some were about religious 
issues, and a few were about his pantheistic views. 
Picton’s radical views finally forced him to leave the Congregational Union of which 
he had long been a member. In 1877, Picton and some others organised a 
Congregational conference in Leicester.256 At the conference, Picton read a paper, ‘The 
Relations of Theology to Religion’, in which he stressed the importance of religious 
feelings over creeds, arguing that ‘religious communion should be based on religious 
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feeling but not on creedal uniformity’. 257  He also questioned Christ’s authority by 
arguing that Christ was merely a man who was wise enough to reveal some of the 
nature of humanity, but who performed no miracles and was constrained by the 
prejudices and errors of his time and nation. The conference soon caused worries within 
the Union. A committee was organized to consider a response to relieve the anxiety, 
and in the May Assembly in Union Chapel, Islington, the committee submitted a 
resolution reaffirming the infallibility of the Bible.258 After this, Picton soon left the 
Union. He made a farewell speech in the spring of 1878 and his name was withdrawn 
from the Congregational Year Book in 1879. Picton then relinquished his ministry in 
Hackney and described himself as an independent minister.259 
In 1884, Picton was elected to be a liberal MP for Leicester, and he held this position 
until his retirement in 1894. After he retired from the House of Commons, he moved to 
Wales. He was a member of the local county council until 1909.260 The number of his 
contributions to periodicals declined, and he instead wrote books on Spinoza, 
pantheism, religion, and education. His book The Religion of the Universe was published 
in 1904 in which he revised his Christian pantheism and suggested a new name for it: 
The Religion of the Universe. He wrote two books introducing pantheism—Pantheism: 
Its Story and Significance (1905) and Spinoza: A Handbook to the Ethics (1907). He also 
wrote two books on the Bible and education—The Bible in School (1901) and Man and 
the Bible (1909). 
 
2.5.2 Picton’s Christian Pantheism or the Religion of the Universe 
Picton defined pantheism as the worship of the infinite, eternal, living, united, and 
mysterious reality of which all things were manifestations. He saw this worship as the 
essence of religion and he considered that as humans developed in intellect, religion 
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would advance closer and closer to its essence, i.e., the pantheism he defined. Picton 
advocated his pantheism mainly in The Mystery of Matter (1873) and The Religion of 
the Universe (1904). Most of his pantheistic ideas were already presented in The 
Mystery of Matter, though in a rather loose form, while The Religion of the Universe 
presented a systematic and the complete version of his pantheism. 
Picton mentioned that his purpose in writing The Mystery of Matter was to speculate 
on the future of religion. In the preface of the book, he pointed out that when he 
observed the unstable state of faith in Victorian Britain, he felt that he had ‘a reasonable 
wish to forecast the final result’ (v) of this state. He argued that ‘the experience of past 
ages, and the knowledge of the present day, unite in pointing to some form of “Christian 
Pantheism” as the religion of the future’ (ix). Picton progressed his contentions 
throughout five essays in this volume. In addition to using rational arguments, he 
usually appealed to emotional happiness and intuitive correctness to sustain his claims. 
In the first essay ‘Mystery of Matter’, Picton proposed the unity of soul and body, or 
of mind and matter. He argued that anyone who studied or speculated on mind and 
matter, especially with the aid of contemporary scientific knowledge, should come out 
at the side of Spinoza ‘into the assured consciousness of eternal, all-comprehensive, all-
pervasive Life, as the only substance’ (12). He was against the traditional view that 
matter was dead and there was something spiritual that made matter move. He wrote 
that ‘I […] resist the invasion of that divine world of will, feeling, beauty and power, in 
which I live, and move, and have my being, by the spectre of a dead abomination which 
is entirely the creation of false inference’ (55). He felt more pleased when conceiving a 
living universe in which nothing was separated from the essence of God, as he wrote 
that ‘I am sure that the oneness of the vision, so far from degrading, would unspeakably 
elevate my sense of the dignity and blessedness of created being’ (56). 
Picton also claimed in the first essay that ‘the reality of existence is inexpressible; but 
worship, spiritual aspiration, and that loyalty of soul to Infinite Power which is the true 
essence of faith, are still, and must be for ever, the noblest energies of man’ (53), and 
he developed this claim in the next three essays—‘The Philosophy of Ignorance’, ‘The 
Antithesis of Faith and Sight’, and ‘The Essential Nature of Religion’. In ‘The Philosophy 
of Ignorance’, Picton argued for the existence of the infinite, eternal, living, united, and 
mysterious reality. He believed that we could have no ‘knowledge beyond that of 
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phenomena’ (62), and he argued that ‘fair appreciation of man’s inevitable ignorance’ 
was ‘the true bearing on religious faith’ (63). He hinted that Herbert Spencer had given 
similar arguments in the first part of First Principles (first published in 1862).261 Picton 
wondered how, if we know nothing beyond phenomena, we can assume that there is 
something beyond phenomena. He tackled this question by referring to our intuition of 
consciousness. He considered that the thing we called ‘self’ is ‘a background of 
continuous susceptibility, concerning which nothing articulate can be said, except that 
it generally maintains its own identity under every variety of impression’ (85-86). He 
argued that ‘it necessarily suggests to us something beneath consciousness that is not 
phenomenal only, but real and substantial’ (87). He wrote that we ‘feel the ultimate 
oneness of all existence—of a measureless ocean of living energy’ (87), and he 
concluded that ‘it is impossible then to exclude from thought that universal order, that 
inconceivable totality of Being in which our personal consciousness and all its little 
knowledge are engulfed. For though in its boundless extension that formless idea 
surpasses all thought, its unreality is utterly unthinkable’ (102). Picton then argued for 
the liveliness of this infinite, eternal, united, and mysterious reality behind phenomena. 
He claimed that, emotionally, ‘it seems impossible to believe that any one ever faced 
fairly the idea of a Universe dead and cold at the heart, without feeling that sickness of 
soul which seizes upon us in the apprehension of an abysmal falsehood’ (108). God was 
identified with this reality by Picton. He wrote that ‘God is a Spirit’262, that ‘[t]he word 
“Spirit” may rather be taken as an abstraction of all phenomenal definition including of 
course molecular vibrations’, that ‘Spirit’ meant ‘an essential Substance, which is not, 
cannot be dead, though life we instinctively attribute to it is inconceivable’, and that 
‘[l]ife is inconceivable just because it comprehends all modes of being, all possibilities 
of spontaneous energy in one’ (127). 
In ‘The Antithesis of Faith and Sight’, Picton argued for the importance of faith over 
sensational knowledge. He was against positivistic agnosticism and materialism that 
saw nothing beyond our sensational knowledge. He claimed that ‘sight gives colour and 
form; faith alone can give us an outer world. Sight gives us recurrent phenomena; faith 
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alone forms them into the Cosmos of eternal order’ (170). He valued and used positive 
knowledge in science, but he also needed to separate his position from agnosticism and 
materialism as he believed in a God of whom all phenomena were manifestations. 
In ‘The Essential Nature of Religion’, Picton argued that the worship of the reality he 
proposed was the essential nature of religion. He considered that ‘if religion is 
universally possible, not to say universally binding, it must be consistent not only with 
freedom of thought, but with any possible issue of a conscientious use of that freedom. 
A universal religion cannot make any creed whatever binding upon us, except that 
which it does not create, but finds involved in, yet needing evolution from, the 
constitution of the human mind’ (210). From this point, he claimed that ‘we may define 
religion as being in its essential nature an endeavour after a practical expression of 
man’s conscious relation to the Infinite. By our conscious relation to the Infinite, I mean 
that indefeasible sense of ultimate substance and all-sufficient power’ (216). Picton 
then argued that this essential nature of religion was found in many religions. John 
Hunt’s account of pantheistic religions in An Essay on Pantheism (1866) was used by 
Picton as a part of his demonstration.263 Picton also argued that ‘the idea of religion, as 
an endeavour after a practical expression of our conscious relation to the Infinite, does 
include the inmost essence of the most earnest forms of Christianity’ (229-30). St Paul 
was represented as an adherent of this view: ‘as St. Paul says, “God shall be all in all” 
(281). Christ’s claim of being the son of God was interpreted by Picton as an expression 
of the fact that humans were manifestations of God.264 
    In the final essay ‘Christian Pantheism’, Picton forecasted pantheism as the future of 
all religions. He claimed that ‘[i]f, in the preceding essays, the signs of the times have 
been in the main rightly, however imperfectly interpreted, they indicate undoubtedly 
the movement of religious thought towards some form of pantheism’ (317). The essay 
was mainly a speculation on how Christianity was supporting this movement. More 
evidence of pantheism among Christian saints were given by Picton, and he brought in 
the term ‘Christian Pantheism’ to describe their position. He wrote that ‘I see no future 
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for the old religious life of apostles and prophets except in the direction of what cannot 
be honestly or adequately described otherwise than as Christian Pantheism’ (318). John 
Hunt’s account of the pantheistic ideas of Christian saints in An Essay on Pantheism was 
again used by Picton.265 Picton also argued that Christianity was more advanced than 
other religions in approaching the essence of religion. He wrote that ‘all believers in the 
rationality of religion, must discover in pantheism the essence of Christian spirit’ (362). 
He considered that in Christian practice, ‘[o]ur thoughts of personal life, of will, and 
counsel, and love, and mercy, and justice, are the warmest and brightest that we know. 
It is inevitable therefore that in the grandest forms they can assume they should be 
transferred to our dreams of the Absolute Being, whom we call God’ (393-94). As Picton 
defined it, ‘Christian Pantheism sees God in everything; and is taught, in part by the 
beauty of the world, to think of Him as the splendour of all things, gathered into unity, 
and expanded to infinite totality’ (404–5). In his view, Christian practices had brought 
Christians closer to pantheism; and when this essence of religion was better understood 
by normal Christians and when their religious practices was refined by this 
understanding, the unstable state of faith in Britain would end, since religion would rest 
in its essence which was its most stable foundation. 
    In The Religion of the Universe, most of Picton’s basic ideas remained the same except 
that he claimed that his pantheism was a development of Spencer’s philosophy of the 
unknowable and of Spencer’s evolutionary philosophy. Picton wrote that ‘a humble 
student may sometimes help equals, and even superiors among his fellow-students, to 
an appreciation and practical use of some point in the Master’s lessons which that 
master’s particular aim at the time required him to leave comparatively 
undeveloped’.266 The humble student was Picton and the master was Spencer. Picton 
claimed that his pantheism would be the result of the full development of Spencer’s 
philosophy of the unknowable. He believed that Spencer’s unknowable was God.267 
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More of his uses of Spencer’s philosophy of unknowable and Spencer’s evolutionary 
views will be introduced in the fifth chapter of this dissertation. 
When arguing for ‘A living universe’ (62), Picton also quoted Martineau from A Study 
of Religion. He wrote: ‘Dr. Martineau has truly said that “homage to an automaton 
universe is no better than mummy worship”’ (62). He recognised that Martineau 
supported the ideas of a living universe and an immanent God. 
In the chapter on ‘Eternal Life’, Picton claimed that man was temporal and only God 
was eternal. He wrote that ‘[n]evertheless the words attributed to St. Paul, “In him we 
live and move and have our being,” ought to imply, though the implication has not 
always been rightly interpreted, a larger assurance of eternal life, not in ourselves but 
in God’ (303); and that death of individual man ‘dissolves the limits of the apparent or 
individual self, and we become one with God. This is the final meaning or the words, 
“The spirit shall return to God who gave it”’ (304).268 Picton considered that ‘[w]e do 
not wholly die, but meet when we merge in God’ (314). 
One of Picton’s main purposes in this book was to argue that his pantheism was 
practical, or ‘experimental’ (267). His conclusion gives us a good taste of the idea: 
 
The Universe shone in its magnificence without beginning before you became 
what you seem to be, and it will exist in its glory for ever after your departure into 
the unseen. Its energy, its life—for it does live—is in itself and not from without. 
You recognise its harmony amid discords; you own that almost daily the prophets 
of science are approximating to a very palpable conviction of its oneness. In that 
oneness you have your place; you emit your spark; you contribute your 
infinitesimal proportion. Willingly or not willingly you do it. But the highest life is 
in doing it willingly, with a sense of unreserved surrender to a perfection you 
cannot master. And that is best attained when, realising the ordered Universe as 
God, and the laws of evolution as his laws, you pursue, according to those laws, 
the highest good revealed to you, and wait for further light. But this is really what 
the Psalmist meant when he said, “Trust in the Lord, and do good” (372). 
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The reviews of Picton’s The Mystery of Matter were mixed. The radical periodical, the 
Examiner, gave a very positive assessment. It considered Picton’s essays ‘interesting 
and instructive’ due to ‘the evident good faith, the keen religious fervour, and the 
dialectical skill which characterise them’.269 The reviewer was ‘disposed to agree with 
Mr. Picton that what he calls Christian Pantheism will be the religion of the future’ (713), 
and recognised ‘the fact that Mr. Picton is labouring earnestly in the cause of human 
progress’ (714). The reviewer also pointed out that the general public needed some 
time to accept Picton’s opinion. He praised Picton for being led by reason to the 
inevitable conclusion of Christian Pantheism and claimed that Picton was as brave as 
John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), the English philosopher who was famous for his view of 
social freedom. The reviewer asserted that Picton ‘would rather go to hell than worship 
a being whom he did not believe to be good’ (715), but he also pointed out that Picton's 
essays contained some philosophical weaknesses that might make them look like 
missionary works. 
By contrast, the Evangelical Nonconformist journal, the British Quarterly Review, 
fiercely criticised Picton. A reviewer saw the future of religion Picton foresaw as gloomy. 
He wrote that Picton ‘has pressed farther into the mysterious darkness, and exhibited 
amazing courage in facing the dread phantoms of the centreless homeless void’.270 He 
argued that Picton’s pantheistic identification of God and the world was dogmatic 
without evidence to support it, and that Picton’s vision of the future of religion could 
be correct only if the Bible, the existence of a personal God, the doctrine of creation, 
and the doctrine of redemption were all wrong. 
The reviews of The Religion of the Universe were mixed as well. The Athenaeum 
pointed out that this work did contain many philosophical speculations even though 
Picton claimed that his work was religious rather than philosophical.271 The reviewer 
also pointed out that many Christians might disagree with Picton’s view of the essence 
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of Christianity. They might argue that ‘Christianity, in the historical sense, means a 
dogma and a ritual, an authoritative Church and creed’ (9). The Bookman, a literary 
news journal, commented that ‘Yet, though “The Religion of the Universe” must be 
pronounced unconvincing, no one can read it without being moved by the deeply 
religious spirit of the author. […] Mr. Picton […] is himself an impressive, if not a unique 
example of how far “a devout Pantheist can retain all the spiritual heritage of Catholic, 
Anglican, or Methodist”—we may even venture to add, “or Independent”’.272 
Picton’s books were well written. His logic was clear, and his arguments were 
convincing. Reviewers usually gave him credits on this point. As he radically changed 
many Christian concepts and practices, radical presses mainly adhered to his ideas while 
traditional religious presses mainly disliked them. Picton seemed to accept the label 
‘Christian pantheist’, as the secularist author Frederick James Gould (1855–1938) called 
him so after a chat with him in his house.273 
 
2.6 James Hinton (1822–1875), Surgeon and Preacher of 
Hintonism 
2.6.1 Hinton’s Early Life and Intellectual Development 
James Hinton was born in Reading, the third child in a rich family. His father John 
Howard Hinton (1791–1873) was at the time a naturalist and denominational leader in 
the Baptist church.274  Ellice Hopkins (1836–1904), the author of Life and Letters of 
James Hinton (1882), pointed out that ‘[c]onsecration to God and to the higher interests 
of life was made the very life-breath of that home; and the children grew up under a 
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religious pressure difficult to release’.275 Hinton derived from his father a deep religious 
devotion which can be found in his later writings. John also taught his children to 
observe natural objects, such as birds, insects, stones, and trees. He taught the young 
James to have ‘the intellectual thoroughness, the dislike of bad logic, and reverence for 
scientific methods’.276 In ethics, Hinton was strongly influenced by his mother Eliza. Eliza 
was a woman of a strong individuality who saw womanhood as valuable as manhood. 
Hopkins pointed out that Eliza ‘infused into her son an enthusiasm of womanhood’,277 
and throughout his life, Hinton worshiped women and the virtues that were commonly 
considered specific to womanhood, such as love and altruism. When Hinton was at the 
age of about twelve, his beloved brother died of scarlet fever. Hopkins considered that 
the death of his brother ‘made a great and lasting impression upon him’ as ‘James was 
enthusiastically attached to his brother, who was his hero and pattern in all things’.278 
This early mental trauma seems to have inspired a special dualism of life and death in 
Hinton’s later thoughts. After the incident, Hinton requested to be baptised and 
practiced as a Baptist. He was ‘a pious, very orthodox boy’.279 
Hinton did not receive a decent early education. He attended the school of his 
grandfather, James Hinton (1761–1823), near Oxford and moved to a Non-conformist 
school at Harpenden at the age about fifteen. In 1838, his father took the Devonshire 
Square Chapel in London, and the family moved to London from Reading. Because of 
financial difficulties, James was taken out of school and worked at a wholesale woollen-
draper’s shop in Whitechapel as a cashier. Hinton suffered to work in what he called an 
‘unintelligible world’.280 After a year, he changed to work as a clerk in an insurance 
office. During this period, he taught himself ‘History, Metaphysics, Russian, German, 
Italian, Arithmetic, [and] Euclid’ at night.281 Since he was very eager to do intellectual 
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work, his father let him enter the medical profession. He was sent to St Bartholomew’s 
Hospital when he was twenty years old. 
Hinton finished his medical education in the year 1847. Before he received his 
diploma, he took a trip to China as a surgeon on a passenger ship, the ‘City of Derry’, in 
1846. After his graduation, he worked as a surgeon in Jamaica and then returned to 
London in 1850. During this period, Hinton suffered religious doubts that came from his 
speculations on brain, matter, spirit, good and evil, love, prostitution, and asceticism. 
His thinking at this time laid the foundation for his future philosophy, but caused him 
to suffer depression.282 Neil Weir points out that by the year 1847, due to his prolonged 
mental suffering, Hinton lost his faith in Christianity.283 From his later religious writings, 
we can see that Hinton did not abandon the Bible and the concepts of God and salvation, 
but he was much less orthodox in interpreting them. 
 
2.6.2 The Development of Hinton’s Pantheistic Philosophy 
Hinton later became famous for his view that nature was alive and man was dead, 
expressed first in his best seller Man and His Dwelling-Place (1859) and later in Life in 
Nature (1862). Hopkins inferred that Hinton’s idea that nature was alive started to 
emerge around the year 1851.284  In letters to his future wife Margaret Haddon in 
August 1851, Hinton speculated on the brain and the soul.285 As a surgeon, he knew 
that the activity of thinking was commonly associated with the material brain. He 
speculated that if the brain was a ‘matter [that] can “think and feel”’, then perhaps the 
soul was a matter that could will.286 It seemed to him that matter could be attributed 
with both the properties of life and spirit. He began to try to formulate a philosophical 
system based on this idea. 
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In 1855, Hinton had a sketch of his pantheistic philosophy. He presented his 
development of thought in a letter probably written sometime after 1866 to George 
Croom Robertson (1842–1892) who at the time was the Grote Professor of Mind and 
Logic at University College London.287 Hinton came up with the idea that since there 
was essentially nothing more in the organic than in the inorganic, then the inorganic 
could be viewed as alive as well.288 When conceiving that the inorganic and the organic 
shared the same substances and laws, people normally came up with the idea that the 
organic was as dead as the inorganic, but Hinton came up with the opposite idea that 
the inorganic was as alive as the organic. It was upon this idea that Hinton built his 
philosophy. His philosophy was brought out systematically in the book Man and His 
Dwelling-Place which was first published in 1859 and went through several editions. 
The book sold so well that Hinton decided to quit the medical practice and raised his 
family by writing. He wrote several books before returning to his practice in 1863.289 He 
also joined the newly founded Metaphysical Society in 1866 after the publication of his 
The Mystery of Pain, which was a moral essay.290 Among his books, he also elaborated 
his pantheism in Life in Nature (1862). The following is a short account of his pantheistic 
philosophy. 
Hinton’s philosophy can be summarised by the slogan that nature is alive and man is 
dead. However, the terms in this slogan did not hold their ordinary meanings. Hinton 
made a separation between phenomenon and noumenon. He claimed that ‘the 
phenomenal’ was ‘the things which we perceive or think’, and ‘the noumenon’ was ‘the 
very fact of being’.291 He credited this separation not to a philosopher, such as Kant, but 
to science. He claimed that science had taught man that ‘Nature (or the universe, or the 
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world) is not truly and in itself such as it is to man’s feeling’, and that it was man’s 
defective perception that resulted in the deviation between what we perceive and what 
really are.292 He pushed this claim to an extreme, arguing that all ‘the phenomena that 
sense perceives, that science investigates, are not truly existing’, and that ‘we are under 
illusion’.293 He defined ‘the physical world’ as the phenomenal and illusory world, while 
there existed a ‘true nature’.294 Nature in Hinton’s slogan meant this true nature, and 
the normal ‘conception of nature is a hypothesis’.295 
If reality is unknowable through perception and reasoning, then how can we know 
what it is? Hinton’s answer was that we could know it through our feelings. In a letter 
to Robertson, Hinton wrote that ‘[i]t is a thing demanding other powers of man besides 
the conceiving powers in order to be known, namely, his emotional ones’.296 From 
Hinton’s writings, we can see that nature in his feelings was like a motherly figure. It 
was active, loving, nourishing, altruistic, and educational. He claimed that ‘nature is not, 
and cannot be, as Science has heretofore represented it, wanting in action, or inert’.297 
He wrote that ‘the perceived inertness or defect in nature is due to man’s 
defectiveness’.298 Hinton meant that the inertness, or the inaction and the passiveness, 
people perceived in nature was not truly a property of nature, and that to perceive 
nature as inert was a property of human perception. He considered that this property 
of human perception was a defect as it hindered humans from perceiving nature aright. 
He also considered that scientific discoveries did not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that nature was inert. He claimed that ‘[t]he work of science, in the discovery of 
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invariableness or law, is not to exclude spirituality or action, but to give to it its true 
meaning of holiness’.299 
For Hinton, to be active was to be alive and spiritual, and to be inert was to be dead 
and physical. He wrote that ‘[t]o this truly active mode of Being the word spiritual has 
been applied; and in this sense that word will here be used’, and that ‘[t]o be inert has 
the same meaning as to be dead’.300 In his view, these respective terms were identical. 
Thus, when he said that nature was alive, he meant that nature was active, spiritual, 
and not inert. What did he mean when he said that man was dead? It may be inferred 
that when he said that man was dead, he meant that humans had the tendency to 
perceive things as dead. However, he claimed that the death of man was not only 
something that happened in the human faculty of perception, but that it was the true 
state of man. He made a somewhat perplexing claim that it was because humans were 
dead but wanted to be alive that humans perceived nature as dead.301 He linked this 
struggle to self-consciousness. He wrote: 
 
This self that we are conscious of makes the world inert to us. Our present 
self-consciousness demands, as it correlative and condition, an inert 
existence around us, which passively obeys our exertion, and is respondent 
to our force. Self-consciousness, involving the sense of exertion, is therefore 
inseparable from a feeling of passiveness in that on which we act.302 
 
Hinton considered that it was self-consciousness that caused the inertness we 
perceived and the evil we experienced. 303  This was the origin of our sins and our 
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sufferings.304 To destroy this self and ‘[t]o be one with Nature’ was the salvation of 
man.305 Love was considered by Hinton to be the key to achieve salvation. He wrote 
that ‘[d]estroyed by the mightier Love, its pale and wounded victims shall arise, with 
freed hearts and holy hands, and join the universal life’.306 
Hinton usually mentioned God in an orthodox manner, but when he talked about the 
ontology of God, he described God pantheistically. He wrote: ‘To be spiritual is to be 
not inert. To be eternal is to BE’, ‘nature is the spiritual and eternal world’, and ‘God is 
THE BEING’.307 He also wrote that ‘[w]e love the Infinite, the Eternal, Him in whom, and 
for whom, and to whom are all things, whose will is done in heaven and earth. His will 
is our will; we have nothing to get; we love Him’.308 These words imply that in his view, 
nature and God were identical, and both were the only real spiritual reality of which the 
physical world was a defective image. In an unpublished manuscript presented by 
Havelock Ellis (1861–1916), Hinton’s other biographer, Hinton discussed whether his 
view was pantheism. He asked: ‘Is not here a unification of Pantheism? All that is is in 
the strict sense God. It is that which God, by His own act […], by His self-sacrifice, 
becomes’.309 But he considered that his pantheism was not that of the normal kind. He 
wrote: ‘For clearly here is the error of Pantheism: it asserts that to be God which is not-
God; i.e., it asserts that to be Being which is not-Being’. 310  Here Hinton can be 
understood as arguing that normal pantheism identified God with physical nature, but 
he was against this kind of pantheism because physical nature was not a real Being for 
him. In a memoir in the Examiner, the writer commented that Hinton operated a 
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‘reconciliation between biblical orthodoxy and Pantheism’ and that ‘Nature had made 
him a Pantheist’.311 
As a surgeon who derived his ideas from scientific notions, Hinton frequently used 
science to support his pantheism. The view that nature was alive was directly linked to 
the concept of living matter against the concept of ‘dead matter’.312 His uses of science 
will be discussed in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. 
 
Hinton’s writings attracted much attention. Reviewers generally valued Hinton’s ideas 
in Man and His Dwelling-Place and Life in Nature as highly original, whether they agreed 
with him or not. Man and His Dwelling-Place was published anonymously. The Fraser’s 
Magazine aimed at Broad Church readers gave it a very positive review. The reviewer 
claimed that it was ‘a most original, acute, well-expressed, and altogether remarkable 
book’.313 The reviewer even claimed that Hinton’s interpretation of man and nature was 
orthodox. He wrote that ‘the book is distinguished not more by originality than by piety, 
earnestness, and eloquence. Its author is an enthusiastic Christian; and indeed his 
peculiar views in metaphysics and science are founded upon his interpretation of 
certain passages in the New Testament. It is from the sacred volume that he derives his 
theory that man is at present dead’ (651). He also wrote and that ‘Stripping our author’s 
views of the unusual phraseology in which they are disguised, they do, so far as regards 
the essential fact of man’s loss and redemption, coincide exactly with the orthodox 
teaching of the Church of England. Man is by nature and sinfulness in a spiritual sense 
dead’ (660). 
Most reviews of Man and His Dwelling-Place were not so positive. Reviewers often 
criticised Hinton for his perplexing logic and the many repetitions. The Saturday Review, 
a journal for highly educated readers, commented that ‘Man and his Dwelling-Place is 
a very remarkable book, though we cannot say we agree with its doctrine; […] a degree 
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of ingenuity in making conflicting opinions throw light on each other which would make 
an inattentive reader complain of confusion and obscurity. To us the principle fault of 
its style appears to be tautology’.314  The most influential independent review, the 
Athenaeum, claimed that ‘[t]he author has lost himself in a maze of four hundred 
pages’.315 The Leader and Saturday Analyst, an organ of religious and social reformers, 
pointed out that ‘[b]y some misapprehension, however, of the full scope of philosophy, 
as now recognised, and an evident desire to ignore certain authorities that should have 
been more carefully consulted and gratefully acknowledged, the author has landed in a 
perplexed statement which he may find it difficult to explain’.316 
Many religious reviewers also expressed their disagreements with Hinton’s religious 
ideas. The Evangelical Nonconformist journal, the British Quarterly Review, commented 
that ‘[i]t is ingenious and able; but the ground on which its large speculations are based 
is, in our judgement, very questionable; and as the basis is, so, of course, must the 
superstructure be’.317 The Catholic organ, the Dublin Review, commented that ‘[t]his 
work gives us very serious pain, because we cannot fail to perceive in its writer an 
anxious yearning after something spiritual, and yet, to our conception, every line of his 
book is a complete abnegation of every part of real religion’.318 The Evangelical journal, 
the North British Review, called the book ‘this extraordinary concatenation of false 
doctrine’.319 
When the book was first published in 1859, reviewers seldom called it a pantheistic 
work. To my knowledge, only one reviewer of the Universal Review, a short-lived 
periodical, treated Hinton’s ideas as pantheistic. The reviewer called attention to ‘the 
uncommonly ugly semblance it bears to Pantheism’.320 He pointed out that ‘[t]he self 
                                                     
314 Anon, ‘Man and His Dwelling-Place’, Saturday Review, 7 (1859), 153–55 (p. 155). 
315 Anon, ‘Man and His Dwelling-Place’, Athenaeum, 1636 (1859), 319. 
316 Anon, ‘Man and His Dwelling-Place’, Leader and Saturday Analyst, 10 (1859), 171–72 (p. 171). 
317 Anon, ‘Man and His Dwelling Place’, British Quarterly Review, 58 (1859), 565. 
318 Anon, ‘Man and His Dwelling-Place’, Dublin Review, 46 (1859), 266–67 (p. 266). 
319 Anon, ‘Man and His Dwelling-Place’, North British Review, 31 (1859), 271–74 (p. 273). 
320 Anon, ‘Man and His Dwelling-Place’, Universal Review, June 1859, 481–502 (p. 500). 
 
121 
 
being the exclusion of God, and true life being the destruction of self, to admit God is 
to destroy self, and to have true life; the monad becomes absorbed in the existence of 
God, and ceases to exist as a monad. This closely resembles the absorption in Brahma 
of the Brahminical and Buddhist philosophies, which are acknowledged pantheistic 
systems’ (500–1). However, when J. W. Jackson and W. H. Gillespie criticised pantheism 
in 1866, Hinton’s work was fully recognised as a pantheistic work.321 The theory in Man 
and His Dwelling-Place was called by Gillespie ‘one particular phase of Pantheism’ and 
‘the Hintonian Pantheism’,322 and by Jackson ‘Hintonism’.323 Gillespie wrote that Hinton 
proposed a ‘complex and compound scheme of Pantheism’ and that ‘we may gather 
[from Hinton’s words] that science has been nearing the goal of the discovery that 
nature is alive’.324 Jackson commented that ‘Hintonism is the confused statement of a 
profound metaphysical truth […]. That what we sometimes call Nature, or the Material 
Universe, is simply force, holding a certain relation to a percipient being, science seems 
to be on the point of demonstrating’ (187). He claimed that ‘[t]he truth is, Mr. Hinton, 
like many other talented young men, has unfortunately presumed to write a book on 
philosophy when he should have been still attending his classes’ (187). 
The book Life in Nature, which was roughly a revision and extension of Man and His 
Dwelling-Place, received similar reviews. The Saturday Review again pointed out that 
‘Mr. Hinton’s paradox is obtained by the simple process of calling things by other than 
their usual names’ and that ‘[t]he proof he offers is in one sense a truism, and in another 
sense a mere washing out of all the marks by which language specifies observed 
differences’. 325  The reviewer concluded that ‘it is ingenious and interesting, but 
singularly unscientific’ (197). As Hinton revised his style of writing, the Athenaeum 
commented: ‘Whilst it would be impossible to say that Mr. Hinton has made out his 
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case, or that we agree with him in his conclusion, we do most earnestly recommend his 
book to thoughtful students. His writings are eminently suggestive; and nothing 
perhaps is a better corrective of the self-sufficiency engendered by limited views of 
natural facts than works like the present, which give a glimpse of vast fields of 
untrodden truth for future observation’.326 The British Quarterly Review also gave a 
more positive review. The reviewer considered that this book was written ‘with great 
boldness and originality’, although that ‘[t]o Mr. Hinton’s chief positions we do not give 
in our adhesion, nor does it appear to us that they are so clearly established as they 
must be in order to obtain the acceptance he desires’.327 
    As reviewers pointed out, Hinton’s books contained many repetitions and his logic 
was often perplexing. His ideas that human’s defective perception and self-
consciousness made humans inert, and that knowing this situation could make humans 
active and be saved from misery, were difficult to understand. The way in which Hinton 
redefined terms could confuse readers, and there were many philosophical terms he 
could have used to better express his thought. His books read more like sermons than 
rigorous philosophical works. Nevertheless, his speculation on the liveness of matter 
was new at that time and his definitions of terms were rare, and this was why many 
reviewers credited his works as original. 
 
2.7 Charles Bray (1811–1884), Non-Sectarian, 
Manufacturer, and Lay Phrenologist 
In his autobiography, Phases of Opinion and Experience during a Long Life: An 
Autobiography (1884), Charles Bray gave an account of the development of his thought 
throughout his entire life.328 This book documents how a Victorian became a supporter 
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of pantheism. In this section, I summarise the important developments in Bray’s 
intellectual life that led him to be an advocate of pantheism. Bray’s pantheism was 
tightly associated with the science of force, and to introduce his pantheism is basically 
to introduce his uses of the science of force. Therefore, in order to avoid repetition, his 
pantheism will be introduced in the third chapter of this dissertation. 
 
2.7.1 Bray’s Life and Intellectual Development 
Bray was born in Coventry in 1811 in a wealthy ribbon manufacturer’s family.329 In his 
autobiography, Bray pointed out that he had believed in a personal God since he was a 
child, and that this never changed.330 At the age of nine, he was sent to a boarding-
school in the countryside of Coventry for five years, but he did not receive a decent 
education there. His religious belief during this period was influenced by nearby 
Methodists. At the age of fourteen, Bray was sent to a better school in Isleworth, near 
London, where he mainly learned Latin, French, and mathematics. At the age of 
seventeen, Bray began to work in a large warehouse in London. He was converted by 
an evangelical neighbour and became a zealous evangelical. He pointed out that at that 
time he felt that his mind was tranquil and many of his bad habits and bad tempers 
were adjusted under the evangelical belief. His leisure time was mostly spent in private 
religious reading and devotional exercises. 
In 1830, Bray returned to his father’s warehouse in Coventry and encountered a 
Unitarian minister of the Great Meeting House. When he was debating with the 
Unitarian minister on the doctrine of Trinity, he realised that his theological knowledge 
was very much insufficient, and that his religious zeal had blinded him to criticisms of 
his belief. He began to read the Bible and its theological interpretations critically, but 
he did this with ‘fear and trembling’, since he felt that this freedom of thought was ‘a 
direct temptation of the Devil’ (12). Bray began to suffer the most severe crisis of faith 
in his life. He wrote: ‘The next year was certainly the most miserable year of my life. I 
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had given up my faith, and with it many of my dearest friends. I had no faith, no friends, 
and I had to begin to build my life over again; my mind was in a complete anarchy, or in 
a state of blank despair’ (16). Bray decided to no longer ignore criticisms of religious 
beliefs, and to take a rationalist view that truths should not conflict with each other. As 
Christian denominations usually conflicted with each other in their doctrines, he 
gradually lost confidence in all sects of Christianity. 
While Bray was struggling to find a new philosophical, theological, and ethical 
foundation for his mind, he came across The Freedom of Will (1754) written by 
American leading Calvinist theologian Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758). In Edwards’ 
book, Bray found what he called ‘Philosophy of Necessity’. Edwards proposed a 
deterministic view of human will: he considered that humans had no normal sense of 
free will, that human’s will was determined by external and internal conditions and was 
pre-deposited by God, and that God was the absolute sovereign of the universe who 
ordered everything in the world.331 Since God was preserved, Bray found that Edwards’ 
philosophy satisfied his belief in God. He eagerly took this philosophy as his new 
foundation of thought. Bray conceived the basic doctrine of the philosophy of necessity 
as the idea that ‘everything acted necessarily in accordance with its own nature, and 
that there was no freedom of choice beyond this’ (17). After he drew out an ethical 
system based on the philosophy of necessity, Bray felt relieved from the crisis of faith. 
He felt that he had ‘emancipated’ (19) himself from the very limited view of his formal 
sect and ‘gained a whole beautiful world’ (19). He also felt ‘happier’ (19) since he could 
reconcile evils with the justice of God by his ethical system. Basically, he held that all 
partial evils were beneficial for the ‘general good’ (19). Bray considered that since 
everything was determined, if he tried his best but still could not solve a bad issue, then 
he could stop struggling and leave the issue to God trusting that God had a plan for 
using this evil to achieve the general good. 
                                                     
331 Avihu Zakai, Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003), p. 320. 
 
125 
 
    Bray reflected that he had been interested in physical science since his school days,332 
but he had not received a decent scientific training. After he became a non-sectarian in 
his early twenties, he was much more willing to rely on scientific doctrines rather than 
religious doctrines, and he became a supporter of secular education and social reforms. 
In 1835, when he was writing a course of lectures on education to be delivered at the 
Mechanics’ Institution in Coventry,333 he chanced upon George Combe’s Phrenology.334 
He was greatly attracted to phrenology. He wrote: ‘if true, the system was much more 
practically applicable to education than any other with which I had been previously 
acquainted’ (22). Bray considered that he was not introduced to free will but was to the 
natural laws of mind in phrenology, so he saw phrenology as a science of mind that was 
in accordance with his fundamental conviction—the philosophy of necessity. He had 
such a strong interest in phrenology that he applied it to his educational works and 
conducted phrenological studies himself. Phrenology soon became another pillar of his 
thought. Phrenology also drew him to consider the unity of the mental and the physical 
as phrenologists tried to establish connections between mind and body. 
In addition to the philosophy of necessity and phrenology, Bray also adopted 
empiricism in his first systemic philosophical work The Philosophy of Necessity (1841).335 
This work showed that he was keen on using scientific methods and scientific theories 
to sustain his philosophical and religious views. He aimed to build a philosophical and 
moral system based on the philosophy of necessity and empiricism, also drawing on 
phrenology. He announced that he was adopting the experimental philosophy of 
English philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–1626) as the methodology of his speculation. 
In his discussion of knowledge and of the relations between intellectual facilities and 
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the external world, Bray based his views on the theories of empiricists John Locke, David 
Hume, Thomas Brown, and John Stuart Mill. He defined consciousness as the 
aggregation of sensations and claimed that we knew nothing outside sensations.336 
Bray applied this scepticism on the knowability of the external world to his view of 
matter and spirit. He claimed that ‘[m]atter is known to us only as the cause of certain 
sensations which we call by various names, as solidity, extension, &c., but whether this 
cause be material or immaterial, we have no means of determining’.337 He showed a 
tendency to dismiss the division of matter and spirit in this work which was later 
developed into a more definite form. 
Bray retired from business in 1856. He spent his time writing on philosophical subjects. 
In 1866, Bray recalled reading physicist William Robert Grove’s (1811–1896) The 
Correlation of Physical Forces, and this inspired Bray to put his philosophy of necessity, 
phrenology, and empiricism to work in discussions about the correlation of forces. Bray 
recalled that at that time he ‘could not see why correlation could stop at the physical 
forces, and why it should not be extended to mental force. Mind is a force, coming to 
us through the food we eat, and under the molecular action of the brain what is called 
physical force becomes subjective conscious force, or mind, and loses than its objective 
character as a force of motion, which it resumes under the action of the will’ (97-98). 
He came up with a pantheistic philosophy on matter, force, mind, and God. He 
developed his theory in On Force, and its Mental Correlates (1866) and clarified it in 
‘Physics and Metaphysics’ (1869), Illusion and Delusion (1873), Natural Law (1874), and 
his autobiography. He used theories from scientific figures, such as John Tyndall, 
Thomas Huxley, Herbert Spencer, William Grove (1811–1896), James Hinton, Hans 
Christian Oersted (1777–1851), Humphry Davy, and Henry Maudsley (1835–1918) to 
support his pantheism. He aimed to build his theory upon contemporary physics. 
Although Bray suffered a crisis of faith in his early twenties and became a non-
sectarian, his strong belief in the existence of God made him unwilling to be totally 
secular, and he found pantheism, which in his view was the deification of nature, a 
logical choice for him. He reflected in his autobiography that ‘I am no Agnostic; to me 
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God is not an unknown God; I may not know the mode of his Being or Working, but He 
is known to me as everything else is, by what He does’ (199). 
There is one more thing worth noting here, that Bray died a pantheist. His 
autobiography was finished a few weeks before his death, and he gave some final 
reflections on death, immorality, and the meaning of life. Bray did not believe that he 
could continue his individuality in the form of soul in another world after the death of 
his body, and neither did he wish to retain his individuality forever. He wrote that 
‘[b]ody and soul make a man: when they are separated neither can retain its identity. I 
am very thankful for the long term of happy life that has been allotted me. I am quite 
willing to retire and make room for some better fellow to come after me. We cannot 
die. Our individuality may be lost. But is the individuality of the very best of us worth 
retaining? Much less that of the great multitude’ (205). Bray did not believe that the 
disappearance of his individuality would be the death of him. As he quoted from an 
unknown source: ‘We live in the Eternal Order, and the Eternal Order never dies’ (205). 
He pointed out that such a view was well expressed in Constance Caroline Woodhill 
Naden’s ‘Pantheist’s Song of Immorality’.338 He quoted her verses at the end of his 
autobiography: ‘Yes, thou shall die; but these almighty forces, | That meet to form thee, 
live for evermore’ (206). His final words demonstrated that pantheism could satisfy a 
Victorian’s religious needs. 
 
                                                     
338 Bray, Phrases, p. 206. Constance Caroline Woodhill Naden (1858–1889), English poet and 
philosopher, was a supporter of evolutionary ethics. Her works followed closely to that of 
Spencer’s. See, S. M. den Otter, ‘Naden, Constance Caroline Woodhill (1858–1889)’, in ODNB 
<https://www.oxforddnb.com/> [accessed 12 August 2018]. 
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2.8 Constance E. Plumptre (1848–1929), Writer on Occult 
Philosophies and Supporter of Secularism  
2.8.1 Plumptre’s Life and Publications 
Constance E. Plumptre was born in an upper-middle-class family in Kensington, London. 
339  Her father Charles John Plumptre (1818–1887) was a barrister and writer on 
elocution. Beside Constance, Charles had two sons Reginald E. Plumptre and Claude C. 
M. Plumptre, and both were lawyers.340 The Plumptre family had some famous figures. 
Constance’s uncle Edward Hayes Plumptre (1821–1891) was the dean of Wells, and 
Anne Plumptre (1760–1818) and Bell (or Annabella) Plumptre (1761–1838), female 
translators and writers, were Constance’s ancestors.341 The biographical information on 
Constance is not abundant. There is a small entry for her in The Feminist Companion to 
Literature in English (1990), but there was no entry for her in the ODNB, and there are 
no mentions of her in the studies of relevant Victorian female intellectuals, such as 
Women’s Theology in Nineteenth-Century Britain Transfiguring the Faith of Their 
Fathers (1998), and Infidel Feminism: Secularism, Religion and Women's Emancipation, 
England 1830–1914 (2013).342 
    Many of Plumptre’s writings are however accessible. Her first publication was 
General Sketch of the History of Pantheism which was first published in 1878 and 1879 
in two volumes. This was where she expressed her support for pantheism. Her 
enthusiasm on pantheism, science, and the reconciliation of pantheism and science was 
                                                     
339  Anon, ‘England and Wales Census, 1861’, in Family Search <https://familysearch.org/> 
[accessed 20 March 2015]. 
340  Anon, ‘England and Wales Census, 1871’, in Family Search <https://familysearch.org/> 
[accessed 20 March 2015]. 
341  Richard Garnett, ‘Plumptre, John Charles’ in ODNB <https://www.oxforddnb.com/> 
[accessed 12 August 2018]; Virginia Blain, Patricia Clements, and Isobel Grundy, The Feminist 
Companion to Literature in English (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 860–61. 
342 Julie Melnyk ed., Women’s Theology in Nineteenth-Century Britain Transfiguring the Faith of 
Their Fathers (New York: Garland, 1998); Laura Schwartz, Infidel feminism (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2013). 
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revealed in this work. She regarded pantheism as an ancient truth and the only rational 
and naturalistic religion that could be in harmony with modern science. She then wrote 
many periodical papers on occult philosophies of historical pantheists notably Giordano 
Bruno (1548–1600) and Lucilio Vanini (1585–1619). Her novel Giordano Bruno: A Tale 
of the Sixteenth Century was published in 1884. Her monograph, Natural Causation: An 
Essay in Four Parts, was published in 1888, showing her interests in the philosophy of 
necessity and secular ethics. A collection of her periodical essays, Studies in Little-
Known Subjects, was published in 1898. Among them, there were essays such as 
‘Charles Bradlaugh: An Appeal’ (1891) and ‘The Higher Secularism’ (1894) showing her 
support for secular ethics and her sympathy towards the freethought and secularism 
movement of Holyoake and Bradlaugh. She argued that a secular ethical system with 
secular happiness as the highest pursuit was far better than a supernatural ethical 
system with unknowable gods and the afterlife as its core. Many of her essays were 
published in the leading radical periodical, the Westminster Review, and in the historical 
magazine, the Antiquary. On the Progress of Liberty of Thought during Queen Victoria's 
Reign (1902) was her last book, in which she gave an account of the development of 
political and religious liberty in the Victorian era. 
    From her writings, it can be inferred that she received a good education in literature, 
science, philosophy, language, and elocution. She read many of Spencer’s writings when 
she was a little girl, and it was probably because of these writings that she became 
interested in science, philosophy, and freethought.343 She was also an admirer of the 
contemporary female writer George Eliot (1819–1880), whose insights in Plumptre’s 
view ‘surpass[ed] not only Charles Dickens, but almost all the great writers of her 
time’.344 In Plumptre’s works on Bruno and Vanini, she showed a great interest in their 
pantheism and their virtues of freethinking. Her interest in pantheism might be caused 
by the combined influence of her reading of Spencer and her studies of historical 
                                                     
343 In a letter to Tyndall’s wife Louisa Tyndall on 15 December 1903, Plumptre wrote that she 
read Spencer’s writings when she was a little girl. See London, Royal Institution, MS Constance 
Plumptre, LT68/10. 
344 Constance Plumptre, Natural Causation (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1888), p. 54. 
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pantheists. In a late reflection of the reasons of her historical study on pantheism and 
pantheists, she pointed out that she intended to use the stories of pantheists to prove 
the legitimacy of the battle for the liberty of thought in her time.345 She believed that it 
was right and necessary to contest the authority of Christianity, which she considered 
was not based on reason but on superstition. Bruno’s and Vanini’s contests against 
Christian authorities were brave examples for her. 
The England and Wales Census in 1881 showed that at the age of 33, Plumptre lived 
with her father and worked as a lecturer on elocution in King’s College, London, and as 
a writer on philosophical subjects. 346  Plumptre took the housekeeping role since 
seventeen for more than twenty years until her father died in 1887 and one of her 
brothers inherited the house.347 As a woman, she did not have the right to own the 
house at that time. There is no record found about her husband or offspring. 
 
2.8.2 Plumptre’s Support for Pantheism 
Plumptre mainly expressed her views of pantheism in General Sketch of the History of 
Pantheism.348 The first volume and the first part of the second volume were historical 
accounts of pantheism, and the second part of the second volume was where Plumptre 
presented her arguments for pantheism. Besides several other periodical articles on 
historic pantheists, Plumptre did not write on pantheism again later in her life. Her 
views were less religious compared to other figures. She focused more on the 
philosophical value of pantheism and regarded pantheism as unpractical due to the 
problem of evil. She sided with the camp of freethought and appeared as a secularist 
                                                     
345 Constance Plumptre, Studies in Little-Known Subjects (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 
1898), p. 59. 
346  Anon, ‘England and Wales Census, 1881’, in Family Search <https://familysearch.org/> 
[accessed 20 March 2015]. 
347 Gould, ‘Miss Constance Plumptre’, in Chats with Pioneers of Modern Thought, pp. 28-33 (p. 
31). 
348 Constance E. Plumptre, General Sketch of the History of Pantheism, 2 vols (London: Samuel 
Deacon & Co., 1878–79). The numbers in brackets after quotations from Plumptre in the next 
paragraphs are page numbers of the second volume of this work. 
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rather than a religious person. It can be inferred that she did not consider that religion 
was a necessity for all people, but she did consider that pantheism was the best religious 
choice if a religion was needed. 
Plumptre defined pantheism as a belief in the unified, infinite, eternal, and 
inscrutable reality of which all phenomena were manifestations. She wrote that ‘if 
Pantheism have any meaning at all it has that implied by a belief in a Reality of which 
Nature is the substantial manifestation’ (263), and that ‘Pantheism […] conceives God 
to be a Power, Eternal, Infinite, (and because Infinite, necessarily beyond our 
comprehension) disclosing Itself alike through every form and phenomenon of Nature’ 
(317). Plumptre considered that it made no sense to define reality as material or 
spiritual, since both material and spiritual phenomena were manifestations of reality. 
She considered pantheism a higher monism than ordinary materialism or spiritualism. 
She wrote that ‘sooner or later they [materialism and spiritualism] are forced to 
coalesce, and each must be lost in the other’ (300). Plumptre pointed out that in 
pantheism God was identical with the universe in the sense that God was the reality of 
the universe, but not in the sense that God was the collection of all phenomena. She 
wrote that ‘[i]t [Pantheism] does not identify God with perishable matter; but rather 
conceives Him to be related to matter somewhat as the soul is to the body’ (317). She 
also implied that when using the word ‘God’ to address reality, pantheists were 
emphasising the divine feelings caused by contemplating the unity, infinity, eternality, 
and incomprehensibility of reality. 
According to this very broad definition, she considered that pantheism was pervasive 
but hidden in history. She wrote that ‘there are few men […] who have not occasionally 
had their moments of Pantheism: when they have felt that of all religions the religion 
of Pantheism is the most noble and the most elevated’; however, ‘Religious men, for 
the most part, do not speak of themselves as disciples of Pantheism in the same way 
that they denominate themselves disciples of Brahminism or Judaism, of Catholicism or 
Protestantism’.349 Plumptre believed that pantheism was an ancient truth that existed 
in most if not all great religions. She also strongly believed that those great religions 
were founded on religious truth, but that they had suffered corruptions as the time 
                                                     
349 Plumptre, General, I, p. 10. 
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went on. The Vedas, the Ionian School, the Eleatics, and Jesus Christ represented great 
religions or great systems of philosophy; while the Hindu religions, Brahmanism, the 
scholastic theology, and various Churches of Christianity were their corrupted 
successors of idol worship and polytheism. Even though the latter religions were 
corrupted, she believed that pantheism never died and could be always found in their 
creeds. 
    Plumptre also portrayed pantheism as a religious position that was most in 
accordance with science. She claimed that ‘Pantheism is, of all the religious solutions, 
the most in accordance with scientific discoveries’ (277). Spencer’s influence was 
apparent as she quoted Spencer constantly. She implied that Spencer was a defender 
of pantheism. She wrote: ‘if I read Mr. Spencer aright, all Matter and all Mind; all 
Religion and all Science; in a word, the whole of mental, moral, and material 
phenomena are in his opinion but the various manifestations of the great 
incomprehensible Unity that runs through all’ (268). Also, after a two-page quotation 
from Spencer’s First Principles, she wrote: ‘We do not think we could quote a more 
suggestive passage as an argument for the truth of Pantheism than the above passage 
from the great philosopher of this century’ (314–15). She also considered that many 
agnostics were pantheists. She wrote: ‘Agnosticism, […] even its believers frequently, 
perhaps almost unconsciously, imply a belief in Pantheism’ (262). John Tyndall was also 
frequently cited by Plumptre when she contradicted pantheism with common-sense 
materialism. She considered that common-sense materialism confused phenomena 
with reality. However, if materialism involved an inscrutable existence underlying 
matter, like Tyndall’s scientific materialism, then she would consider this kind of 
materialism to be pantheism. She wrote that ‘Materialism in its transcendental sense 
may indeed be imagined to be Universal Existence without beginning or end, but then 
this form of materialism is in reality Pantheism’ (276). More of her uses of modern 
sciences will be introduced in the next three chapters of this dissertation. 
 
Reviews of her work were mixed. An advertisement in the Academy quoted several 
positive reviews. The Westminster Review claimed that ‘[t]he section on Vanini alone 
deserves to be called exceptionally original’; the Spectator, an independent review of 
politics, literature, theology, and art, considered that ‘[t]he interest is strong enough to 
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carry the reader pleasantly enough to the end of the volume’; and the Unitarian Organ, 
the Inquirer, commented that the work was ‘[i]nteresting and well written’.350 However 
there were many critical voices. In a review of Plumptre’s second volume in the 
Evangelical Nonconformist journal, the British Quarterly Review, the reviewer stated: 
‘We confess we can suggest no reason why this book should have been published’.351 
The reviewer pointed out that ‘[t]he writer of this book has conceived a violent affection 
for what he calls Pantheism, and he therefore sets to work to write about it’ (577-78), 
and ‘[h]e often extends the term very much further, so as apparently to include all in 
whom there has been a spirit of religiosity without any definite dogmatic theory. […] 
Pantheism becomes simply the natural religious instinct’ (578). 352  The reviewer 
criticised Plumptre’s logic claiming that ‘[v]ery plainly we must not look for logic in this 
book’ (578). In another review of the same journal reviewing Plumptre’s other edition 
of the work, the reviewer also claimed that Plumptre’s work was ‘philosophically 
inexact and historically misleading’.353 The Dublin University Magazine, a short-lived 
literary and philosophic review journal, also pointed out that Plumptre was logically 
inconsistent or at fault in some places.354 The radical journal, the Examiner, stated their 
stance that ‘[w]e are very sorry to have to differ from so evidently enthusiastic and 
devout a Pantheist’.355 Besides criticising Plumptre’s philosophical views of pantheism, 
the reviewer also pointed out that this work looked like a chunk of notes rather than an 
introductory book to the history of pantheism. 
 
                                                     
350 Anon, ‘Advertisement’, Academy, 359 (1879), 5. 
351 Anon, ‘General Sketch of the History of pantheism’, British Quarterly Review, 136 (1878), 
577–78 (577). 
352 Plumptre’s work was published anonymously first, thus the reviewer used ‘he’ to address 
her. 
353 Anon, ‘Book Review’, British Quarterly Review, 142 (1880), 554–56. 
354 Anon, ‘Book Review’, Dublin University Magazine, November 1878, 639–40. 
355 Anon, ‘General Sketch of the History of Pantheism’, Examiner, 3717 (1879), 532–33 (p. 532). 
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2.9 Conclusion 
Pantheism in Victorian Britain appears in the current historiography as a religious 
position that attracted those who were dissatisfied with Christianity or as a religious 
position that was inherently atheistic and anti-Christian. From examining the lives and 
pantheisms of eight advocates of pantheism, we learn that there were certainly some 
advocates of pantheism who became interested in pantheism because they were 
disappointed by Christianity, but there were also many advocates of pantheism who did 
not leave their Christian Churches and did not consider pantheism to be in conflict with 
their Christian beliefs. Also, panentheism, or higher pantheism, was not the only form 
of pantheism Christians could adopt in Victorian Britain, and the stricter form of 
pantheism, that fully identified God and the universe, could also be made suitable for 
Christians, as the examples of Hunt and Barratt show. The Christian thinkers who 
opposed the form of pantheism that fully identified God and the world were concerned 
about the implications of such a theory with moral problems about the potential losses 
of free will, of moral responsibility, and of the distinction between good and evil. 
However, these problems could be explained away if humans were seen as 
manifestations of God, meaning that God’s free will was human’s free will, and if the 
notions of good and evil were understood in terms of perfection and imperfection, or 
benefit and harm. 
When comparing these eight figures, we can see that they focused on different 
aspects of pantheism. On the speculative side, Hunt and Plumptre treated pantheism 
as a rational and freethinking theology; Martineau and Poynting treated pantheism as 
the belief that God never left the universe, opposing deism; Hinton and Barratt treated 
pantheism as a religious position that saw the universe as a united life and 
consciousness; Bray treated pantheism as a theology for necessitarians; and Picton saw 
pantheism in the form of Spinozism and Biblical criticism. On the practical side, Hunt 
and Plumptre did not care to apply their views of pantheism in religious practice; Hinton, 
Picton, Martineau, Poynting, and Barratt proposed different reform schemes of 
religious practice; and Bray developed his personal practice of pantheism to inspire 
others. Their views of pantheism were very different as were their foci. Their different 
foci reflect their different goals in advocating pantheism. Hunt and Plumptre required 
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reason to be the highest standard in theology; Martineau and Poynting needed God to 
govern the world unceasingly; Hinton was enthusiastic in the view that everything was 
alive; Barratt was in favour of the evolutionary view of consciousness, morality, and 
religion; Bray sought a religious position that both maintained God and the philosophy 
of necessity; and Picton sought a religious position that would be forever in accordance 
with rationalism and science. The differences in their views and purposes demonstrate 
that they did not share a common scheme. Most of them were rather isolated and 
independent from each other. Besides Martineau and Poynting, there is yet no evidence 
to show that they had any personal contact. 
The figures discussed in this chapter show that pantheism in Victorian Britain was not 
a coherent religious position. Advocates of pantheism could oppose each other in the 
key issues of whether God and the world were fully identical, whether there were 
supernatural existences or not, whether the world was determined or not, whether 
common-sense freewill existed or not, whether pantheism could be practiced or not, 
and whether Christian churches should be maintained or overthrown. They did, 
however, share some similarities. They believed in the existence of God although they 
held different views of God, they highly valued reason and science, they were troubled 
by the unstable state of faith in Victorian Britain, and they tried to find a position where 
religion and the progress of scientific knowledge would be reconciled while religion did 
not retreat from the intellectual arena. They were dissatisfied with various traditional 
Christian theologies as they found that these theologies were not philosophical enough 
to satisfy their intellectual needs; they were against the deistic solution as deism 
distanced God from the world to the extent of atheism; they did not accept materialism, 
since a dead universe was intellectually and emotionally unconvincing for them. 
Pantheism, the belief of an immanent God and a living universe in whatever sense, was 
their final answer. They found in pantheism a world where God was forever with nature 
and humans, natural powers and laws were not blind or mechanical but were 
intellectual and purposeful, science and religion were naturally reconciled since their 
objects were the same thing—nature and God were the same thing or largely identical, 
and religion, like science, no longer needed to be bound by infallible doctrines. Science 
was always an important element in their writings on pantheism and the next three 
chapters of this dissertation will focus on their uses of science. 
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3     
Pantheistic Uses of the Science of Force 
Physics in the Victorian era was remarkable for achievements of grand unifying theories 
and quantitative analyses. The theories of the correlation of forces, the conservation of 
force, and the conservation of energy were heated topics in the mid-Victorian era. 
Mathematical methods became widely used and fostered new disciplines, such as 
energy physics, thermodynamics, and electromagnetism. Advocates of pantheism were 
in favour of unifying theories of force, as these theories opened new avenues for 
pantheistic interpretations about the relationship between God and the world. In this 
chapter, I bring in five advocates of pantheism—Martineau, Poynting, Picton, Plumptre, 
and Bray—and analyse how they made use of scientific practitioners’ concepts and 
theories of force. The popular physical theories among these pantheistic figures were 
the correlation theories of force of which physicist William Grove and physiologist 
William Carpenter (1813–1885) were famous advocates, the idea of the conservation 
of force which was often associated with physicist Michael Faraday, the matter-as-force 
theories of which Faraday was a famous advocate, and the idea of the unity of mind in 
nature proposed notably by German idealistic physicist Hans Christian Oersted. 
Martineau and Poynting made associations between force and will, and they turned 
unifying theories of force into supports for their view of the existence of a unifying will 
in nature. Picton and Plumptre also made use of unifying theories of force to support 
their view that reality was a united being, though different from the two Unitarians, 
they did not associate force with will. Bray went further than the others. He made the 
concept of force the fundamental concept of his pantheism, and he identified force with 
God. In the first part of this chapter, I introduce relevant scientific concepts and theories 
of force, and in the second part of the chapter, I analyse how each advocate of 
pantheism made use of these theories. The mathematical developments in physics, 
such as Newtonian mathematical mechanics and energy physics, were generally 
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ignored by advocates of pantheism. Thus, they are generally not discussed in this 
chapter. 
 
3.1 Scientific Theories of Force 
3.1.1 The Concept of Force  
The concepts of force, the conversion of forces, the correlation of forces, and the 
conservation of force were core concepts of Victorian physics.356 The meaning of the 
scientific concept of force was never fully settled among Victorian scientific 
practitioners.357 There were generally two kinds of major treatments of the concept—
a mathematical treatment and an intuitive understanding. In the mathematical context, 
‘force’ was mostly treated as a vector representing the direction and quantity of an 
attraction or a repulsion acting on an object and responsible for its change of motion.358 
The force acting upon an object could be measured by the mass of the object times its 
acceleration. It was usually represented by the formula: F=ma. This treatment of force 
can be traced back to Isaac Newton (1643–1727), whose Principia (1687) lay the 
mathematical foundation of classical physics. The ontological nature of force in the 
mathematical context was usually left open to debate, and it made no sense to discuss 
whether this kind of force was conserved or not.359 In the wider context, especially in 
popular conceptions, ‘force’ was generally treated in a more intuitive way as a kind of 
entity or abstraction of certain physical phenomena. Different from concrete solids, 
liquids, and gases that were usually called ‘matter’, forces were more subtle, ethereal, 
                                                     
356 Steven N. Shore has presented a general history of the concept of force in his Forces in 
Physics—A Historical Perspective (Westport: Greenwood, 2008). 
357  Yehuda Elkana, The Discovery of the Conservation of Energy (London: Hutchinson 
Educational, 1974), p. 17. 
358 For example, see the handbook for students of the London University: John C. Thresh, Physics, 
Experimental and Mathematical (London: W. Stewart, 1884). 
359 Thomas L. Hankins, Science and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), pp. 13–16. 
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and active things. The common forces were heat, light, electricity, magnetism, chemical 
affinity, gravity, motion, and inertia. Many popular scientific books, such as William 
Grove’s The Correlation of Physical Forces (1846) and Michael Faraday’s On the Various 
Forces of Nature and Their Relations to Each Other (1860), treated the term ‘force’ in 
this way. Contrary to the mathematical conception of force, the intuitive conception of 
force left much room for ontological speculations. The conversion of forces, the 
correlation of forces, and the conservation of force were discussed under this 
conception. 
In the religious context, the second treatment of force was far more popular than the 
first one. While the mathematical conception of force was too abstract to be used in 
the religious context, the second, the more intuitive conception of force could inspire 
theological and philosophical discussions about the ontological state of the universe. 
The treatment of force as entity was also linked to an even broader human intuition. 
The Victorians could intuitively conceive that nature was composed by causative agents 
and inert materials.360 This dualistic view could be attributed to human’s sense of mind 
and body.361 By analogy, forces, as they were active agents, could be associated with 
mind, will, soul, and spirit. This possible association gave rise to many religious ideas, 
and many advocates of pantheism made use of this association as we shall see later. 
Although advocates of pantheism were not concerned about the scientific enterprise 
of energy, they sometimes used the term ‘energy’ as a synonym of force, indicating 
some kind of power in nature. Energy physics was a very important development of 
Victorian physics. The term ‘energy’ was brought into the scientific context by Scottish 
engineering physicist William Thomson (1824–1907) around 1850, and the famous 
mathematical doctrine of the conservation of energy was coined by German physicist 
                                                     
360 Charles Coulston Gillispie, The Edge of Objectivity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1960), p. 400. 
361 Moritz Schlick, Philosophy of Nature, trans. by A. von Zeppelin (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1949). Elkana cited this in Elkana, Conservation of Energy, p. 17. 
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Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894) in this period.362 The concepts of energy and 
force were strictly different in a hard science context. The concept of energy can be 
traced back to the concept of vis viva (living force) of German philosopher Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716).363 Leibniz’s vis viva was defined as mass times squared 
velocity. The term ‘energy’ was defined as the capacity to do work. Leibniz’s formula of 
vis viva was used as a measurement of a form of energy—kinetic energy (E = mv2). A 
constant force acting on an object was said to do work on it. The work the force done 
could be measured by the force times the distance travelled by the object (W = fs). It 
could also be said that the object gained this amount of kinetic energy from the source 
that exerted the force upon the object. The quantity of the changed kinetic energy of 
the object could be made equal with the work of the force done on it by adding 
parameters (fs = ½mv22 - ½mv12). This equation can be interpreted as that the energy of 
the source of force is transferred to the object as its kinetic energy. The doctrine of the 
conservation of energy asserts the possibility of making equations between 
measurements. Both the concept of energy and the doctrine of the conservation of 
energy could be treated as purely mathematical without indicating any real entity. 
Thomson criticised those who tried to treat energy as having an absolute existence.364 
However, the concept of energy had a great potential to be treated intuitively as some 
kind of universal entity. In the Victorian religious context, ‘energy’ was commonly 
treated as a synonym of Faraday and Grove’s ‘force’, and ‘the conservation of energy’ 
was often treated as a synonym of ‘the conservation of force’. 
 
                                                     
362 See, for example, Crosbie Smith, The Science of Energy—A Cultural History of Energy Physics 
in Victorian Britain (London: The Athlone Press, 1998), pp. 1–2; and P. M. Harman, Energy, Force 
and Matter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 41. 
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3.1.2 The Correlation of Forces and the Conservation of Force 
Thomas Kuhn estimates that the ideas of the conversion and the correlation of forces 
became central to nineteenth-century physics in the 1830s.365 If a force was observed 
to produce another one, physicists could claim that the former force was ‘converted’ to 
the latter force during the process. Some conversions of forces had been known for 
centuries and some were established by experimental physicists in former decades 
before the 1830s. It had been known for centuries that magnetism could produce 
motion when a magnet attracted iron, that motion could produce electricity through 
friction, that electricity could produce motion when a electrostatic charged object 
attracted things, that electricity could produce heat when lightening hit something, that 
electricity could produce light as lightening was visible, that heat could produce motion 
as steam engine was built upon this effect, that motion could produce heat through 
friction, and that chemical affinity could produce heat and light as combustion and 
many other chemical reactions showed. If two forces could mutually produce each 
other, then physicists could see them as ‘correlated’. From these long-known 
conversions, motion and electricity, and motion and heat were correlates. 
The correlation of electricity and chemical affinity was established after the discovery 
of the Galvanic or Voltaic current by Italian physicists Luigi Aloisio Galvani (1737–1798) 
and Alessandro Volta (1745–1827) in the 1790s and the discovery of electrolysis by 
English surgeon Anthony Carlisle (1768–1840) and chemist William Nicholson (1753–
1815) in the early 1800s. Galvani and Volta discovered that a circuit of two different 
metals and a moist conductor could produce an electric current.366 Their discovery 
showed that chemical affinity could produce electricity. Volta invented the Voltaic pile, 
or the Voltaic battery. Carlisle and Nicholson soon used the Voltaic battery to 
decompose water and discovered electrolysis. Their discovery showed that electricity 
could also produce chemical affinity, and thus closed the circle of electricity and 
chemical affinity. The correlation of electricity and magnetism was established through 
                                                     
365  Thomas Kuhn, ‘Energy Conservation as an Example of Simultaneous Discovery’, in The 
Essential Tension (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 66–104 (p. 75). 
366 Hankins, Science and the Enlightenment, p. 72. 
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discoveries of electromagnetic phenomena. In 1820, Danish physicist Hans Christian 
Oersted demonstrated that magnetic effects could be produced by electric current, and 
he called this effect electromagnetism. In 1831, Michael Faraday discovered 
electromagnetic induction finding that a change of magnetism could produce an electric 
current. Their discoveries closed the circle of magnetism and electricity. The correlation 
of heat and electricity was established after several discoveries of thermoelectric 
effects. In 1822, Baltic German physicist Thomas Johann Seebeck (1770–1831) 
demonstrated that a heated bimetallic junction would produce an electric current.367 In 
1834, French physicist Jean Charles Athanase Peltier (1785–1845) discovered that heat 
might be produced or absorbed when a current flowed through a bimetallic junction. 
Their discoveries showed that heat and electricity could be considered a correlate. In 
1831, Macedonio Melloni (1798–1854) discovered radiant heat and considered it 
similar to light. His discovery implied that the correlation between light and heat could 
be established by identifying them as one same thing. 
Kuhn points out that with this rapid increase in evidence, physicists began to actively 
apply the ideas of the correlation of forces in their research from 1830.368 Isolated 
discoveries were gathered together to form an idea of universal convertibility. The idea 
that all kinds of forces were convertible into each other was speculated by many 
physicists, notably William Grove and Michael Faraday. 
The idea of the conservation of force constitutes one step further to the idea of the 
correlation of forces. The idea of the correlation of forces affirms that forces can be 
converted into each other, but it does not imply that forces are not destroyed partially 
or that new forces are not created during the conversion. The idea of the conservation 
of force is not inherent to the idea of the correlation of forces. Kuhn has argued that 
the principle of the equality of cause and effect, that a cause and its effect is equal in 
some vague sense, was often a belief among Victorian scientific practitioners; and that 
the idea of universal convertibility leads to the idea of universal conservation when this 
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principle is applied.369 Faraday was the name the Victorians usually came up with when 
mentioning the idea of the conservation of force. 
 
3.1.2.1 William Grove and the Correlation of physical forces 
William Grove was among the first physicists who advocated the idea of the universal 
correlation of forces. He claimed that the first public occasion where he promulgated 
the idea of the correlation of forces was his inaugural lecture, titled ‘On the progress of 
physical science since the opening of the London Institution’, delivered at the London 
Institution on 19 January 1842.370 Grove developed this idea more fully in a course of 
lectures at the London Institution in 1843. After that, he related this idea closely with 
his physical experiments and promoted it actively in many public lectures.371 Grove’s 
idea of the correlation of forces culminated in his book The Correlation of Physical 
Forces, published in 1846. It was the first ‘popular exposition’ of the idea of the 
correlation of forces in Britain.372 The book was very influential. It went through five 
more editions published successively in 1850, 1855, 1862, 1867, and 1874. The central 
argument of this work remained the same throughout these editions, but Grove greatly 
updated and extended his evidence in every edition. 
    Grove’s main argument was that ‘the various affections of matter which constitute 
the main objects of experimental physics, viz., heat, light, electricity, magnetism, 
chemical affinity, and motion, are all correlative, or have a reciprocal dependence; […] 
that either may produce or be convertible into, any of the others’ (15–16). It is 
noticeable that Grove called physical forces ‘affections of matter’ in the main body of 
the book. The word ‘affection’ in his book meant ‘a state, condition, or relation which 
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is temporary or not essential to the object; a mode of being’,373 so the phrase ‘affections 
of matter’ can be interpreted as states of matter, conditions of matter, or modes of 
matter. Generally, Grove used ‘affections of matter’ and ‘physical forces’ 
interchangeably. Grove acknowledged that the word ‘force’ was ‘used in very different 
senses by different authors’ (16). In a narrow sense, he defined force as ‘that which 
produces or resists motion’ (16), similar to the mathematical conception of force. 
However, he tended to use the term in a broader sense as ‘an abstract or generalised 
expression’ (18) of ‘active principle’ (16). Affections of matter were certainly active 
principles since they could produce each other. The difference between his uses of 
these terms was subtle. When using ‘affections of matter’, Grove highlighted the 
observable contents of things, and when using ‘forces’, Grove emphasised on the 
‘producer’ (19) role of things. 
Grove argued for the correlation of any two affections by experiments showing or 
implying that they directly or indirectly produced each other. If the decrease of an 
affection usually accompanied the increase of another affection, then the former 
affection was said to produce or to be converted into the latter. Grove’s main objective 
was to prove that the above-mentioned affections of matter could produce each other. 
The ways affections produced each other were not limited to direct productions, and 
how exactly affections produced each other was not a major concern for Grove in this 
work. For example, in the fourth edition, Grove pointed out that ‘Magnetism can […] 
through the medium of electricity, produce heat, light, and chemical affinity. Motion it 
can directly produce under the above conditions’ (193). Grove admitted that the 
processes of conversion were largely unknown, moreover, the natures of affections 
were mostly unknown. But he considered that his theory of the correlation of these six 
affections was well defended since there was much evidence showing their mutual 
productions. There were four other affections of matter he discussed shortly—catalysis, 
gravitation, inertia, and aggregation. He believed that they were correlated with other 
affections, but he had relatively less evidence to support their correlations. 
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Grove’s evidence included many classical phenomena and new scientific discoveries. 
For example, in the fourth edition, he mentioned that ‘Light also is readily produced by 
motion, either directly, as when accompanying the heat of friction, or mediately, by 
electricity resulting from motion’ (41); that ‘[i]n the decompositions and compositions 
which the terminal points proceeding from the conductors of an electrical machine 
develop when immersed in different chemical media, we get the production of chemical 
affinity by electricity, of which motion is the initial source’ (42); and that ‘[m]agnetism, 
as was proved by the important discovery of Faraday, will produce electricity, but with 
this peculiarity—that in itself it is static’ (190). His evidential base grew larger and larger 
edition after edition as new scientific discoveries emerged year after year. In the final 
1874 edition, he attached a 222-page-long list of experimental investigations to 
substantiate his thesis. 
    Grove also speculated on the possibility of the universal correlation of all physical 
phenomena. He considered that ‘no physical phenomenon can stand alone: each is 
inevitably connected with anterior changes, and as inevitably productive of 
consequential changes, each with the other, and all with time and space. […] and many 
existing phenomena hitherto believed distinct will be connected’ (271). He extended 
his concept of physical forces to all physical phenomena. He implied that since forces 
were active principles that caused, and since all physical phenomena were causes of 
something, thus all physical phenomena could be considered active principles or forces 
as well. Grove was cautious about not making the broad claim of the universal 
correlation of all things, since he did not have enough empirical evidence to support 
this, and he wanted his thesis to be empirical. He made a careful claim that ‘the 
probability is, that, if not all, the greater number of physical phenomena are correlative’ 
(248). Grove stayed agnostic about the ultimate structure of matter. He wrote that 
‘probably man will never know the ultimate structure of matter or the minutiae of 
molecular actions; indeed it is scarcely conceivable that the mind can ever attain to this 
knowledge’ (253). 
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3.1.2.2 Michael Faraday and the Conservation of Force 
Faraday was a Sandemanian. He conceived the universe as a power created by God, and 
he considered physical forces as active forms of the power. 374  All forces were 
substantially united in Faraday’s philosophy, as they were manifestations of a single 
power. Thus, he maintained a theory of the conservation of force that was in its essence 
the idea of the conservation of matter: that nothing was created or destroyed during 
natural processes. As a famous physicist, Faraday advocated his theory of the 
conservation of force through many of his lectures and papers. For example, Faraday 
gave a Friday discourse, ‘On the Conservation of Force’, on 27 February 1857, in which 
he elaborated his theory. The discourse was printed in periodicals, such as the 
Proceedings of the Royal Institution, the Philosophical Magazine, and the London, 
Edinburgh and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science. It thus reached a 
large audience. 
In this discourse, Faraday claimed that ‘the progress of the strict science of modern 
times has tended more and more to produce the conviction that “force can neither be 
created nor destroyed,” and to render daily more manifest the value of the knowledge 
of that truth in experimental research’.375 He argued that ‘we know matter only by its 
force’ (225), so, ‘to admit […] that force may be destructible or can altogether disappear, 
would be to admit that matter could be uncreated’ (225). Faraday implied that if 
scientific practitioners agreed that matter was indestructible, then they must agree that 
force was indestructible. He also pointed out ‘that no particular idea of force does not 
include assent to’ the indestructibility of both matter and force (226). Thus, for the 
reason that the indestructibility of matter and of force mutually supported each other, 
he ‘urge[d] that the conservation of force ought to be admitted as a physical principle 
in all our hypotheses, whether partial or general, regarding the actions of matter’ (226). 
He then imagined that if the conservation of force was admitted as a principle of physics, 
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then ‘no hypothesis should be admitted, nor any assertion of a fact credited, that denies 
the principle’ (227), and ‘[t]he case of a force simply removed or suspended, without a 
transferred exertion in some other direction’ should be considered ‘absolutely 
impossible’ (227). 
Faraday reflected that audiences might consider his principle of the conservation of 
force a metaphysical doctrine rather than a scientific doctrine, and he argued that the 
principle of the conservation of force was scientific. He compared the idea of the 
conservation of force with the idea of time. He pointed out that both of them existed 
everywhere, and that ‘it is […] not metaphysical to except an effect in every case […] so 
in regard to the principle of the conservation of force, I do not think that to admit it and 
its consequences, whatever they may be, is to be metaphysical’ (226–27). Faraday’s 
words granted scientific prestige to the doctrine of the indestructability of matter and 
of force. 
 
3.1.2.3 William Carpenter and the Correlation of Vital, Mental, and Physical Forces 
Grove’s theory of the correlation of forces was limited to physical phenomena. After his 
work on the correlation of physical forces was published, many scientific practitioners 
in biological disciplines soon saw the possibility of extending Grove’s argument to vital 
and mental phenomena and to formulate a broader correlation theory. The most 
famous advocate of such an extension was the physiologist and psychologist William 
Benjamin Carpenter. Carpenter first pointed out the possibility of extending Grove’s 
theory in a review of Italian physicist Carlo Matteucci’s Lectures on the Physical 
Phenomena of Living Beings (1848) in the medical periodical, the British and Foreign 
Medico-Chirurgical Review, in January 1848.376 He later gave a systematic expression of 
his idea in his 1850 paper ‘On the Mutual Relation of the Vital and Physical Forces’ 
published in the scientific journal, the Philosophical Transactions. 
Carpenter was a Unitarian. In the preliminary remarks of the paper ‘On the Mutual 
relation of the Vital and Physical Forces’, Carpenter expressed his belief in the unity of 
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force: ‘all force which does not emanate from the will of created sentient beings, 
directly and immediately proceeds from the Will of the Omnipotent and Omnipresent 
Creator’ and these forces were ‘so many modi operandi [methods of operation] of one 
and the same agency, the creative and sustaining will of the Deity’ (730). He considered 
that scientific practitioners of his time studied the universe as ‘the manifestations of 
certain forces; and each department of science takes cognizance of one or more of 
these’ (729). He pointed out that the force that physiologists studied was called the vital 
force. He wrote that modern physiologists recognised that on the one hand ‘many of 
the phenomena of living bodies may be placed in the same category with those of 
inanimate matter’, and on the other hand, ‘living bodies present a large class of 
phenomena which are altogether peculiar to them’ (728). He then pointed out that the 
notion of ‘vital agency’ or vital force was thus used by physiologists to address the cause 
of these peculiar vital phenomena in order to separate them from chemical agencies 
and mechanical agencies. Carpenter noticed that Grove had mentioned that the 
correlation of physical forces could be applied to the organic world, but the forces 
Grove applied were physical forces—light, heat, electricity, magnetism, etc.,377 while 
‘the purely vital operations of growth, development, and reproduction are not even 
named by him [Grove]; and not the slightest hint is given by him of the existence of any 
such relation between the Vital and Physical forces’ (730). Carpenter intended to 
establish the correlation of the various vital forces and the correlation of the vital and 
the physical forces in this paper. He followed Grove’s methodology, asserting that if two 
forces were correlates, then they could mutually produce each other.378 In addition, 
Carpenter asserted that if the two forces were manifestations of a more fundamental 
force, then they were also correlates. In Carpenter’s religious belief, all forces were 
obviously correlates, but like Grove, he did not cite his religious belief as a support and 
he aimed to present a scientific proof of his theory. 
                                                     
377 See W. Carpenter, ‘Mutual Relations’, p. 730. 
378 Ibid., p. 731. 
 
149 
 
 
 
Carpenter claimed that there was only one vital force which manifested in different 
forms when it ran through different ‘material substrat[a]’.379 He separated different 
forms of vital force into two categories. The first category was called the ‘organizing 
forces’ (747), including the ‘forces of growth, multiplication, and transformation’ (733). 
These forces were considered by Carpenter to be operating in both plants and animals. 
The second category was nerve and muscle forces, or ‘Nerve Agency’ (736), and they 
were exclusive to animals. 
Carpenter considered that the correlation of nerve forces and physical forces was 
rather obvious. He used evidence to show the mutual productions between nerve 
forces and electricity, heat, light, motion, and chemical affinity. For example, in his 
argument for the correlation between nerve forces and electricity, he first pointed out 
that ‘if an electric current be made to traverse the trunk of a motor nerve for a short 
distance only, it will produce contraction of the muscles which are supplied from its 
branches’, and that ‘in like manner, if the electric current be passed for a short distance 
only along a sensory nerve, it will excite in the sensorium the peculiar sensations 
ordinarily produced by impressions conveyed through that nerve’ (742). He considered 
that these two observations showed that ‘electricity excites nervous force through the 
instrumentality of the nervous structure’ (744). He then exemplified the phenomenon 
of ‘the Electric Fishes’ (743) to show that ‘nervous force excites electricity through the 
instrumentality of the electrical apparatus’ (744). As nerve forces and electricity could 
mutually produce each other, Carpenter concluded that they were correlates. He 
argued for the correlation of nerve forces and heat, light, motion, and chemical affinity 
in the same manner. But magnetism was left out since he considered that there was no 
direct evidence. 
    Carpenter found it difficult to find evidence to support mutual productions between 
organizing forces and physical forces. He tried to establish the correlation between 
them by identifying them. He argued that ‘these Organizing forces […] are so completely 
dependent upon the continual agency of Heat (and in some cases of Light also), that 
they may be considered as the manifestations of the action of heat upon organized 
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fabrics’ (747). He gave examples such as the ‘rate of growth [of a plant] being in a 
precise inverse ratio to the amount of [solar light and heat] it receives’ (748). He 
concluded from his many examples that ‘[h]eat is something more than a stimulus 
capable of arousing a dormant vital force; but, on the other hand, they by no means 
justify the assumption that heat and the “vital principle” are identical’ (750). The 
correlations between organising forces and light and electricity were argued in the 
same manner, and magnetism was again left out. 
Carpenter also linked his extended theory of the correlation of force to his religious 
belief. He wrote: ‘starting with the abstract notion of Force, as emanating at once from 
the Divine Will, we might say that this force, operating through inorganic matter, 
manifests itself in electricity, magnetism, light, heat, chemical affinity, and mechanical 
motion’; ‘when directed through organized structures, it effects the operations of 
growth, development, chemico-vital transformation, and the like’; and ‘through the 
instrumentality of the structures thus generated nervous agency and muscular power’ 
(752). Through these words Carpenter made the correlation theory consistent with his 
Unitarian belief. 
For Carpenter, mental forces and vital forces were two different categories. Nerve 
forces were not identified with mind by Carpenter. The paper ‘On the Mutual Relations 
of the Vital and Physical Forces’ did not include discussions of whether mental forces 
and other forces were correlated, but Carpenter speculated on this issue in his Principle 
of Human Physiology. In the 1868 edition of the book, he devoted a section to the 
discussion of the ‘Correlation of Physiological and Psychical action’.380 Carpenter held 
the dualism between force and matter. He viewed matter as passive substance and 
force as active agent. He put mind and force in the same category, and he stressed that 
mind was a form of agency similar to physical forces but was not identical to any of 
them. He considered that mind and nerve forces were correlates, and that through 
nerve forces as intermediaries, mind and other forces were also correlates. He wrote 
that ‘[t]he power of the Will can develop Nervous activity, and […] Nerve-force can 
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develop Mental activity, [thus] there must be a Correlation between these two modes 
of dynamical agency’ (542), and that ‘[t]his idea of Correlation of Forces will be found 
completely to harmonise with […] [psychological and physiological] phenomena’ (542–
43). 
 
3.1.3 Matter-as-Force Theories 
There was a branch of thought in physics in the late-eighteenth and the early-
nineteenth centuries in which matter was reduced to force or power. This idea was 
often labelled ‘Boscovich’s theory’ or ‘Boscovich’s doctrine’. Roger Joseph Boscovich 
(1711–1787) was an eighteenth-century Ragusan Jesuit mathematician and natural 
philosopher. He was famous for his theory of point atomism, that nuclei were infinitely 
small points and the extension, solidity, and impenetrability of matter were properties 
of centrally-directed forces with point nuclei as centres but not properties of nuclei.381 
Thus, since the essential properties of matter—solidity and impenetrability—became 
the properties of force, it can be said that in Boscovich’s theory, matter was reduced to 
force. Boscovich’s point atomism was well received and spread widely in Britain, as he 
presented his theory as a fulfilment of the Newtonian dream of the unification of all 
forces.382 Peter M. Harman points out that by the early nineteenth century, Boscovich’s 
theory was ‘broadly familiar to British natural philosophers’ and ‘clearly formed part of 
the implicit intellectual baggage of the period’.383 There were many developments of 
Boscovich’s theory, such as Joseph Priestley’s natural philosophy of power,384 Michael 
Faraday’s matter-as-force theory, and William Thomson’s vortex theory of atoms. The 
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idea of reducing matter to force was also introduced and discussed by famous scientific 
practitioners such as Thomas Young (1773–1829), Humphry Davy, William John 
Macquorn Rankine (1820–1872), and James Clerk Maxwell (1831–1879).385 
Faraday’s matter-as-force theory was a popular one among the Victorians. Faraday 
first elaborated his matter-as-force theory in a Friday evening discourse at the Royal 
Institution on 25 January 1844. The Library Gazette: A Weekly Journal of Literature, 
Science, and Fine Arts reported that Faraday’s discourse ‘attracted a very numerous 
audience’.386 His discourse was later published in the Philosophical Magazine with the 
title ‘A Speculation touching Electric Condution and Nature of Matter’ and reached a 
larger audience.387 He also reiterated matter-as-force theory later in several papers 
such as ‘Thoughts on Ray-Vibrations’ (1846) and ‘On the Conservation of force’ (1857). 
As Faraday actively promoted the matter-as-force theory, he was widely recognised as 
a supporter of this theory, alongside Boscovich and Priestley. 
Faraday’s matter-as-force theory was proposed as an alternative to the common 
atomic theory of matter. In ‘A Speculation touching Electric Conduction and Nature of 
Matter’, Faraday pointed out that the prevalent theory of the atomic constitution of 
matter of his day involved the idea that matter was constituted of solid, hard, and 
impenetrable atoms, centrally directed forces, and empty space between atoms. Forces 
surrounding atoms gave atoms structural capabilities. The congregations of atoms 
formed different substances. Faraday was dissatisfied with this atomic theory of matter 
since he found it difficult to use it to explain the nature of electric conduction and 
insulation. He pointed out that in this atomic theory, atoms and space were two 
different entities. Space was understood as the only continuous part of matter since 
atoms were discrete. If space was the only continuous part of matter then paradoxically, 
‘space may be proved to be a non-conductor in non-conducting bodies, and a conductor 
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in conducting bodies’ (138). Faraday considered that this paradox meant that there was 
something wrong with the common atomic theory. 
In order to explain the phenomena of conduction and non-conduction, Faraday 
abandoned the concept of solid, impenetrable and extended nuclei. The rejection of 
the concept of nuclei was presented in Boscovich’s Theoria Philosophiae Naturalis. 
Faraday could not read Latin, but he may have become acquainted with Boscovich’s 
theory through his former supervisor Humphry Davy or through reading Priestley’s 
works.388 Although his theory differed from Boscovich’s in several respects, Faraday 
called his rejection of nuclei ‘Boscovich’s theory’.389 ‘Atoms’, as redefined by Faraday, 
‘are mere centres of forces or powers, not particles of matter, in which powers 
themselves reside’. 390  They were, according to him, only mathematical points 
surrounded by forces. There were thus no solid, impenetrable, and discrete particles of 
matter in Faraday’s universe. 391  ‘Matter will be continuous throughout’.392  Faraday 
assumed that the whole universe was a continuous plenum of force. Conducting and 
non-conducting could be explained as different properties of different bulks of particles 
of matter, and there was no need to refer to empty space. Thus, the contradiction 
caused by the common notion of atoms disappeared. Faraday considered that his 
rejection of nuclei had a great advantage in explaining electrical phenomena and caused 
little to no trouble in other branches of science, such as chemistry, crystallography, and 
magnetism. 
Matter-as-force theories presented a way to dismiss the dualism of matter and force. 
Priestley made use of Boscovish’s theory to argue against the dualism of matter and 
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spirit and to support his monistic view of the world.393 Faraday’s theory also implied 
that the universe was a unity rather than was composed of discrete sections. 
 
3.1.4 Hans Christian Oersted and the Unity of Mind in Nature 
Hans Christian Oersted (1777–1851) was a German physicist who was greatly influenced 
by German idealistic philosophy and its pantheistic tendencies. His idea of the unity of 
mind in nature was known by many Victorians through the translation of his work Ein 
Geist in der Natur (The Soul in Nature), published in London in 1852.394 Though his idea 
of the unity of mind in nature was largely speculative, he did try to use science to 
support this idea. 
Oersted presented his idea loosely in this book. In the first chapter titled ‘The Spiritual 
in the Nature’, Oersted claimed, through the mouth of a fictional figure Alfred, that all 
material bodies in nature were ‘changeable’ and only spiritual existences were 
‘invariable’ (6–7). In his theory, spiritual existences included laws and forces of nature. 
He claimed that ‘[t]he laws of nature are founded on Reason’, since ‘Naturalists have 
frequently deduced natural laws from a process of reasoning, and afterwards 
discovered them really existing in nature’ (11). Since ‘reason is manifested in nature’, 
he claimed that ‘the laws of Nature are the thoughts of Nature’ and ‘these thoughts of 
Nature are also thoughts of God’ (20). He also claimed that all material bodies were 
combinations of fundamental forces, that ‘their difference only depends upon the 
natural laws by which they are governed’ (23). He considered that the effecting laws of 
nature in a body could be called its ‘essential Thought’ or its ‘living idea’—‘the idea 
realized by the forces of nature’ (24), and that ‘the essence of a thing is therefore its 
living Idea’ (24). He believed that this conception of the universe implied that there was 
‘a unity of thought’ (22). ‘Man’, he considered, ‘is distinguished above all other 
                                                     
393 For example, see Joseph Priestley, Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit (London: J. 
Johnson, 1777). 
394 Hans Christian Oersted, Soul in Nature, trans. by Leonara and Joanna B. Horner (London: 
Henry G. Bohn, 1852). 
155 
 
 
 
creatures on earth by this; viz., that Reason, which all other animals unconsciously obey, 
in him is awakened into self-consciousness’ (27). In this sense, man is ‘a free agent’ (27). 
In the section titled, ‘The Essential Unity of Intelligence throughout the Universe’, of 
the fifth chapter, ‘All Existence a Dominion of Reason’, Oersted argued for ‘the 
universality of the laws of nature’ (95). He pointed out that scientific practitioners had 
proved that the same laws governing the earth governed other planets. Some 
practitioners extended these laws to the whole universe, but some were sceptical of 
this universal extension. Oersted intended to prove that ‘the laws of nature hold good 
throughout the universe’ (92). He proposed as a rule that if a law of nature was a law 
of reason, then it was a universal law. He believed that man as ‘a product of Nature’ 
(109) could be self-conscious of universal laws.395 By this rule, he turned many scientific 
theories into universal laws. For example, he argued that ‘the first law of motion, 
namely, that every simple impulse must produce a rectilinear motion, […] is a necessary 
law of reason’(93), since it was logically inconceivable that this law of motion was not 
true in any part of the universe. He also argued in this way for the universality of several 
laws of light, sound, chemical affinity, electricity, galvanism, magnetism, and heat. As 
Oersted regarded the laws of nature as the thoughts of nature in the first chapter of his 
book, it can be inferred that the universality of natural laws was also a proof of the unity 
of mind in nature. 
 
3.2 Pantheistic Uses of Scientific Theories of Force 
We have seen in the previous section that the concept of force had been central to 
physics since Newton. While ‘force’ in Newton’s physics was defined mathematically 
with few metaphysical implications, the term was used in an intuitive way to denote 
various forms of power or subtle matter by Victorian scientific practitioners such as 
Grove, Faraday, and Carpenter. These scientific practitioners formulated unifying 
theories of force, and Faraday even advocated a unifying theory of matter and force. 
There were also German pantheistic physicists, such as Oersted, giving pantheistic 
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interpretations of physical theories. Victorian advocates of pantheism made use of 
these theories to support their pantheistic doctrines, as we shall see in this section. 
 
3.2.1 James Martineau and the Correlation of Forces and the Unity of Mind 
Martineau’s philosophical theism comprised a dualistic theory of passive matter and 
active causes. He considered that God’s will was the cause of nature, and that the forces 
studied by physicists were manifestations of God’s will. God was thus to a very large 
extent immanent in nature, and forces were manifestations of God. Martineau’s view 
of force was considered pantheistic by the poet and essayist Roden Noel (1834–1894). 
Noel reflected: ‘I do not quite see how theologians escape Pantheism after all, if they 
maintain with Mr. Martineau […] that Force is Will’, because if ‘Force is Will, with the 
element of Thought left out by us, […] Matter or Force then must be God’. 396  As 
Martineau wished to reconcile science and religion, he drew on scientific practitioners’ 
theories of force and made his own interpretations to support his pantheistic view of 
force. 
In the essay ‘Nature and God’ (c. 1860), Martineau made use of Grove’s theory of the 
correlation of physical forces and William Carpenter’s extension of this theory into vital 
and mental phenomena. Martineau was criticising the recent popular view that ‘the 
whole scientific and the whole religious mode of approaching and viewing the external 
world’ were in conflict.397 He argued that religion and science approached the external 
world with different faculties of human consciousness, and therefore their 
interpretations of external phenomena were necessarily different, but this difference 
did not imply that one of them was inferior to the other. He claimed that religion 
proceeds ‘on the data of our Voluntary and Moral faculties, carries a supernatural 
interpretation through the universe, and sees in nature the expression of affections and 
will like our own’, while science proceeds ‘on the data of our Perceptive and 
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Generalizing faculties, discovers uniformities of phenomena, and accepts the 
conception of necessary law not only as the key to Nature, but as exhaustive and 
ultimate’ (150–51). Martineau considered that religion and science were not in conflict 
as long as they did not trespass on the other’s sphere.398 When Martineau was trying 
to find an ‘intermediate conception’ to aid the mutual understanding between science 
and religion, he found ‘the idea of Force’ which he considered ‘more than physical and 
less than theological’ (154). From books he listed in the beginning of his essay, it can be 
inferred that Martineau read Grove’s second edition of The Correlation of Physical 
Forces (1850), Carpenter’s essay ‘On the mutual Relations of the Vital and Physical 
Forces’ (1850), and the fifth edition of Carpenter’s Principles of Human Physiology 
(1855). 
Martineau defined ‘force’ by quoting Grove’s definition, claiming that ‘the word 
denotes “that active principle inseparable from matter which induces its various 
changes”’ (154).399 He made two inferences from Grove’s and Carpenter’s theories on 
force. One was that ‘force’ was ‘a physical postulate indispensable to the interpretation 
of nature, yet not physically known’ (155); and the other was that ‘the plurality of forces 
is an illusion’ and ‘in reality, and behind the variegated veil of heterogeneous 
phenomena, there is but one force, the solitary fountain of the whole infinitude of 
change’ (157). Martineau argued that since the physical composition of force was not 
known, it was a metaphysical construction rather than an absolute existence. He 
speculated that the idea of force was invented to assist us in our understanding of 
phenomena, and that behind this concept was the ‘primitive intuition’ (158) of will in 
nature. Martineau quoted Carpenter’s view that ‘our consciousness of force is really as 
direct as is that of our own mental states’ and ‘force must be regarded as the direct 
expression or manifestation of that Mental state which we call Will’ (158) as a support 
for his theory. 400  In addition, Martineau argued that physicists’ experimental 
confirmations of the correlation of forces strengthened his belief of the unity of will in 
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nature since the unity of forces implied the unity of causes, and as he identified cause 
and will, the unity of causes was the unity of will. For Martineau, the unity of will in 
nature meant that there was a singular person, a God, whose mind possessed the 
united will. He thus claimed that the conclusion could be made from contemporary 
physical theory of force that ‘all Force is of one type; and that type is Mind’ (159). He 
implied that the correlation theories of forces supported his higher pantheistic view 
that God’s mind was the direct cause of all phenomena. 
Martineau was aware of Boscovich’s theory when he wrote ‘Nature and God’. He 
noticed that Thomas Elford Poynting’s solution for the disunity between matter and 
force was like that of Boscovich’s, though he considered this solution weak and did not 
say much about it.401 However, when he wrote A Study of Religion (1888) many years 
later, he seemed to incline towards Boscovich’s monism of matter and force.402 
When denying the existence of multiple self-existing beings, Martineau usually made 
it clear that he denied only that there were plural self-existing causes. In other words, 
he held that God, a living will and cause of the phenomena of the world, was the only 
cause of the world. In order not to fully identify God with the universe, he also needed 
something non-causal and co-existed with God. He had considered that there was a 
primitive matter being a non-causal self-existing being different from God, and that God 
exerted his will upon this matter. Matter-as-force theory reduced matter to force, and 
in Martineau’s theology, force was not a self-existing thing but a manifestation of God’s 
will, thus, it can be inferred that if Martineau incorporated matter-as-force theory into 
his theology, then his primitive matter would no longer be a self-existing thing but an 
aspect of God. However, in A Study of Religion, Martineau welcomed such a speculation. 
He considered that the solidity of matter could be conceived as a property of force 
similarly to what ‘Boscovich and Faraday’ presented in their theories,403 and that if 
matter was dissolved in this way, then he could take space as a self-existing being 
separated from God and attribute everything to God except space. Space in his 
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definition was ‘the eternal condition of a universe’ (407). He saw that ‘[t]he ontological 
simplicity of this hypothesis, which recommended it to Boscovich and Faraday, gives it 
undoubtedly a great advantage’ (406). Martineau also argued that the matter-as-force 
idea coupled with his view of force could easily be made consistent with ‘the popular 
doctrine of creation out of nothing’ (407). He reasoned that space was usually conceived 
by ordinary people as nothing, and if there were only God and space, then everything 
would seem to appear from nothingness. Martineau evaluated his speculation that ‘its 
metaphysical neatness […] strongly recommend it to acceptance’ (408). 
Oersted had talked about the unity of mind in nature, which was similar to 
Martineau’s view of the unity of will in nature. Martineau had read Oersted’s book The 
Soul in Nature. He reviewed the English translation of The Soul in Nature when it was 
published in 1852, and he made some connections to his theology. Martineau 
interpreted Oersted as saying ‘that throughout all worlds are beings fundamentally 
similar, in their rational faculties, both to each other and to the eternal living reason of 
God’.404 He commented that this idea ‘has received, for the first time we suppose, a 
careful and systematic treatment on scientific grounds’.405 He introduced Oersted’s 
work as the first systematic exposition of God’s immanent and unifying will by a 
prominent scientific practitioner. He welcomed Oersted’s speculation on the 
universality of laws, and on the idea that all of them were the thought of God.406 
However, he was dissatisfied with Oersted’s view of freewill. He considered that 
Oersted’s psychology was ‘not founded on reflective self-knowledge, but a mere 
application of physical doctrine to the mind’, and that it resulted in the inference that 
will was determined by physical doctrines and consequently was not free.407 
So far, we have seen that Martineau drew on theories of the scientific practitioners 
Grove, Carpenter, and Oersted to support his pantheistic view that God’s will was the 
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direct and only cause of all natural phenomena, and that he also considered Faraday 
and Boscovich’s matter-as-force theories helpful. Martineau believed that religion was 
a legitimate way of producing knowledge about nature. He also used his synthesis of his 
philosophical theism and the science of force to support his belief that nature would be 
better understood if it was studied from both the religious side and the scientific side. 
As Ralph Waller points out, this synthesis was used by Martineau during his debate with 
John Tyndall, against Tyndall’s claims that the assumption of God was not needed in 
explaining natural processes, and that religion should relinquish the intellectual fields 
concerning the physical universe.408 The science of force was used by Martineau in 
support of his philosophical theism, and also as a weapon, when adjusted by his 
theology, against materialism and atheism. 
 
3.2.2 Thomas Elford Poynting and the Ideas of Matter-as-Force and Force-
as-Mind 
Poynting was a student of Martineau when he studied for the Unitarian ministry at 
Manchester College, Manchester. Influenced by Martineau, he also treated force as a 
manifestation of God’s mind. However, he differed from Martineau in his view of matter. 
As early as 1860, Poynting had already adopted a form of monism in which he reduced 
matter to force. (Martineau at the time held a dualism of matter and force, and he 
criticised Poynting’s monism in his essay ‘Nature and God’.) The idea of matter as force 
and the idea of force as mind were the two pillars of Poynting’s religious philosophy. By 
using these two ideas, he formulated a united universe and considered it God. When 
he made his arguments, he cited many scientific practitioners’ theories of force and 
interpreted them in his own way. His use of the science of force is evident in his essay 
‘Materialism, an Unscientific Habit of Thought’ (1874). 
Poynting’s main argument in this essay was that materialistic atheism was ‘not the 
result of science’, and that physical philosophers brought us ‘to the conclusion, not that 
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matter excludes spirit, but rather that it may fitly be regarded as spirit’. 409 He claimed 
that ‘the [physicists’] final analysis of matter resolves it into force—force, subtle, 
mysterious in itself, invisible, as the gravitation which surrounds and holds us’ (228), 
and that this view of matter ‘brings us to the conclusion that this force, like the force in 
our being, is pervaded and directed by an all-controlling Mind’ (228). He implied that 
the existence of a universal mind in nature was implied by the current physical theories 
of matter and force. He thus claimed that materialistic atheism was ‘an unscientific 
habit of thought’ (228) and was not supported by current science. This paper can be 
separated into two parts. In the first part, Poynting presented his matter-as-force 
theory, and in the second part, he presented his force-as-mind theory and formulated 
his idea of universal unity. 
In the first part of this paper, Poynting proposed a matter-as-force theory in which 
gravitation was the ultimate force. He claimed that: 
 
Each ultimate molecule of matter is nothing but a point at which meet 
opposite lines of gravitation force that converge upon it from all infinity. The 
force, by the very laws of convergence, increases in intensity—through 
concentration—inversely as the square of the distance. […] This attractive 
force, so rapidly and enormously increasing the nearer we get to the centre, 
is surely sufficient to explain all the phenomena of cohesion. The 
incalculable resistance which any two molecules must encounter when they 
strike against each other, centre to centre, is also sufficient to account for 
all phenomena of repulsion. (230) 
 
Not only did he reduce atoms to mathematical points, but he also reduced all types of 
force to gravitational force or attractive force. He drew on the scientific authority of 
Newton, Boscovich, Priestley, and Faraday to support his theory. He attributed the 
origin of his notion of matter to Boscovich’s point atomism. He wrote that ‘[t]his 
conception of matter is only a modification of a view first propounded in his “Theoria 
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Philosophiae Naturalis” by Father Boscovich’ (230–31). Poynting was a teacher of Latin, 
so he was able to read Boscovich’s Theoria Philosophiae Naturalis. He quoted 
Boscovich’s words in Latin in footnotes.410 He wrote that ‘I cannot help believing that 
Boscovich’s thought, carried out with necessary modifications, is destined some day to 
revolutionize many portions of material science, and still more to revolutionize the 
whole form of theology’ (232). 
    Priestley was the next figure Poynting talked about. He portrayed Priestley as the 
philosopher who spread Boscovich’s atomism in England and who combined 
Boscovich’s atomism with theology. He wrote that ‘[t]he fundamental principle of 
Boscovich was set forth in English by Dr. Priestley in his “Disquisitions relating to Matter 
and Spirit,” and his “History of Discoveries relating to Vision,” &c. In the “Disquisitions,” 
he thus expresses it: “Suppose that the Divine Being, when he created matter, only fixed 
certain centres of various attractions and repulsions extending indefinitely in all 
directions. […] All effects […] may be resolved into attraction or repulsion.” […] “On this 
hypothesis, everything is the Divine power.”’ (232). ‘Thus,’ Poynting claimed, ‘Priestley 
in effect said, “All matter is spirit”’ (233). 
Poynting then talked about Faraday. He treated Faraday as a contemporary advocate 
of Boscovich’s atomism. He considered that Faraday’s Friday lecture on matter-as-force 
theory ‘set forth Boscovich’s fundamental principle’ (233). Faraday’s refutation of 
nuclei was cited by Poynting. He also claimed that the reduction of all types of force to 
gravitational force was expressed in Faraday’s lecture. The following words from 
Faraday were quoted by Poynting as a proof: ‘“The view now stated of the constitution 
of matter would seem to involve necessarily the conclusion that matter” (i.e. the force 
which is matter) “fills all space, at least all space to which gravitation extends, including 
the sun and the solar system: for gravitation is a property of matter dependent on a 
certain force, and it is this force that constitutes the matter”’ (234). Faraday did not 
claim that gravitational force was the fundamental force of which all other types of 
force were forms, and the force that constituted matter in this quotation was not a 
specified force, though Poynting interpreted this force as gravitational force. Poynting 
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enthusiastically claimed that ‘This is the exact doctrine that I wish to demonstrate more 
fully, viz. that IT IS THE FORCE OF GRAVITATION, the force, i.e., on which gravitation 
depends—THAT CONSTITUTES MATTER’ (234). 
Poynting argued that he could explain all phenomena by attractive force only without 
solid nuclei or repulsive force. The fundamental existences of the physical universe in 
his theory were attractive forces. Atoms were the meeting points of attractive forces. 
The strength of attraction was proportional to the density of attractive force. Poynting 
considered that when an attractive force (which can be imagined as a vector) crossed 
the centre of an atom, it became a repulsive force for that atom, therefore, he 
considered that there was no need to assume repulsive force as a fundamental force. 
He also considered that the density of repulsive force in the centres of atoms was 
infinitely high, thus atoms would not penetrate each other. The impenetrability and 
solidity of nuclei were thus reduced by Poynting to effects of force. He used everyday 
examples of gravitational attraction as well as views from Newton and physicist Balfour 
Stewart (1828–1887) to support his claim that attractive forces were everywhere. He 
wrote that ‘Newton tells us [in Principia] that there is a gravity towards all bodies’ (237). 
He quoted from Stewart’s textbook Conservation of Energy (1872): ‘“Every particle of 
the universe attracts every other particle with a force depending jointly upon the mass” 
(say rather the amount of force) “of the attracting and of the attracted particle, and 
varying inversely as the square of the distance between the two”’ (238).411 
Poynting made an even stronger claim that ‘the common notion of matter and 
molecules violates at every point [of] Newton’s great law’, that ‘Nature does nothing in 
vain, and it is in vain to do by more what might be done by fewer causes’ (242–43). 
Poynting argued that if attractive forces could explain everything, to postulate the 
notion of solid nuclei and the notion of repulsive force was to assume ‘Nature doing by 
more what might be done by one’ (243). This, he considered, violated Newton’s 
principle of simplicity. 
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After reducing everything in nature, expect space, to attractive force, Poynting 
proceeded to argue that positing an intelligent being was necessary in order to explain 
the operation of the all-pervading attractive force. This argument was developed in the 
second part of his essay in which he brought in his theology. He drew on the scientific 
authority of Clerk Maxwell, Thomas Huxley, and John Tyndall to support this view. He 
cited Maxwell and wrote that ‘as Prof. Clerk-Maxwell observes, […] [i]t looks as if the 
all-pervading force were intelligent or directed by intelligence’ (244). He cited Huxley 
and Tyndall and wrote: ‘I accept the doctrine of Mr. Huxley, that “all vital action” is 
probably “the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays it.” I agree 
with Dr. Tyndall’s statement, “that the human mind itself—motion, intellect, will, and 
all their phenomena—were once latent” in atoms of the primeval nebula. […] That in 
the force which gathers round each force-centre and makes the molecule, there is not 
only force, there is life’ (245). Poynting then concluded: ‘[a]s the force comes out of 
life—is a manifestation of life, the life of God—is it not likely that He who makes in every 
molecule of force a provision of force for the future evolutions of force, would make 
there also a provision of life for the future evolutions of life?’ (245). 
Huxley’s and Tyndall’s words were usually used to support materialism and atheism, 
since they seemed to deprive God of creative power and give it to matter, as if God was 
no longer needed. Poynting was against this interpretation of science. His solution was 
to reduce everything to active force so that there was nothing inactive or dead in the 
universe, to see activeness as a sign of life so that the whole universe was alive, and to 
treat the living universe as God himself rather than as something self-existing without 
God. In this way, he could appropriate the concept of living matter used by materialistic 
scientific practitioners to support his view that the universe was a life, the life of God. 
He dismissed the view that materialistic atheism was the necessary result of science 
and showed that pantheism could be inferred from science. 
Poynting also argued that the force-as-mind idea was scientific. He quoted the 
explanation of the intuition of the concept of force from astronomer John Herschel 
(1792–1871): ‘“It [the concept of force] is,” said Sir John Herschel, “our own immediate 
consciousness of effort when we exert force to put matter in motion, or to oppose and 
neutralize force, which gives us this internal conviction of power and causation, so far 
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as it refers to the material world”’ (246).412 Poynting reasoned that ‘[w]e are conscious 
of force in our own being, which we will call mind-force, meaning simply force wielded, 
directed by mind. In the universe we see force too—the world-force. It is like the mind-
force in producing effects, in overcoming or resisting opposing force’ (246). He implied 
that, by analogy, if the force of our body was mind or was directed by mind, then the 
force of the world was mind or was directed by mind as well. He considered that ‘[t]he 
great world-force looks exactly like a great mind-force. It indicates a Mind as living in it, 
wielding it’ (246). Poynting saw his argument as ‘a perfectly scientific argument’ (246). 
He claimed that it was scientific to make inferences about the properties of large scale 
things from observations of small scale things, like Newton concluded the universality 
of gravitation from his observation of a few objects on earth, like Darwin established 
the theory of evolution from his observations on modified plants and animals on a small 
scale, and like Gustav Kirchoff (1824–1887) and Robert Bunsen (1811–1899) explained 
spectroscopic phenomena in the sun from their observations of little flames in their 
laboratory.413 So he claimed that his inference of the existence of a world-mind from 
the observation of the human mind was scientific. 
We have seen that Poynting drew on many scientific practitioners—Newton, 
Boscovich, Priestley, Faraday, Huxley, Tyndall, Darwin, Maxwell, John Herschel, Balfour 
Stewart, Gustav Kirchoff, and Robert Bunsen—to support his monistic vision of matter 
and force, his idea of a universal mind, and ultimately his pantheistic view that the 
universe was an aspect of God. He was deeply troubled by the pervasive view that 
science necessarily led to materialism or atheism. He managed to counter it through a 
synthesis of pantheism and the science of force. 
 
                                                     
412 See John Herschel, Outlines of Astronomy, Fourth Edition (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea, 
1857), p. 233. 
413 Poynting, ‘Materialism’, p. 247. 
166 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Constance Plumptre and James Allanson Picton and Conservation 
Theories 
Picton and Plumptre defined pantheism in a similar way. They saw pantheism as a belief 
in a unified, infinite, eternal, and inscrutable reality of which all phenomena were 
manifestations. The theories of the correlation of forces and the conservation of force 
were theories that united a wide range of physical phenomena. They used these 
unifying theories to support the existence of a united reality. 
    Plumptre in her General Sketch of the History of Pantheism (1878–79) mentioned 
several times the theory of the correlation of forces, the theory of the conservation of 
force, and the theory of the conservation of energy. She did not rigorously separate 
them but rather she treated them as the same theory and used them interchangeably. 
Energy was treated by her as a synonym of force rather than as a mathematical quantity. 
For example, she wrote that ‘[t]he doctrine of the Conservation of Energy (for Force is 
as indestructible as Matter) asserts that no power can make its appearance in nature 
without an equivalent expenditure of some other power’.414 Plumptre did not learn 
these theories from Grove’s Correlation of Physical Forces, since she was uncertain 
about the publication date of Grove’s work. She wrote that this theory was written by 
‘Mr. Justice Grove […] some fifteen or twenty years ago’,415 while Grove’s work was 
firstly published thirty-two years ago, and the last edition was published four years ago 
at the time when Plumptre’s work was published. This implies that Plumptre did not 
read Grove’s work. Nor did she mention Faraday. The source in which she learned these 
theories was John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. 
John Stuart Mill was a leading empiricist philosopher in nineteenth-century Britain. 
His work A System of Logic was first published in 1843 and went through nine editions 
before Plumptre’s work was published. His work was very influential as well as 
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controversial.416  Plumptre quoted Mill’s interpretation of the conservation theories 
from the ninth edition of this work which was published in 1875.417 In her quotation, 
Mill claimed that ‘the sciences of physical nature have made a great advance in 
generalisation through the doctrine known as the Conservation or Persistence of 
Force’.418 He pointed out that ‘the establishment of this comprehensive law has led to 
a change in the language in […] the scientific world’, and that before the establishment 
of this laws, the unlikeness of phenomena ‘had caused them [these phenomena] to be 
referred to so many distinct forces. Now that they are known to be convertible into one 
another without loss, they are spoken of as all of them results of one and the same 
force, manifesting itself in different modes’. 419  Mill also made a rather personal 
interpretation, claiming that ‘the Conservation of Force is really the Conservation of 
Motion, that in various interchanges between the forms of force, it is always motion 
that is transformed into motion’.420 He supported his claim by citing some examples of 
the correlations between heat, light, and motion. 
Plumptre wrote that ‘Motion […] is the first principle’ of the physical universe in Mill’s 
theory, and that ‘[t]he whole phenomena of the entire universe […] owe their origin to 
it [Motion]; for heat, light, etc., are but forms of motion’ (211). She considered that 
Mill’s concept of motion was in the same category as ancient Greek philosophers’ first 
principles, such as Thales’s water, Heraclitus’s fire, Xenophanes’s God, Parmenides’s 
Being, Pythagoras’s The One, and Anaxagoras’s Intelligence. 421  She saw that Mill’s 
theory proved that ‘[t]he Eleatics […] were right in saying, All comes from One. All does 
come from One, and the outward manifestation that One presents is Motion’ (211). 
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These ancient philosophers were introduced by Plumptre as pantheists, and she 
introduced Mill’s theories in her chapter on Greek pantheists. She implied that current 
physical philosophers proved the ancient pantheistic doctrine that the world was 
originated from a single principle, and that physical philosophers’ concept of force in 
the doctrine of the conservation of force was identical with pantheists’ first principles. 
Plumptre claimed that ‘Pantheism […] would gladly welcome this new theory of the 
Correlation of Forces as a proof of the correctness of her own theory’ (212). She also 
claimed that if a pantheist followed Mill’s phraseology, then ‘God would not merely be 
conceived to be the Cause of Motion, but […] would be necessarily identical with 
Motion’ (212). 
Besides using the doctrine of the conservation of force to support the pantheistic 
doctrine of a united reality, Plumptre also used this doctrine to support her anti-
creationism, that there was no creation from nothing. She wrote that ‘Light runs into 
Heat, Heat into Electricity, Electricity into Magnetism, Magnetism into Mechanical 
Force; and, Protean-like, Mechanical Force changes back into Light and Heat. There is 
conversion, but no creation. […] One power changes into another; transformation and 
metamorphosis seem to be the order of the heavens as much as of earth’. 422  She 
claimed that ‘the acceptance of this doctrine [of the conservation of force] deals the 
final death-blow to the ancient notion of Creation, as ordinarily understood’.423 She 
thus implied that physicists’ doctrine of the conservation of force supported the 
pantheistic doctrine of transformation while it falsified creationism. 
    Picton’s use of the science of force was less obvious than Plumptre’s, but it is worth 
a mention. He made several claims that the modern physical concept of energy, in the 
sense of force, and its conservation were consistent with pantheism. In his Mystery of 
Matter, he interpreted ‘the “correlation of forces”’ as meaning that ‘[t]he eternity and 
the changeless sufficiency of the one inscrutable Energy, which manifests itself in ten 
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thousand forms’.424 In his later book Pantheism: its story and significance, Picton wrote: 
‘the matter or energy of which we think we consist, was in existence, every atom of it, 
and every element of force, before we were born, and will survive our apparent death. 
And the same thing, at least on the Pantheistic view, is true of every other mode of 
apparently separate or finite existence’.425 
From Plumptre and Picton, we see that the subtle difference between the concepts 
of force and energy, or the difference between the theory of the correlation of forces, 
the theory of the conservation of force, and the theory of the conservation of energy 
might not have mattered to religious people in Victorian Britain. These two advocates 
of pantheism mostly borrowed from these physical theories the idea that there existed 
something mysterious and universal that united all things in the world. 
 
3.2.4 Charles Bray and His Theory of Force-as-God 
While Martineau, Poynting, Picton, and Plumptre used the science of force to support 
some of their views, Bray used the concept of force as the very foundation of his 
pantheism. He treated force as God, while others did not. Bray claimed that there was 
only one reality of which all phenomena were manifestations. He identified this reality 
with the ‘Substance’ of Spinoza, the ‘Being’ of Hegel, the ‘Noumenon’ of Kant, and the 
‘Force’ of physical philosophers.426  These terms were synonymous for him, and he 
tended to use ‘Force’ rather than the other terms since he intended to build his theory 
upon contemporary physics. The term ‘force’ in Bray’s definition denoted active 
principle, cause of action, or source of action.427 He knew that ‘force’ was used by many 
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physicists as an abstraction of things, but he was more willingly to treat it as a 
fundamental entity. He claimed that ‘Modern discovery’ had recognised ‘force as an 
entity’ and recognised the ‘indestructibility and persistence’ of force.428 He implied that 
his treatment of force as a fundamental entity was supported by modern physicists’ 
doctrine of the conservation of force. The fundamental reality was considered a great 
‘Force’ by Bray, and phenomena were called by him ‘forces’, ‘forms of Force’, or ‘modes 
of Force’. 
    Bray adopted the idea of matter as force to reduce matter to force so that force could 
be the only entity of the universe. He proposed to abandon the concept of atom, and 
he claimed that this abandonment was supported by prominent physical philosophers. 
He wrote that the ‘highest physical philosophers’ of his time had ‘abolished the atom 
and put a centre of force in its place’, and ‘what we call matter is now said to be 
force’.429 Bray often cited Thomas Huxley as a representative of the ‘highest physical 
philosophers’. When arguing that matter should be viewed as force, he often quoted 
Huxley’s words that ‘[e]very form is force visible; a form of rest is a balance of forces; a 
form undergoing change is the predominance of one over others’.430 The source of this 
quotation is unclear. The earliest document I find in which Huxley spoke of something 
similar was Huxley’s speech in the 1866 meeting of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science. He said that ‘every form is force visible’. 431  Huxley was 
discussing biology especially morphology and physiology, so the ‘form’ he was referring 
to was likely a form of life rather than any form of existence. Since Bray’s On Force was 
also published in 1866, it is uncertain whether Bray knew this speech before he finished 
the book. Nevertheless, Bray interpreted Huxley’s view as claiming that all phenomena 
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were forces. In Bray’s paper ‘Physics and Metaphysics’, he reasoned with another 
quotation from Huxley. He wrote: ‘Science now reduces all things to “the attraction, 
repulsion, motions, and co-ordination of the ultimate particles of matter;” but these 
ultimate particles of matter—molecules and atoms, are unknown quantities […] they 
are creatures of the imagination, and as pure assumption as the spirit of the 
spiritualists’.432 He implied that because atoms were hypothetical and because only 
forces were responsible for our sensations, thus there was no need to assume matter, 
and therefore, it was intelligible to assume force as the only fundamental existence of 
the world. 
Bray formulated a systematic view of force. In his view, forces could be classified into 
two categories: ‘concentrated’ 433  forces and ‘operant’ forces. 434  The forces that 
composed particles and massive structures, or matter in an ordinary sense, were 
concentrated forces; and the forces that ran through these structures were operant 
forces. The properties of matter were determined by both kinds of forces. Old things 
ceased to exist, and new things appeared, when the Force passed from old forms into 
new forms. Cause and Effect was this sequence of the Force. Everything died eventually, 
but the Force was indestructible and persistent. Bray also claimed that the past was 
‘irrevocable’, and he pointed out that he borrowed this term from Grove.435 
Mind was regarded by Bray as a form of force. As an empiricist and amateur 
phrenologist, he held that ‘our consciousness is all that is known to us, and all else is 
only more or less probable interference’,436 and that ‘[c]onsciousness is supposed to be 
a general term denoting states of mind, but mind has no existence in itself, but consists 
of these “states”, or stream, or succession of thoughts and feelings [i.e. propensity, 
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sentiment, sensation, ideas, perception, conception, memory, imagination, and 
judgement]’.437 These states of mind, or, in other words, mental phenomena, were 
considered mental forces by Bray. Bray claimed that mental forces and physical forces 
were correlated. In his autobiography, he pointed out that he came up with the idea of 
the correlation of mental and physical forces when he read Grove’s Correlation of 
Physical Forces. He wrote that ‘I was indebted […] to Mr. G. Grove’, and that ‘I could not 
see why correlation could stop at the physical forces, and why it should not be extended 
to mental force’.438 William Carpenter’s influence on Bray seems to have been indirect. 
Bray mentioned in his autobiography that ‘he was indebted […] much to James Hinton 
in his “Physiological Riddles,” published in the Cornhill Magazine’.439 In the series of 
papers ‘Physiological Riddles’, Hinton discussed the union of consciousness and living 
body. To support his views, Hinton incorporated William Carpenter’s doctrine of the 
correlation of the physical and vital forces and Thomas Carlyle’s view that life was a 
mode of operation of physical forces—magnetism, electricity, chemical affinity, etc.440 
Bray did not discuss what he learnt from Hinton’s paper, though Hinton’s papers seems 
to strengthen Bray’s view that vital and physical phenomena could be explained by 
correlated forces. 
Body, especially brain, was considered by Bray the structural base of mental 
phenomena. Different parts of the brain were responsible for different mental 
functions. There was a part of brain responsible for ego or self-identity, a part 
responsible for the characteristic and direction of volition, and a part responsible for 
‘the world of our likes and antipathies—called the Moral world’.441 In this sense, he 
claimed that mental forces were also physical forces and that there was no boundary 
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between the mental and the physical, the soul and the body, and the spiritual and the 
material. To conceive the world as spiritual or as material made no essential difference 
for Bray, therefore, he also called the world ‘a great spiritual organism’.442 Bray also 
used empiricist reasoning to sustain the dissolution of the gaps between matter, force, 
and mind. He wrote: ‘We know only our own consciousness, and “other things” all 
resolve themselves into forces which are transformed into mind, and are therefore 
directly akin. Thus all is mind, or if we prefer to say, force is material, why then, all is 
matter’.443 
‘God’, in Bray’s definition, ‘is all, “the ever-present power—that presents itself to us 
as force—a power that does everything and assumes all forms”’. 444  He denied the 
transcendence of God, and in this sense he considered himself an atheist.445 For him, 
God was the world, the universe, and the totality of everything, but ‘God’ was not 
simply another term to address the world. Bray saw the world as a great person, while 
all forces were its body, and the collective of all forces manifested its intelligence. He 
felt that there was a ‘Supreme Intelligence’446 of the world like there was an intelligence 
in every human. Bray treated laws, orders, and unity as manifestations of intelligence, 
therefore, he envisioned the laws, orders, and unity present in the universe and the 
general progressive trend of the universe as a sign that there was a great intelligence 
taking care of the universe, unifying things, and directing things with the purpose of 
making the universe better. As the term ‘God’ was commonly used to address a superior 
being in traditional Christianity, so Bray claimed that ‘[a]s Force is intelligent and One, 
it would be more properly called Being—possessing personality; and that Being we have 
called God’.447 The Supreme Intelligence was the intelligence of God, but as there was 
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no boundary between the mental and the physical in Bray’s view, so the Supreme 
Intelligence was not something separated from the body of God, but was a function of 
the body of God, like the human mind was a function of the human body. Bray was a 
determinist holding that everything was determined and no ordinary sense of free will 
existed.448 The Supreme Intelligence was no exception and it was also determined by 
its body. 
After he reached the unification of mental and physical forces, that the physical and 
the mental were only different in terminology, he stressed further that physicists should 
take into account his proposed identification of the mental and the physical. He wrote 
that ‘on the recognition of this great truth, that causation is as constant, and that law 
reigns as much in the realm of mind as of matter, our future progress in this department 
[physical science] must depend’.449 
Bray labelled his idea ‘the deification of nature’. He quoted words of Tyndall, Huxley, 
John Robert Seeley (1834–1895) who was the author of Ecco Homo (1866), Lucretius 
and James Hinton and claimed that deifying nature was inevitable in current science. 
He wrote: 
 
Professor Tyndall tells us that “Matter contains the promise and potency of every 
form of terrestrial life.” “By supposing the present material world,” says Huxley, 
“to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; 
and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. […] The author 
of “Ecce Homo” says that if men have ceased to believe in anything beyond 
Nature, the best thing for them to do, if they must have a God, is to deify Nature. 
Lucretius affirms “That Nature is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself, 
without the meddling of the gods.”450 
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Bray knew that deifying nature was a pantheistic action as he wrote that ‘[a]s James 
Hinton says—“Now we say “individuals and God in them,” here after we shall say “God 
and in this form””; and here James Hinton passes from Theism to Pantheism’.451 
Bray’s view on force, God, and the universe was considered pantheistic by others. A 
reviewer of the Evangelical Nonconformist periodical, the British Quarterly Review, 
called Bray’s philosophy a ‘new pantheism’.452 Bray himself also implied that many of 
his friends wondered whether he was a pantheist, but he was hesitant to admit that he 
was, since he considered that ‘no Pantheist’ would accept the Supreme Intelligence he 
characterised.453 The reason why Bray wrote that no pantheist would accept his ideas 
of the Supreme Intelligence might be because the pantheistic thinkers he knew well—
Thomas Carlyle, Ralph Waldo Emerson, William Wordsworth, Alfred Tennyson, James 
Allanson Picton, and James Hinton—did not subscribe to his image of God and of the 
world. Bray’s works were unpopular as he said that he never made a penny from 
writing,454 so it could be inferred that in his life time there might be no followers of his 
ideas who identified themselves as pantheists. Therefore, it might be because of the 
lack of approval from other pantheists on his philosophy that Bray concluded that he 
was not ‘a Pantheist according to its usual acceptation’.455 
We have seen with Bray that it was possible to build a pantheistic theology upon 
physicists’ theories of force. A pantheistic conception of God could be inferred from the 
unity and the activeness of force. Bray made this inference straightforward. He actively 
claimed that the science of force was leading people to believe in an immanent God 
and a deified nature. In addition, as Bray claimed that he came up with his pantheistic 
philosophy when reading scientific practitioners’ books on force, he also implied that 
reading scientific books on force could lead people to accept pantheism. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
The term ‘force’, as it was used by Victorian scientific practitioners, could foster a sense 
that there was a unifying power in nature, or that there was only one power that ran 
nature. As we saw in Grove’s, Carpenter’s, and Faraday’s scientific writings, they often 
talked about force not as a mathematical vector, but as something real, either as an 
abstraction of phenomena or as an entity. While they often restricted force to heat, 
light, electricity, magnetism, motion, inertia, gravity, and chemical affinity, they also 
implied that the term ‘force’ could be applied to anything physical, vital, or even mental. 
They often used scientific examples of the correlation of forces to support some limited 
unities in nature, though these examples and their conclusions could be easily used to 
support the idea of the universal unity of everything. Moreover, many scientific 
practitioners already believed in the idea of the universal unity before they proposed 
unifying theories. As we have seen, Faraday as a Sandemanian believed that the whole 
physical universe was a unified power created by God, and Carpenter as a Unitarian 
believed that natural forces were manifestations of the singular will of God. Oersted as 
a German natural philosopher was greatly influenced by German pantheistic 
philosophies. He believed that nature was a united mind, which could be called God. 
The science of force in the Victorian era welcomed religious interpretations as many 
theories of force included ontological speculations, and as many scientific practitioners 
also gave their own interpretations to support their religious beliefs. Faraday and 
Carpenter made interpretations to support their dissenting beliefs. Other famous 
examples include Anglican scientific practitioner William Whewell’s support of the 
doctrines of the Church of England in his Bridgewater Treatise On Astronomy and 
General Physics (1833), and Scottish physicists Balfour Stewart and Peter Tait’s support 
of Presbyterian doctrines in their book The Unseen Universe (1875). It is well-known by 
historians that the science of force could be used by Victorian scientific practitioners to 
support the traditional theistic image of God. What is currently less well-known is that 
some Victorian scientific practitioners also used the science of force to support 
pantheistic images of God. 
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Bray and Hinton were scientific practitioners in a broader sense, although they were 
not physicists. Bray practiced phrenology and Hinton was a surgeon. While it is not 
discussed in this chapter in detail, Hinton did make use of the correlation and 
conservation theories of force to support his view of a living universe in his Life in Nature 
and some periodical papers such as the ‘Physiological Riddles’, which was mentioned in 
the section about Bray. These will be further discussed in the section dedicated to him 
in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. Bray and Hinton showed that their readings 
and speculations on the science of force helped them formulate their pantheistic beliefs, 
and that in return, when they argued for their pantheistic ideas, they used the science 
of force as an important support. What they had in common was that they inferred the 
universal unity of everything from the limited empirical evidence of the correlations of 
forces, they took the activeness of force as a sign of life or intelligence, and they saw 
such a living and intelligent universe as God. 
Outside the scientific circle, there were also religious people who made use of the 
science of force in support of pantheism as we have seen in the cases of Martineau, 
Poynting, Picton, and Plumptre. Contrary to Bray, the science of force was less of an 
influence on their pantheistic ideas. Scientific theories of force served as evidence for 
some of their doctrines, rather than something inherent to their philosophies. 
Martineau used the concept of force and its correlation to reconcile science and religion 
while maintaining the intellectual authority of religion in the study of the physical world. 
Poynting used matter-as-force theories to support his monism and to counter 
materialistic and atheistic interpretations of science. Both already held that the 
universe was in some sense a manifestation of God’s will, and they believed that the 
unity of forces proposed by scientific practitioners could make their view more 
convincing. Picton seldom talked about the science of force. He and Plumptre used 
conservation theories to support their view of a united reality which could be called 
God. The influence of German pantheism and natural philosophy is seen in Martineau. 
His view of force as a manifestation of God’s will was echoed in Oersted’s idea of the 
unity of mind in nature, which Martineau pointed out. 
Most scientific sources of these advocates of pantheism belonged to the popular 
science category rather than to the hard science category. One might be tempted to 
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assume that German natural philosophy would have been more influential, but most 
advocates of pantheism did not pay much attention to German idealists’ pantheistic 
interpretations of the science of force. Grove’s Correlation of Physical Forces was the 
most popular source. Faraday’s lectures and Carpenter’s papers on correlation and 
conservation theories were also influential. Huxley as a famous scientific populariser 
was sometimes mentioned as a source of physical knowledge, though he was a biologist 
rather than a physicist. Besides these scientific practitioners’ works, advocates of 
pantheism could also acquire knowledge about the science of force from popular 
philosophical writings, such as John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic. Most of the famous 
names in the history of physics, such as William Thomson and William Macquorn 
Rankine, were not mentioned. 
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4     
Pantheistic Uses of the Science of Matter 
One of the major developments of nineteenth-century theories of matter was chemical 
atomism, in which matter was assumed to be composed of heterogeneous atoms, or 
elements, that carried different properties and could be distinguished quantitatively by 
relative weight. First developed in the work of English chemist John Dalton (1766–1844) 
in the early 1800s, chemical atomism soon became very popular among chemists. It 
brought chemistry to the level of other precise sciences, such as mechanics and 
astronomy, and it fostered many new branches of science, such as organic chemistry 
and spectrum analysis. Three advocates of pantheism—James Hinton, James Allanson 
Picton, and Constance Plumptre—are studied in this chapter to demonstrate how 
scientific theories of matter could be used in support of pantheism. Scientific 
practitioners made many inferences from chemical atomism. Among them, two are 
particularly relevant to this chapter: first, the concept of living matter in which matter 
actively organised itself rather than being passively run by active agents; and secondly, 
the idea of the uniformity of matter according to which all realms of the world—the 
organic, the inorganic, the heaven, or the earth—shared the same atomic base. Hinton 
used the idea of living matter to support his pantheistic view that nature was alive; 
Picton used the implication of the uniformity of matter to support his monistic view of 
the world; and Plumptre used the idea of the uniformity of matter to argue for the 
uncreatedness of nature against creationism, and for the unity of man and the world. 
Scientific popularisers John Tyndall, Thomas Huxley, and John William Draper were their 
sources of chemical knowledge. Spectrum analysis, which was often introduced in 
popular organs, was also used as an evidence to support the unity of the universe. 
    In the first section of the chapter, I introduce the developments of chemical atomism 
and spectrum analysis, as well as Tyndall’s, Huxley’s, and Draper’s interpretations. The 
second section of the chapter begins with a discussion of accusations of pantheism 
made against Tyndall. In her article ‘John Tyndall: Pantheist’, Ruth Barton studies 
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Tyndall’s personal writings and concludes that Tyndall was a pantheist, though she 
seldom mentions Tyndall’s contemporaries’ views. I give a brief account of what 
Tyndall’s contemporaries said about his pantheistic tendencies and demonstrate that 
Tyndall’s claims could be viewed as supports for pantheism even by non-advocates of 
pantheism. After the section on Tyndall, there are three sub-sections detailing the uses 
of these theories of matter by the three advocates of pantheism. 
 
4.1 Scientific Theories of Matter 
4.1.1 The New Atomism as the Consensus Matter Theory 
John Dalton introduced a new atomism for quantitative chemical analysis in his three-
volume work A New System of Chemical Philosophy (1808, 1810, 1827). He defined 
atoms as heterogeneous minima of simple and compounded substances. There were as 
many different atoms as there were different substances. Dalton’s atomic system was 
new in the sense that it merged two branches of former theories of matter—the atomic 
theory of matter and the elemental theory of matter. 
The atomic theory of matter can be traced back to the ancient Greek philosophers 
Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus (341–270 BCE) and the Roman Epicurean poet 
Lucretius (died mid to late 50s BCE).456 They proposed that the world was composed of 
atoms, by which they meant indivisible tiny particles, and empty space between atoms. 
The atomic theory of matter was not favoured by physicists and chemists for many 
centuries until the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Scientific practitioners such as 
Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), and Johann Baptist Van 
Helmont (1579–1644) rediscovered Pre-Socratic atomic theories and incorporated 
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them into their theories of matter.457 In the seventeenth century, systematic atomic 
theories were formulated by many philosophers, notably French philosopher Pierre 
Gassendi (1592–1655) and English mechanical philosopher Robert Boyle (1627–
1691).458 Newton inherited Boyle’s atomism and improved it by adding mechanics and 
new properties to characterise atoms, such as attractive and repulsive forces, mass, and 
inertia. 459  It was one of the Newtonians’ dreams to quantify chemistry with the 
measurement of chemical forces, and to make chemistry a predictive science like 
mechanics. 460  Atoms were homogeneous particles for most of these atomic 
philosophers. They considered that homogeneous atoms were able to form complex 
structures that demonstrated different chemical phenomena. 
    Chemical practitioners, such as physicians, pharmacists, iatrochemists, alchemists, 
metallurgists, brewers, dyers, and tanners, usually found the atomic theory of matter 
too speculative to be used in practice, and they instead favoured the elemental theory 
of matter.461 The elemental theory of matter can be traced back to the ancient Greek 
four-element system, in which matter was understood as a mixture of four elements—
air, fire, earth, and water.462 This four-element system was central to many ancient and 
Medieval philosophers’ views of matter. Aristotle founded his physics upon this system, 
and Paracelsus (1493–1541), the founder of iatrochemistry, also adopted this system. 
Many seventeenth and eighteenth century chemists also worked with similar elemental 
systems, such as that of German Cameralist Johann Becher (1635–1682), who proposed 
a system with three elements—‘mercurious earth’, ‘fatty earth’ and ‘vitreous earth’, 
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and German chemist Georg Ernst Stahl (1659–1734), who renamed ‘fatty earth’ as 
‘phlogiston’ in 1718 and added water as the fourth element of matter in this system.463 
There existed a more pragmatic form of the elemental theory of matter among 
chemical practitioners. Isolatable substances, such as ‘gold, silver, iron, mercury, tin, 
copper […] lead […] brimstone [sulphur] […] [and] charcoal [carbon]’, were treated as 
simple substances since ancient time.464 Fire was often used as an analytical method to 
decide whether a substance was decomposable (or not simple) or not. Chemical 
practitioners could directly observe, manipulate, and study these substances and their 
mutual reactions. However, chemical practitioners often used different names and 
definitions to describe substances, and this caused difficulties in the communication of 
chemical knowledge for a long time. A universal systematic nomenclature was finally 
proposed by French chemists Louis-Bernard Guyton (1737–1816), Antoine Lavoisier 
(1743–1794), and their colleagues in the late eighteenth century. 465  In this 
nomenclature, substances were classified into two general categories: ‘substances not 
decompounded’, or elements, and compounded substances. Before, a substance might 
have had many names in different chemical texts, but in this nomenclature, a substance 
was assigned a unique chemical name which indicated its chemical constitutions.466 
Elements included oxygen, hydrogen, sulphur, mercury, gold, copper, iron, lead, silver, 
tin, zinc, antimony, nickel, charcoal, etc.467 Compounded substances had names such as 
‘sulphuric acid’, ‘red oxyd [oxide] of iron’ and ‘white oxyd of tin’.468 By the end of the 
eighteenth century, this nomenclature had become the standard chemical language 
among chemical practitioners across Europe. Its position was strengthened by 
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influential textbooks such as Lavoisier’s Traité élémentaire de chimie (1789), which was 
translated into English by Scottish writer Robert Kerr (1757–1813) in 1790.469 
Dalton merged these two traditions of theories of matter by making ‘atom’ and 
‘element’ synonymous. In his theory, atoms were no longer homogeneous but 
heterogenous, and each atom represented an element or a compound. The ground-
breaking part of his atomism was the assumption that different atoms had different 
atomic weights. Exact atomic weights were not measurable in the nineteenth century, 
but relative atomic weights were. Dalton proposed a stoichiometry in his New System 
to calculate relative atomic weights, and this method turned out to be very successful. 
Chemical elements and chemical reactions could be measured and represented 
quantitatively by relative weights. As Arnold Thackray points out, Dalton’s work soon 
changed the focus of chemists from chemical mechanism to chemical measurement.470 
The philosophical ground of the new atomism was unstable, though this did not 
trouble most chemists as they could measure relative weights of chemicals without 
considering what ultimate particles were nor whether there were forces between them. 
Historically, the atomic approach was usually more speculative and metaphysical than 
the elemental approach. The term ‘atom’ usually implied something fundamental, 
while ‘element’ usually meant something simple and did not necessarily carry the 
notion of something fundamental. Dalton united these two approaches, ascribing the 
metaphysical status of the atom to the notion of element. He claimed that elements, or 
atoms, were ‘the ultimate particles’471 of matter and pictured them as solid billiard balls. 
However, this view was questioned by many chemists as it was very speculative. 
Chemists, such as Jöns Jacob Berzelius (1779–1848), William Ostwald (1824–1903), and 
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Pierre Duhem (1861–1916), could make use of the stoichiometry without committing 
to Dalton’s philosophy of atom.472 
By 1860, the new atomism became the standard theory of matter in chemistry.473 
Chemicals were represented by combinations of heterogeneous billiard-ball atoms or 
elements, and each of them had a set relative weight. The new atomism gave rise to 
many fields of science. For example, as Alan Chalmers summarises, organic chemistry 
had progressed significantly since the 1830s due to the application of chemical formulae; 
the structures of organic compounds were proposed in the vision of this atomism; the 
statistical kinetic theory of gas, in which the behaviour of gas was explained by the 
motion and collision of molecules, was developed by Maxwell from 1859; and atomic 
explanations were extended and succeeded in not only these two fields but also in ‘the 
effect of solutes on solutions, osmotic pressure, crystallography and optical rotation, 
properties of thin films, spectra and so on’.474 Although there still existed many rival 
systems and despite the fact that there was no consensus on the ultimate structure of 
matter among scientific practitioners, the new atomism was the theory that provided 
the widest range of generalisation during this period. Hence, this new atomism was 
generally accepted by scientific practitioners in the second half of the nineteenth 
century as the best theory of matter.475 
This consensus among scientific practitioners was communicated to the public 
through various kinds of organs—textbooks, popular science books, lectures, 
periodicals, pamphlets, newspapers, etc. Chemical textbooks after 1860, such as 
industrial writer Charles Haughton Gill’s Chemistry for Schools (1869) and chemist and 
astronomer William Allen Miller’s Introduction to the Study of Inorganic Chemistry 
(1878), were mostly written in elemental and atomic terms. Tables of elements were 
given in these textbooks including symbols and relative atomic weights of elements, 
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and chemical reactions were explained by chemical formulae.476 Scientific practitioners 
would seldom leave out the terms ‘atom’ and ‘element’ when they mentioned theories 
of matter in their scientific discourses. For example, Tyndall gave an evening lecture in 
Manchester in 1874 on crystals, and he explained the phenomena of crystallisation in 
full atomic terms, such as ‘atomic architect’, ‘play of invisible particles’, and ‘atoms is 
[…] added to atoms’.477 Newspapers such as the daily national newspaper, The Times, 
reported chemists’ accounts of the new atomism. For example, in a report of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science Meeting in September 1883, the chemist 
and president John Hall Gladstone’s address on the history of elemental theories was 
reported, and terms such as ‘hydrogen’, ‘elementary science’, and ‘atomic weights of 
the elements’ were introduced. 478  Until the end of the nineteenth century, newly 
discovered elements, such as argon, were reported widely by science-related 
periodicals and newspapers.479 Through these medias, the new atomism appeared to 
the public as the most scientific and intellectually authoritative way to view matter. 
 
4.1.2 Spectrum Analysis and the Uniformity of the Heaven and the Earth 
Spectrum analysis was a newly emerged branch of science in the 1860s in which the 
spectra of terrestrial and heavenly bodies were used to identify their chemical 
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elements.480 The study of spectra had been carried out long before the 1860s. The 
phenomenon in which a rainbow light was generated by a prism was known by the 
Romans. 481  The publication of Newton’s Opticks in 1704 marked the beginning of 
modern spectroscopy. In the 1800s, German physicist Joseph Fraunhofer (1787–1826) 
found that there were a large number of thin black lines in the solar spectrum as well 
as in other stars’ spectra, and he recorded these black lines in great detail. These lines 
were called the Fraunhofer lines. In the first half of the nineteenth century, physicists, 
such as John Herschel (1792–1871) and William Talbot (1800–1870), also studied the 
spectra of the coloured flames produced by the burning of salts. The spectra of salts 
were not rainbow-like but were composed of several thin bright lines and thick black 
lines between them. Some British physicists, such as George Gabriel Stokes (1819–1903) 
and Balfour Stewart, found that some salts’ bright lights seemed to be able to fit in the 
black lines of the solar spectrum, but they considered this to be a coincidence.482 In the 
1860s, German physicists Robert Bunsen (1811–1899) and Gustav Robert Kirchhoff 
(1824–1887) began to systematically study the spectra of flames produced by burning 
chemical elements. Kirchhoff found that a vapour of an element absorbed from white 
light the rays that it emitted when it was burned. This striking discovery allowed them 
to assume that the dark lines in the spectrum of sun light indicated that corresponding 
elements existed in the sun and absorbed corresponding rays. With this assumption, it 
was possible to analyse the chemical constitution of a terrestrial or heavenly body by 
comparing its spectrum with known elements’ spectra. 
Many popular accounts of spectrum analysis appeared in the 1860s and the 1870s in 
Britain, such as British chemist Henry E. Roscoe’s Spectrum Analysis—Six Lectures (1870) 
and German school principal Heinrich Schellen’s textbook Spectrum Analysis in Its 
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Application, which was translated into English in 1872.483 The elemental constitutions 
of many celestial bodies were presented. For example, Schellen wrote that in the sun, 
‘iron, sodium, potassium, calcium, magnesium, manganese, chromium, nickel, and 
hydrogen’ were strongly considered to exist, that ‘zinc, barium, copper, cobalt, and gold’ 
might exist, and that ‘silver, mercury, antimony, arsenic, tin, lead, cadmium, strontium, 
[…] lithium, […] silicon and oxygen’ did not exist.484 It was known that the moon and 
planets did not emit light but reflected sunlight. Their spectra were mostly the same as 
the solar spectrum and any differences would indicate the substances that absorbed 
rays in their surfaces. For example, Schellen also wrote that the spectra of ‘Venus, Mars, 
Jupiter, and Saturn’ indicated that their atmosphere contained ‘aqueous vapour’, and 
that the spectrum of Neptune seemed to suggest that it contained ‘carbon’.485 Stars 
were known to be suns that emitted light. Sodium and Magnesium were assumed to 
exist in most stars, while hydrogen, ‘bismuth, antimony, tellurium, and mercury’ were 
assumed to exist in some stars.486 
Such spectroscopic writings demonstrated to the public that scientific practitioners 
had found terrestrial elements in the heavens. They implied that the heavens were not 
absolutely different from the earth. Moreover, from this, it could easily be inferred that 
the whole universe shared a material base or an elemental structure with things on the 
earth. 
 
4.1.3 Divergent Interpretations of the New Atomism 
Chemical atomism and the elemental structure of matter was widely accepted by British 
scientific practitioners in the second half of the nineteenth century, however, when it 
comes to the philosophical and theological implications of chemical atomism, they had 
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many different views. Many British physicists and chemists proposed their 
interpretations in line with their own religious convictions. While chemistry was not 
used as commonly as mechanics, astronomy, geology, and biology by British natural 
theologians in support of natural theology, some of them did incorporate chemical 
knowledge into their natural theology. A famous example was Anglican physician and 
chemist William Prout’s Bridgewater Treatise: Chemistry, Meteorology, and the 
Function of Digestion—Considered with Reference to Natural Theology (1834). The 
series of books, The Bridgewater Treatises, was composed of eight treatises written by 
seven leading scientific practitioners and a layman. The purpose of these treatises was 
to demonstrate ‘the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested in the 
Creation’, which was the core doctrine of natural theology.487 Prout portrayed God as 
the ‘Supreme Chemist’ who created the world and gave purpose to things, and he 
considered that chemists worked as collaborators of the Supreme Chemist and helped 
Him ‘complete or perfect creation’.488 In the treatise, he introduced the contemporary 
corpuscular and elemental theory of matter, physical forces, the constitution of the 
earth, the attribution of elements, heat and light on the earth, the adaptations of life, 
the organisations of organic bodies, and modes of nutrition such as digestion. In due 
courses, he reminded readers that these ‘wonderful and extraordinary arrangements 
[…] display the wisdom and power of the great Creator’.489 
Orthodox interpretations of matter theory can also be found among Scottish 
Presbyterian scientific practitioners. For example, the Presbyterian physicists Balfour 
Stewart (1828–1887) and P. G. Tait (1831–1901) wrote the book The Unseen Universe 
(1875), aiming to counter ‘the materialistic statements now-a-days freely made (often 
                                                     
487 See the ‘Notice’ in William Prout’s treatise Chemistry, Meteorology, and the Function of 
Digestion (London: William Pickering, 1834). 
488 See Richard Ahrens, ‘William Prout (1785–1850) A Biography Sketch’, Journal of Nutrition, 
107 (1977), 17–22 (p. 21); and Brooke and Cantor, Reconstructing Nature, p. 333. 
489 Prout, Chemistry, p. 85. 
 
189 
 
 
 
professedly in the name of science)’. 490  They proposed that there was an unseen 
universe alongside the visible universe, and they reconciled their belief and scientific 
theories by using this assumption. The existence of the unseen universe allowed the 
existence of the things ‘absolutely immaterial and spiritual’ (201). Thus, the existence 
of God, the interference of God upon the visible universe, the soul of man, the special 
position of man in nature, etc. could be made intelligible and compatible with 
contemporary physical and chemical theories. They also argued against ancient Greek 
and Roman atomic theories in which atoms were homogeneous, solid, and 
impenetrable particles. They called them ‘the very false ideas’ (130). They considered 
that this model of atoms would reduce ‘the order of the universe to pure chance’ and 
thus resulted in materialism. They rather supported William Thomson’s vortex atomism. 
Thomson was influenced by Faraday’s matter-as-force theory and pictured atoms as 
ether vortexes. Atoms in this sense were not divisible, they formed a continuum. 
Stewart and Tait claimed that ‘the act by which the atom was produced must 
necessarily […] have been an act of creation in time, that is to say, an act impressed 
upon the universe from without’ (155). They considered that this dynamic model of 
atoms strongly suggested the existence of the unseen universe and the existence of ‘the 
Great First Cause’ who set ether to rotate. 491  Their belief in the existence of the 
supernatural thus could be maintained under the new atomism. 
    The three scientific practitioners—Tyndall, Huxley, and Draper—that will be mainly 
discussed in the following sub-sections were rather unorthodox and radical scientific 
practitioners. In this chapter, I demonstrate that their interpretations supported radical 
theological positions—materialism, atheism, and also pantheism. The following three 
sub-sections introduce their relevant interpretations that were used by advocates of 
pantheism. 
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4.1.3.1 John Tyndall and the Uncreatedness of the Organic World and the Structural 
Power of Matter 
Tyndall used chemical knowledge to support his assumptions about the uncreatedness 
of the organic world and the structural power of matter, or the living power of matter. 
These two assumptions were often perceived as radically opposed to orthodox 
Christianity since they potentially denied the divine origin of life, the divine influence in 
nature, and consequentially the existence of God. Tyndall often advocated that organic 
nature was uncreated in the sense that its matter and forces were fundamentally the 
same as those of inorganic nature. He was against the vitalism held by Christians, such 
as Prout and Coleridge, who posited the existence of a special vital force in the organic 
world but not in the inorganic world. Molecular behaviour was one of Tyndall’s main 
research topics.492 In support of his arguments, Tyndall often illustrated the circulation 
of molecules between human body, animal, vegetable, and the inorganic environment. 
    His arguments appeared as early as in an anti-vitalism essay published in 1864. The 
essay was collected in the Fragments of Science under the title ‘Vitality’.493 Tyndall 
defined vitality or vital force as ‘a special agent’ responsible for ‘the origin, growth, and 
energies of living things’ (459). He considered that ‘all the energy which we derive from 
plants and animals is drawn from the sun’ (459), rather than from any supernatural 
sources. He pointed out that this idea had existed for many years, but that it was more 
poetical than scientific as no one had been able to provide a mechanical theory to 
explain the detailed mechanism (459-60). He intended to use the current atomism to 
formulate a mechanism. He considered that the energy came from the sun ‘lifted [the 
oxygen] from the carbon and the hydrogen’ (462). Potential energy was restored in ‘the 
forcible separation of the atoms of compound substances’ (461). Why was potential 
energy generated in such a way? In another article, ‘The Constitution of Nature’, Tyndall 
explained that ‘[w]herever two atoms capable of uniting together by their mutual 
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attractions exist separately, they form a store of potential energy’. 494  Tyndall 
considered that this energy could turn into motion and heat through reunions of oxygen, 
carbon, and hydrogen in chemical reactions in organisms. Tyndall also considered that 
the energy transmission from plants to animals and eventually to human bodies 
occurred through the circulation of molecules. When ‘we eat the vegetable, and we 
breathe the oxygen of the air’ (462), energy was transferred from our environment to 
our bodies. An atomic mechanism of the origin, storage, and conversion of vital force 
was thus formulated. As molecules and forces circulated between the organic and the 
inorganic worlds, Tyndall argued for the uncreatedness of the organic world. He wrote: 
‘the matter of the animal body is that of inorganic nature. There is no substance in the 
animal tissues which is not primarily derived from the rocks, the water, and the air’ 
(462). Thus, Tyndall argued that no new atoms were created when organisms were 
formed, and no atoms were destroyed when organisms died; that molecules circulated 
between different kinds of bodies; and that the circulation of atoms and molecules was 
responsible for the transmission of energy between the two worlds. 
Tyndall repeated this view in his famous Belfast Address in 1874, and this time he 
strongly implied that the uncreatedness of the vegetable world was a generalisation 
that had been accepted by contemporary scientific practitioners. Near the end of the 
address, when Tyndall introduced the current grand scientific generalisations, he 
mentioned that ‘[t]he vegetable world, though drawing almost all its nutriment from 
invisible sources, was proved incompetent to generate anew either matter or force. […] 
The activity of each animal as a whole was proved to be the transferred activity of its 
molecules’.495 Tyndall gave the address as the president of the British Association for 
the Advance of Science. The address was expected to be a summary of scientific 
progress in Britain in the previous year.496 In his speech, Tyndall did not present the 
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views of his opponents and instead gave the impression that his view was the consensus. 
It can be imagined that for those who held similar views with Tyndall, this address was 
a good resource. 
Tyndall also advocated a view of matter in which matter possessed immense power 
that allowed it to form organic and inorganic structures without any external help. He 
called this power structural power, constructive power, or formative power. He also 
considered that the assumption of the structural power of matter was the fundamental 
feature that separated his so-called ‘scientific materialism’ from brute materialism. He 
used the formative mechanisms of chemical compounds established by chemists as 
examples. Tyndall’s scientific materialism turned out to be highly offensive to many 
Christians since it had the potential to deny the divine origin of life given that living 
structures were organised by matter itself without any divine interference.497 
    Tyndall’s scientific materialism comprised four main doctrines: he believed that 
matter was not passive but instead possessed immense structural power which allowed 
it to form both inorganic and organic structures without the help of an external 
intelligence; that matter was ultimately mysterious, so no one should arbitrarily limit its 
potential; that the connection between matter and consciousness was also mysterious; 
and that matter should be studied under the contemporary atomism without the 
interference of theology. This materialism appeared in the essay ‘Vitality’, and Tyndall 
described the essay as a succinct version of the scientific materialism he expressed in 
his Belfast Address.498  As Tyndall considered that organic matter was derived from 
inorganic matter, he suggested that the structural power of matter was responsible for 
the formation of organics. He wrote: ‘Structural forces are certainly in the mass whether 
or not those forces reach to the extent of forming a plant or an animal. […] In an 
amorphous drop of water lie latent all the marvels of crystalline force; and who will set 
limits to the possible play of molecules in a cooling planet? If these statements startle, 
it is because matter has been defined and maligned by philosophers and theologians, 
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who were equally unaware that it is, at bottom, essentially mystical and 
transcendental’.499 
Tyndall elaborated his scientific materialism three years later in an address delivered 
before the mathematical and physical section of the British Association in Norwich on 
19 August 1868.500 The address was included in Fragments of Science since its first 
edition under the title ‘Scientific Materialism’. In the fifth edition, when Tyndall 
included the 1874 Belfast Address in Fragments of Science, he designated this 1868 
address as a suitable ‘supplement’ of the 1874 Belfast Address. 501  In ‘Scientific 
Materialism’, he gave many examples of minerals, vegetables, and animals to 
demonstrate the ‘constructive power’(413) of matter, such as the formations of crystals, 
the growth of a grain of coin, and animal heat and motion. Based on these examples, 
Tyndall claimed that the structural power of matter alone could explain ‘the formation 
of a crystal, a plant, or an animal’ (418). He also claimed that ‘many scientific thinkers 
more or less distinctly believe’ in this (418). 
It is important to note that Tyndall did not apply this view to consciousness. He did 
not consider that consciousness could be reduced to the molecular condition of the 
brain. Tyndall claimed that the profound scientific thinkers of his day would also agree 
that ‘for every fact of consciousness […], a definite molecular condition, of motion or 
structure, is set up in the brain’ (419), and that the change of molecular conditions in 
the brain would affect consciousness. ‘But,’ he said, ‘the passage from the physics of 
the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable’ (420). How 
consciousness perceived, translated, and in return controlled the molecular condition 
in the brain was a problem Tyndall did not think could be answered. He did not consider 
consciousness and the molecular condition of the brain to be identical. Tyndall thus 
rejected the ‘materialist’ position that molecular motions could explain everything 
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(420–21). He claimed that ‘the problem of the connection of body and soul is as 
insoluble, in its modern form, as it was in the pre-scientific ages’ (421). 
Tyndall advocated his scientific materialism again in the 1874 Belfast Address, though 
he gave fewer examples of the structural power of matter than he did in his previous 
lecture ‘scientific materialism’. Tyndall tried to persuade audiences that ‘any form of 
life can be developed out of matter’ (524). He pointed out that chemists were 
‘intimately acquainted with the structural power of matter, as evidenced in the 
phenomena of crystallisation’ (525). They had found the mechanical mechanisms of the 
formation of many substances that ‘were some time ago regarded as the sole products 
of vitality’ (525). Tyndall reasoned that this trend of discovery could justify the belief 
that all organisms’ mechanical mechanisms of formation could be discovered, so it was 
proper to believe that matter had the potency to form life. Whether consciousness was 
formed by matter was again claimed by Tyndall as an ‘unanswerable’ question (504). 
Tyndall’s three articles—‘Vitality’, ‘Scientific Materialism’, and the 1874 Belfast 
Address became very useful scientific sources for those who supported materialism, 
who were against creationism, and who denied the divine influence upon natural 
processes. Many reviewers labelled Tyndall a leading materialist, though Tyndall 
himself avoided the title of materialist and was more in favour of the title of agnostic.502 
He did not build a systematic philosophy and left many questions unanswered, such as 
the relation between the spiritual and the material. 
 
4.1.3.2 Thomas Huxley and the Physical Basis of Life 
Huxley was keen on marketing his view of the universe, which he called ‘New Nature’. 
His ‘New Nature’ was a self-contained and self-evolving system.503. It was in opposition 
with the old static and divine-interfered nature in traditional Christian theology. His 
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view was somewhat radical, but he was more cautious than Tyndall and was willing to 
reconcile Christian theology with science. Huxley did believe in some Christian doctrines, 
such as the immortality of soul, though he seldom expressed them in the public.504 He 
preferred to called his position ‘agnosticism’, a term he coined, which meant that he 
did not subscribe to any metaphysical views of God.505 Huxley, like Tyndall, held that 
matter possessed the power to form life, and his also believed that all organic matter 
had the same basic structure. These views were expressed in his famous public lecture, 
‘The Physical Basis of Life’, delivered in Edinburgh on 8 November 1868.506 The lecture 
was collected in his book Lay Sermons (1870). 
In the beginning of the lecture, Huxley introduced that ‘protoplasm’ was the scientific 
name of ‘the physical basis of life’ (132). By using this phrase, he intended to convey his 
idea that ‘there is some one kind of matter which is common to all living beings, and 
that their endless diversities are bound together by a physical, as well as an ideal, unity’ 
(132–33). Huxley pointed out that ‘under a sufficiently high microscopic power’, 
physiologists and biologists had seen that human tissues as well as vegetables were 
composed by ‘innumerable multitude of little, circular, discoidal bodies, or corpuscles’ 
(139). These ‘corpuscles’ were ‘of essentially similar structure’ (139). Using this 
evidence, Huxley considered that ‘so far as form is concerned, plants and animals are 
not separable’ and ‘all living forms are fundamentally of one character’ (141–42). He 
called these corpuscles protoplasm, the physical basis of life, ‘living matter’ (142), or 
‘the matter of life’ (148). 
Huxley then argued that ‘the properties of protoplasm result from the nature and 
disposition of its molecules’ rather than from ‘vitality’ (151). He considered that 
protoplasm was ‘always dying’, resolving to ‘its mineral and lifeless constitutions’, 
though it would come alive again from lifeless matter (145). He pointed out that 
chemists’ analyses of organics showed that ‘all the forms of protoplasm which have yet 
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been examined contain the four elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, in 
very complex union’ (143). These four elements were ‘all lifeless bodies’, and ‘in certain 
proportions and under certain conditions’, they gave rise to ‘carbonic acid, water, and 
ammonia’ (149). These compounds were also lifeless, but ‘when they are brought 
together, under certain conditions they give rise to the still more complex body, 
protoplasm, and this protoplasm exhibits the phenomena of life’ (149). Huxley saw ‘no 
break in this series of steps in molecular complication’, and he considered it fit ‘to speak 
of the various powers and activities of these substances as the properties of the matter 
of which they are composed’ (149). 
Huxley understood that it was unconventional at that time to treat the phenomena 
of life in the same way as the properties of matter. He tried to render this idea 
intelligible by comparing water and protoplasm. He pointed out that ‘when hydrogen 
and oxygen are mixed in a certain proportion, and an electric spark is passed through 
then, they disappear, and a quantity of water, equal in weight to the sum of their 
weights, appears in their place’ (149). In explaining this phenomenon, scientific 
practitioners did ‘not assume that a something called “aquosity” entered into and took 
possession of the oxide of hydrogen […], and then guided the aqueous particles to their 
places’ (149). They rather believed that this phenomenon was a ‘result from the 
properties of the component elements of the water’ (150). Huxley then pointed out 
that the formation of protoplasm was like that of water. ‘When carbonic acid, water, 
and ammonia disappear, and in their place, under the influence of pre-existing living 
protoplasm, an equivalent weight of the matter of life makes its appearance’ (150). It 
was common to assume that vitality came into function during the formation of 
protoplasm, but Huxley contested that it made no sense to assume vitality while at the 
same time abandoning aquosity. He argued: ‘If scientific language is to possess a 
definite and constant signification whenever it is employed’, (151) then ‘[i]f the 
phenomena exhibited by water are its properties, so are those presented by protoplasm, 
living or dead, its properties’ (151). Huxley considered it a logical conclusion that ‘all 
vital action may […] be said to be the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm 
which displays it’ (152). 
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Unlike Tyndall, Huxley did not hesitate to put forth the claim that mental phenomena 
could also be explained as molecular properties. He said that ‘it must be true, in the 
same sense and to the same extent, that the thoughts to which I am not giving utterance, 
and your thoughts regarding them, are the expression of molecular changes in that 
matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena’ (152). This attitude was 
also expressed in other lectures. For example, in a lecture on Descartes’s ‘Discourse 
Touching the Method of Using One’s Reason Rightly and of Seeking Scientific Truth’, 
Huxley introduced Descartes’ mechanical philosophy in which animals and human 
bodies were viewed as machines. He added that ‘thought is as much a function of 
matter as motion is’.507 
The common cellular structure of organic substances introduced by Huxley in his 
public sermon could be striking for many Victorians. The life forms that in appearances 
had no any significant similarity, such as a plant and a human body, now were said to 
be fundamentally the same thing. This sermon was a great source for those who needed 
to find scientific support for the uniformity of living things and the uniformity of the 
organic and the inorganic. 
 
4.1.3.3 John William Draper and the Indestructibility of Matter 
Physicists and chemists in the nineteenth century often assumed matter to be 
indestructible within the course of nature, as we have seen with Faraday in the previous 
chapter. From the second half of the eighteenth century, weight was increasingly 
accepted as a form of measurement for the quantity of matter, and the conservation of 
mass was increasingly accepted as an axiom.508 Gravimetric analysis had been one of 
chemical practitioners’ major concerns since the late eighteenth century. The weight of 
an element was often assumed to be conserved during a chemical reaction.509 It was a 
common belief among chemists that matter was not created or destroyed if its weight 
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did not change. Chemists’ assumption of the conservation of mass during chemical 
reactions strengthened the doctrine of the indestructibility of matter. 
The belief in the indestructibility of matter was also a traditional doctrine of atomism, 
expressed in the indestructibility of atoms. It was mentioned or implied in the 
philosophies of pre-Victorian atomic philosophers, among whom Democritus, Epicurus, 
and Lucretius were often mentioned in Victorian publications.510 The indestructibility of 
atoms was also expressed by many Victorian physicists and chemists within the context 
of the new atomism. Empirically proving the indestructibility of atoms was not possible 
as atoms were not observable in the nineteenth century. Scientific writers used indirect 
evidence to render this view intelligible and convincing for general readers. One 
favourite strategy was to portray that atoms circulated between bodies without being 
destroyed or created. The writer and chemist John William Draper (1811–1882) gave 
such an example in his History of the Intellectual Development of Europe (1863). 
In History of the Intellectual Development of Europe, Draper gave a short history of 
chemistry from ancient times to the present. 511  He claimed that ‘the idea of the 
destruction and creation of matter’ was ‘disposed’ in modern chemistry, and that ‘the 
indestructibility of matter’, or ‘the imperishability of substance’, was one of the 
fundamental assumptions of current chemistry.512 The ‘constituent parts’, or ‘atom[s]’, 
were indestructible, and they were not the aspects of things that might ‘change through 
decompositions and recombinations’ (602). 
Draper then used the example of the circulation of a particle of water in nature to 
demonstrate the continuity of atoms despite changes in form. In this example, the trip 
of the particle of water began in the sea. It then evaporated into the air. Its motion was 
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invisible. It then might become a particle of a cloud and drop onto the earth as a particle 
of a rain-drop. It might then become a particle in a fountain, enter the root of a plant, 
and become a particle of the plant. It might move to a leaf of the plant and be 
decomposed into oxygen and hydrogen by sunlight. Its constituent oxygen and 
hydrogen might then become parts of organic compounds of the leaf. An animal might 
eat the leaf and take in these elements of the particle of water into its body. These 
elements might then be combined into a particle of water again through chemical 
reactions within the animal’s body and excreted through breath or even tears. It might 
eventually become a particle in the sea again. Draper claimed that for the particle of 
water, ‘whatever the course through which it has passed, whatever mutations it has 
undergone, whatever the force it has submitted to, its elementary constituents endure. 
Not only have they not been annihilated, they have not even been changed’ (602). In 
other words, the atoms that composed this particle of water were indestructible since 
no matter how they circulated, they did not change. 
 
4.2 Pantheistic Uses of Scientific Theories of Matter 
In the first part of this chapter, I have introduced the new atomism, the development 
of spectrum analysis, and Tyndall’s, Huxley’s, and Draper’s interpretations of these 
developments in the theory of matter. In this second part, I first give a brief account of 
how Tyndall’s contemporaries viewed his seemly pantheistic theory of living matter. I 
then give three accounts of the uses of theories of matter in support of pantheism by 
Hinton, Picton, and Plumptre. 
 
4.2.1 Accusations of Pantheism Made Against John Tyndall 
Tyndall was accused of pantheism by some of his contemporaries after he delivered the 
1874 Belfast Address because of his claim that matter was creative. The following is the 
key sentence that caused him to be accused of pantheism: 
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By an intellectual necessity I cross the boundary of the experimental evidence, 
and discern in that Matter which we, in our ignorance of its latent powers, and 
notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered 
with opprobrium, the promise and potency of all terrestrial Life.513 
 
Tyndall claimed that the powers that derived life were properties of matter rather than 
properties of other agencies. Thus, he did not call matter a dead substance, but instead 
envisioned it as a living thing. John Masson (?–1927), a Scottish Classicist who is 
mentioned by Barton, pointed out: ‘To him [Lucretius], matter is living. Like Tyndall, he 
is willing to believe that every clod of earth, every lump of stone on the street, is tingling 
and throbbing with life, – and potency of life. This is pantheism’.514 He also reasoned 
that ‘[i]f matter is not created, and as Professor Tyndall also implies, a God exists, it 
does not seem possible to evade the conclusion that matter is eternal, and God identical 
with matter’ (366), and this was pantheism. Masson considered that ‘[t]he opinions 
expressed in the address are not inconsistent with the existence of a Creator’ (366), 
however, Robert Buchanan (1841–1901), an anti-religious poet and novelist, 
considered that Tyndall’s theory of living matter was not compatible with the concept 
of a supernatural Creator. Buchannan commented that Tyndall’s ‘theory of organic 
matter is destructive to any sort of Deism; indeed, so far as we see, it leaves no room 
whether for even the higher Pantheism, though it is full of that lower Pantheism which 
sees in every clod and stone the potency of universal life’.515 
Other commentators expressed similar suspicions. An anonymous writer of a report 
of the Belfast Meeting published in the Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine wrote that 
Tyndall’s promotion of the idea of living matter might be a ‘distinct announcement of 
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the broadest materialism, if not a downright materialistic pantheism’.516 James McCosh 
(1811–1894), a Calvinist philosopher and president of the College of New Jersey who is 
also mentioned by Barton, commented that Tyndall ‘is obliged, however, to admit a 
“formative power, as Fichte would call it, this structural energy ready to come into play 
and build the ultimate particles of matter into definite shapes”’, and that ‘this might 
seem to make him [Tyndall], like Fichte, a pantheist’.517 However, Barton does not 
mention that McCosh quickly refuted this and regarded Tyndall as a man with no 
religious conviction. He wrote that Tyndall ‘is not inclined to become fixed down to any 
religious creed’ (45), and that Tyndall ‘retains nothing of pantheism but its 
sentimentality’ (45). John William Dawson (1820–1899), a Protestant geologist, 
considered that Tyndall’s theory drove him to take up the ‘ground which is actually that 
of the pantheists, whose doctrines he would no doubt altogether repudiate’, and that 
Tyndall’s position ‘thus obliges him to oscillate between materialism and pantheism, 
and to present a strange aspect of inconsistency’.518 
As we see, these commentators considered that the concept of living matter was 
pantheistic, but many of them did not consider Tyndall to be a pantheist. The case of 
the Belfast Address has been introduced here to show that the concept of living matter 
itself could be considered a pantheistic doctrine by many Victorians, and those who 
advocated this concept could be associated with pantheism. 
 
4.2.2 James Hinton and a Living Nature 
Tyndall publicly rejected vital forces and attributed vital powers to matter as early as 
1865 when his essay ‘Vitality’ was published. Hinton, also a scientific practitioner, had 
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declared similar views earlier and more religiously than Tyndall. His Men and His 
Dwelling Place (1859) was based on the doctrine that nature was alive and there was 
no dead matter. In his later book Life in Nature (1862), he aimed to use science to 
support his doctrine. Tyndall once told Hinton: ‘you have the physical mind’.519 Hinton’s 
uses of the science of matter were mainly presented in his book Life in Nature (1862). 
He was among the first generation in Victorian Britain who inferred a substantial unity 
between the organic and the inorganic worlds from chemical atomism. Like Tyndall, 
Hinton first interpreted chemical atomism as supporting the view that the organic world 
was composed of the same matter and forces as the inorganic world. In this view, 
nature was seen as a continuum. Hinton went further than Tyndall and inferred from 
this view his pantheistic idea that inorganic nature was also alive and that the whole of 
nature was ‘a conscious existence’ manifesting ‘a Higher Intelligence’.520 
Hinton began his argument with the claim that vital forces were not new forces but 
the forces that ran the inorganic world. He mentioned Grove’s Correlation of Physical 
Forces and Carpenter’s ‘Correlation of the Physical and the Vital Forces’ (1850) as 
supporting his argument.521 He wrote that ‘[w]e do not require, for organic life, to 
assume any new or special power; the common and all-pervading powers of nature are 
enough’ (145). He conceived life as ‘a process, or a mode of operation, of the same 
powers which we recognize under other names, as magnetism, electricity, or chemical 
affinity’ (140). He also credited this idea to Coleridge who expressed this view of life in 
Hints towards the Formation of a more Comprehensive Theory of Life (1848).522 From 
this anti-vitalism position, Hinton brought out his pantheistic view: ‘If it be proved that 
the forces and laws of the inorganic world constitute all that is to be found of physical 
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power or principle in organic life, then does not the conclusion follow that the 
apparently inorganic world is truly living too?’.523 Hinton considered that the question, 
‘How can the living be derived from that which is not living?’ (146), was not solved by 
the doctrine of the correlation of forces. In order to solve this problem, he sought help 
from the new atomism. He claimed that ‘[n]ature is universally living is a position that 
has often been maintained; but evidence of its truth could not be given until various 
physiological problems had been at least approximately solved’ (146). He also 
considered that it was the contemporary science based on the new atomism that solved 
‘various physiological problems’. 
As a surgeon who was familiar with physiology, Hinton separated vital phenomena 
into two categories: function and nutrition. He made the definitions that ‘[t]he actions 
of a living body are called its “functions”’ (4), and that the growth and decay of a living 
body is called its nutrition. Both were reduced to chemical changes, and the concept of 
external vital force was rejected. He wrote that ‘[t]he vital force is not the agent in the 
functions; they are effects of the chemical force’ (33) and that nutrition ‘is always 
dependent on Chemical Change’ (vi). In his discussion of functions, Hinton gave human 
anatomical examples. He attached two pictures of hand nerves drawn separately by 
Swiss anatomist Albert von Kölliker (1817–1905) and German anatomist Rudolf Wagner 
(1805–1864), and introduced the consensus among anatomists that ‘[t]he nerve force 
originates in a particular chemical change’ and that nerve force was suspected to be 
‘like the galvanic’.524 He also attached pictures of muscle fibres from English anatomist 
William Bowman (1816–1892) and pointed out that ‘chemical action is one of the best 
known sources of motor force, and one of the most frequently employed’. 525  He 
considered it suitable to see these functions as ‘result[s] from chemical changes within 
it [the body]’ (38). 
In his discussion of nutrition, Hinton pointed out that the body was nourished by 
surrounding inorganic substances, and that there did not seem to be any new elements 
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appearing in organic substances. The most difficult part for Hinton was to explain how 
inorganic substances were organised into organic substances without using the concept 
of external vital force. He claimed that it was ‘the mode in which its [a body’s] elements 
are arranged’ (41) that was responsible for the processes of organisation. He 
demonstrated this with the example of an egg albumen. Hinton pointed out that 
according to the current chemical knowledge, the albumen ‘consists mainly of three 
gases (hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen), and one solid (carbon), with small quantities 
of other bodies, of which the chief are sulphur, phosphorus, and lime’ (40). When 
‘[e]xposed to air, albumen decays; the carbon unites with oxygen and forms water, and 
with nitrogen to form ammonia. Similarly, the sulphur and phosphorus select some 
other ingredients of the albumen, or of the atmosphere, to unite with them into simpler 
compounds’ (40–41). The album would become an organic substance when the process 
was complete, and muscles and nerves would appear. Hinton considered that this 
process demonstrated that the idea that inorganic substances could become organic 
substances and ultimately formed functional parts of the body through chemical 
changes was intelligible. 
From these discussions, Hinton proposed the hypothesis: ‘That which constitutes 
matter living, in the ordinary sense, is a certain arrangement of its elements’ (146). He 
pointed out that a common understanding at the time he wrote the book was that ‘the 
organic world is distinguished at once by a special eminence over the rest of nature, 
and by a special mystery’ (196). He argued that with his hypothesis, the organic world 
did not have a special eminence over the inorganic world, and thus ‘Life presents to us 
no mystery’ (197). He suggested: ‘we must, in the present state of our knowledge, 
consider the living body, like all other material substances, to consist of “atoms”—
minute particles, beyond which we cannot conceive division to be carried. These atoms, 
by their arrangement, constitute the organic matter’ (146–47). 
Hinton then inferred his pantheistic view that nature was alive from this hypothesis. 
He noticed that atoms when ‘separately considered, are not organic’, in other words, 
‘are not themselves living’ (146–47). He claimed: ‘The ultimate atoms of which a living 
body is composed are not individually possessors of life; the life is in their mutual 
connection’ (147). Hinton considered that everything, including our bodies and 
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heavenly ‘orbs’, was ‘atoms […] in an organization of a corresponding magnitude’, thus 
that it was intelligible to make an analogy between ‘the stellar groups’ and ‘the forms 
and processes of the organic world’ (149). He cited the Prussian geographer Alexander 
von Humboldt’s (1769–1859) metaphor in Cosmos: A Survey of the General Physical 
History of the Universe (1845), according to which ‘motion in every point of the vault of 
heaven’ was the same as motion of vegetable ‘in the germinating, leaf-pushing, flower-
unfolding’ (150–51). Hinton claimed that based on this understanding of the foundation 
of matter, it was intelligible to conceive a substantial and structural uniformity of nature, 
and that in such a view, there was no break between life and non-life. He suggested 
readers to consider ‘Life infinite and boundless’ (151–52). The universe was in this sense 
alive and pantheistic. 
Hinton also claimed that ‘our hearts’ called us to see life as universal, and that the 
universal life in return guaranteed this sympathy.526 He viewed nature as ‘a conscious 
existence’ (200) manifesting ‘a Higher Intelligence’ (153). He considered that nature 
presented us ‘riddles’ in order to ‘sport’ us, that ‘[t]he study of Nature, revealing to us, 
though faintly, yet truly, traces of the laws and methods of the Highest and Universal 
Worker’, and that ‘this study has its worthy end, only when it raises us to act like Him’ 
(154). Hinton here used rhetoric that was often seen in orthodox natural theology. 
Francis Bacon’s similar views of God and of the meaning in studying nature were cited. 
In its outfit, Hinton’s view looked like an orthodox natural theological view, however, it 
was pantheistic at its core. It was a habit of Hinton to use orthodox Christian rhetoric, 
as E. M. O. Ellis, Havelock Ellis’s wife, pointed out: ‘Hinton, in his philosophy, was always 
seeking to put new wine into old bottles. He wanted to use the symbolism of the Bible 
as the theological mind uses it, while courageously building on these beautiful symbols 
an entirely new meaning’.527 
Though Hinton inferred from the new atomism a united and living nature, he kept 
stressing that the atomism was no more than a hypothesis. He used it to make the 
concept of living nature intelligible and in line with contemporary science. However, he 
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considered atoms dead and that a thoroughly living nature should not have a dead 
foundation. Hinton claimed: ‘Life on this view is not explained; it is denied. It is true that 
it is made universal, but in that very universality the thing itself is lost’ (156). Hinton did 
not blame science but attributed this paradoxical situation to a false interpretation of 
science. He referred to his separation of phenomenon and noumenon mentioned in 
Man and His Dwelling Place. He claimed that science dealt with the phenomenal world 
but not the real world. In Hinton’s view, it was by our defective perception that we 
perceived the phenomenal world as fundamentally dead, but the real world was fully 
alive as our religious feelings told us. Thus, Hinton claimed that only when humans 
falsely conceived science as a study of the real world, would they have the conclusions 
that the real world was dead and science was against religious feelings about the world. 
He believed that if people conceived scientific study in his way, then science and religion 
would be reconciled: religious feelings showed us the real world and science studied its 
defective manifestations in our perception. He exclaimed: ‘It is a living world which we 
thus perceive under the appearance of passive forces; of chemistry and mechanism. […] 
Life is universal: it only seems to be mechanical’ (160). ‘Life, of which the seeming life 
in the organic world, the seeming deadness in the inorganic, alike are the appearance’ 
(161), and ‘we have hearts and souls to know it by’ (162). 
With the case of Hinton, we have seen that the new atomism could constitute a 
double-edged sword for advocates of pantheism. Hinton used an idea implied by the 
new atomism, that all things were united in the sense that they shared the same 
material base, to dismiss the gap between living and dead things, as well as between 
man and nature. By dismissing these gaps, he argued for his pantheistic doctrine that 
dead things were in fact alive, that there was nothing dead in nature, and that nature 
was thoroughly alive. However, he also knew that chemists normally did not consider 
atoms to be alive, and that if the fundamental part of the world was dead, then his 
pantheistic idea of a living nature was threatened. In order to solve this problem, he 
claimed that the new atomism was not the ultimate theory of matter. 
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4.2.3 James Allanson Picton and the Mystery of Matter 
Picton, like Hinton, used the term ‘life’ to address the universe and God. Phrases like 
‘Eternal Life’ and ‘Universal Life’ were frequently used by Picton in his writings. 528 
However, unlike Hinton, Picton did not make the concept of life significant in his 
pantheism, and the dualism of life and death was not Picton’s major concern. Picton’s 
reasons for using ‘life’ to address the universe and God were that it was emotionally 
‘impossible to believe […] the idea of a Universe dead and cold at the heart’, and that 
‘spontaneity’, which was normally attributed to life, ‘must necessarily be attributed to 
the source and substance of all things’.529 Thus, rather than to refer to the universe, or 
to God, as a dead being, he chose to call it a life. His major concern was to prove the 
unity of the world and the unknowability of its reality. As a reminder, the basic doctrine 
of Picton’s pantheism was that material and spiritual phenomena were all 
manifestations of a mysterious and united reality, which could be called God. Picton 
used the science of matter to support his monistic view of the world as well as two 
properties of reality—unity and unknowability. These uses of science can be found 
mainly in his books The Mystery of Matter (1873) and The Religion of the Universe 
(1904). Picton’s first work on pantheism was written roughly 10 years after Hinton’s. He 
therefore benefited from a wider choice of scientific ideas to support his views. Indeed, 
over the course of these 10 years, Tyndall and Huxley had become famous among the 
general public and had formulated several radical views that Picton could use. 
Picton was against the common dualism of material and spiritual substances. In his 
pantheism, there was only one substance of which all things were manifestations. He 
claimed that modern science was proving that his monistic view of substance was much 
more reasonable than the dualism of matter and spirit: 
 
in modern times science and philosophy combine to make impossible that old 
sword-and-sheath, or shell-and-kernel theory of the world, by which men once 
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expressed the unfathomable contrast of “within and without.” The intimacy of 
relationship which scientific research establishes between soul and body is such, 
that one feels relationship to be hardly the word to express what looks much more 
like identity. And when once this is realised, it becomes impossible henceforward 
to find satisfaction in the ordinary dualistic notion of two ultimate substances 
fundamentally and essentially distinct. (12) 
 
Huxley’s lecture ‘The Physical Basis of Life’ was used by Picton to support his views. 
Picton wrote: ‘he [Huxley] told us that all organisations […] are all composed mainly of 
one sort of matter which in all cases, even those at the extremity of the scale, is almost 
identical in composition. And the one other fact on which he insisted was, that every 
living action […] is accompanied by, and in a sense finds an equivalent expression in, a 
definite waste or disintegration of material tissue’ (14). Picton pointed out that it 
seemed certain (at the time) that mental activities would always accompany ‘molecular 
agitation, producing definite chemical results’ (14) in the brain, and that ‘thought and 
love and indignation and fear, which in one direction find their expression in majestic 
eloquence, should in another direction find their expression in the production of 
carbonic acid urea and water’ (15). By presenting these notions, he claimed that ‘[s]uch 
a union as this between soul and body seemed logically to amount to identity’ (15). He 
quoted Huxley’s words: ‘sooner or later we shall arrive at a mechanical expression of 
consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of heat’.530 
Picton did not view the mechanical explanation of material and mental phenomena 
as ultimately true. The part of Huxley’s theory that Picton regarded as most valuable 
was the idea of the unity of the mental and the material. Picton wrote: ‘it matters not 
whether the theories referred to are true or not. They assert, at any rate, that unity of 
the world, which in some form or other must ultimately be accepted; and at which, in 
any form, believers in two substances must stumble’ (19–20). Picton also saw Huxley’s 
theory as an example of a pantheistic awakening of his time through science. He 
claimed that ‘the discoveries of modern science have given so grand an awakening’ to 
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the ‘sense of a comprehensive unity’, and that ‘[w]hoever then contributes a side light, 
a shade of thought, a suggestive word on the mystery of matter, is doing what he can 
to hasten that day when “God shall be all in all”’ (20). As C. B. Upton pointed out in his 
review of Picton’s work, Picton treated Huxley as a ‘chief intellectual pioneer’ of his 
pantheism.531 
Chemical atomism was specially discussed by Picton. He tried to reconcile atomism 
with his view of reality. He saw atomism as a useful theory providing ‘a cause, out of 
which we can rationally educe the effect’ (36), but not as a truth about ultimate reality. 
Picton did not believe that knowledge of reality in itself beyond empirical experience 
was possible. He thus considered that ultimate truth was not attainable through the 
empirical sciences, and therefore did not treat atomism as a representation of the truth. 
Picton noted that atomic materialism, which asserted that atoms were the ultimate 
reality of the world, was in conflict with his position, and he was worried about the 
pervading view that scientific atomism entailed atomic materialism. He argued against 
this view: ‘physical philosophers propose to reduce all our perceptions, and everything 
else about us, to a system of molecular mechanics. […] The method ought to be 
materialistic […] for that is only another name for precise observation and accurate 
inference. But […] to accuse molecular mechanics of a materialistic tendency is about 
as reasonable as it would have been to accuse the first aeronaut who ventured to 
explore the clouds, of a voyage into outer darkness’ (32–33). In other words, such an 
accusation was absurd for Picton. 
A pessimistic induction was put forth by Picton to further convince readers not to 
treat atoms as ultimate beings.532 He pointed out that scientific practitioners’ theories 
of matter had changed over time, that former theories were usually falsified by later 
theories, and that contemporary theories might also end up being contradicted. He first 
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gave the example of Descartes’s theory of matter, in which: ‘matter and space are 
inseparable’ and the universe composed ‘of continuous and infinitely extended matter’ 
(45). He then pointed out that in modern atomism, which was ‘[t]he more favoured 
doctrine in modern times’, ‘matter is ultimately constituted of minute indivisible 
particles, which are separated one from another by spaces’.533 He also noted that some 
modern scientific practitioners such as ‘Faraday’ suggested that atoms were ‘capable of 
wholly interpenetrating one another, and […] thus producing an entirely new mode of 
force, or, in common language, a new substance’. 534  With these examples, Picton 
claimed that ‘its [physical research] history has been to a large extent a process of 
correction, ever approximating to, but, in the nature of the case, incapable of attaining 
absolute truth’ (38). 
Modern science was viewed by Picton as an attempt to find the ultimate unity of the 
world. Chemical atomism was one of these attempts, and Picton considered that it 
helped people to better know and to better worship the mysterious reality of the world. 
Picton claimed that ‘surely there is […] a larger joy in the feeling of a fresh 
approximation towards the inconceivable because infinity unity, which constitutes the 
maze of worlds a universe’ (101).535 Thus, although ultimate reality was not attained by 
physical science, Picton still considered that the practice of finding unity ‘exercised over 
our souls is the inmost secret of the joy we feel in all our largest contemplations of the 
world’ (103), and that ‘[s]ubstance may be unsearchable; and the divine universe is 
unspeakable; but the indefeasible certainty of their reality is our nearest intellectual 
approach to the One Eternal who draws us for ever with a resistless attraction to 
worship’ (103). 
The case of Picton shows that scientific practitioners’ mechanical explanations of 
mental phenomena could be used to support monistic view of mind and matter against 
dualistic views. The atomic theory of matter allowed Picton to insist on the idea of the 
unity of reality. But he also noticed that atomic materialism, in which the foundation of 
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the world was not united but composed of discrete parts, could be inferred from 
chemical atomism, and that this went against his pantheism as God could hardly be 
described as a discrete reality. He addressed this problem by arguing that the current 
atomic theory of matter was not the definitive theory of matter, and that the ultimate 
nature of matter was unknowable. 
 
4.2.4 Constance Plumptre and Anti-Creationism and the Unity of Man and 
the Universe 
Plumptre’s ontological view of the world was similar to Picton’s. She also viewed the 
world as the manifestation of a mysterious and united reality. Plumptre used theories 
of matter mainly to support two doctrines within her vision of pantheism. The first was 
a doctrine of anti-creationism according to which nothing was created from nothing, 
there were only transformations, and the universe was eternal. The second was a 
doctrine of the unity of humans and the universe. These two doctrines were also held 
by Picton, but Plumptre used different scientific materials to support them. Plumptre 
developed her vision of science and pantheism mainly in the second volume of her 
General Sketches of the History of Pantheism (1879), which was published about six 
years after Picton’s Mystery of Matter. Several new sources such as Tyndall’s 1874 
Belfast Address and more works on spectrum analysis had become available during 
these years. 
The doctrine of the indestructibility of matter implied in chemical atomism was used 
by Plumptre to support her anti-creationism. For Plumptre, pantheism was different 
from monotheism in its denial of ‘the dualistic doctrine of a personal extra-mundane 
God on the one hand, and a perishable universe on the other’.536 The universe in her 
view contained only transformations and was eternal rather than perishable. Plumptre 
pointed out that the view of matter as indestructible was a ‘thing under the sun’ (269) 
(which meant a doctrine that was widely talked about and accepted) in the late 1870s. 
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She interpreted the doctrine of ‘the indestructibility of Matter’ as asserting that 
‘[m]atter decomposes and recombines. As it was in the beginning, so it is now’ (269). 
Using atomic terminologies, she wrote: ‘Every atom of the universe continues to exist, 
and must exist as in the beginning’ (269). She thus claimed that this doctrine implied 
that ‘there has been no creation, only a transformation’ (269). Draper’s description of 
the circulation of a particle of water in The Intellectual Development of Europe was used 
by Plumptre as an example how matter changed appearance without changing its 
essence. She quoted a large paragraph from Draper’s book and treated it as a part of 
her reasoning. In the end of the quotation, Draper wrote: ‘Not only have they [the 
elements of a particle of water] not been annihilated, they have not even been changed; 
and in a period of time, long or short, they find their way as water back again to the sea 
from whence they came’ (270–71). 
Plumptre also pictured a phoenix-like universe in line with the doctrine of the 
indestructibility of matter and Laplace’s nebular hypothesis. She imaged that ‘the whole 
[universe] […] originated from a nebulous condition, so it is destined to return into a 
similar nebulous condition, to be built again, perchance, […] into fresh forms of Suns 
and Planets and Satellites’ (293). Spectrum analysis was used by Plumptre to illustrate 
that it was proper to imagine stars as suns and planets as earths. She pointed out that 
‘[s]pectrum analysis has shown that certain of the stars contain substances identical 
with those contained in our Sun as well as in our own little earth’ (289). She used the 
known elements of Sirius, Vega, Pollux, and Aldebaran as examples. Plumptre imagined 
that all beings in the universe were in ‘endless revolutions of birth and decay’ (295), and 
that the totality of substance of the universe did not change but only became different 
forms. 
Tyndall’s words in the 1874 Belfast Address on the uncreatedness of organic matter 
and on the structural power of matter were also quoted by Plumptre to support her 
view that there was no creation but only transformations. Plumptre wrote: ‘As 
Professor Tyndall says:—“The vegetable world, though drawing almost all its nutriment 
from invisible sources, was proved incompetent to generate anew either matter or 
force. […] The animal world was proved to be equally uncreative. […] The activity of 
each animal as a whole was proved to be the transferred activity of its molecules”’ (269). 
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She inferred that ‘Changes, and the accompanying transformations of forces, are 
everywhere in progress. […] But all these so-wonderful changes are but changes of form 
alone, and not of substance’ (269). 
The unity of human beings and the universe was considered by Plumptre an essential 
and exclusive doctrine of Pantheism. She quoted the Anglican clergymen Henry Liddon’s 
(1829–1890) description of pantheism from Some Elements of Religion (1872): ‘the 
great attraction and strength of Pantheism lies in the satisfaction which it professes to 
offer to one very deep and legitimate aspiration; it endeavours to assure man of his real 
union with the source of his own and the universal life. It is this profound idea, this most 
fascinating allurement, that can alone explain the empire’ (277). She considered this 
description to be ‘well said’ (277). Plumptre claimed that ‘[s]cience is at last beginning 
to prove to us beyond the possibility of contradiction the identity of man with all other 
forms of existence whether organic or inorganic’ (278). She used Tyndall’s view of the 
uncreatedness of the organic world and the concept of protoplasm, probably taken 
from Huxley’s lecture, to support the unity of human beings and the universe. 
In her reasoning for the unity of man and God, Plumptre first claimed that it was a 
‘proved fact’ (296) that organic matter was of inorganic nature, that there was no 
organic substance that was not derived from the inorganic world. She quoted Tyndall’s 
words on the circulation of molecules between vegetables, animals, humans, and the 
inorganic world in the essay ‘Vitality’. She wrote: ‘“We eat the vegetable,” as Professor 
Tyndall tells us, “and we breathe the oxygen of the air; and in our bodies the oxygen, 
which had been lifted from the carbon and the hydrogen by the action of the sun, again 
falls towards them, producing animal heat and developing animal form”’ (297). 
Plumptre pointed out that there was no new atom created in the process of life, so ‘as 
Professor Tyndall has lucidly expressed it, “The animal world is, so to say, a distillation 
through the vegetable world from inorganic nature”’ (297). She also quoted Tyndall’s 
words in the introduction of the Fragments of Science: ‘“All three worlds” (the inorganic, 
the vegetable and animal) says Dr. Tyndall, “constitute a unity, in which I picture life as 
immanent everywhere”’ (301).537 
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Plumptre then introduced the concept of Protoplasm, though she did not mention 
her sources. She introduced this concept roughly in the same way as Huxley did in the 
lecture ‘The Physical Basis of Life’. She claimed that Protoplasm was found to be ‘the 
formal basis of all life’, and that ‘Protoplasm, being, as it is, a combination […] of four 
elements carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, demonstrates to us that without the 
inorganic world the organic world could not have been what it is. […] And as the organic 
world arises from the inorganic, in like manner, must it return into the inorganic’ (298). 
Plumptre pointed out that all organisms would eventually die and resolve into the 
minerals, and that these lifeless constituents would ‘at some subsequent period to be 
built up again into fresh forms of vegetable, animal, or man’ (298). Plumptre considered 
these verified the ancient hypotheses of ‘Transmigration and Metamorphosis’ (298) in 
oriental and Greek pantheistic philosophies. By using Tyndall’s and Huxley’s evidence 
that all existences in nature were united in substance, she concluded that human beings 
as existences in nature were united with everything else in substance. 
Plumptre treated the relationship between mind and matter in a similar way as 
Tyndall. She held as certain that ‘Matter influences Mind, as Mind, in its turn, re-acts 
upon Matter’ (298), and she believed that the scientific knowledge of their mutual 
influences was possible. But like Tyndall, she considered their ultimate relation 
‘incompressible’ (298). She claimed: ‘All Matter and all Mind are but two outer aspects 
of the one comprehensive Reality which underlies as it includes all external phenomena’ 
(299). 
Plumptre noted that her view could be seen as similar to materialism. She quoted 
Tyndall again and stressed in the same way as he did that she was ‘no materialist in the 
ordinary sense of that word’ (299). She claimed that she did not believe ‘that a mere 
mechanical self-arrangement of perishable matter is sufficient to account for the origin 
of the universe’ (299). She believed that fundamental reality was incomprehensible, 
and that ‘there is a Unity which runs through Nature, displaying itself alike in mineral, 
plant, and animal, connecting the organic world with the inorganic’ (299). Tyndall 
viewed matter as ultimately mysterious, and Plumptre quoted Tyndall’s words from the 
Introduction of Fragments of Science: ‘“When I attempt to give the power which I see 
manifested in the Universe an objective form,” says Professor Tyndall, “personal or 
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otherwise, it slips away from me, declining all intellectual manipulation. I dare not, save 
poetically, use the pronoun “He,” regarding it; I dare not call it a “Mind;” I refuse to call 
it even a “Cause.” Its mystery overshadows me; but it remains a mystery”’ (312).538 
Plumptre interpreted this as a ‘description of God’ which had ‘more real religion, more 
reverent humanity’ than any other ‘anthropomorphic concept’ of God (313). 
In the case of Plumptre, we see that she used the idea of the indestructibility of 
matter, the idea of the uncreatedness of the organic world, and the structural power of 
matter to argue against creationism and supernatural interference, and to support her 
pantheistic images of God, the world, and man. Plumptre did not reduce mind to matter 
but saw them as two aspects of a united and mysterious reality. It can be inferred that 
humans were united with the universe in both mind and body in her pantheism, though 
she only used the science of matter to prove that man was united with the universe in 
body. She was also concerned about materialism and distanced herself from it, as it 
implied a cold and dead world which could hardly be called God. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
The idea of the uniformity of the universe could be easily inferred from nineteenth-
century chemical atomism. All kinds of substances were represented by billiard-ball 
elements and their compounds, and chemists were discussing confidently and 
quantitatively about reactions of elements and compounds. All substances seemed to 
share the same elemental base, even when they looked very different. Many scientific 
practitioners, among whom Hinton, Tyndall, and Huxley I have introduced in this 
chapter, inferred a united view of the universe from chemical atomism. They used 
chemical knowledge to argue that the realms that were commonly conceived as 
essentially different, such as the organic and the inorganic, vegetable and animal, and 
animal and man, were essentially the same in the sense that they shared the same 
substantial base and the same set of laws. Huxley also introduced the public to the 
cellular micro-structure of organisms and claimed that all organisms shared the same 
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structural base. Applications of spectrum analysis demonstrated that some elements 
on earth could also be found in celestial bodies. These discoveries strongly implied that 
celestial bodies shared the same elemental base and even the same laws with beings 
on earth. 
The all-round uniformity of the universe implied by chemical atomism could be used 
to support almost all religious positions. Orthodox scientific practitioners such as 
William Prout and P. G. Tait could interpret uniformity as a sign of the intelligent work 
of God. Deistic or materialistic scientific practitioners such as Tyndall and Huxley could 
interpret uniformity as a sign that nature was a closed system, that there was no 
supernatural interference. Advocates of pantheism favoured those materialistic 
interpretations more, and they added their own interpretations to make uniformity a 
sign of the existence of the pantheistic God. As we have seen, after arguing for the 
uniformity of nature through chemical, physiological, and anatomical knowledge, 
Hinton claimed that the uniformity of nature meant that there was no demarcation 
between life and death, thus, nature could be seen as thoroughly alive, and the living 
universe as a great life could be called God. Picton and Plumptre argued that the unity 
of nature had always been a core idea of pantheism while it had not in Christian 
monotheism, as there were many demarcations in Christian mythology, such as body 
and soul, man and its environment, and living spirit and dead matter. They cited 
Tyndall’s and Huxley’s views of the uniformity of nature and made the claim that 
scientific practitioners were increasingly supporting the doctrines of unity in pantheism 
against those discrete views in Christian monotheism. 
It should be noted that chemical atomism could be problematic for advocates of 
pantheism. On the one hand, the unity of nature chemical atomism naturally supported 
was unity in the sense of uniformity, or of a shared material and structural base, but 
not in the sense of indivisibility. Atoms were pictured as discrete billiard balls, and thus, 
they did not form a continuum. The discrete atomic model of matter could be a 
potential threat to the doctrine of unity of pantheism because the model implied that 
the ultimate reality of the universe might be composed of numerous discrete 
substances rather than a single continuous substance. On the other hand, chemical 
atoms, although they were already seen as far more active than Newtonian 
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homogeneous atoms, could still be considered by the Victorians as dead machines, and 
thus chemical atoms could fall into the old materialism, in which there was no spirit in 
the universe, but only dead matter following soulless mechanisms. Such a dead 
universe could hardly be treated as a God. Advocates of pantheism noticed these 
problems, and their common stratagem was to treat chemical atomism as a mere 
hypothesis. They argued that chemical atomism was useful in the sense that it 
cultivated the idea of the unity of nature by showing that nature could be viewed as 
having only one material basis with no essential divisions, and they denied that atoms 
were ultimate particles or that chemical atomism was the final theory of matter. 
The indestructibility of matter was often an unspoken belief of Victorian chemists. 
This idea was strengthened by the assumption that the weight of an element did not 
change during chemical processes. This idea was compatible with various religious 
positions. As I have shown in the previous chapter, Faraday, a Sandemanian, believed 
in this idea. Advocates of pantheism, such as Plumptre, could use this idea to argue 
against creationism and supernaturalism, claiming that since nothing was created or 
destroyed, then there was no creation ex nihilo and that there were no miracles. 
Christian monotheists, however, could still believe that it was God who had created 
such a closed system from nothing in the beginning, and that God could still create or 
destroy matter. 
The idea of the structural power of matter was advocated by some radical scientific 
practitioners notably Hinton, Tyndall, and Huxley. They presented this idea as following 
naturally from chemical and physical studies of matter. As they pointed out, 
assumptions of active agents in nature that controlled matter were not necessary, even 
in the realm of life. The properties of matter themselves would possibly explain the 
formations of all kinds of substances, inorganic or organic. Hinton inferred from this 
idea that nature was thoroughly alive or active. Tyndall was accused of pantheism 
because he proposed in his Belfast Address the pantheist Giordano Bruno’s vision of 
living matter. Plumptre made use of this idea to give creative power to nature, and to 
argue against the existence of any supernatural power. The idea of the structural power 
of matter could easily be associated with pantheism in Victorian Britain, as historic and 
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contemporary supporters of pantheism advocated it, using it against the Christian 
doctrines of creation and of divine interference in nature. 
The scientific sources for advocates of pantheism were again mainly popular sources. 
Popular scientific writings and lectures of radical scientific practitioners such as Tyndall, 
Huxley, and Draper were particularly useful. It can be inferred that advocates of 
pantheism also acquired chemical knowledge from reports of chemical discoveries from 
various popular organs—newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, lectures, etc. Advocates 
of pantheism besides Hinton, who was himself a scientific practitioner, did not use hard 
science sources. As far as I read, all of them did not mention famous names from the 
history of chemistry, such as Dalton and Berzelius. 
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5     
Pantheistic Uses of the Science of Evolution 
Evolution was one of the major topics of science and public debate in the second half 
of the nineteenth century in Britain. The term ‘evolution’ was used to indicate 
development, natural change, organic transmutation, and usually, though not 
necessarily, progress. The idea of evolution was applied by many Victorian scientific 
practitioners and philosophers to almost all realms of the world—the cosmos, the earth, 
the inorganic environment, the organic world, the human body, human mentality, 
human society, and human morality. The phrase ‘the science of evolution’ in this 
chapter is used loosely, denoting the developmental theories of scientific practitioners 
and evolutionary philosophers, rather than only denoting formally scientific 
evolutionary theories, such as Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection. The 
evolutionary view of the world was widely accepted in Britain by the 1870s. Many 
Victorians tended to believe that most things in the world came into being through long-
term natural changes rather than through God’s direct creation. The old static 
worldview, in which the world was what it was at the time God created it, was 
thoroughly abandoned. Inspired by the great advances in technology and living 
conditions, many Victorians also believed that the world was progressing, or changing 
towards better states. Their evolutionary views of the world were thus often 
progressive, asserting that progress was a law of evolution. 
Victorian advocates of pantheism usually found the idea of evolution, the idea of 
progress, scientific theories of evolution, and radical evolutionary philosophies very 
useful in supporting their pantheistic ideas. In this chapter, I bring in four advocates—
Hunt, Picton, Plumptre, and Barratt—to demonstrate various pantheistic uses of the 
science of evolution. As we shall see, Hunt considered that the theory of evolution 
proved that there was an immanent deity in nature who made and exerted such a 
unifying plan. Picton claimed that he had built his pantheism upon the philosophy of 
the most famous evolutionary philosopher Herbert Spencer, and he applied the theory 
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of evolution in support of his pantheistic ethics, his idea of universal consciousness, and 
his view of pantheism as the final evolution of religion. Plumptre used the nebular 
hypothesis, which was a common component of the evolutionary worldview, to argue 
against the Christian doctrine of the supernatural creation of the universe, and she also 
used German Darwinian and monist Ernst Haeckel’s interpretation of the theory of 
evolution to support her monism. She saw Spencer as one of the greatest philosophers 
who envisaged pantheism as the final evolution of religion. Finally, Barratt formulated 
an evolutionary ethics. He used the theory of evolution to support his view of universal 
consciousness and his view that pantheism was the next step of religious evolution. 
This chapter begins with an introduction of the general background of the ideas of 
evolution and progress and of the evolutionary theories that interested advocates of 
pantheism. The two most cited evolutionary philosophers among advocates of 
pantheism—Spencer and Haeckel—are introduced separately. I then discuss the 
famous Cambridge geologist Adam Sedgwick’s criticism of Vestiges of the Natural 
History of Creation (1844) for the problem of pantheism, and I also discuss the 
accusations of pantheism made against Spencer by his reviewers. These two cases show 
how evolutionary theory itself and evolutionary philosophers could be seen as 
pantheistic by non-advocates of and even critics of pantheism. After introducing these 
backgrounds, I give accounts of the uses of evolutionary theories and philosophies by 
the four advocates of pantheism separately. 
 
5.1 The Science and Philosophy of Evolution 
Advocates of pantheism were interested in the general ideas of evolution and progress, 
and in several theories of evolution concerning the nebular origin of the universe, the 
geological history of the earth, the transmutation of species, and the natural origins of 
ethics and religion. The idea of evolution was gradually applied to almost all intellectual 
fields in the late nineteenth century, though not all theories of evolution interested 
advocates of pantheism. For example, they seldom talked about technical details, such 
as the mechanism of species variation and the branching tree of life, and they also 
seldom talked about the applications of the ideas of evolution and progress in other 
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fields such as politics, economics, art, and literature. Thus, this section focuses more on 
the above mentioned evolutionary ideas and theories that interested advocates of 
pantheism. The first part is an overarching introduction of the general background of 
relevant ideas and theories, the second and the third parts are introductions of 
Spencer’s and Haeckel’s evolutionary philosophies, and the fourth and the fifth parts 
are accounts of Sedgwick’s criticism of pantheism and of the accusations of pantheism 
made against Spencer. 
 
5.1.1 The General Background 
The idea of evolution in the nineteenth century was intertwined with the idea of 
progress. Both ideas were central to the evolutionary worldview at the time. 
Evolutionary biologists such as the central figure Charles Darwin and his so-called 
bulldog Thomas Huxley usually used the concept of evolution to denote natural and 
successive processes and used the concept of progress to denote improving processes. 
From their viewpoints, evolution was not necessarily progressive while progress was 
not necessarily natural or successive. By contrast, these two terms were used almost as 
synonyms in the public and by many evolutionary philosophers, notably Herbert 
Spencer. 
Progress was an important theme of European philosophy in the eighteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries. Many thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), David Hume 
(1711–1776), Adam Smith (1723–1790), G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), Auguste Comte, 
John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx (1818–1883), and Herbert Spencer, were inspired by the 
intellectual advancements of the Enlightenment and wrote on progress.539 Some of 
them, including Kant, Comte, Mill, and Spencer, expressed their belief in the progress 
of humanity, claiming that humanity improved throughout history and would keep 
improving in the future. The fast advancements and applications of technology, such as 
the railway and telegraph in Victorian Britain, also enhanced people’s belief in progress. 
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It was easy for the Victorians to see signs of progress in daily life. The concept of 
progress gave rise to many philosophical controversies. As Margaret Meek Lange 
summarises, progressive philosophers often disagreed about the definition of progress, 
the cause of progress, and the evidence of progress.540 Yet many thinkers including 
most pantheistic figures in this chapter did not speculate deep into the philosophical 
problems of the concept of progress. They usually used ‘progress’ to denote 
improvement in a common-sense manner. 
The term ‘evolution’ was brought into wider usage by Spencer in the 1850s.541 In this 
decade, many progressive thinkers gathered around the radical Westminster Review, 
promoting naturalistic philosophy and advocating progress as a law of nature. The term 
‘evolution’ was redefined by Herbert Spencer in this decade to denote a naturalistic, 
successive, and progressive process. Before the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the term ‘evolution’ was mostly used in scientific contexts to describe the development 
of embryos.542 Embryological development was a progressive process from simple to 
complex and from homogeneous to heterogeneous. Herbert Spencer proposed in his 
1857 essay ‘Progress: Its Laws and Cause’: ‘the development of a seed into a tree, or an 
ovum into an animal, constitute an advance from homogeneity of structure to 
heterogeneity of structure. […] Now, we propose in the first place to show, that this law 
of organic progress is the law of all progress. Whether it be in the development of the 
Earth, in the development of Life upon its surface, in the development of Society, of 
Government, of Manufactures, of Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, Art, this 
same evolution of the simple into the complex, through a process of continuous 
differentiation, holds throughout’. 543  Spencer proposed to apply ‘evolution’ to all 
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natural and human developments. He also claimed in this essay that progress was an 
eternal status of nature including human constitutions. Nature, including man, was 
progressing towards more advanced states. Spencer gave a moral assertion that the 
more advanced a thing was the more beneficial it was for man.544 The term ‘evolution’, 
when first introduced into the wider context, thus possessed a strong sense of progress. 
Darwin did not use the term ‘evolution’ to denote his developmental theory of 
species in his famous On the Origin of Species (1859). It was not until his 1871 
publication, The Descent of Man, that he started to use the term.545 He rather used the 
terms ‘modification’ and ‘change’ to denote species transmutation.546 Differently from 
Spencer, Darwin did not consider the transmutation of species progressive. 547  The 
mechanism of species transmutation he proposed—natural selection on random 
variations—did not guarantee that the developmental process of species was 
progressive. Variation was random with no progressive purpose, and nature did not 
always preserve more complex organisms. A natural disaster could wipe out complex 
organisms while leaving only single-cell organisms alive. Nevertheless, as the term 
‘evolution’ was widely associated with ‘progress’, when the Victorians mentioned 
‘evolution’, they usually also meant ‘progress’, and Darwin was treated as a high-priest 
of the ‘cult of progress’.548 
The acceptance and application of the idea of evolution arrived at different times in 
different scientific disciplines. In the beginning of the Victorian era, the developmental 
view of the cosmos and the earth was already widely accepted by British Christian 
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geologists and astronomers. Scientific practitioners accepted that the current forms of 
the cosmos and the earth were not what they were like when God created the universe. 
There were two general theories of development that were popularly used by early 
Victorian thinkers—the nebular hypothesis and the geological history of the earth, and 
both theories were also popularly used by later thinkers in their evolutionary syntheses, 
such as the writer and publisher Robert Chambers (1802–1871) in his sensational book 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844) and Spencer in his First Principles of a 
New System of Philosophy (1862). 
The phrase ‘nebular hypothesis’ was coined by Anglican polymath William Whewell 
(1794–1866) in his Bridgewater treatise On Astronomy and General Physics (1833).549 
He used this phrase to describe a theory of the origin of the solar system that combined 
the theory of the origin of planets of French astronomer Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–
1827) with the theory of the origin of stars of German-born English astronomer William 
Herschel (1738–1822). Laplace’s theory was developed in his book Exposition of the 
System of the World (1796) and his five-volume work Celestial Mechanics published 
between 1798 and 1827.550 He excluded the assumption of God and based his theory 
on Newton’s laws of physics. Laplace speculated that the sun had an extended hot 
atmosphere in primitive time, that it rotated and condensed into several rings, and that 
these rings condensed into planets and their satellites. Herschel developed his theory 
in his papers ‘On Nebulous Stars, Properly So Called’ (1791) and ‘Astronomical 
Observations Relating to the Construction of the Heaven’ (1811).551 Herschel observed 
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nebulae and stars within them with the aid of his telescopes. He proposed that stars 
might have originated from condensations that happened within nebulae, and he 
implied that our sun was once in a nebulous state.552 Whewell considered that these 
theories could be combined to offer a cosmic history, in which our sun and our whole 
system were once a cloud of matter which, under the effects of the laws of nature, 
gradually rotated, condensed, and cooled into the current state.553 As Simon Schaffer 
points out, the hypothesis became important among Victorian thinkers through works 
of the economist and astronomer John Pringle Nichol (1804–1859), and became widely 
known in the public through Robert Chambers’ Vestiges (1844).554 
The changing view of the earth was widely accepted in Christendom since ancient 
time. The Bible recorded that God created the earth through several steps and several 
days. Geological strata demonstrated that there were large changes of terrain in the 
history of the earth. It was common among Christian thinkers to explain large changes 
of terrain by catastrophes casted by God. This catastrophism was adopted by 
seventeenth-and-eighteenth-century mechanical philosophers René Descartes (1596–
1650), Thomas Burnet (1635–1715), and William Whiston (1667–1752), as well as by 
early-nineteenth-century geologists such as Georges Cuvier (1769–1832) and Adam 
Sedgwick.555 There was also a uniformitarian tradition among European thinkers who 
explained terrestrial changes with natural mechanisms, such as volcano, earthquake, 
and erosion, rather than supernatural catastrophes. James Hutton (1726–1797), John 
Playfair (1748–1819), and Charles Lyell (1797–1875) were famous eighteenth-century 
                                                     
552 Michael Hoskin, ‘Herschel, William (1738–1822)’, in ODNB <https://www.oxforddnb.com/> 
[accessed 12 August 2018]. 
553 Whewell, Astronomy, pp. 181–87. 
554 Simon Schaffer, ‘The Nebular Hypothesis and the Science of Progress’ in History, Humanity 
and Evolution, ed. by James R. Moore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 131–
64 (p. 134). 
555 Bowler, Evolution, pp. 31–32 
 
226 
 
 
 
and early-nineteenth-century advocates of uniformitarianism in Britain. 556  The 
geological time preceding humankind was usually extended beyond a few days to 
thousands of years or to a million years.557 We can see a somewhat standard expression 
of the developmental view of the earth in the 1830s in William Buckland’s Bridgewater 
treatise Geology and Mineralogy Considered with Reference to Natural Theology (1836). 
As Jonathan Topham points out, the Bridgewater treatises written by prominent 
scientific practitioners and clergymen bore the purpose of providing safe science for 
society.558 Buckland claimed: ‘Geology has already proved by physical evidence, that 
the surface of the globe has not existed in its actual state for eternity, but has advanced 
through a series of creative operations, succeeding one another at long and definite 
intervals of time’.559 
    While the changing view of the cosmos and the earth was widely accepted in the 
1830s, the changing view of life was not accepted by most British biologists. Species 
were generally believed to be fixed and were seen as never having changed after their 
creation by God. Palaeontologists, such as William Buckland (1784–1856) and Adam 
Sedgwick, were fully aware of the appearance and disappearance of species shown in 
fossil records, and they claimed that God successively created and destroyed species at 
the beginning and the end of each geological era.560 
The developmental view of life was proposed rather speculatively in the early 
nineteenth centuries by French naturalists Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829) and 
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Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1772–1844). Lamarck invented the term ‘transformisme’ 
(transformism) to denote theories of species transmutation in the scientific 
literature.561 He also gave a thoroughly naturalistic account of the origin of species 
based on species transmutation in Philosophie Zoologique (1809). In France, 
transformism was also defended by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. However, it encountered a 
formidable opponent in Cuvier, who dominated the French scientific community. The 
Lamarckian theory of species transmutation was marginalised in France due to a lack of 
sufficient scientific evidence to counter Cuvier’s authority. 
In Britain, the idea was also marginalised, but was not totally disregarded. As Darwin 
discussed at the start of the fourth edition of On the Origin of Species (1866), several 
people had discussed the idea of species transmutation in Britain over the preceding 
decades, such as Spencer, Huxley, and Joseph Dalton Hooker (1817–1911).562 Theories 
of species transmutation were also discussed among working-class radicals from the 
1840s.563 Chambers’ Vestiges introduced the idea of species transmutation to a wider 
public in Britain in 1844. The idea that humans were descended from animals was very 
striking for the Victorians at that time. The book was not scientifically robust, and it was 
soon dismissed as a popular science work by scientific practitioners, including Darwin 
and Huxley.564 
No scientific work was considered by scientific practitioners to contain enough 
evidence to sustain the idea of species transmutation until Darwin’s Origin of Species 
was published in November 1859. Darwin gave detailed evidence concerning domestic 
and natural animals to support the variation of species and the modification of species 
through selective inheritance of variations. He proposed the theory he named ‘Natural 
Selection’ as ‘the main but not exclusive means of modification’.565 In Darwin’s theory, 
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the environment of a species offered limited resources, and consequently individuals 
of the species needed to compete for resources in order to survive and reproduce; 
random variations in characters between individuals caused different degrees of 
adaptation; the individuals that had a higher degree of adaptation would have a higher 
chance to reproduce and pass on their characters; in the long run, the species would be 
modified with characters that granted a higher degree of adaptation. Darwin intended 
to make this book strictly technical. He avoided discussing religious issues and cosmic 
stories until the last sentence of the book, where he suggested that life had begun with 
one or a few created life forms, and that the rest of life forms had evolved from them 
according to laws of nature.566 
Origin of Species gave rise to a wide debate about the general idea of evolution, the 
idea of species transmutation, the theory of descent, and the origin of man, although 
the mechanism of evolution—natural selection—received little attention.567 Darwin’s 
theory was soon identified with the term ‘evolution’ even though he did not use the 
term in this way.568 Darwin excluded progress from his theory, but people soon linked 
his theory with evolutionary philosophies like Spencer’s. Many conservative 
theologians criticised the implications of the idea of species transmutation and the 
theory of descent for human origins. They feared that this view of life would threaten 
the Christian belief in the existence of soul and consequently threaten Christian 
morality.569 The book was generally well received among scientific practitioners, except 
some Christian scientific practitioners like Sedgwick, William Whewell, and St. George 
Mivart (1827–1900).570 As Secord points out, the book became a rallying point that 
assembled a group of new-generation scientific practitioners to support evolution in 
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the public within a few months, such as Huxley, Tyndall, William Carpenter, and William 
Clifford (1845–1879). 571  Darwin’s theory was in tune with their naturalism, their 
objective to exclude Christian authority from science, and their faith in progress.572 The 
developmental view of life was soon widely accepted as more convincing than the fixed 
view of life among British scientific practitioners, though the mechanism of species 
transmutation Darwin proposed, natural selection, was less accepted. 
The possibility of the animal descent of humans, including the physical body and 
mental and intellectual functions, was fiercely debated after the publication of Origin. 
Britain’s contact with tribal human races, such as the native peoples of South America, 
was a factor sustaining the view of the evolution of man. Darwin was inspired by his 
experience with American Indians, who looked, according to him, closer to animals than 
Europeans.573 He believed that human races had a common ancestor, thus tribal races 
could be viewed as less evolved forms of Europeans rather than as complete other 
species. Darwin omitted human beings in Origin, but he gave his view in The Descent of 
Man published a decade later in 1871.574 The book did not attract huge attention like 
Origin, since the view of the animal ancestry of humans was not new anymore by the 
time. This topic had been explored by Huxley in Man's Place in Nature (1863), by Lyell 
in Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man (1863), by Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–
1913) in Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection (1870), and by Haeckel in The 
History of Creation (1868).575 
It became a popular practice to apply the idea of evolution to humanity from the 
1860s onwards, especially in studies of major social institutions such as ethics, religion, 
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art, law, and language. British travellers and missionaries, who reported their 
observations of primitive nations outside Europe, provided data for these syntheses. 
Darwin himself was a powerful advocate of evolutionary ethics—the ethics that treated 
‘moral sense’ as an evolved function like other physical senses and subjected moral 
actions to evolutionary processes.576 The desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain as well 
as inheritable social instincts were usually treated by evolutionary moral philosophers 
as important mechanisms of moral evolution. These were well illustrated in Darwin’s 
Descent of Man. 577  Darwin pointed out that some human moral instincts, such as 
sympathy and altruism, could be found in lower animals, such as monkeys, apes, and 
bees. He also evidenced that human nations had primitive states where humans’ social 
behaviours were more animal-like. He thus suggested to treat human morality as an 
evolved function. Evolutionary ethics was also proposed by Spencer in his The Data of 
Ethics (1879), by Leslie Stephen (1832–1904) in his The Science of Ethics (1882), and 
many more.578 
Religion was also subjected to evolution, especially in evolutionary anthropologists’ 
works, such as John Ferguson McLennan’s (1827–1881) ‘The Worship of Animals and 
Plants’ (1869), John Lubbock’s (1834–1913) Origin of Civilisation (1870), and Edward 
Burnett Tylor’s (1832–1917) Primitive Culture (1871).579 As George W. Stocking points 
out, these British anthropologists mainly concerned the intellectual aspect of religion 
while left out the practical aspect, thus, their theories were mainly theories of the 
evolution of religious ideas.580 In their evolutionary anthropology, human society was 
seen as having evolved from barbaric to civilised, and religion, as a social institution, 
had evolved alongside it from rudimentary to complex. Lubbock classified ‘lower 
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religions’ ‘according to the nature of the object worshiped’ in the following orders: 
atheism, fetishism, nature-worship, shamanism, and idolatry.581 Christian monotheism 
was treated by him as a higher religion than these. Tylor considered animism—the 
belief in spirits that animated the world—as the rudimentary form of religion and as the 
essence of religion, from which religions with complex theories and rituals had 
evolved.582  McLennan, as well as Spencer, held similar views with Tylor. 583  In later 
decades, there were also many anthropologists using evolutionary narratives to 
describe religion, such as James George Frazer (1854–1941) in his The Golden Bough: a 
Study in Magic and Religion (1890), Edward Caird (1835–1908) in his Gifford Lectures 
on the evolution of religion delivered in 1890–1892, William Robertson Smith (1846–
1894) in his Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (1894), Edward Clodd (1840–1930) 
in his Animism: The Seed of Religion (1905), and Lewis Richard Farnell (1856–1934) in 
his The Evolution of Religion: An Anthropological Study (1905).584 
 
5.1.2 Herbert Spencer and A System of Synthetic Philosophy 
Herbert Spencer was one of the most famous evolutionary philosophers in the late 
Victorian period. A railway civil engineer in his youth, Spencer began his literary life as 
a sub-editor on the free-trade journal, the Economist, at the age of 28. He soon joined 
the Westminster Review circle of radical thinkers. After his two first books—Social 
Statics (1850) and The Principles of Psychology (1855), he announced his ambition to 
write a gigantic synthetic philosophy synthesising physics, biology, psychology, 
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sociology, and ethics with positivism and the law of progress. The work was published 
in ten successive volumes finally completed in 1896. It can be seen as a completion of 
the positivistic and progressive programme of the Westminster Review circle. The goal 
of this programme was to prove the universality and uniformity of natural laws not only 
in the physical world but also in the organic world, human society, and the mental realm, 
and to prove that progress towards better states was a fundamental law of nature like 
the law of the indestructibility of matter and the law of the conservation of energy.585 
Evolutionary theory was a fundamental element of Spencer’s progressive philosophy. It 
was also a unique characteristic of Spencer’s philosophy compared to many other 
progressive philosophers such as Hegel, Kant, Comte, Mill, and Marx who did not build 
their philosophies upon evolutionary theory. This characteristic made Spencer’s 
synthetic work a good source for those who interested in both the idea of progress and 
the science of evolution. 
Spencer’s synthetic philosophy began with the book First Principles of a New System 
of Philosophy (1862). In this book, Spencer sketched out the fundamental ideas of his 
evolutionism. First Principles contained a large extension of his essay ‘Progress: Its law 
and cause’ (1857). Spencer defined evolution in the book as ‘the integration of matter 
and concomitant dissipation of motion’, and dissolution as ‘the absorption of motion 
and concomitant disintegration of matter’.586 He also defined progress as the ‘change 
from a less coherent form to a more coherent form’ or the increase of 
‘heterogeneity’.587 One of Spencer’s main arguments in this book was that progressive 
evolution was a law of nature. In other words, he argued that matter in general was 
integrating towards more coherent and more heterogeneous states. 
In order to support this claim, Spencer gave an inductive proof and a deductive proof. 
In his inductive proof, he argued that ‘existences of all orders do exhibit a progressive 
integration of Matter and concomitant loss of motion’, i.e., do exhibit progressive 
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evolution.588 Spencer illustrated and interpreted the following processes as progressive 
and evolutionary: the formation of the solar system according to the nebular hypothesis, 
the geological development of the earth, the growth of individual organisms including 
the human body, the transmutation of species, the development of human society, the 
development of human language, industrial developments, and aesthetic art 
developments.589  Spencer claimed that these processes were evolutionary because 
they involved the integration of matter, and that these processes were progressive 
because these aggregations of matter increased coherence and heterogeneity. In his 
deductive proof, Spencer aimed to deduce progressive evolution from the laws of 
force. 590  He reasoned that a cause or a force would create multiple effects and 
consequently the state of homogeneity was unstable. Thus, matter had a tendency to 
become heterogeneous. A complex heterogeneity was considered by Spencer as the 
ultimate ‘stable equilibrium’.591 
First Principles was followed by two volumes of Principles of Biology published in 1864 
and 1867; two volumes of Principles of Psychology published in 1870 and 1872, three 
volumes of Principles of Sociology published between 1876 and 1896, and two volumes 
of Principles of Ethics between 1879 and 1892. These subsequent volumes aimed to 
demonstrate in detail that progressive evolution was the law of the organic world, 
human mentality, human society, and human morality. A point that deserves a mention 
is Spencer’s view of life. Spencer defined life as ‘[t]he continuous adjustment of internal 
relations to external relations’. 592  He coined the phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ in 
Principles of Biology after reading Darwin’s theory of natural selection. 593  Spencer 
subjected all phenomena of life to this adaptive perspective. Mental functions were also 
                                                     
588 Ibid., p. 307. 
589 Ibid., pp. 308–27. 
590 Ibid., p. 398. 
591 Ibid., p. 402. 
592 Ibid., p. 84. 
593 Herbert Spencer, Principles of Biology, 2 vols (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1884), I, 
pp. 444–45. 
 
234 
 
 
 
viewed by Spencer as adaptive mechanisms evolved from natural processes. Spencer 
claimed that ‘every advance in Intelligence essentially consists in the establishment of 
more varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments’.594 
    The basic ideas of Spencer’s synthetic philosophy—the doctrine of the universality of 
laws and the doctrine of progress as a law of nature—were not entirely novel, but 
Spencer extended them with fashionable scientific theories, especially those of organic 
evolution. He built a comprehensive worldview in which an external God was not 
needed, everything including the human mind was governing by the natural laws only, 
and the universe was advancing towards an ultimate heterogeneous equilibrium. For 
those who wanted to argue against the Christian doctrine of God and the Christian 
doctrine of creation, and also wanted to have a moral guidance from science, Spencer 
provided them a good source of reference. Yet, Spencer was rather agnostic in regard 
to religion. As a writer in the Edinburgh Review wrote: ‘He never rejected Christianity, 
he said, because he never accepted it’.595 
    Spencer’s immense fame did not follow immediately. Before 1866, Spencer’s writings 
and his doctrine of progressive evolution were not well known outside the Westminster 
Review circle, but after 1866, his philosophy quickly became very famous among 
reading people in Britain and gained great international fame, especially in America, 
until the decline of his fame in the mid-1880s.596 At the peak of Spencer’s reputation, 
he was admired as the Aristotle, the Francis Bacon or the Newton of the nineteenth 
century.597 He was also the only philosopher in history whose works sold over a million 
copies during his lifetime. 598  Greta Jones argues that this upsurge of Spencer’s 
reputation was because of the growing acceptance of Darwinian evolutionary theory 
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during these years, and because Spencer had a good relationship with the Darwinian 
circle. Spencer was a member of the X-Club in which members, such as Huxley and 
Tyndall, were usually supporters of the ideas of evolution and progression. 599  The 
publication of Darwin’s Origin in 1859 had heated up the debates over the general idea 
of evolution. The discussion of evolution was not only among scientific practitioners, 
but was also featured in periodicals, newspapers, and satires. The growing public 
concern over the general idea of evolution made Spencer’s philosophy significant. 
There were many periodical articles that reviewed or summarised his ideas. Between 
the 1870s and the mid-1880s, Spencer’s name, like Darwin’s name, was perceived by 
people as a synonym of the idea of evolution.600 Spencer’s use of modern scientific 
theories in support of his philosophy made him appear as an authoritative man of 
science in many Victorians’ eyes, though he was never a practical scientist. Due to his 
great fame, his works were good sources of reference for many people who wanted to 
find scientific support for positivism and evolutionism in the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century. 
 
5.1.3 Ernst Haeckel and The History of Creation 
Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) was a famous German Darwinian biologist. He held a 
monistic view of mind and matter, and he saw God and nature as united. He interpreted 
the theory of evolution as being in favour of monism and against supernaturalism, 
including creationism. His views were expressed in his widely circulated book Natürliche 
Schöpfungsgeschichte (1868). Robert Richards has pointed out that Haeckel’s work 
served as a main source for many people to learn about Darwinian evolutionary theory 
not only in Germany but also in Britain and in other countries prior to the First World 
War.601 In Victorian Britain, the first English translation of the work was published in 
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1876, titled The History of Creation. The renowned literary review periodical, the 
Athenaeum, commented that Haeckel’s The History of Creation meant that English-
speaking readers ‘for the first time, have an opportunity of perusing an elaborate 
treatise on the principles of evolution, and of the doctrine of natural selection, from the 
pen of one other than Mr. Darwin himself’. 602  The radical weekly, the Examiner, 
commented that ‘[o]ur English literature is not yet so rich in works on the subject of 
evolution but we may be grateful for the translation of so clear and vigorous a treatise 
as the one now before us’.603 These book reviews show that the work was received well 
in Britain as a good popular book on evolution. 
    The History of Creation was published in two volumes. The first volume focused on 
explaining and defending the theory of descent and the theory of natural selection. 
Haeckel claimed that Darwin’s theory of evolution was not a hypothesis but a truth like 
Newton’s law of gravitation.604 He praised Darwin for having ‘solved the yet harder 
problem of bringing the complicated phenomena of organic nature under the sway of 
the same natural laws’ (xiv). One of his main goals in this volume was to support 
Darwin’s theory with empirical evidence, and in this way, to argue against those who 
criticised Darwin’s theory on the ground that it was ‘not sufficiently proven’ (xviii-xix). 
In the second volume, as the Examiner noted, ‘Haeckel attempts to supply a pretty full 
sketch of the actual order of descent’.605 He drew genealogical trees of species. In the 
case of humans, Haeckel believed that all human races were derived from a single 
species he called ‘primitive men’ (309). Over time, primitive men divided into twelve 
races with different bodily and intellectual characteristics. Though all human races 
shared a common ancestor, Haeckel considered that the current twelve races were so 
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different that they should be considered different species. Among these races, Haeckel 
claimed that ‘[t]he Caucasian, or Mediterranean man (Homo Mediterraneus), has from 
time immemorial been placed at the head of all races of men, as the most highly 
developed and perfect. […] In bodily as well as in mental qualities, no other human 
species can equal the Mediterranean’ (321). This was an instance of Haeckel’s infamous 
racism. His genealogical tree of humankind was hierarchical. There were absolute 
physical and intellectual superiorities or inferiorities between different races and 
between races of different periods. The trend was generally progressive over time with 
the latter being superior to the former. 
Haeckel’s work was not simply a popular exposition of Darwinian evolutionary theory. 
It was also a vehicle to advocate his own belief in monism. Richards points out that 
Haeckel intended to write evolution in an anti-supernaturalist way, and that ‘he took 
on Darwinian theory as a kind of theological doctrine, recasting it as the foundation for 
his “religion of monism”’.606 Haeckel was a member of the Evangelical Church almost 
all his whole life due to family tradition; however, he lost faith in supernatural religion 
after his beloved first wife, Anna Sethe, died in 1864, two years after their wedding. As 
Richards also points out, after this heart-breaking event, Haeckel was driven ‘to find a 
more enduring and rational substitute for orthodox religion in Goethean nature and 
Darwinian evolution’ and ‘he still thought of himself as a religious person, though his 
was the religion of Spinoza and Goethe’.607 Indeed, Haeckel’s monism can be seen as a 
development of the pantheistic philosophies of Spinoza, Goethe, and other German 
idealists, although he was more willing to be associated with materialism than with 
pantheism. 
Haeckel identified his monism with his so-called ‘scientific materialism’, which was a 
positivistic view of the universe.608 He called his philosophy monism in the sense that 
there were only natural existences, or forms of matter, in the universe and no 
supernatural existences, or spirits. Natural phenomena were united in the sense that 
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there were no supernatural interventions that broke natural causal chains; every 
phenomenon had its cause and effect in nature. Haeckel also claimed that ‘all exact 
science, and the law of cause and effect at its head, is purely materialistic’ (36) and that 
‘we think it necessary to call […] [scientific materialism] either Monism or Realism’ (37). 
    In History of Creation, Haeckel also spent a few chapters arguing against the 
creationism of Christian biologists, notably that of Cuvier and Swiss-American biologist 
and geologist Louis Agassiz (1807–1873). Christian creationism was a supernatural 
creationism which involved a supernatural creator separate from nature. Haeckel also 
used the term ‘Creation’ in the book title but what he meant was ‘non-miraculous’ (7) 
creation or natural creation. He defined creation as meaning ‘the coming into existence 
of a body by a creative power or force’ (8). Christian supernatural creationism contained 
a dualistic conception of the natural and the supernatural. It was directly opposed to 
Haeckel’s monism. He criticised Cuvier and Agassiz for being anthropomorphic and 
unscientific. He wrote that ‘they overlook the fact that this personal Creator is only an 
idealized organism, endowed with human attributes. The low dualistic conception of 
God corresponds with a low animal stage of development of the human organism’ (70). 
He also expressed his belief in ‘the sublime idea of the Unity of God and Nature’ (71) 
and cited pantheists Bruno and Goethe as supports. He claimed that ‘[t]his monistic 
idea of God […] belongs to the future’ (70). Richards points out that ‘Haeckelianism 
became the faith of the Monist League, whose members spread across several 
continents’.609  It is no surprise to see that the widely-read History of Creation was 
picked up by advocates of pantheism as an important scientific support. 
In Britain, the book was praised for its scientific part but criticised for its religious part. 
The Nonconformist organ, the British Quarterly Review, commented that ‘whereas 
Darwin has never excluded the action of a Creator, but expressly requires it in order to 
[allow] the creation of the first primordial forms, from which all things have come, 
Haeckel dispenses with conscious purpose and intelligence, and reduces everything to 
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a self-mechanical force’. 610  The author called Haeckel’s philosophy ‘Evolutionary 
Materialism’.611 He criticised Haeckel for lacking evidence to support his claims of ‘the 
reality of spontaneous generation’ and the natural origin of language. 612  He saw 
Haeckel’s materialistic claims as dogmatic. The final verdict was: ‘We do not deny that 
his book contains much valuable scientific material, but as a ‘History of Creation’ it is a 
blank failure, and its dogmatism and arrogance render it as offensive as its philosophy 
is unsound and inadequate’.613 The Athenaeum, though it praised Haeckel’s synthesis 
of evolutionary theory, criticised Haeckel’s materialism as dogmatic and unnecessary. 
The author wrote that ‘more refined minds will find its dogmatism almost intolerable’, 
and that ‘[p]roselytizing materialism makes right-minded people shun science’614 The 
author exclaimed: ‘Why has he not taken a hint from his master—Darwin’.615 These 
book reviewers all saw Haeckel’s religious position as materialism, and none of them 
mentioned pantheism. This might be because Haeckel himself identified his religion as 
materialism and did not mention the term ‘pantheism’. Even so, people would easily 
find pantheism or arguments in favour of pantheism in it. 
 
5.1.4 Adam Sedgwick’s Charge of Pantheism on Vestiges 
As Jim Secord shows in Victorian Sensation, although Robert Chambers was more deistic 
than atheistic in Vestiges, the book was often criticised by Victorian thinkers as a 
potential vehicle of materialism and atheism. Pantheism was also one of the Victorians’ 
concerns when they read Vestiges, although historians seldom mention it. Secord has 
mentioned that the atheistic writer of the freethought movement William Chilton 
(1815–1855) argued in an 1845 paper that the religious position of Vestiges ‘was a 
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“transition state” to be followed by pantheism and atheism’.616 Secord also gives an 
account of Adam Sedgwick’s criticism of Vestiges for materialism and atheism, but 
Secord does not mention that pantheism was also one of Sedgwick’s major concerns. 
In the fifth edition of Sedgwick’s A Discourse on the Studies of the University of 
Cambridge (1850),617 he warned that Vestiges might spread materialism, atheism, and 
also pantheism in the country and might consequently threaten the Christian spiritual 
and moral foundation of the country.618 He claimed that the central ideas in Vestiges—
‘spontaneous generation’ and ‘progressive development’—‘were invented and 
affirmed by those who did their best to cheat us out of our conceptions of a Creator, 
and denied the whole doctrine of Final Causes’ (xix). Sedgwick argued: ‘the inevitable 
and legitimate consequence of the theory’ was ‘that it does away all distinctions 
between material and moral’ and ‘it tells us that the soul of man is but a material 
mechanism’, consequently, ‘it destroys the very essence of moral responsibility’ (cxl–
cxli). Sedgwick saw that this might lead us to either atheism or pantheism. He wrote: 
‘With such a view of nature we may end in downright atheism; or, if we accept the 
indications of intelligence in the natural world, we may perhaps advance one step 
farther, and try to satisfy the longings of the mind in some cold scheme of pantheism’ 
(xvii). 
    Pantheism, in Sedgwick’s view, ‘denies the personality of the Godhead. It is not, on 
this scheme, true that God created all nature; but that all nature is God; and the word 
God becomes no longer a personal term defining our conception of a Creator and Ruler 
over the world; but an abstract collective term to define and comprehend all the 
phenomena of the universe’ (clxxiv). Most commonly, ‘Pantheism deifies the dead 
elements, and advances not one single step beyond sensual phenomena’ (clxxiv). In the 
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extreme ‘material pantheism’, ‘nature may in the end evolve a personal God’ ‘out of 
the combinations of dead material elements by progressive development’ (clxxv). He 
criticised pantheism for being ‘but Atheism tricked out in the semblance of religion’ 
(clxxvii). The cosmology of Vestiges was called ‘rank materialism’ by Sedgwick, and he 
claimed that ‘rank materialism, as a scheme of nature, is shallow, inadequate, and false. 
It is the foundation of Atheism, Pantheism, and almost every modification of 
psychological delusion in our views of nature’ (clxxxi). 
As pantheism was considered by Sedgwick as a superficial cover of atheistic 
materialism, he applied most of his criticisms of atheistic materialism to pantheism. He 
argued that pantheism, like materialism, denied external causes and thus denied the 
first cause. He wrote that ‘Atheism and Pantheism strip us of one of the best element 
of our intellectual nature. There is a principle of causality within us without which we 
could never ascend to any conception of general truth, or of law and order, whether 
material or immaterial’ (clxxvii–clxxviii). Sedgwick considered this illogical since there 
could not be second causes without a first cause. Sedgwick also claimed that pantheism, 
like materialism, held the idea of the material origin of mind. He considered that the 
material origin of mind implied in pantheism was unthinkable, as he wrote: ‘I cannot, 
by any effort of the imagination, conceive my personal self to be so decompounded 
that its several functions should be resolved like the dead elements of a material body, 
and made to pass, one by one, into a new and separate form of conscious existence’ 
(clxxxii–clxxxiii). As for the extreme idea of the material and evolutionary origin of God, 
Sedgwick criticised it as ‘blasphemous’ and ‘out of all analogy and harmony with the 
knowledge of experience’ (cxc–cxci). 
Sedgwick’s criticism of Vestiges shows that Victorian thinkers could criticise 
developmental theory for spreading pantheism due to its potential to support 
pantheism, and this potential was demonstrated by pantheistic thinkers in the part and 
in the present time. The writer Richard St John Tyrwhitt (1827–1895) once mentioned 
that Charles Darwin was accused of pantheism. He wrote: ‘evolution is connected with 
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the name of Mr. Darwin, and he is accused of Pantheism’.619 Tyrwhitt did not give 
evidence or explain why Darwin was accused of pantheism, but it can be imagined that 
since some thinkers considered the idea of evolution pantheistic, Darwin as its most 
famous advocate might also have been considered to be advocating pantheism.620 
 
5.1.5 Accusations of Pantheism Made Against Herbert Spencer 
The accusations of pantheism made against Spencer during his life time have rarely 
been mentioned in the historiography. Spencer scholars usually see him as an agnostic 
who was sometimes associated with scientific materialists, such as Tyndall. In fact, 
Spencer was occasionally accused of pantheism by his contemporaries, mainly because 
of his metaphysical view that the reality of the world was an Unknowable, of which all 
things were manifestations. The view was very similar to pantheists’ doctrine of God. It 
was mainly expressed in the first part of First Principles. 
Spencer began by claiming that ‘all our knowledge, properly so called, is Relative’, 
that due to ‘our indestructible belief’ in an underlying actuality, we inevitably conceive 
something ‘Non-relative’, ‘absolute’ or ‘actual’ behind the relative or ‘appearance’, but 
we cannot have knowledge of it because ‘human intelligence is incapable of absolute 
knowledge’.621  Spencer credited this idea to Scottish philosopher William Hamilton 
(1788–1856) and English philosopher Henry Longueville Mansel (1820–1871).622  He 
                                                     
619 Richard Tyrwhitt, ‘On Evolution and Pantheism’, Contemporary Review, 33 (1878), 81–96 (p. 
83). 
620 Robert Richards has argued that Darwin’s conception of nature was greatly influenced by 
German romantics, such as his idea that nature came into being through gradual change rather 
than sudden creation. See Robert Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 514–54. He shows some connections between Darwin 
and pantheistic thinkers. 
621  Spencer, First Principles, pp. 96–97 and 68. The following numbers in brackets behind 
quotations of Spencer in this section are page numbers of this book. 
622 Ibid., p. xiii. 
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gave large quotations from Mansel’s Limits of Religious Thought (1858).623 Hamilton’s 
Philosophy of the Unconditioned (1829) might also be a source of Spencer’s philosophy. 
Based on this epistemological scepticism, Spencer made the ontological claim that the 
ultimate reality was ‘the Unknowable’ and that all that could be known was the 
appearance of the Unknowable.624 
Spencer also proposed to reconcile science and religion by using this idea. He wrote 
that ‘[i]f Religion and Science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be 
this deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts—that the Power which the Universe 
manifests to us is utterly inscrutable’ (46). He claimed that, on the one hand, ‘true’ 
religion had ‘everywhere established and propagated one or other modification of the 
doctrine that all things are manifestations of a Power that transcends our knowledge’ 
(100). In other words, true religion was the acknowledgement and worship of the 
Unknowable. On the other hand, true science was ‘all positive and definite knowledge 
of the order existing among surrounding phenomena’ (102). That is to say that true 
science did not claim knowledge of the Unknowable. From these two points, Spencer 
considered that if science and religion both stayed in their suitable forms, admitting the 
Unknowable, then science and religion would be reconciled. He argued that the conflict 
between science and religion was caused by religious people being unreligious and 
creating dogmatic takes on the Unknowable, or by scientific people being unscientific 
and claiming knowledge about the Unknowable. 
Michael W. Taylor has pointed out that ‘[a]s a substitute for religion, Spencer’s system 
was sufficiently ambiguous that it was capable of being most things to most men’, that 
many people used Spencer’s system to support ‘secular’ and ‘evolutionary’ theodicies, 
and that Spencer was often accused of promoting atheism and materialism.625 The 
combination of the anti-creation, anti-personal God, positivism, and progressive 
evolutionism elements suggested to contemporaries the potential for materialism and 
atheism in his works, though Spencer himself denied being atheist or materialist, since 
                                                     
623 Taylor, Spencer, p. 135. 
624 Spencer, First Principles, p. 1. 
625 Taylor, Spencer, pp. 7 and 138. 
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he still suggested that religious feelings were necessary. Like Tyndall, he was against 
established religions but was in support of religious sentiments. What Taylor does not 
mention is that Spencer’s system had the potential to be used to support pantheism, 
and that Spencer himself was also accused of pantheism. 
While Spencer’s system could be seen as atheistic, materialistic, or deistic for the 
reason that he denied the influence of an external God upon nature, it was also possible 
to suggest that his system supported the existence of an immanent God in nature. 
Spencer’s rhetoric of the Unknowable was strikingly similar to pantheists’ rhetoric of 
the immanent God. Because of this similarity, it was easy for Victorian readers to 
identify Spencer’s Unknowable with a pantheistic God. Spencer’s denial of an external 
and personal God, his denial of creation, and his positivistic view of the world were also 
common components of pantheism. Many of Spencer’s contemporary critics thus 
pointed out that Spencer’s philosophy had the potential to support pantheism. 
For example, an anonymous writer in the Catholic periodical, the Dublin Review, 
pointed out that Spencer’s Unknowable often reminded them of the God of 
pantheism.626  Another writer in the Dublin Review claimed that ‘the philosophy of 
Herbert Spencer does not merely tend to Pantheism but contains it’. 627  Catholic 
biologist St George Mivart (1827–1900), pointed out that Spencer’s Psychology tended 
towards pantheism.628 Roman Catholic priest and novelist William Barry (1849–1930) 
considered that atheism, agnosticism, and pantheism were sects of a new religion and 
that Spencer was a chief propagandist of this religion.629 Spencer himself mentioned an 
accusation of pantheism made by Mansel. He pointed out in a periodical article that 
Mansel had claimed that ‘Mr. Spencer, in his work on First Principles, endeavours to 
                                                     
626 Anon, ‘The Scripture Doctrine of Creation’, Dublin Review, 20 (1873), 242–49 (p. 245). 
627 Anon, ‘Catholicity and Pantheism’, Dublin Review, 23 (1874), 251–56 (p. 253). 
628 George Mivart, ‘An Examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Psychology’, Dublin Review, 23 
(1874), 476–508 (p. 508). 
629 William Barry, ‘The New-Birth of Christian Philosophy’, Contemporary Review, 44 (1883), 
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press Mr. Hamilton into the service of Pantheism and Positivism together’.630 Spencer 
denied being pantheistic and replied that this was a ‘somewhat strange assertation by 
the way, considering that I reject them both’.631 
Spencer did not consider his system pantheistic, and he rejected pantheism together 
with animism, polytheism, monotheism, and atheism in the first part of First 
Principles. 632  Spencer considered that there were three common suppositions 
concerning the origin of the universe. ‘We may assert that it is self-existent; or that it is 
self-created; or that it is created by an external agency’ (30). He associated the first one 
with atheism, the second one with pantheism, and the third one with monotheism, and 
he considered all of these suppositions weak. When criticising the first supposition, 
Spencer wrote that ‘[t]he assertion that the Universe is self-existent does not really 
carry us a step beyond the cognition of its present existence; and so leaves us with a 
mere re-statement of the mystery’ (32). When discussing the second supposition, 
Spencer wrote that ‘[t]he hypothesis of self-creation, which practically amounts to what 
is called Pantheism, is similarly incapable of being represented in thought’ (32). He 
considered that the idea of self-creation implied that the universe knew what it was 
going to be and created its futures according to those images. He called the images 
‘potential universe’ (33). He criticised the idea of the existence of potential universes 
for being paradoxical, because if a potential universe could be represented in thought, 
then it must exist as something, and consequently, as it existed, it was an ‘actual 
universe’ rather than a potential universe, thus humans could not actually conceive a 
potential universe. In addition, he pointed out that humans also had no idea about how 
a potential universe could become an actual universe. With these reasons he claimed 
that it was not possible to form a clear idea of a self-created universe, and he thus 
repudiated pantheism. Regarding the third supposition, Spencer considered that it 
suffered all the weaknesses of the first two suppositions. Instead of assuming the 
universe to be self-existent or self-created, it assumed an external creator as self-
                                                     
630 Herbert Spencer, ‘Replies to Criticisms’, Fortnightly Review, 14 (1873), 581–95 (p. 583). 
631 Ibid., p. 583. 
632 Spencer, First Principles, p. 43. 
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existent and self-created. Spencer argued that humans could not form any clear idea of 
that creator and humans did not have any evidence of its action in creation. Moreover, 
he considered that the idea of creation from nothing implied that space had a moment 
of non-existence, and he considered this idea to be unthinkable. Spencer concluded 
that ‘these three different suppositions respecting the origin of things, verbally 
intelligible though they are, and severally seeming to their respective adherents quite 
rational, turn out, when critically examined, to be literally unthinkable’ (35). 
Spencer also repudiated these religious positions on the ground that they all claimed 
knowledge about the Unknowable. When talking about pantheism, he wrote that ‘in 
Pantheism, in which the generalized personality becomes one with the phenomena; we 
equally find a hypothesis which is supposed to render the Universe comprehensible’ 
(43). Spencer implied that pantheism, as it still claimed knowledge of the Unknowledge, 
was not the true religion he supported. 
It will show in the following sections that his pantheistic followers could easily find 
ways to avoid these criticisms and to make ‘pantheism’ the name of Spencer’s true 
religion. This was also why Spencer’s system was associated with pantheism by many 
critics, even though he claimed to reject pantheism. This situation was similar to his 
attitude towards positivism. Many reviewers, including modern reviewers such as 
Taylor, have represented Spencer’s system as fundamentally positivistic, while Spencer 
denied this. Taylor claimed that Spencer’s denial of positivism was because Auguste 
Comte’s positivism supported French materialistic social philosophy, which was against 
the ‘liberal and eudaemonist tradition’ in Britain, and which Spencer did not wish to be 
associated with.633 Pantheism was somewhat notorious in Britain as well, thus, it was 
understandable if Spencer did not want to be associated with pantheism. 
 
5.2 Pantheistic Uses of Evolutionary Theories 
In the previous section, we see that the developmental view of the cosmos and the 
earth as well as the idea of progress had a long history prior to the Victorian era, 
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however the developmental view of life was widely accepted only after the 1860s. The 
general developmental and progressive view of the world expressed in Vestiges (1844) 
was widely considered valid after the developmental view of life became widely 
accepted. The term ‘evolution’ was commonly used to denote development theory 
after Spencer introduced it into wider usage in the 1850s, and the idea of progress was 
often implied in this term. Evolutionary theories and evolutionary philosophers were 
sometimes criticised for being pantheistic, as we have seen with the cases of Sedgwick 
and Spencer. In this section, we will see how advocates of pantheism made use of these 
old and new evolutionary theories as well as of the pantheistic image of evolution to 
support their pantheistic doctrines. 
 
5.2.1 John Hunt and the Doctrine of Development and the Unity in the Plan 
of Nature’s Works 
In Hunt’s view, pantheism was synonymous with rational theology, the kind of theology 
that utilised reason to the utmost so that no doctrine was accepted without being 
examined by reason. He believed that the use of reason in theology necessarily led to 
the conclusion that God was the infinite. He pointed out that God’s infinity implied 
God’s immanency in the world, since if the world was not in God, then God was 
excluded from the world, and consequently God was limited and not infinite. According 
to Hunt, God’s immanence in the world also meant that God did not create once and 
leave the world but created unceasingly. He believed that the world ‘was not a work, 
but an unfolding; a manifestation of mind in matter; a development of the One into the 
many’, and he claimed that the unfolding way of creation was expressed in ‘the doctrine 
of development’, or ‘the law of progress’, which was increasingly supported by scientific 
practitioners.634 He wrote: 
 
That the soul which lives and works in nature is God, is the partial truth of all the 
theories of progressive development. These theories were the inevitable result of 
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the study of nature. There, all is progress. Everything unfolds. The highest 
organism has its beginning in the smallest form of life. The visible starts from the 
invisible. The things which are seen are made from things which are not seen.635 
 
Hunt gave an account of the history of the doctrine of development accompanied by 
pantheistic interpretations. He considered that the doctrine of development already 
existed in ancient cosmologies, such as Brahmanism, and he claimed that the doctrine 
had been revived and made scientific in modern times by French naturalists Benoît de 
Maillet (1656–1738), Jean-Baptiste Robinet (1735–1820), Lamarck, and Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire.636 Hunt argued that the developmental theories of these French naturalists all 
implied that nature was united. He observed that ‘Robinet’s theory was vastly 
comprehensive, uniting all kingdoms, classes, and species. He believed that he had 
found the key of the universe, and that he laid the foundation of all true science, in 
being able to say, “Nature is one”’ (352). He read Lamarck as claiming that ‘Nature is 
one and undivided. It knows of no orders but the order of progression’ (353). He saw in 
Geoffrey that ‘Nature […] has formed all living beings on a unique plan, essentially the 
same in the principle but varied after a thousand ways in all its necessary parts’ (355). 
After introducing these French naturalists, Hunt pointed out that the doctrine of the 
unity of nature could be used to support pantheism. He wrote that the pantheistic poet 
‘Goethe had announced the doctrine of development as the law of the vegetable 
kingdom. […] What seemed at first but the fancy of a poet is now the scientific doctrine 
of vegetable morphology’ (357). 
In the British context, Hunt considered that ‘[t]he doctrine of development was first 
made popular in England by the ‘Vestiges of a Natural History of Creation’ (358). He also 
                                                     
635 Hunt, Pantheism and Christianity, p. 347. The quotations from Hunt in the rest of the section 
come mostly from Pantheism and Christianity, since, although most ideas already existed in An 
Essay on Pantheism, Hunt revised and reorganised this part about the doctrine of development 
in Pantheism and Christianity. The numbers in brackets after quotations from Hunt in this 
section are the page numbers of this book. 
636 Ibid., pp. 347–52. 
249 
 
 
 
indicated that the idea of the transmutation of species, the idea of a changing earth, 
and the nebular hypothesis were presented in the book. In regard to the nebular 
hypothesis, Hunt mentioned that Laplace might have thought it unnecessary to assume 
God in the progress of the solar system, but that ‘the author of the ‘Vestiges’ saw in this 
progressive working the mode of operation most becoming the divine Being, and most 
analogous to all that we know of his ordinary working’ (359). In regard to the creation 
of the Earth and life, Hunt read from Vestiges that God progressively created the 
inorganic and the organic worlds using the same set of substances and laws. He wrote: 
‘Life pressed in as soon as there were suitable conditions. Organic beings did not come 
at once on the earth by some special act of the Deity. The order was progressive. There 
was an evolution of being, corresponding to what we now see in the production of an 
individual’ (360). 
Darwin was the next and final figure in Hunt’s account. He claimed that ‘[t]he 
development doctrine found a rigidly scientific advocate in Charles Darwin’ (360). He 
acknowledged that the theory of natural selection was the theory Darwin proposed to 
account for changes in species. Hunt claimed that ‘[t]he development doctrine has 
received but little additional illustration since Darwin’s work’ (361). In 1866, he 
considered that Darwin’s Origin was almost the final statement of the doctrine of 
development, and he still held this view in 1884. Charles Lyell’s acceptance of the 
transmutation of species and Huxley’s endeavour in searching for missing links were 
mentioned by Hunt as minor developments. As an orthodox Church of England 
clergyman, Hunt accepted the theory of descent that humans evolved from animals, as 
he cited Huxley and wrote that ‘Professor Huxley finds most humanity in the 
chimpanzee’ (362). 
For Hunt, the doctrine of development also implied the unity in the plan of nature’s 
works, and both ideas implied an immanent deity in nature. He claimed that ‘[t]he 
doctrine of development may be denied, but the facts which have led to a belief in it 
remain the same, and require to be explained. These facts are an obvious unity in the 
plan of nature’s works, which is now acknowledged by all scientific men’ (362). For him, 
there was no division between life and non-life in nature. He wrote: 
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Life itself is supposed to be but a higher degree of the same power which 
constitutes what we call inanimate objects. […] When we say life is present or 
absent, we only mean the presence or absence of a particular manifestation of life. 
The all-life of the universe is the Deity energising in nature—this is the theology of 
science. The conception of the universe is incomplete if it is not conceived as a 
constant and continuous work of the eternally-creating Spirit. […] Religion, poetry, 
and science all demand that, however much God may transcend his creation, he 
must in some way be immanent therein (364). 
 
Hunt here did not simply claim that scientific theories of development could be 
compatible with his pantheistic view of God, but also claimed that these scientific 
theories necessarily ended in his pantheistic view of God. 
    There are many conceivable problems in Hunt’s argument. On the one hand, the 
doctrine of development and the idea of the unity of nature are compatible with a 
version of deism in which God created all these rules once and left the world to run by 
itself as a closed system. These ideas do not necessarily lead to the idea of an infinite 
and immanent deity. On the other hand, God’s infinity and immanency do not 
necessarily imply that the world is progressive and undivided. Hunt did not tackle these 
problems. This part of his work also did not attract much attention from reviewers. 
Among all the reviewers that I mention in Hunt’s section in the second chapter of this 
dissertation, only the reviewer of the Evangelical Nonconformist journal, the British 
Quarterly Review, mentioned Hunt’s uses of science. The reviewer praised him: ‘One of 
the special features of this new issue is the place which is assigned to Mr. Darwin and 
the law of development in relation to Pantheism. Here Dr. Hunt shows more than his 
usual decision and incisive insight’.637 
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5.2.2 Constance Plumptre and Her Evolutionary Cosmology 
Plumptre used evolutionary theories in many ways in the second volume of her General 
Sketch of the History of Pantheism (1879). 638  First, she drew a picture of human 
intellectual evolution, in which monism and pantheism were the highest conceptions in 
intellectual evolution. Secondly, she used Haeckel’s interpretation of Darwin’s theory 
to support her monistic view of God and nature, and she used the nebular hypothesis 
to support her view of a phoenix-like universe. Thirdly, she interpreted Spencer’s 
philosophy of the Unknowable as pantheistic in its essence. 
Plumptre adopted a thoroughly evolutionary cosmology in her pantheism, though it 
was presented in quite a fragmentary fashion in her work. When she talked about 
human intellect, she represented it as progressively developed from animal-like to 
highly-civilised. She claimed that ‘Man, as everything else in Nature, has to advance 
from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher’ (271–72). She considered 
that humans were at first similar to animals, ‘crawling upon the earth, absorbed in the 
pursuits necessary for the satisfaction of his animal desires and animal necessities’ 
(271–72). It was language, she considered, that began human civilisation. She wrote: ‘I 
have often thought that the great step which marks the differentiation of the human 
from the animal is the possession of Language’ (272). She considered that mind and 
reason originated from language. 
This evolutionary picture implied a hierarchy of ideas, which Plumptre used to 
support her idea of religious evolution. She considered that there were two ways to 
explain the causes of natural phenomena—‘Creation by external agency, and Self-
Existence or Universal Immanence’, and that ‘[e]ach of these answers has two forms. 
External agency may be Polytheism or Monotheism; Self-Existence may be Pantheism 
or Atheism’ (273). Plumptre ranked these ideas chronologically. She considered that 
polytheism was the first stage in intellectual history. She wrote: ‘Uncultured humanity 
almost invariably selects the polytheistic form of external agency as a solution of the 
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enigma. And naturally so; nay necessarily so. […] In the childhood of every religion in 
the world we see the same ideas disclosing themselves. […] In the lower religions gods 
and goddesses rule over the destinies of men more in caprice than from any definite 
purpose.’ (274). She associated polytheism with ‘uncultured humanity’, ‘the childhood 
of every religion’, ‘the lower religions’, and the ‘primary and lowest stage of religion’ 
(274). 
The next development was Monotheism. Plumptre considered that when man 
‘becomes alive to the fact that one all-powerful and omniscient Ruler of men and of 
things is a worthier object of adoration than are a multitude of divinities of small and 
limited power, all hating and warring against each other, he gradually arrives at the 
conception of Monotheism’ (274–75). She saw this development as ‘an immense 
development in his spiritual nature’ (274–75). There were also lower and higher forms 
of monotheism. The lowest kind was almost the same as polytheism, and the highest 
one was held by Christian saints such as St Augustine. She did not elaborate on her 
criteria for distinguishing between higher and lower monotheisms. 
The next and perhaps the final stage was pantheism. She claimed that the highest 
form of monotheism had ‘a more sublime conception of God’ than pantheism, but that 
‘Pantheism is supplanting Monotheism, not because of its greater sublimity but because 
of its greater capability of verification’ (275). She claimed that ‘Science, that great 
leavener of religion’ (275) was currently the cause of a new evolution of religion from 
monotheism to pantheism. The reason was that science in her view disproved ‘the 
doctrines of a local Heaven or a Personal God’ (276) that were central to monotheistic 
beliefs. She claimed that science had made the idea of a personal God sitting in a 
localised heaven unbelievable, since the sky was but systems of stars after systems of 
stars and nothing looked like a localised heaven. She also claimed that ‘Science is at last 
beginning to prove to us beyond the possibility of contradiction the identity of man with 
all other forms of existence whether organic or inorganic’ (278), which, she pointed out, 
was a central doctrine of pantheism. 
In Plumptre’s account of religious evolution, pantheism was the newest religion and 
thus the most civilized and advanced religion. As it has been introduced in the first 
chapter of this dissertation, many Christian critics argued for the opposite picture, in 
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which pantheism was a lower form of religion while monotheism was the most 
advanced theology. One of their reasons was that pantheism existed in many primitive 
religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism, which came earlier than Christianity, and 
whose adherents were supposedly not as civilised as the British people. Plumptre did 
not mention such criticisms. She constantly insisted that pantheism was held by elites 
in those cultures, and she implied that if there was no science, then pantheism and 
monotheism might exist side by side, but since science existed, then pantheism would 
replace monotheism in the foreseeable future, since ‘Pantheism is, of all the religious 
solutions, the most in accordance with scientific discoveries’.639 
Moreover, Plumptre also used Spencer’s law of progress and his view on the progress 
of knowledge to argue that pantheism was truer than monotheism. She quoted from 
the beginning of the third part of Principles of Biology, in which Spencer argued that the 
idea of special creation was given by ‘undeveloped intellect’ and consequently this idea 
tended to be erroneous like many other primitive ideas. According to his law of progress, 
Spencer asserted that ‘ideas are not usually true ideas. […] What we call the progress 
of knowledge, is the bringing of Thoughts into harmony with Things; and it implies that 
the first Thoughts are either wholly out of harmony with Things, or in very incomplete 
harmony with them’.640 Plumptre paraphrased this, claiming that ‘certain conceptions 
are the product of immaturity, whether in the race or the individual’, and there is ‘a 
strong probability that such conceptions are erroneous’ (279). Thus, ‘Polytheism is 
invariably the product of a low culture would make it yield in probability to Monotheism, 
which is the product of a relatively high culture; and Monotheism in its turn is yielding 
to Pantheism, as mankind attains by degrees a still higher order of intelligence’ (279). 
She claimed that since pantheism was the product of ‘a late and eminently scientific 
century’, according to the law of progress, its doctrine was truer than monotheism and 
polytheism, which were products of ‘an early and eminently unscientific century’ (279). 
In addition to her hierarchy of polytheism, monotheism, and pantheism based on an 
evolutionary history of human intellectual development, Plumptre also ranked monism 
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and dualism and claimed that the monistic idea of God was more advanced than the 
dualistic idea of God. She quoted from the third chapter of The History of Creation, in 
which Haeckel criticised Cuvier and Agassiz’s theistic concept of God. Cuvier and Agassiz 
defended a dualistic concept of God according to which God and nature were separated 
and God was external to nature. Haeckel claimed: ‘The low dualistic conception of God 
corresponds with a low animal stage of development of the human organism. The more 
developed man of the present day is capable of, and justified in, conceiving […] the 
monistic conception of the universe […], [the] monistic idea of God […] [and] the 
sublime idea of the Unity of God and Nature’. 641  Haeckel linked this intellectual 
development with the physical development of the human organism. This was a strong 
claim since Haeckel was essentially implying that the races that believed in monism 
were physically more developed than those that believed in dualism. Through Haeckel’s 
words, Plumptre implied that pantheism as a form of monism was evolutionarily higher 
than monotheism, which was a dualism. 
So far, we see that Plumptre used the popular evolutionary view to formulate an 
evolutionary history of the human intellect in which pantheism was the most recent 
development and thus the most advanced religious position among all its opponents. 
She also used evolutionary theories to support specific pantheistic doctrines. One such 
doctrine was that God and nature were united, and another was that there was no 
creation but only transformation. 
In supporting her monistic view of God and nature, Plumptre, once again, used 
Haeckel’s words. She quoted from the first chapter of The History of Creation in which 
Haeckel introduced Darwin’s theory of descent and argued that this theory was the final 
block of a monistic view of nature. Haeckel claimed: ‘By the Theory of Descent we are 
for the first time enabled to conceive of the unity of nature in such a manner that a 
mechanic-causal explanation of even the most intricate organic phenomena’.642 He also 
claimed that ‘all natural bodies which are known to us are equally animated, that the 
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distinction which has been made between animate and inanimate bodies does not exist. 
[…] This final triumph of the monistic conception of nature constitutes the highest and 
most general merit of the Theory of Descent, as reformed by Darwin’.643 By quoting 
these words of Haeckel, Plumptre argued that Darwin’s theory of descent supported 
the pantheistic conception of a divine and living nature, against the monotheistic 
conception of nature. 
Plumptre also incorporated the nebular hypothesis in her pantheistic cosmology. She 
extended the hypothesis from the solar system to the whole universe and added the 
idea of everlasting circles of rebirth and decay. She pictured the whole universe as a 
phoenix that went through numerous circles of decay and rebirth. In the introduction 
to her cosmology, Plumptre argued that ‘transformation and metamorphosis seem to 
be the order of the heavens as much as of the earth’ (287). She found that the nebular 
hypothesis supported this claim. Plumptre credited the nebular hypothesis to Laplace 
and did not mention Herschel or others. She wrote that ‘if the theory of Laplace be true 
[…] the entire solar system […] was, in its original state, one vast, gigantic whole, 
travailing in labour before its offspring could be detached from it’ (287). She also 
stressed its scientific authority, claiming that ‘although that theory has not yet emerged 
from the region of hypothesis, it is an hypothesis which seems to be daily gaining 
ground with the most enlightened minds’ (287). It is also noticeable that she used the 
genealogical term ‘offspring’. In this context, the term gives the sense that the primitive 
gigantic sun was the common ancestor of all existences in the solar system. Indeed, she 
called the sun ‘the common Father of the mighty system of Comets, Planets, and their 
satellites’ (289). Plumptre extended this view to the whole universe and speculated that 
our ‘Sun in its turn may but be the offspring of a yet greater sun, this, again of yet 
greater, or perhaps of a system of suns, until we find that the entire Universe may have 
originally been one vast, gigantic, nebulous whole’ (289). She implied that there was a 
genealogical unity of all things, not only in the solar system, but also in the whole 
universe. 
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Incorporating the philosophical speculations of David Strauss, Kant, and Leibnitz, 
together with ideas from Buddhism, Plumptre imagined a phoenix-like universe. In her 
speculation, ‘at some distant period, the Earth must eventually return into the Sun’ 
(291), because ‘the resistance of the ethereal medium’ ‘is believed must eventually 
bring the Earth into the Sun’ (292). When the earth and other planets and satellites 
collided with the sun, they would become gaseous again. Thus ‘the whole Sidereal 
System will eventually be reduced to the state of nebulousity from which it originated’ 
(292–93). She extended this view to the whole universe and speculated that ‘as the 
whole Universe has in all probability originated from a nebulous condition, so it is 
destined to return into a similar nebulous condition, to be built up again, perchance, […] 
into fresh forms of Suns and Planets and Satellites’ (293). Using quotations from 
German theologian David Strauss’s ‘Dogmatic Divinity’ and The Old Faith and the New 
(1873), Plumptre asserted that the universe as a whole was everlasting, but its parts 
went through continuous phases of perishing and rebirth. Kant had made a similar 
speculation in his General History and Theory of the Heavens (1755). Plumptre cited 
Kant’s view that when planets collided with the sun the collision would ‘add 
immeasurably to his heat’ so the collision would fuel up the next round of rebirth. Lastly, 
through citing Leibniz and Buddhism, Plumptre asserted that ‘there never has been a 
time when worlds and beings have not been evolved in endless revolutions of birth and 
decay’ and that ‘[e]very world has arisen from a former ruined world’ (295–96). 
Plumptre’s cosmology was different from Spencer’s and seems to be at odds with her 
former views. Spencer considered that, according to the law of progress, the universe 
would continue to evolve from simple to complex until it reached maximum 
complexity—an ultimate equilibrium. There would be small dissolutions, such as the 
death of organisms, but on the large scale, Spencer believed that progress was the main 
trend. Plumptre relied on Spencer’s law of progress to claim that what came later was 
more advanced than the former. But if the universe was like a phoenix, then it had 
periods of decay. In those decaying periods, what came later should be worse than the 
former. Plumptre did not attempt to address this problem in her work. She also ignored 
the second law of thermodynamics and the implication of entropy. According to this 
law, the usable energy of the universe was decaying, and consequently the universe 
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would run out of fuel and end in a heat death, which seemed incompatible with a 
phoenix-like universe. 
Plumptre also made use of Spencer’s philosophy of the Unknowable. Many Christian 
critics claimed that this philosophy was pantheistic. In their views, pantheism was more 
primitive than Christian monotheism, and they implied that, if Spencer’s philosophy was 
pantheistic, then it was intellectually inferior to their theology. Plumptre also 
considered Spencer’s philosophy pantheistic, but she praised Spencer since she saw 
pantheism as a better religious position than Christian monotheism. Plumptre’s 
definition of pantheism—‘a belief in a Reality of which Nature is the substantial 
manifestation’ (263)—was structurally the same as Spencer’s definition of the 
Unknowable. Considering that Plumptre read and liked Spencer’s philosophy when she 
was young, she might have derived her definition of pantheism from Spencer’s 
definition of the Unknowable. Spencer claimed that the belief in the Unknowable was 
the essence of all true religions, and Plumptre also claimed that pantheism was the 
essence of all religions. Throughout Plumptre’s General Sketch, one of her main 
arguments was that pantheism was a central doctrine of various religions and 
philosophies. She claimed: ‘it may well be doubted whether any single doctrine can 
count so many witnesses to its truth as that of Pantheism. Certainly the only one which 
can at all numerically approach it is Agnosticism, and even its believers frequently, 
perhaps almost unconsciously, imply a belief in Pantheism’ (262). 
In her argument that agnostics also held pantheistic views, Plumptre quoted 
extensively from Spencer’s First Principles and Principles of Psychology. She quoted 
seven pages from the first part of First Principles, including Spencer’s claim that 
‘Religion and Science are but two aspects of the One Inscrutable Power that manifests 
itself in all phenomena’ (267). She quoted a page from Spencer’s concluding chapter in 
the first volume of Principles of Psychology. In this quotation Spencer claimed that 
psychological research taught us that we could not think of matter without mind or 
mind without matter, and this coordinated with the conception of the one unknowable 
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reality which was neither material nor spiritual.644 Plumptre observed: ‘if I read Mr. 
Spencer alright, all Matter and all Mind; all religion and all Science; in a word, the whole 
of mental, moral, and material phenomena are in his opinion but the various 
manifestations of the great incomprehensible Unity that runs through all’ (268). She 
claimed: ‘We do not think we could quote a more suggestive passage as an argument 
for the truth of Pantheism than the above passage from the great philosopher of this 
century’ (314–15). 
Plumptre considered that ‘Pantheism asserts that there is a Reality—
incomprehensible indeed, because infinity—but displaying itself without possibility of 
contradiction through every act and phase of Nature’ (315). Spencer asserted exactly 
such a reality; thus, Plumptre claimed that Spencer’s words spoke the truth of 
pantheism. Spencer was often viewed as an agnostic in Victorian Britain, since he talked 
about reality being ‘unknowable’. 645  In Plumptre’s view, ‘Perfectly consistent 
Agnosticism would doubt whether there were a Reality at all’ (262). But she saw that, 
in her present day, agnostics were not holding to perfectly consistent agnosticism, 
rather, ‘either conscious or unconscious’ (262), like Spencer, they believed in an 
unknowable reality. Thus, by using Spencer as a representative of agnostics, Plumptre 
made her claim that agnostics usually held pantheistic views. She implied that Spencer’s 
philosophical sources, William Hamilton and Henry Mansel, and famous agnostics, such 
as Huxley, were also pantheistic in their view of reality. 
 
5.2.3 James Allanson Picton and the Philosophy of the Unknowable and the 
Evolution of Life, Ethics, Consciousness, and Religion 
Picton wrote about pantheism during two separate periods of his life. The first period 
was from the late 1860s to the early 1870s when Picton worked as a clergyman in 
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Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Second Edition, 2 vols (London: Williams and Norgate, 1870), 
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Congregationalist chapels. His pantheistic ideas during this period were published in the 
monograph The Mystery of Matter in 1873 in which he proposed his vision of a Christian 
pantheism as the future of religion. His use of the idea of evolution was limited in this 
work. In most cases, he tried to reconcile the idea of evolution and his doctrines of 
pantheism, countering atheistic interpretations of evolutionary theories. The second 
period was at the end of the Victorian age, when he retired from his MP work and 
moved to Wales to write about philosophy. During this period, he rebuilt his Christian 
pantheism drawing upon Spencer’s idea of the Unknowable, Spinoza’s idea of reality 
and God, and Spencer’s and other’s progressive evolutionism. He now called his 
pantheism ‘the Religion of the Universe’ rather than ‘Christian Pantheism’ and saw it as 
the religion that had survived the Victorian crisis of faith and as the inevitable religion 
of the future. He wrote two published books on this topic—The Religion of the Universe 
(1904) and Spinoza (1907). In these works, he did not just seek to reconcile evolution 
and pantheism, but he used the idea of evolution actively and intensively as the building 
blocks of his pantheism. Although these books were published a few years after the end 
of the Victorian era, they are discussed in this section because they constituted 
extensions of work Picton had begun in the 1870s rather than new twentieth-century 
ideas. 
In the early 1870s, Picton was already familiar with Spencer’s philosophy of the 
Unknowable. In Picton’s essay, ‘The Philosophy of Ignorance’, Spencer was cited as ‘one 
of the greatest among modern philosophers’ who confirmed the existence of the 
mysterious reality. 646  In the essay, ‘The Essential Nature of Religion’, Picton used 
Spencer’s approach to reconcile science and religion. He wrote that ‘Mr. Herbert 
Spencer […] [makes] the reconciliation between science and religion to lie in the 
recognition on both side that “the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly 
inscrutable”’. 647  There were several similar uses of Spencer’s philosophy of the 
Unknowable in the essay ‘Christian Pantheism’. 648  In these essays, Picton used 
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647 Ibid., p. 219. He quoted from Spencer, First Principles, p. 46. 
648 Picton, Mystery, p. 369, 
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Spencer’s philosophy as an authoritative confirmation of his pantheistic idea of the 
mysterious reality of which all thing were manifestations. 
Spencer rejected pantheism in First Principles and claimed that the self-created 
universe in pantheism was unthinkable and pantheism irreligiously claimed knowledge 
of the Unknowable. Picton was aware of Spencer’s position and attempted to deal with 
it. In the essay ‘Christian Pantheism’, Picton claimed that he did not need any of the 
three suppositions of the origin of the universe Spencer criticised. He wrote: ‘We need 
not think of the universe as “self-existing.” We only know that it exists, and that it 
impresses us as everlasting’ (413). He claimed that ‘pantheism has nothing to do with 
“self-creation.” […] For the notion of any absolute beginning, whether called “self-
evolved” or anything else, seems totally inconsistent with genuine pantheism’ (413–14). 
He observed that Spencer denied teleological evolution in which the universe 
constantly changed towards potential images of the universe, and he supported 
Spencer and claimed that pantheism did not need this either. The third supposition 
Spencer criticised assumed an external creator. Picton did not specifically talk about 
Spencer’s criticism, since he had already repudiated this assumption in many parts of 
his book. As for Spencer’s criticism of pantheism as claiming knowledge over the 
Unknowable, Picton always claimed that his reality was mysterious and he did not claim 
knowledge over it. By claiming both that pantheism needed not to assume a self-
existent universe, a self-created universe, or an external creator, and that pantheism 
did not claim knowledge over the ultimate reality, Picton dismissed Spencer’s criticisms 
of pantheism and reconciled his pantheism with Spencer’s synthetic philosophy. 
Picton also discussed many evolutionary ideas. First, he recognised that evolutionism 
might be used atheistically to deny divinity, and he argued that progressive evolution 
was divinely driven. In the essay ‘Mystery of Matter’, Picton wrote: ‘To me the doctrine 
of an eternal continuity of development has no terrors; for believing matter to be in its 
ultimate essence spiritual, I see in every cosmic revolution a “change from glory to glory, 
as by the Spirit of the Lord”’ (55–56). In the essay ‘The Essential Nature of Religion’, 
Picton made it clear that ‘All evolution implies a divine Power’ (218). In the essay 
‘Christian Pantheism’, he gave a reason why evolution was divinely driven. He 
considered that if there were only mechanical forces, then things would either run in 
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perfect harmony, or become disintegrated and dissolute when there was a tiny want of 
harmony. He reasoned that ‘[t]he very fact that things do not work smoothly, and that 
instead of degenerating into deeper discord, they produce higher harmonies in the 
progress of evolution, seems proof demonstrative, that at the heart of the world is 
something more than molecular mechanics. Whenever healing power is, there is life. 
And so any great process of redemption is bright with the tokens of a Living God’ (482). 
Secondly, Picton used the evolutionary view of species and the theory of natural 
selection to argue against the personal image of God. He argued that the creation of 
species in traditional Christianity was depicted as analogous to human creation, and 
that when the evolution of species had become widely accepted, such an 
anthropomorphic form of creation as well as the personal image of God had become 
very difficult to believe. He wrote: ‘it was comparatively easy, if only the metaphysical 
difficulties could be ignored, to conceive of each organism as the result of a personal 
design, comparable to our own consciousness of mental effort’ (336), ‘[b]ut now, […] it 
is a generally […] established opinion that all the species of living things […] are the 
result of development, by ordinary processes of natural generation. […] And when we 
candidly estimate all that is necessarily involved in such a belief, we must feel that the 
difficulty of insisting upon the analogy of human design is no longer one of merely 
metaphysical contradiction, but of actual fact’ (337). Picton also argued that the theory 
of natural selection posed great difficulties for the personal image of God. He pointed 
out that ‘the struggle of life’ (338) did not seem to be a method of design that man 
would adopt, and thus the analogy with God was hard to maintain. 
Thirdly, Picton used progressive evolutionism to argue against the Christian doctrines 
of the devil, evil, and sin. Picton argued that Christians believed that both the devil and 
humans had fallen from good to evil and sinful states, however, ‘the theory of […] 
evolution […] knows no Fall’ but only ‘advances from the imperfect towards the perfect, 
from the beast to the saint’, and so Christians faced ‘difficulties which they never saw 
before’ in front of the theory of evolution (474). 
 
At the turn of the century, Picton developed a more systematic pantheism. Rather than 
citing Spencer’s philosophy of the Unknowable as an evidence, he rebuilt his pantheism 
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upon this philosophy. Picton considered that Spencer had unveiled the future of religion 
and the best solution to the conflict between science and religion by the philosophy of 
the Unknowable, but that Spencer had not fully developed it, so that he felt the need 
to draw it out by himself. He wrote in the first chapter of The Religion of the Universe 
that ‘in his [Spencer’s] First Principles […] what is suggested is a recognition on both 
sides that Science and Religion alike contemplate the same Infinite Unknowable Being, 
whose finite phases may indeed, in different aspects of them, be harmoniously 
interpreted by each, but whose absolute Totality is beyond the conception of either’.649 
He observed that ‘the advantage of such a reconciliation [is that it is] permanent in 
essence but in form continually adaptable to increased knowledge of finite things’ (10–
11). He also considered that Spencer’s synthetic philosophy ‘was, after all, limited to an 
exposition of the finite working of phenomenal evolution’ so that to propose a future 
religion from this philosophy ‘was not within his purpose’ (41). Picton claimed that ‘no 
one else has tried to do just what he [Picton] has in view; and in the last years of his life 
he feels it an imperative duty to show, if he can, the adaptability of Mr. Spencer’s 
solution to relieve man of all the moral and spiritual anxieties, distresses, and struggles, 
of which during the greater part of the nineteenth century he suffered his own share 
with the people of that age’ (41). 
Picton developed Spencer’s philosophy pantheistically by claiming ‘the Unknowable 
as God’ (71). His main reason for this identification was that religious feelings were 
aroused by conceiving the Unknowable and its infinity, and that the Unknowable was 
the God or gods of other religions when their conceptions of God were strictly examined. 
He used Spencer’s view that the recognition and worship of the Unknowable was the 
essence of true religion. Picton claimed that ‘[t]he unknowableness of God, “in the strict 
sense of knowing,” has been a commonplace of religion since the dawning of human 
consciousness’ (71). He identified Spencer’s Unknowable with other people’s God, 
claiming that ‘his [Spencer’s] “positively unknown” is what ordinary people call “the 
Eternal”’, and that ‘this “Ultimate Existence” he [Spencer] preferred to call the 
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Unknowable. And, after all, it is unknowable in the strict sense of knowing. In this 
acknowledgement all the greatest saints are at one with Herbert Spencer’.650 
In a later published work on Spinoza, Picton also identified Spencer’s Unknowable 
with Spinoza’s Substance or God. Picton wrote: ‘By “God” he [Spinoza] means the 
“Universe”’; ‘How should we think of this “absolutely infinite Being” […]? The late 
Herbert Spencer was content to regard Him as unknowable, and in this I have elsewhere 
maintained he was quite right’. 651  After some analyses of Spinoza’s thoughts, he 
claimed that ‘[f]or Spinoza, […] the reconciliation between religion and the science of 
his day lay also in a recognition of the Unknowable’.652 He also made it clear that people 
intuitively conceived the Unknowable as God: ‘the ultimate constitution of things, as an 
infinite number of unbeginning and endless series, is unknowable. But it is also true that 
we may have an intuition a Unity which is God’.653 
Beyond the use of Spencer’s concept of the Unknowable, Picton also made several 
new uses of evolution in The Religion of the Universe compared to Mystery of Matter. 
First, Picton extended his view that evolution was divinely driven. His new claim was 
that variation and natural selection were all divinely driven, and the process of natural 
selection on random variations caused no waste. He claimed: 
 
eminent men of science have admitted that natural selection does not explain 
the impulse to variation without which selection would be impossible. But on our 
view of God, that impulse to variation is the manifestation of his life urging 
growth toward a destined end. […] we assume that in any growing world […] the 
tide of the life of God is rising in organic forms and stimulating variations, which 
furnish the opportunity for “natural selection”.654 
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He argued that we may see unfitted variations as failures and wastes, but ‘the notion 
of failure is essentially human, and is caused only by our confinement to a limited point 
of view. While therefore we insist that what we call failure must surely find a place in 
the harmony of the Whole’ (104). In Picton’s view, ‘nothing is wasted’ (100) in the 
process of natural selection on variations, and all served the harmony of the Whole 
which was God. 
    Picton also claimed that natural ‘selection is not to be regarded as a matter of 
haphazard’ (100). He used what we may call recapitulation theory or the law of 
parallelism to support this view.655 Picton mentioned Karl Ernst von Baer (1792–1876) 
and others’ recognition of the similarities in developing patterns of embryos of different 
species. He claimed that ‘it is more rational to think that the same mysterious power 
which now co-ordinates the struggle of cells in an embryo so that the new type shall be 
produced, did also in those primeval times co-ordinate the apparently random action 
of selection so as to secure the true line of evolution’ (102). Picton here seemed to 
adopt the design argument, which asserted that God designed the process of evolution. 
He denied this by writing that ‘I am not repeating the “argument from design”; […] I 
only urge that in the evolution of species there is as much evidence of life acting by 
“law,” as there is in the growth of a tree’ (102). He asked readers to conceive the 
process of evolution ‘as an infinitesimal manifestation of an Infinite Life’ (102). 
Secondly, Picton suggested an evolution of consciousness to help readers to conceive 
a non-personal God. His idea of consciousness was based on William Clifford’s 
‘psychological atomism’.656 Picton pointed out that ‘Professor Clifford proposed as a 
hypothesis the universal inherency of elementary consciousness or “mind-stuff” in 
matter’, and Picton considered that ‘at any rate from the amoeba to the oyster, and up 
to the eagle, the elephant, the man, we can hardly help reading, in the phenomena they 
present, almost infinitely grade forms of consciousness’ (83). He pointed out that 
                                                     
655 Bowler, Evolution, pp. 121–24. 
656  A term used in Albert C. Lewis, ‘Clifford, William Kingdon (1845–1879)’, in ODNB 
<https://www.oxforddnb.com/> [accessed 12 August 2018]. 
265 
 
 
 
‘though we are all evolutionists now, and none of us would deny the imperceptible 
graduation of life-sense upwards from the elementary consciousness of matter, yet 
most of us draw the line at twentieth-century man, and say that between this and God 
there is nothing. Therefore God must be like that’, i.e., God must be human-like (84). 
He suggested readers conceive that human consciousness was not the highest form of 
consciousness in evolution, that there were many grades of consciousnesses higher 
than humans’ consciousness, and that the higher they were the less human-like they 
were. With this idea, Picton considered that we could be convinced that God as the 
infinite consciousness would not be human-like. 
Picton also believed that higher forms of consciousness would evolve from the 
current human consciousness. He gave an example of human society. He speculated 
that human individuals were to human society what cells were to an organism. In this 
sense, if an organism had a higher consciousness than its individual cells, then human 
society, when its individuals were highly integrated, would show a higher consciousness 
than human individuals. He claimed: ‘Not only are social organisation and the general 
consciousness which we call public opinion merging the individual in the greater soul, 
but physical invention is promising to make an aggregate of individuals resemble to a 
startling degree the integration of protozoan cells in metazoic organisms’ (87). Picton 
used the telephone, telegraph, and railway, as examples to show that such an aggregate 
was possible. He imagined: 
 
The telegraph and telephone are in their infancy, but already they appear 
capable of bringing all the world into as constant and intimate communication 
as that which is effected by the neural system for the cells of the human body. 
Railways and other channels of trade are like the circulation of the blood. […] 
We can set no bounds to this vivifying process. […] A hundred thousand years 
hence all human society may be one gigantic man, with a single consciousness 
integrated out of thousands of millions […].657 
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He also imagined that when human society became a single consciousness, ‘no one will 
need to buy a newspaper in order to know of the fortunes of incorporated Man’, and 
‘any one in Europe rising in the morning, will know as much as the feelings of his 
brethren in Japan or New Zealand as he does now of the condition of his fingers and 
toes’ (87). 
Picton claimed that this formula of the evolution of consciousness—lower forms of 
consciousness integrated into higher forms of consciousness—had ‘no bounds’ (87). He 
implied that human societies or even the earth, the sun, and other celestial bodies could 
integrate into higher forms of consciousness. In this grand picture, Picton pointed out 
that human personality was surely not a final product, as it was hard to imagine that 
human personality would be preserved in higher forms of consciousness. Thus, he 
claimed: ‘The conceit we have of our little self-centred life-sense, as the perfect mode 
of being to which the Eternal Himself must conform, is really a base idolatry’ (88). 
Sedgwick had pointed out, in his criticism of Vestiges, that there was a ‘crazy’ dream 
among materialistic pantheists, who imagined that God had evolved from natural 
processes.658 Picton’s idea was quite close to this crazy dream as he imagined an infinite 
evolution of consciousness, but for him, God existed eternally and was not the result of 
evolution. His vision of the evolution of consciousness was used to convince readers 
that God should not have human personality, and God was not seen by him as an 
evolved consciousness. For Picton, evolution only happened to finite things, but not to 
the infinite God. 
Thirdly, Picton used an evolutionary ethics as his pantheistic ethics. In the 1870s, 
Picton had briefly proposed to see moral instinct as an evolved factor, but he left out 
the essence of righteousness.659 In the 1900s, he proposed evolution as the essence of 
righteousness and devolution as the essence of wrongness or evil. Picton claimed that 
‘what we feel as morally good, looks in the direction of evolution or integration, while 
what we feel as morally evil, looks in the direction of disintergration’, thus he claimed 
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that ‘the relational conditions essential to morality alone exist, is concerned with 
evolution rather than devolution, with integration rather than disintegration.’660 He 
illustrated that ‘mutual loyalty, brotherly love, purity, honour, development of capacity 
and mastery over nature’ (282) were all concerned with evolution and integration 
rather than devolution and disintegration. Picton held that evolution was divinely 
driven, and he also accepted that devolution was divinely driven. He claimed that ‘while 
both opposite sets of forces and processes are generally the results of the divine energy, 
the business and the duty of humanity are bound up with the positive processes of 
evolution toward a higher state’ (282). It can be inferred that, like Spencer who viewed 
evolution as a general trend despite the existence of particular evolutions and 
devolutions, Picton considered that God as a whole was always evolving thus was 
always good, and since there were minor evolutions and devolutions in parts, thus there 
were good and evil in parts. 
Such an ethics based on evolution may appear materialistic. What separated Picton’s 
pantheistic ethics with materialists’ evolutionary ethics was his view that moral 
evolution was divinely driven. In order to explain how moral evolution was divinely 
driven, Picton proposed that the loyalty of parts towards the whole was the power that 
motivated moral evolution. He wrote that ‘loyalty to some greater whole of which the 
individual forms an integral part, and, where necessary, self-sacrifice to that greater 
whole, is the most important spiritual energy concerned in social and moral evolution’ 
(282). 
    Fourthly and lastly, Picton placed pantheism in the zenith of the evolution of religion 
and reconciled pantheism and Christianity in this picture. In the 1900s, Picton no longer 
called his pantheism Christian pantheism, but rather the Religion of the Universe. He 
claimed that religions from fetishism to Christianity were all ‘phases of the gradual 
evolution of the ultimate religion of the Universe’ (151). Since he considered that there 
was no waste and failure in the process of evolution, he viewed all religions as necessary 
steps of the evolution of religion. Picton often claimed that he did not deny the 
necessity and value of Christianity, but he asked to allow Christianity to further evolve 
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into the religion of the universe. When discussing the Church and its service, Picton 
claimed that ‘[n]ot an abolition of the Church, but farther evolution is our need’ (316). 
He also claimed that ‘the new reformation will probably differ from the former [the 
Lutheran Reformation] in achieving its work by degrees almost as imperceptible as 
those of physical evolution’ (317). He meant that the evolution of the Church towards 
the religion of the Universe would be as slow as physical evolution. Picton claimed that 
the recognition of the religion of the universe ‘does not cancel the value of historical 
religions as such. For the whole religious evolution of man has been energised by the 
divine spirit through the finite experience of the creature’ (350). For Christianity, he 
wrote that ‘I have pleaded that for us of the Western world, Christianity is far the most 
important of historical religions, while the experiences of its saints come nearest to us 
and are most susceptible of realisation in our own inner life. Yet it can only be as a phase 
of the Religion of the Universe, and not as the universal religion itself’ (350). Picton 
reconciled Christianity and pantheism by placing Christianity as a necessary step in the 
evolution towards the religion of the Universe, or pantheism. 
 
5.2.4 Alfred Barratt and the Evolution of Consciousness, Ethics, and 
Religion 
In his book, Physical Ethics, Barratt used the general idea of evolution and Spencer’s 
philosophy of life to propose an evolutionary view of consciousness, an evolutionary 
ethics, and an evolutionary view of religion. By combining these three components, he 
made the claim that pantheism was the next step of religious evolution. As they were 
highly intertwined, I introduce these three components one by one and then show how 
he reached his pantheistic conclusions. 
The first component is Barratt’s view of consciousness. As a disciple of Spencer, 
Barratt’s major difference with Spencer was his view of consciousness. Spencer 
considered that consciousness was a function of highly developed minds and it only 
existed in man and higher animals, but Barratt considered that consciousness was 
rather the basis of all kinds of mind. Barratt wrote that ‘if he [Spencer] takes 
consciousness in its strictest meaning, as nothing more than the phenomena by which 
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it is manifested to us, these phenomena must be resolvable into others before them, 
and there must be at any rate the elements of consciousness in inanimate matter’.661 
In Barratt’s view, everything had consciousness including lower animals and inanimate 
matter. For him, a thing’s consciousness was all the phenomena, interior and 
environmental, that presented to the thing. 
What then was the relationship between mind, matter, and consciousness? Barratt 
did not strictly define these terms. He claimed that ‘mind (or consciousness in the 
narrow sense) and matter, are but two parts of our whole self, or consciousness in the 
larger sense; and that the former of them is a copy of the latter’ (361). In the 
relationship between mind and matter, Barratt was a monist. He claimed that mind and 
matter ‘are identical and inseparable’ and mind was ‘a copy’ of matter, but the copy 
might not be full or accurate.662 Though Barratt separated the broader and narrow 
senses of the term ‘consciousness’, he tended to identify mind and consciousness in the 
sense that they both denoted the whole realm of phenomena presented to an 
individual; and he also tended to identify the individual with such a mind or 
consciousness. 
There was a hierarchy of the extent of consciousness in Barratt’s philosophy, and this 
was the basis of his theory of the evolution of consciousness. Barratt used a similar 
definition of life to that of Spencer: ‘All Life depends upon adaptation of an organism to 
external media; and by the extent and completeness of this adaptation the degree of 
Life in the scale of evolution is determined’ (33). He considered that the extent of the 
consciousness of a thing depended on its inner functions and its interactable 
environment. The more inner functions it had, the more inner phenomena were 
presented to its consciousness, and thus the wider its consciousness was. Also, the 
more inner functions it had, the more environment with which it could interact; and the 
more environment it interacted with, the more outer phenomena were presented to 
its consciousness, and thus the wider its consciousness was. 
                                                     
661 Barratt, Ethics, p. 40. 
662 Ibid., pp. 111–12. 
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Barratt incorporated his view of consciousness with the popular view of the evolution 
of life. He used Spencer’s Principles of Psychology as a scientific source. 663  Barratt 
believed that the lowest animals’ (single-cell organisms) consciousnesses were very 
narrow due to their limited organic functions and consequently limited interactable 
environment. They only had limited sensation. In the process of evolution, organisms 
became more complex with more functions and thus more interactable environment. 
Barratt identified four functions which had appeared successively during evolution: 
‘sensation’, ‘memory’, ‘reasoning’, and ‘knowledge’; and four kinds of interactions with 
environment which had appeared successively: ‘reflex action’, ‘lower instinctive action’, 
‘higher instinctive action’, and ‘voluntary or intentional action’.664 Consciousness was 
extended while life gradually possessed these functions and interactions with 
environment. Humans had possessed all these functions and interactions, and thus they 
had much a wider consciousness than single-cell lives. 
Barratt did not consider the evolution of consciousness ended in human beings. He 
inferred that evolution would continue and that the extent of consciousness would 
keep increasing until it covered everything. Barratt imagined that in the next stage of 
evolution, humanity would evolve a kind of universal consciousness, like an omniscient 
and omnipresent God. This universal consciousness was, in Barratt’s view, an exact 
representation of nature while our current consciousness was a partial and inaccurate 
representation of nature. He described his vision of consciousness: 
 
If mind be associated not with some portions of nature only, but with the whole 
sphere of phenomena, a more thorough consciousness of the ultimate unity of our 
whole self is attained, and a considerable step made towards that final idea of 
human development in which mind becomes a perfect reproduction of nature, and 
its sequences completely assimilated to the laws of the outer world; an ideal which 
                                                     
663 Ibid., p. 33. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Part III, Chapter VIII. 
664 Barratt, Ethics, pp. 36–39 and 57. 
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we embody in the conception of a Deity in whom thought and existence, subject 
and object, are re-united, whose self is nature, and whose mind is the universe.665 
 
In order to understand Barratt’s mechanism of this future evolution of consciousness, 
it is important to grasp the second component of Barratt’s philosophy—his evolutionary 
ethics. Barratt proposed an ethical system built on the physical sciences without 
assumptions of supernatural interventions. He argued that our ‘moral sense’ was a 
physically evolved function like our other senses, such as the sense of light in our eyes, 
and he also identified pleasure with moral goodness and treated the action of pursuing 
pleasure and avoiding pain as the essence of morality.666 In his theory, the behaviours 
by which animals acquired benefits and avoided harm were predecessors of human 
morality, and they were in essence the same as the moral actions in humans, though 
different in complexity. Barratt gave a speculative evolutionary history of morality 
alongside the evolutionary history of consciousness. He considered that the moral 
senses and actions increased in kind and complexity as the functions and interactions 
of organisms increased. He proposed that through the process of evolution, the simple 
and reflexive pursuit of benefits in single-cell organisms had evolved into higher moral 
actions in humanity. It is worth mentioning that Barratt viewed the evolution of 
morality in humans as an organic process. Humans’ detailed moral creeds were 
considered organically inheritable by Barratt.667 
The moral function of sympathy was considered by Barratt to be the key to the future 
evolution of humanity. He defined sympathy as ‘the perception of emotional 
phenomena in others’ (84). When a person perceived an emotional phenomenon in 
another person, ‘the idea of a similar sensation in himself immediately follows’ (84). In 
this sense, Barratt claimed that ‘Sympathy is therefore nothing more than ‘a 
readjustment of self love’’ (87). Because of this, Barratt considered that sympathy was 
                                                     
665 Ibid., p. 361. Notice that Barratt used mind as a synonym of consciousness here. 
666 Ibid., pp. 49–50 and 12–17. 
667 Ibid., p. 62. 
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an extension of self or consciousness. He saw sympathy as the foundation of many 
higher moral actions, such as love, altruism, and patriotism.668 He considered that when 
two people loved each other, an individual’s consciousness was extended to another 
individual, and that in patriotism an individual’s self or consciousness was extended to 
a country. He wrote that in patriotism, ‘man becomes no longer an individual but a 
member of an organism, he identifies himself with that organism, and wishes to do 
good to it as to himself’ (94). Barratt viewed these extensions of the consciousness of 
human individual as a sign of evolution. He considered that human’s consciousness 
would eventually extend to the whole universe, and in that situation a human individual 
would see the whole universe as himself. He wrote that ‘as man sees in nature more 
and more analogies to himself, and eventually views it as a great organism of which his 
own body and actions are merely members, so must he at last by the very laws of his 
nature look upon it as a great living mass of consciousness like his own’ (114), and that 
‘as man is ever putting himself into the bodily forms of other men, so will he eventually 
put himself into the universe’ (115). Thus, the way to acquire the universal 
consciousness, proposed by Barratt, was to see the universe as a great consciousness, 
and then to use sympathy to extend human consciousness into this great consciousness. 
The third component of Barratt’s philosophy concerned the evolution of religion. 
Barratt’s view of religion was different from Spencer’s. He did not consider the 
Unknowable as the essence of true religion. His view was instead close to atheistic 
philosophers Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) and Karl Marx, who viewed God as man’s 
imaged ideal self. 669  Barratt claimed that ‘[r]eligion is a consequence and an 
embodiment of the universal tendency to progress, a vague foreshadowing of future 
knowledge. It is thus a dream of perfection’ (118). In regard to the relationship between 
science and religion, Barratt wrote that ‘the religion of the present must be the science 
of the future, […] each age contains the prophecy of the next, and it speaks by its 
religion’ (120), and that ‘Science and Religion are truly one, for Religion is but a shadow 
of future Science’ (224). Thus, for Barratt, Religion at any given time in history expressed 
                                                     
668 Ibid., pp. 89 and 94. 
669 Fichman, Evolutionary Theory and Victorian Culture, p. 173. 
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mankind’s dreams of perfection in that particular age, and science fulfilled these 
dreams. Barratt also considered that when the dream of an age was fulfilled, it was no 
longer a dream, and man would make new dreams, and consequently, religion changed 
or evolved to be the vehicle of the new dreams. Barratt wrote that ‘the highest minds 
of all ages have been led by the conception of an ideal future and of a Being more 
perfect and holy than themselves. These die not with the circumstances that occasion 
them, for their real source is human nature itself, and they descend to its successive 
generations. They are the steps of evolution of man’ (119–20). He believed that saints 
and prophets of every age foresaw the future perfection of their age, and they 
expressed these visions in religion. The religions that bore visions of future perfection 
were considered by him to be the true religions, and he called other religions ‘the 
Religion of Ignorance’ (125). Barratt was against Auguste Comte’s secular religion, the 
Religion of Humanity, since it contained no prophecy of the future. He claimed that ‘the 
“Religion of Humanity” […] fails in the very ground-work and essence of Religion, the 
ideal or imaginative element; it substitutes past for future, history for prophecy, 
memory for aspiration, experience for faith’ (374). 
Barratt considered that the dream Christianity carried was ‘the great idea of a 
universal humanity’ (125). He considered that Christianity was the first religion that 
called humans to love their neighbours as they loved themselves, and that this united 
humanity. Barratt foresaw that ‘[a]t the foundation of Christianity the work that science 
promised to perform was the unification of humanity; and this work it has completely 
executed. It now points out in the future, as its next task, the unification of the universe; 
and this must stamp the character of the religion of succeeding ages’ (126). He claimed 
that ‘as the Christianity of the past was pre-eminently a religion of humanity; so must 
its successor in the future be nothing less than a religion of the universe’ (126). Barratt 
used the same phrase as Picton, the ‘religion of the universe’, to designate the future 
religion. He knew what he proposed was pantheism as he claimed that ‘in the future 
expression of man’s idea of the relation of the Deity to the universe we may anticipate 
a strong leaning to Pantheism’ (129). In Barratt’s view, pantheism represented man’s 
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dream of becoming omniscient and omnipresent and of becoming one with the 
universe.670 
Barratt also reconciled Christianity and pantheism by envisioning Christianity as a step 
in the evolution of religion and pantheism as the next step. Barratt claimed that a 
pantheistic tendency had existed in Christianity. He wrote: ‘the concept of Providence 
was no longer one of direct external interference, as in the old mythology, but of an 
indwelling Spirit, the sequences of whose thoughts are represented to us in the events 
of nature; in whom everything that is lives and moves and has its being. The whole 
tendency of later experience is to confirm and expand this Pantheistic belief’ (129–30). 
In Barratt’s view, the Christian concept of God was changing from an absolute 
supernatural Being to an immanent Being, and he saw this as the sign of pantheism. 
Pantheism, however, was not the end of Barratt’s religious evolution. Barratt wrote: 
‘Pantheism has been the religion only of the greatest minds; but as by the process of 
evolution the great minds of one age become ordinary in the next. […] its now imagined 
forms must in turn give way to a higher religion, which perhaps now our minds are 
unable to grasp. […] For each religion is but the dream of its age’ (131). 
Barratt died at a young age before he could fully develop his pantheistic ideas. There 
were only dozens of pages on religion in Barratt’s publications. He left many questions 
unanswered such as why the universal consciousness acquired by sympathy could be 
seen as similar or even identical to the universal consciousness of the universe itself. 
Though he was a member of the Church of England, he seemed to treat religion in the 
way of atheistic thinkers. The Examiner criticised that ‘Mr Barratt would have done 
better had he stuck to philosophy and let religion alone. […] he becomes as a rule 
hopelessly unintelligible, and, when not absolutely unintelligible, lays himself open to 
the charge of being profane’.671 Nevertheless, although lacking in detail, Barratt showed 
us a quite unique vision of a pantheistic future. 
 
                                                     
670 Barratt, Ethics, p. 128. 
671 Anon, ‘Physical Ethics or the Science of Action’, Examiner, 3234 (1870), p. 53 
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5.3 Conclusion 
The idea of evolution could be made fully compatible with Christian monotheism in 
Victorian Britain as there were many monotheistic evolutionists, such as Alfred Russel 
Wallace, Charles Lyell, and St George Mivart. The idea could also be made compatible 
with pantheism, as there were several advocates of pantheism who used it to support 
their views. Even before the four advocates of pantheism in this chapter came to use 
evolution in support of pantheism, many critics already considered the idea of evolution 
and the most famous evolutionary figures—Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin—
pantheistic, as we have seen in Adam Sedgwick’s criticism of Vestiges in 1850, in several 
reviewers’ reviews of Spencer’s First Principles, and in a report of the writer Richard St 
John Tyrwhitt. The German pantheistic tradition also influenced German scientific 
practitioners’ interpretations of evolution, as we have seen in Ernst Haeckel who 
interpreted evolution as supporting monism against supernaturalism. 
    We can draw several conclusions from the comparison of the uses of evolutionary 
theory by advocates of pantheism. Plumptre, Picton, and Barratt used a genealogical 
and progressive language in evolutionary theory, claiming that pantheism was at the 
top of the evolutionary chain of religion. They drew out a progressive and evolutionary 
picture of religion in which fetishism, polytheism, monotheism, and pantheism came 
into being successively throughout human history. Thus, they not only depicted 
pantheism as the most advanced religion, but also reconciled pantheism with other 
religions, especially Christianity, by placing them in a genealogical order. In such a 
picture, Christianity was no longer an opponent of pantheism, but a necessary 
predecessor of pantheism. 
Advocates of pantheism could easily use the popular evolutionary cosmology as the 
cosmology of their pantheism. They used this naturalistic cosmology to argue against 
supernaturalism, especially the image of a personal God and Christian creationism. Also, 
since they directly used this scientific cosmology and welcomed its future changes, they 
claimed that pantheism was the religious position most in accordance with modern 
science. They demonstrated that pantheism was adaptable in a scientific nation. 
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Picton and Barratt both proposed evolutionary ethics as the ethics of pantheism. 
Pantheists were faced with a problem regarding evil: if nature was God and God was 
good, then there was no separation of good and evil, and all deeds humans saw as evil 
were in fact good. Though very different in detail, Picton and Barratt both held, in 
common with many evolutionary moral philosophers, that our moral sense, like other 
senses, had evolved through a natural process rather than being created by a 
supernatural God. They explained that our sense of good and evil was an acquired 
character like the sense of sight in our eyes. Picton considered that evolution and 
progress equalled to goodness. He argued that good and evil were only applicable to 
humans but not to God since from God’s point of view, all things served general 
harmony which was progressive and ultimately good. Barratt identified good and evil 
with pleasure and pain, and he viewed all things as morally neutral on a universal level. 
They thus found different ways to explain away ethical problems of pantheism through 
evolutionary ethics. Plumptre did not propose an evolutionary ethics, but since she later 
became a secularist and proposed scientific ethics, she might have been sympathetic to 
this approach. 
The idea of the universal consciousness was always an appealing feature of pantheism. 
Picton and Barratt made it more credible by developing theories of the evolution of 
consciousness. They proposed a hierarchy of consciousnesses from low to high, 
alongside the evolution of life. By induction, they predicted that there would be higher 
forms of consciousness in the future, higher than current human consciousness. They 
believed that the universal consciousness would be the end of the evolution of 
consciousness. God’s consciousness was viewed by Picton as the highest consciousness, 
the universal consciousness, however, he did not consider that God had evolved. 
In regard to scientific sources, all these advocates of pantheism used popular science 
sources, like Spencer’s and Haeckel’s books and the general ideas of evolution and 
progress that were abundant in various kinds of media. As far as I have read, none of 
them quoted Darwin’s books and Darwin’s name was rarely mentioned. The reason 
might be that Darwin’s books were very technical and religiously neutral, while Spencer 
and Haeckel presented Darwin’s and others’ evolutionary theories in ways that 
advocates of pantheism found easier to use. Also, in the religious arena, advocates of 
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pantheism did not need to discuss the technical details of evolutionary theory. What 
they needed was the general idea that science supported a naturalistic history of nature, 
and this idea was abundant in Spencer’s and Haeckel’s works. Advocates of pantheism 
did not cite any evolutionary anthropologists, such as Lubbock and Tylor, when they 
proposed their evolutionary views of religion. The reason might be that the idea of 
religious evolution was popular enough while none of those famous anthropologists 
ranked pantheism as the highest religion. 
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Conclusion 
The dissertation opened with two questions. First, why did some Victorian thinkers 
observe that pantheism had become common in Britain in the 1870s? Secondly, why 
did some consider science to be an important factor? In this dissertation, I have 
examined Victorian published writings that contained discussions about pantheism, and 
I have come up with an extensive historical account of pantheism and of pantheism and 
science in Victorian Britain. With this account, the dissertation provides an answer to 
the initial questions. 
    Overall, this dissertation has shown that pantheism in Victorian Britain was more of 
a theological and philosophical position than an organised religion or movement, since 
there were no pantheist churches, sects, or organs and most advocates of pantheism 
had little contact with each other. Three pantheistic traditions—the Spinozian and 
German idealistic philosophies, pantheistic poetry, and materialistic pantheism—
affected Victorian thought throughout the entire era. Since the beginning of the era, 
pantheism had been viewed by many Victorian thinkers as a science-related religious 
position. They considered that pantheism influenced the scientific theories of European 
idealistic and materialistic scientific practitioners. They also observed that many 
pantheistic philosophies and theologies shared similar rationalistic and naturalistic 
doctrines with the scientific enterprise. From the 1830s to the 1850s, pantheism in 
Britain was generally rejected, as many Christians considered it a threat to Christian 
monotheism. The situation changed significantly in the 1860s when many thinkers 
began to criticise former prejudiced treatments of pantheism and proposed fairer 
treatments. Many advocates of pantheism emerged in the 1860s and the following 
decades defending pantheism as the best way to reconcile science and religion and to 
bring about a more stable condition of faith in Victorian Britain. They came from various 
religious backgrounds including the Church of England, dissenting Christian Churches, 
and the radical freethought camp. They reinforced the image of pantheism as a science-
related religion. As science gained the status of the highest intellectual authority in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, many advocates of pantheism built pantheistic 
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doctrines upon scientific theories or interpreted scientific theories as evidence that 
supported pantheism. Some of them claimed pantheism as the most suitable religion 
for a scientific nation. 
With this picture of pantheism in Victorian Britain, it is understandable that some 
Victorian thinkers considered pantheism to be prominent in the 1870s and science to 
be important in spreading pantheism in Britain. In the next two sections, I discuss the 
achievements of this dissertation and its implications for historical scholarship. 
 
What Has This Dissertation Achieved? 
There are three major achievements of this dissertation. It revises the religious map in 
Victorian Britain by adding pantheism into the existing picture. It shows many detailed 
relations between science and pantheism in Victorian Britain. Finally, it helps to better 
understand scientific practitioners against the religious background in Victorian Britain. 
    First, this dissertation redraws the map of the Victorian ferment of faith by showing 
a significant territory that is neglected. It is well-known by historians that religious 
beliefs in Victorian Britain were unstable due to fast social and intellectual changes.672 
Christianity, the traditional and national belief, was challenged from the outside by 
materialists, naturalists, and atheists, as well as from the inside due to conflicting views 
between denominations and among individuals. Many Victorian thinkers worried that 
such chaos might threaten the moral foundation of the nation and cause the country to 
degenerate, while many were thrilled by opportunities offered by this ferment of faith. 
They set forth to find suitable beliefs. Dozens of Christian sects were formed, 
agnosticism and spiritualism appeared, religious debates were all over periodicals. 
Historians are currently familiar with the efforts of monotheists, deists, spiritualists, 
materialists, agnostics, and atheists, but the efforts of pantheists are not counted. 
I have argued and demonstrated in this dissertation that pantheism was significant in 
the Victorian ferment of faith. There were more than six thousand published articles 
mentioning pantheism. In these articles, pantheism was criticised as well as supported 
                                                     
672 For example, Helmstadter and Lightman ed., Victorian Faith in Crisis. 
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by many Victorian thinkers. Pantheism in Victorian Britain was not a new church but 
was rather a theology and philosophy that could fit in various existing religions. It was 
not necessarily against Christianity, as there were many Christian advocates of 
pantheism. It could serve as a theology for religious people who refused to subscribe to 
any doctrines of any churches but who still believed in a God. It could also be included 
in rationalistic, naturalistic, and anti-supernatural schemes of radical thinkers. 
Advocates of pantheism from different religious backgrounds had different and often 
conflicting pantheistic doctrines. They could differ on central issues concerning the 
definitions of God and the world, the transcendence and the immanence of God, the 
personality of God, the relationship between God and man, the freedom of will, the 
foundation of morality, and the future of religion. What they shared was an anti-deistic, 
anti-naïve-materialistic, and anti-atheistic scheme, and a stress on the immanence of 
God. This complex situation is captured by my contextual definition of pantheism in 
Victorian Britain as a spectrum of views concerning the relationship between God and 
the world and involving a particular emphasis on the immanence of God to the extent 
that God and the world were inseparable. Many advocates of pantheism believed that 
assuming high degrees of the immanence of God could reduce the tension between 
scientific naturalism and religious supernaturalism, and thus could bring faith, at least 
its intellectual aspect, to a more consonant condition. 
Secondly, this dissertation shows that pantheism was related to science in important 
ways. The history of pantheism in Victorian Britain adds a powerful example challenging 
the conflict thesis of science and religion, which posits a timeless conflict between 
science and religion. Many advocates of pantheism in Victorian Britain claimed that 
pantheism was a scientific religion in the sense that it allowed them to directly use 
science as the foundation of their religious worldview no matter how scientific theories 
changed in the future. While Christian monotheists might reconcile science and religion 
by restricting science to the natural world and religion to the supernatural world, 
advocates of pantheism presented pantheism as a religion that was at one with science. 
They usually implied that if God and the universe were the same or almost the same, 
the object of worship in religion and the object of study in science became identical. In 
this sense, scientific knowledge was knowledge about God, and religious worship could 
282 
 
 
 
be adjusted continuously according to the development of scientific knowledge, and 
thus there was no essential conflict between science and religion. 
This dissertation also presents many detailed relations between pantheistic doctrines 
and scientific theories. I have highlighted that high-profile and wide-ranging theories 
designed to draw together many phenomena in an overarching way—the theory of the 
correlation of forces, the theory of the conservation of force, the doctrine of the 
indestructibility of matter, the matter-as-force theory, the idea of the uniformity of 
nature and the concept of living matter implied in chemical atomism, the nebular 
hypothesis, the theory of the evolution of life, and the theory the evolution of human 
society, mentality, ethics, and religion—were the most used scientific theories by 
Victorian advocates of pantheism. They interpreted these theories as supporting the 
pantheistic image of a living and united universe, which could be called a God. Some of 
them also used these theories to argue against supernaturalism by formulating a 
thoroughly naturalistic view of the world in which no supernatural power was needed. 
Hard scientific theories, especially those expressed in mathematical forms such as 
theories in energy physics, as well as technological developments were rarely 
mentioned by them. I have also demonstrated that not all Victorian scientific theories 
were friendly to advocates of pantheism. For example, the theory of entropy and the 
discrete model of atoms that pictured a dying or disunited universe could be 
troublesome for them, though they could find ways to get around these issues. 
Thirdly and lastly, this dissertation shows that pantheism affected Victorian 
perception of scientific theories and of scientific practitioners. Historians are familiar 
with the influences of Christian monotheism, deism, materialism, agnosticism, and 
spiritualism upon the Victorians’ perceptions of science and scientific practitioners. It is 
well known that Christian natural theology was strong in the first half of the nineteenth 
century with books like the Bridgewater Treatises providing safe scientific knowledge 
for society;673 that deism was considered by many Victorians the religious position of 
many naturalistic figures, such as the author of Vestiges Robert Chambers, who 
                                                     
673 For example, Topham, ‘Science and Popular Education in the 1830s’. 
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believed in the existence of the supernatural but kept the supernatural away from 
science;674 that materialism was perceived by many Victorians in the second half of the 
nineteenth century as the outcome of science with John Tyndall as a famous 
representative of scientific materialism;675 that agnosticism was used by some scientific 
practitioners, notably Thomas Huxley, to try to keep themselves away from religious 
debates;676  and that spiritualism created new scientific investigations and scientific 
practitioners, like William Crookes (1832–1919), Alfred Russel Wallace, and Oliver 
Lodge (1851–1940), investigated spiritual phenomena.677 
This dissertation adds pantheism to this picture. It shows that several scientific 
theories—especially the matter-as-force theory, the theory of living matter, and the 
evolutionary theory of life—and several scientific figures—notably Herbert Spencer, 
John Tyndall, Thomas Huxley, and James Hinton—often appeared in Victorians’ 
discussions of pantheism. Many critics treated these theories as if they were pantheistic 
doctrines and criticised these scientific figures for being pantheistic. Many supporters 
of pantheism used these theories or claimed these scientific figures as pantheistic 
philosophers and pioneers to further their pantheism. Scientific practitioners 
sometimes joined these discussions. Spencer rejected pantheism and argued against 
accusations of pantheism made against him, Tyndall promoted the pantheistic idea of 
living matter, and Hinton was himself a preacher of pantheism. Pantheism was one of 
the religious positions that came into the Victorians’ minds when they engaged with 
science. 
                                                     
674 For example, Michael Taylor, ‘Herbert Spencer and the Metaphysical Roots of Evolutionary 
Naturalism’, in The Age of Scientific Naturalism, ed. by Bernard Lightman and Michael S. Reidy 
(London: Pickering & Chatto, 2014), pp. 71–88 (p. 75). 
675 For example, Lightman, ‘Scientists as Materialists in the Periodical Press’. 
676 For example, Bernard Lightman, ‘Huxley and Scientific Agnosticism’, BJHS, 35 (2002), 271–
89. 
677 For example, Shane McCorristine ed., Spiritualism, Mesmerism and the Occult, 1800-1920, 5 
vols (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012), III, pp. vii and xvi. 
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This dissertation also helps to solve the Barton-Kim controversy regarding whether 
Tyndall was a pantheist. Barton argues that Tyndall was emotionally and intellectually 
greatly influenced by pantheistic thinkers, such as Kant, Schlegel, Fichte, Emerson, and 
Carlyle, and she thus claims that Tyndall was more of a pantheist than a materialist.678 
Kim argues that ‘a transcendentalist trait was insistent in Tyndall’s philosophy, and it 
damages the claim made by Barton that Tyndall was a pantheist’, and thus he describes 
Tyndall’s position as ‘transcendental materialism’ rather than as pantheism.679 It seems 
Kim has taken a very strict definition of pantheism, in which there can be no any sense 
of transcendency. However, this dissertation shows that the term ‘pantheism’ in 
Victorian Britain was often used loosely. Many people were seen as pantheistic while 
they still believed in some sort of transcendency. The position now commonly called 
panentheism, in which God is both transcendental and immanent, was often included 
in pantheism in Victorian Britain. Within this context, Tyndall can be called and was 
indeed suspected by some of his contemporaries to be a pantheist, even though he 
believed in something transcendental. 
 
What are Its Implications for Historical Scholarship? 
The dissertation raises many important questions for historians regarding pantheism, 
pantheists, and the relationship between pantheism and science. In this section, I first 
discuss the implications of this dissertation for historians of religion concerning the 
study of pantheism in Victorian Britain and in the world. Secondly, I discuss the 
implications for historians of science and religion regarding the study of science-religion 
relations in Victorian Britain and the study of science-pantheism relations worldwide. 
Thirdly, I discuss the implications for historians of science regarding the study of science 
and scientific practitioners in the religious context. 
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679 Kim, John Tyndall's Transcendental Materialism, pp. 11 and 45–46. 
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    For historians of religion, the big picture of pantheism across all times and locations 
is too simple. Only major schools and famous thinkers of pantheism are in our historical 
accounts, while there are potentially a large number of less famous pantheistic thinkers 
being ignored, like many of the advocates mentioned in this dissertation. 680  They 
constitute an important part of history. The eight advocates of pantheism in this 
dissertation formed the philosophical, theological, and practical aspects of the history 
of pantheism in Victorian Britain, while well-known Victorian pantheistic figures, such 
as Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth, and Thomas Carlyle, mostly formed 
the literary aspects of the history. The history of pantheism remains incomplete and 
might lead to misconceptions if it only focuses on famous thinkers. Thus, the history of 
pantheism can be better written if we explore beyond elite figures. 
The more specific case of the history of pantheism in Victorian Britain is also not yet 
comprehensive. I have had to work selectively, but future scholarship can build upon 
my initial findings using many sources available to gain further understanding of how 
pantheism was featured in Victorian religious life and debate. Private writings would 
constitute a good starting point to pursue this study. They can teach us more about 
whether a person really convicted to pantheism and how pantheism benefited him or 
her in private life. Due to the constraint of time of a doctoral project, there are many 
possible pantheistic figures not explored in this dissertation, such as the politician and 
scientist George Campbell (1823–1900), the journalist and theologian Richard Holt 
Hutton (1826–1897), the writer and artist Samuel Butler (1835–1902), the poet and 
philosopher Constance Caroline Woodhill Naden (1858–1889), the philosopher Samuel 
Alexander (1859–1938), and the dean of St Paul’s William Inge (1860–1954). These 
figures could be further studied to enrich our knowledge of Victorian pantheism and 
Victorian religion. 
For historians of science and religion, there are opportunities to adjust the picture of 
Victorian science and religion by uncovering more uses of science in support of non-
                                                     
680 For example, see the entry for pantheism in Encyclopaedia Britannica. William L. Reese, 
‘Pantheism’, in Encyclopaedia Britannica <https://www.britannica.com/> [accessed 12 
September 2018]. 
286 
 
 
 
monotheistic religious positions. Currently, the uses of science by Christian monotheists 
are well-known, with the uses of science by deists, materialists, agnostics, atheists, and 
spiritualists being more or less studied, as these people often engaged in conversations 
with Christian monotheists. This dissertation shows that pantheism was also 
intertwined with these religious positions, and advocates of pantheism made important 
uses of science in ways that are currently not studied in the historiography. This 
negation may lead to the misconception that pantheism was not present in the context 
of Victorian science and religion. Chapters on pantheism and on advocates of pantheism 
can be added in books that involve Victorian science and religion, such as the eight-
volume anthology of relevant primary sources Victorian Science and Literature (2011–
12), the third volume of which is dedicated to the topic of ‘Science, Religion and Natural 
Theology’.681 Victorian uses of science in support of pantheism as well as for other 
major alternatives to Christian monotheism can be further studied to balance out the 
current inadequate focus. Also, the British imperial context continues to be massively 
underexamined. 
    There are also opportunities to further study the relations between pantheism and 
science from the nineteenth century onward across the world. Pantheism has been 
promoted as a scientific religious position since the nineteenth century, 682  and the 
panentheist movement in the twentieth century also focused on establishing close 
relations between pantheistic ideas and scientific theories. We know that several 
famous people, such as the process philosophers Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) 
and Charles Hartshorne (1897–2000) and the physicist Albert Einstein (1879–1955), 
related pantheistic ideas with science.683 There were potentially more thinkers linking 
                                                     
681 Gowan Dawson and Bernard Lightman ed., Victorian Science and Literature, 8 vols (London: 
Pickering & Chatto, 2011–12). 
682 For example, The World Pantheist Movement < https://www.pantheism.net > [accessed 12 
September 2018]. 
683 For example, Keith E. Yandell, ‘Protestant Theology and Natural Science in the Twentieth 
Century’, in Lindberg and Numbers ed., God and Nature, pp 448–71 (pp. 466–67); and Ronald 
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pantheism with science in order to support the idea that pantheism was a scientific 
religion. Wesley J. Wildman in Religion & Science (1996) has pointed out that pantheism 
is one of the popular alternative solutions to Christian monotheism in harmonising 
science and religion in human history. 684  Through studying the relations between 
pantheism and science, historians can discover more ideas and efforts to harmonise 
science and religion. Pantheism deserves chapters in science and religion 
encyclopaedias like The History of Science and Religion in the Western Tradition: An 
Encyclopedia (2000).685 
For historians of science, developing a more complex map of the religious context of 
science in Victorian Britain, with pantheism being included, will help to better 
understand scientific practitioners against this background. Scientific practitioners in 
Victorian Britain inhabited a world in which people were concerned with pantheism and 
its relations to science. Not only Tyndall, but also Spencer, Huxley, Charles Darwin, 
James Hinton, George Campbell, and many more were involved in pantheistic 
discussions. This raises new questions concerning how scientific practitioners 
influenced pantheists, how the pantheistic context influenced scientific practitioners’ 
beliefs as well as their scientific theories, how scientific practitioners presented their 
relevant views, and how these views were represented or misrepresented by others. By 
being more sensitive to the presence of pantheism in Victorian culture and by paying 
more attention to passing references to pantheism, historians of science will be able to 
give these questions more adequate answers. 
 
This dissertation offers an historical account of pantheism in Victorian Britain and its 
connections with contemporary science. It has shown that pantheism in Victorian 
Britain was a significant science-related religious position, with many scientific theories 
                                                     
L. Numbers, Galileo Goes to Jail—And Other Myths about Science and Religion (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 192–93. 
684  Wesley J. Wildman, ‘The Quest for Harmony’, in Religion & Science, ed. by W. Mark 
Richardson and Wesley J. Wildman (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 41–60 (p. 55). 
685 Ferngren ed., History of Science and Religion. 
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and scientific practitioners being considered pantheistic and being used by advocates 
of pantheism in support of their pantheistic doctrines. By bringing out this history of 
Victorian pantheism, this dissertation enriches our understanding of Victorian religion 
and of the relationship between science and religion in Victorian Britain. It opens new 
opportunities for scholars to further study pantheism and its relations to science, and 
to formulate a more complex religious map of Victorian Britain and a more 
comprehensive picture of pantheism across the world. 
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